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 Introduction 
 
 
 
The antitrust analysis of sports leagues, at first glance, appears to be utterly 
confused. Why does Major League Baseball (MLB) have an antitrust exemption, but the 
National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the 
National Hockey League (NHL) do not? Surely, there cannot be that much difference 
between MLB and these other leagues. And, why didn’t the antitrust authorities – the 
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) – oppose and stop the merger of the two major professional football 
leagues (i.e., the National Football League and the American Football League) and the 
two major professional basketball leagues (i.e., the National Basketball Association and 
the American Basketball Association)? Surely, these were mergers to monopoly (or near 
monopoly). Their combined market share in the relevant market had to be close to 100%. 
What were the antitrust authorities thinking? And why do the antitrust authorities allow 
sports leagues to negotiate broadcast deals on behalf of their members? Surely, this 
increases the price that broadcasters must pay relative to what they could negotiate with 
each league member individually. 
On the other hand, sports leagues engage in a myriad of activities which have 
attracted antitrust scrutiny. Leagues typically set rules regarding who is eligible to play, 
how players will be assigned to teams, and the terms of those assignments. Leagues may 
also impose a cap on teams’ player payrolls, or impose a ‘luxury tax’ on the teams with 
the highest player payrolls. Aren’t these examples of the exercise of monopsony power 
by sports leagues over the players?  
Moreover, sports leagues typically set rules regarding the entry of new teams, the 
purchase, sale, and relocation of existing teams, and the sharing of revenue among teams. 
Leagues may attempt to limit the number of games a team can play, or the number of 
televised games it can play. Leagues set rules over allowable and banned equipment. 
Why do sports leagues adopt such rules and policies? Do they have an anticompetitive 
effect? Do they have a procompetitive rationale? 
The antitrust analysis of sports leagues is also interesting because it involves a 
multitude of controversial economic issues. Are sports leagues cartels or are they better 
understood as joint ventures? Are sports leagues natural monopolies? Do the rules and 
policies adopted by sports leagues restrict output or enhance demand for their product? 
And what is the ‘product’ produced by sports leagues? How does an incumbent sports 
league respond to the entry of a rival league? Is it ‘vertical foreclosure’ if a team in the 
incumbent league refuses to allow a team in the rival league to play at the same stadium? 
Is the stadium an ‘essential facility’? 
This book presents an overview of the antitrust analysis of sports leagues. Chapter 
1 gives a brief history of the major sports leagues in the United States, discusses 
differences among leagues, and examines how economists answer the question: “What is 
a sports league?” Chapter 2 reviews the basics of antitrust analysis and their application 
to sports leagues, including antitrust exemptions, rule of reason analysis, evidence of 
monopoly and monopsony power (or, to use an analogous term, ‘market power’), and 
market definition issues. Chapter 3 discusses antitrust disputes between sports leagues 
and their own member teams over such issues as restrictions on the purchase, sale and 
relocation of existing teams and the sharing of revenues. Chapter 4 examines antitrust 
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 disputes between rival sports leagues. Chapter 5 addresses disputes with teams from rival 
leagues that want to join the league and prospective owners who want to purchase an 
existing league team. Attention then turns to the input market. Chapter 6 addresses 
antitrust disputes between sports leagues and players concerning issues like eligibility 
restrictions, free agency, salary caps, and luxury taxes. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 examine 
antitrust disputes between sports leagues and coaches, stadium owners, and equipment 
suppliers, respectively. Attention then shifts to the output market. Chapter 10 discusses 
antitrust disputes between sports leagues and promoters/sponsors, for-profit sports camp 
operators, merchandisers, and the media. Chapter 11 investigates antitrust lawsuits 
brought by fans, taxpayers, and the federal government against sports leagues over issues 
such as team sanctions, league television packages, taxpayer-financed stadiums, and 
league television blackout rules. Chapter 12 reviews proposals to curb the monopoly 
power of professional sports leagues. 
-  - 8
 Chapter 1 
 
What Is a Sports League? 
 
 
 
 Economists, antitrust lawyers, and the courts have wrestled with the question: 
“What is a sports league?” Is it a collection of competitors (i.e., teams) acting 
collusively? If so, the league would seem to be a cartel. Or is the league a single entity, 
with each team analogous to a subsidiary of a large corporation? If so, the league cannot 
be colluding, because an entity cannot collude with itself – it has to collude with another 
entity. Or is a league basically a joint venture undertaken by teams, similar to General 
Motors and Toyota launching a joint venture to produce automobiles? If so, when is such 
a joint venture anticompetitive and when is it procompetitive? Irrespective of the answers 
to these questions is another: is a sports league a natural monopoly? Moreover, is it even 
possible to answer such questions generally, or is there one set of answers specific to, 
say, the National Football League and another set of answers specific to the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association? 
 Not surprisingly, those who allege that certain activities of sports leagues violate 
the antitrust laws view teams as engaged in an antitrust conspiracy, with the league 
functioning as a cartel whose anticompetitive activities enhance the profits of its 
members (the teams). Alternatively, those who allege a league is a single entity point out 
that an entity cannot be engaged in an antitrust conspiracy only with itself. In contrast, 
those who view sports leagues as joint ventures contend that league activities should be 
evaluated under the “rule of reason.” 
 This chapter explores the question: “What is a sports league?” It begins with an 
overview of the major sports leagues in the United States. This overview leads to a 
discussion of some key differences, from an antitrust perspective, between the various 
sports leagues and a discussion of sanctioning bodies as a form of sports league. It 
concludes with an examination of competing economic answers to the question: “What is 
a sports league?” 
 
 
A Brief History of the Major Sports Leagues in the United States. The four major 
professional sports leagues in the United States are the National Football League (NFL), 
Major League Baseball (MLB), National Basketball Association (NBA), and National 
Hockey League (NHL). The major collegiate sports league is the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA). Two of the newer professional sports leagues are Major 
League Soccer (MLS) and the Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA). This 
section provides a brief history of these leagues, focusing primarily on their creation, the 
rules and sanctions imposed on their members, their competition (and, in some cases, 
merger) with rival leagues, and their attempt to limit player compensation. 
 The leagues’ histories are interesting because, today, the NFL, NBA, NHL, MLB, 
and NCAA are entrenched incumbent leagues whose dominance appears unlikely to be 
eroded by a new entrant. Yet, that dominance was not always the case, nor was their 
future dominance ensured. Today, the major sports leagues are economic powerhouses 
and it may be difficult to imagine a time when they were not. Thus, it is useful to review 
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 their histories, as well as the (short) histories of some newer leagues, such as MLS and 
the WNBA. 
 
National Football League.1 In 1899, a neighborhood football team named the 
Morgan Athletic Club was formed on the south side of Chicago. Over the years, 
its name changed a number of times – Racine Cardinals, Chicago Cardinals, St. 
Louis Cardinals, Phoenix Cardinals. Today, the team is known as the Arizona 
Cardinals, the oldest professional football team still playing. The first attempt to 
form a professional football league occurred in 1902; it was named the National 
Football League. Another attempt to form a professional football league occurred 
in 1920; it was initially named the American Professional Football Conference, 
but shortly thereafter changed its name to the American Professional Football 
Association (APFA). The APFA drafted a league constitution and by-laws, 
assigned territorial rights to teams, placed restrictions on player movements, 
developed a membership criteria for franchises, and issued team standings. It also 
charged its teams a $100 membership fee (which no team ever paid) and 
scheduling was left up to the individual teams – the result being that teams did not 
all play the same number of games. The APFA changed its name to the National 
Football League in 1922; the member teams included the Green Bay Packers and 
the Chicago Bears. 
 In 1925, the Pottsville Maroons, an independent pro team, were one of 
five new franchises admitted to the NFL. Pottsville scheduled a game against a 
team of former Notre Dame players to be played in Philadelphia. The NFL 
franchise in Frankford, a section of Philadelphia, protested that the game was to 
be played in its protected territory (Frankford was playing a home game the same 
day). The NFL forbid Pottsville from playing the game, but Pottsville played 
anyway. The NFL fined Pottsville, suspended it, and returned the franchise to the 
league.  
 The NFL took a variety of actions against other teams as well. For 
example, in 1927, the NFL decided to eliminate the financially weaker teams and 
consolidate the quality players from 22 teams onto just 12 teams. At the depth of 
the Great Depression in 1932, the NFL had only 8 teams.  
The NFL also imposed penalties for violating league rules. In 1931, the 
Chicago Bears and Green Bay Packers were two of the teams fined $1,000 each 
for using players whose college classes had not yet graduated. The NFL instituted 
an annual draft of college players in 1936, with the teams selecting in inverse 
order to their finish.  
 The first of several professional football leagues to form and call itself the 
American Football League occurred in 1926. The first folded after the end of its 
first season. Another American Football League formed in 1936. A third 
American Football League was formed in 1940 and folded in 1941. The All-
America Football Conference (AAFC), whose eight teams included the Cleveland 
Browns, was formed in 1946. Three years later, the NFL and AAFC entered into a 
merger agreement in which three AAFC franchises – Cleveland, San Francisco, 
and Baltimore – would join the NFL. A fourth American Football League (AFL) 
                                                 
1 This history is based on the NFL chronology posted on the NFL website. 
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 was formed in 1959 by Lamar Hunt. The AFL signed a five-year television 
contract with ABC. The NFL and AFL agreed to a verbal no-tampering pact 
relating to player contracts. In 1961, Willard Dewveall of the Chicago Bears 
became the first NFL player to play out his option and sign with an AFL team, the 
Houston Oilers. The AFL brought an antitrust suit against the NFL over the 
NFL’s alleged monopoly and its conspiracies involving expansion, television, and 
player signings. In 1962, the district court ruled against the AFL; the appeals 
court affirmed the district court’s decision. Secret talks between the NFL and 
AFL began in 1966 and the leagues agreed to merge. The leagues agreed to 
maintain separate schedules through 1969 and to play an annual AFL-NFL World 
Championship Game beginning in January 1967 – an event now known as Super 
Bowl I. The leagues agreed to hold a combined draft beginning in 1967 and to 
merge into a single league with two conferences in 1970. Congress passed 
legislation exempting the AFL-NFL merger from antitrust action on October 21, 
1966. 
 It was not the first time Congress passed a bill concerning sports leagues. 
On September 30, 1961, President Kennedy signed a bill legalizing single-
network contracts by professional sports leagues. In 1973, Congress passed 
legislation requiring any NFL game sold-out 72 hours prior to kickoff to be made 
available for local televising. (The legality of the NFL’s blackout policy was 
upheld by a district court judge in 1962.) 
 Other leagues have formed and attempted to compete with the NFL. The 
World Football League started play in 1974 and folded the next year. The United 
States Football League (USFL) started play in 1983 and folded in 1985. The 
USFL filed a $1.7 billion antitrust suit against the NFL; the jury rejected all of the 
USFL’s television-related claims and awarded $1 in damages. In 1988, the 
appeals court upheld the jury’s verdict.  
 Throughout its history, the NFL approved the relocation of numerous 
teams. However, when the Oakland Raiders sought to move to Los Angeles in 
1980, the NFL blocked the move and the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission, 
joined by the Oakland Raiders, filed an antitrust suit against the NFL. In 1982, the 
jury ruled against the NFL, clearing the way for the move. A state court jury ruled 
for the NFL in 2001, rejecting the Oakland Raiders’ claims that the NFL 
destroyed its 1995 Hollywood Park stadium deal and that they own the Los 
Angeles market. 
The NFL modified its cross-ownership restrictions in 1997, permitting 
team owners to own teams in other sports in their home market and in markets 
without NFL teams. In 2001, NFL owners approved additional league-wide 
revenue sharing, agreeing to pool the visiting teams’ share of gate receipts for all 
preseason and regular-season games and dividing the pool equally beginning in 
2002. 
 The NFL Players Association, the union representing NFL players, was 
founded in 1956. In 1982, it called a strike that lasted 57 days, shortening the 
regular football season from 16 games to 9. Another strike occurred in 1987. A 
two-week lockout of game officials occurred in 2001.   
 The NFL launched the World League of American Football (WLAF) in 
1991. The WLAF did not play any games in 1993 and 1994. It resumed play in 
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 1995. In 1998, the league was renamed the NFL Europe League, and later, NFL 
Europa. The NFL folded the money-losing league after its 2007 season. 
  
  
Major League Baseball.2 The first professional baseball league was the National 
Association (NA) founded in 1871 and which folded in 1876 after six of its 
strongest teams withdrew to form a new league, the National League of 
Professional Baseball Clubs (NL). The NL began as an eight team league, but that 
number dropped to six the second year after two teams refused to make western 
road trips later in the first season and were expelled from the NL.  
The American Association (AA) began play in 1882 and offered lower 
ticket prices, served alcoholic beverages where legal, and scheduled games on 
Sundays. During seven of the ten years of their coexistence, the NL and AA 
participated in an early version of the World Series – a series of exhibition games 
arranged by the teams involved. The AA merged with the NL after the 1891 
season. 
The NL was torn by internal conflict when some team owners sought to 
convert the league into a form of a ‘trust’ – there would be a single common 
ownership of all 12 teams. Today, such a structure is known as a ‘single entity 
league.’ Other team owners strongly opposed the plan and it was not 
implemented. The NL did impose a $2,400 limit on annual player wages in 1894. 
The Western League was founded in 1893 as a minor league based in the 
Great Lakes states. It renamed itself the American League (AL) in 1899. When 
the NL contracted to eight teams for the 1900 season, eliminating teams in 
Baltimore, Cleveland, Louisville, and Washington, the AL responded by placing 
teams in the abandoned Cleveland market and on the south side of Chicago. The 
AL declined to renew its National Agreement membership when it expired in 
October 1900 and, in January 1901, the AL declared itself a major league. The 
AL was able to hire disgruntled NL players and relocated two teams (Milwaukee 
and Baltimore) to cities with NL teams (St. Louis and New York, respectively).  
In 1903, a new version of the National Agreement was signed, with the 
AL and NL formally accepting each other as an equal partner in major league 
baseball. Major League Baseball (MLB) is the entity that effectively operates the 
NL and AL as a single league. MLB is governed by the Major League Baseball 
Constitution, an agreement whose origins can be traced back to the 1876 NL 
Constitution. MLB negotiates television, labor, and marketing contracts and hires 
umpiring crews. 
In 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Federal Baseball Club v. 
National League that the business of baseball cannot be considered interstate 
commerce and thus is not subject to the federal antitrust laws. MLB’s antitrust 
exemption was supported in subsequent court decisions. Courts ruled that the 
antitrust exemption has been in effect for so long, and Congress has failed to pass 
legislation removing the exemption, that removal of MLB’s antitrust exemption, 
if it occurs, must be by an act of Congress, not by a court decision. Despite 
                                                 
2 This history is based on the following Wikipedia entries: History of Baseball in the 
United States, Major League Baseball, American League, and National League. 
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 complaints by some members of Congress, no legislation has ever passed 
stripping MLB of its antitrust exemption – although the exemption was limited to 
some extent by the Curt Flood Act of 1998.  
In 1947, the unwritten ‘gentleman’s agreement’ barring blacks from 
playing in MLB games was violated with the signing of Jackie Robinson. The 
next year other Negro League stars like Satchel Paige were signed by ‘white’ 
MLB teams and the Negro National League folded in 1948. (The Negro American 
League continued play until 1960, but lost its major league talent.) 
The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) was formed in 
1966, the same year that two Cy Young winners – Sandy Koufax and Don 
Drysdale – refused to re-sign their contracts. The reserve clause, which had 
restricted the free movement of players between teams since the NL’s early days, 
was under challenge. In 1970, Curt Flood, a St. Louis Cardinal outfielder, went to 
court to negate his trade to another team, making his argument in part on antitrust 
grounds. Despite losing his case, he won public sympathy. Then, in 1975, two 
players played the season without contracts and, at season’s end, declared 
themselves free agents. The dispute was sent to an arbitrator, who ruled in favor 
of the players – and was promptly fired by MLB. MLB owners were forced to 
accept the collective bargaining package offered by the MLBPA which essentially 
replaced the reserve clause with the current system of free agency and arbitration. 
Team owners implemented spring training lockouts in 1976 and 1990; player 
strikes occurred in 1972, 1973, 1980, 1981, 1985, and 1994. The 1981 dispute 
concerned compensation for the loss of players to free agency. The 1985 dispute 
concerned the division of television revenue. The 1994 dispute, which led to the 
cancellation of the World Series, concerned television revenue sharing and a 
salary cap. 
   
 
National Basketball Association.3 In 1946, the owners of major sports arenas, 
including Madison Square Garden in New York City, founded the Basketball 
Association of America (BAA). It was not the first professional basketball league, 
having been preceded by the American Basketball League (ABL) and the 
National Basketball League (NBL), and did not have the best players. Four of the 
BAA’s 11 teams folded after the first season. The ABL’s Baltimore Bullets 
moved to the BAA and won the championship the same season. Prior to the 1948 
season, four of the NBL’s best teams moved to the BAA, including the 
Minneapolis Lakers with their star player, George Mikan. Minneapolis won the 
1948 season championship. In 1949, the six remaining NBL teams were absorbed 
into the BAA, which was renamed the National Basketball Association (NBA). 
The next year the NBA reduced the number of franchises from 17 to 11; by 1954, 
there were only 8 franchises. 
 The introduction of the 24-second shot clock prior to the 1954 season led 
to higher scoring (and more exciting) games. Small-market teams continued to 
relocate to larger markets. After the Fort Wayne Pistons moved to Detroit and the 
                                                 
3 This history is based on information posted on the NBA website, the Wikipedia entry 
for the National Basketball Association, Koppett (1976), and Staudohar (1999). 
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 Rochester Royals moved to Cincinnati prior to the 1957 season, only one NBA 
team (Syracuse) was located in a metropolitan area of less than a million people. 
 The American Basketball Association (ABA) was created in 1967, with 11 
teams playing a 78-game schedule (the NBA’s 12 teams played an 82-game 
schedule). Some cities that had failed to attract an NBA franchise, such as Dallas, 
Denver, Houston, and Oakland, obtained ABA franchises. The ABA permitted its 
teams to sign college undergraduates and the ABA succeeded in signing a number 
of star players, including Julius Erving. Player salaries shot up as the ABA and 
NBA competed to sign players. The NBA also responded to competition from the 
ABA by rapidly expanding the number of franchises in an attempt to tie up the 
most viable cities.  
The NBA and ABA attempted to merge in 1970, but an antitrust suit filed 
by NBA players, who had benefited handsomely from the competition between 
the two leagues, halted the merger. The two leagues tried and failed to obtain 
Congressional permission to merge, as the NFL and AFL had done in 1966. The 
NBA reached an out-of-court settlement of the antitrust suit in 1976, agreeing to a 
much weaker reserve formula – a ‘matching offer’ arrangement in which a player 
who had played out his contract could reach a deal with any other team but the 
original team could retain the player by matching that offer. The settlement 
cleared the way for a deal between the NBA and ABA in which four ABA 
franchises (Denver Nuggets, Indiana Pacers, New York Nets, and San Antonio 
Spurs) would pay a $3.2 million entry fee and be absorbed into the NBA, raising 
the number of NBA franchises to 22. The deal was approved by Congress. 
The National Basketball Players Association was formed in 1954 and the 
first collective bargaining agreement with the NBA was reached in 1967. The 
league experienced financial problems and, in 1983, negotiated a collective 
bargaining agreement included capped player salaries, guaranteed that players 
would receive 53% of league revenue, and instituted a drug control program. The 
salary cap was a ‘soft’ cap – it did not apply to teams re-signing their own 
players. The league appeared to flourish and, unlike the NFL, MLB, and NHL, the 
NBA had no work stoppages.  Then, in the 1998-99 season, there was a 202-day 
lockout when the NBA team owners reopened negotiations on the 1995 collective 
bargaining agreement and sought a ‘hard’ salary cap. During the 1997-98 season, 
player salaries had reached 57% of the $1.7 billion in league revenue, far above 
the 51.8% required to reopen negotiations. The NBA owners dropped their 
demand for a hard salary cap, but won a cap on individual player salaries; players 
won a guarantee for 55% of league revenue in years 4 through 6 of the agreement 
and 57% in year 7. 
The NBA created a women’s league, the Women’s National Basketball 
Association, in 1996 and an affiliated minor league, the National Basketball 
Development League, in 2002.   
 
 
National Hockey League.4 The first professional hockey league was formed in 
1904 and named the International Pro Hockey League. It had six teams – five in 
                                                 
4 This history is based on information posted on the NHL and ESPN websites, as well as 
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 the United States and one in Ontario. The league folded in 1907. The National 
Hockey Association (NHA), which included the Montreal Canadians, played its 
first game in 1910. In 1911, the Pacific Coast Hockey Association (PCHA) was 
formed by teams in western Canada. In 1915, the two leagues agreed that the two 
league champions would face off, with the winner receiving the Stanley Cup – a 
silver bowl which the English Governor General of Canada, Lord Stanley of 
Preston, had purchased in 1892 and decreed be awarded to the best amateur team 
in Canada. The NHA suspended operations during World War I. 
 The National Hockey League (NHL) was formed in 1917 by four NHA 
teams after a series of disputes with the owner of the NHA’s Toronto Blueshirts. 
The NHL added a new Toronto franchise – the Toronto Arenas – which became 
the Toronto Maple Leafs in 1927. By the end of the first season, only three of the 
five NHL franchises remained. The Quebec Bulldogs shut down temporarily; the 
Montreal Wanderers folded after a fire destroyed the Westmount Arena which 
they shared with the Montreal Canadians. 
 The Western Canada Hockey League (WCHL) was formed in 1921as 
essentially a ‘sister’ league to the PCHA. The WCHL and PCHA played 
interleague games, with the champion of each league facing off to compete 
against the champion of the NHL for the Stanley Cup. The PCHA had only three 
teams so when the Vancouver Maroons folded in 1924 the two remaining teams 
moved to the WCHL, which was renamed the Western Hockey League (WHL).  
 NHL teams won the Stanley Cup in seven of its first nine years. The last 
Stanley Cup won by a non-NHL team was in 1925 by the WHL’s Victoria 
Cougars. By 1926, other Canadian hockey leagues could not match the salaries 
offered by NHL teams. The WHL folded and the NHL purchased the contracts of 
every WHL player for $258,000. Separate deals were made to stock two NHL 
expansion teams. The Chicago Black Hawks purchased the players of the Portland 
Rosebuds for $15,000 and the Detroit Cougars (known today as the Detroit Red 
Wings) purchased the players of the Victoria Cougars for $25,000. Five of the 
WHL teams attempted to re-form and created a semi-pro league named the Prairie 
Hockey League, which lasted only two years, closing after the 1927-28 season. 
The NHL had expanded to 10 teams by the 1930-31 season, but with the 
onset of the Great Depression and then World War II the number dropped to six 
by 1942. Apparently spurred by the creation of the junior Western Hockey 
League in 1967, the NHL began to expand rapidly, doubling in size by adding six 
franchises in 1967 and then adding six more teams between 1970 and 1974. 
The World Hockey Association (WHA), a 12-team league, was formed in 
1972 and outbid the NHL for several star players, including Bobby Hull, who left 
the Chicago Black Hawks and signed a 10-year, $2.75 million contract with the 
WHA’s Winnipeg Jets. The NHL responded by continuing to add expansion 
teams. The result was a dilution of the talent pool and decline in the overall 
quality of play. By 1976, many WHA teams were on the financial brink and the 
WHA and NHL began to discuss a merger. By the time an agreement was reached 
                                                                                                                                                 
the following Wikipedia entries: Los Angeles Kings, National Hockey League, 
Pacific Coast Hockey Association, Western Canada Hockey League, Western Hockey 
League, and World Hockey Association. 
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 on March 22, 1979, only six WHA teams remained. Four of those six teams 
joined the NHL; the other two were paid to fold. 
In recent years a number of NHL teams have encountered financial and 
legal problems. The Pittsburgh Penguins declared bankruptcy in 1974 and 1998, 
the second leading to its star player Mario Lemieux taking over the team. The Los 
Angeles Kings declared bankruptcy in 1995; its owner, Bruce McNall, was 
convicted of bank fraud. The Ottawa Senators declared bankruptcy in January 
2003 after being unable to pay its players. A few days later, the Buffalo Sabres, 
whose owner John Rigas was embroiled in the collapse of Adelphia 
Communications, also declared bankruptcy. 
The first NHL Players Association was formed in 1957 and was soon 
crushed. Ted Lindsay, the Association’s president, was traded by Detroit to the 
last place Chicago Black Hawks. The NHL’s first and only player strike occurred 
in April 1992, but lasted only 10 days and all affected games were rescheduled. 
The NHL’s first lockout occurred at the start of the 1994-95 season and lasted 103 
days, resulting in a shortening of the regular season from 84 to 48 games. The 
NHL owners again locked out the players in 2004, eventually leading to the 
cancellation of the entire 2004-05 season. The NHL sought ‘cost certainty’ for its 
teams, which the NHL Players Association rejected as a euphemism for a salary 
cap. The lockout ended in July 2005 and the 2005-06 season began on schedule. 
The terms of the collective bargaining agreement included maximum and 
minimum salaries for individual players, a guarantee that players would receive 
between 54% and 57% of League revenues, an enhanced revenue sharing plan for 
teams, and terms for free agency; it did not contain a luxury tax. 
 
 
National Collegiate Athletic Association.5 The Intercollegiate Athletic 
Association of the United States (IAAUS) was formed in March 1906 in reaction 
to the violent nature of intercollegiate football – during the 1905 season alone 
there were 18 deaths and more than 150 injuries, leading President Theodore 
Roosevelt to host a White House meeting with the representatives of several 
schools. In 1910, the IAAUS changed its name to the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA). Membership increased rapidly as the NCAA standardized 
the rules in numerous sports.  
Beginning in the early 1920s, the NCAA attempted to limit college 
athletics to amateurs, adopting guidelines regarding player eligibility, recruiting, 
and financial aid, but leaving enforcement to individual conferences and schools. 
In January 1948, the NCAA adopted the ‘Sanity Code’ granting the NCAA 
enforcement authority, but the only penalty was a schedule boycott whose 
imposition required a two-third vote of all NCAA members at the annual 
convention. Two years later, the NCAA failed to get the two-thirds majority 
needed on a motion to suspend seven institutions for violating the Sanity Code. 
                                                 
5 This history is based on information posted on the NCAA website, DeBrock and 
Hendricks (1997), Eckard (1998), and the following Wikipedia entries: Association 
for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women, National Association of Intercollegiate 
Athletics, and National Collegiate Athletic Association.  
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 The Sanity Code was repealed in January 1951; not a single sanction was imposed 
under the Code. A new code was adopted in January 1952. It contained a 
workable enforcement mechanism whose penalties included a schedule boycott, 
but also lesser penalties such as public reprimands, probation, reductions in the 
number of allowable scholarships, and bans on appearances on television and at 
bowl games.   
 In 1949, the NCAA financed a study of the impact of television on 
football attendance and, in 1951, it declared a moratorium on the live 
broadcasting of college football games. A year later, the NCAA voted to allow 
limited live television. The NCAA contracted with the television networks to 
broadcast a limited number of games each season. Individual schools and 
conferences were prohibited from contracting with the networks to televise 
additional games. The price of broadcasting rights for NCAA football productions 
soared and the NCAA attempted to spread the rights fees across its membership. 
The school generating the bulk of these fees objected and the NCAA decided to 
restructure into three divisions, with Division I comprised of the largest revenue 
generating programs. The elite programs were not satisfied and threatened to 
withdraw from the NCAA, which responded by further restructuring Division I 
into I-A, I-AA, and I-AAA. Nevertheless, 66 schools formed the College Football 
Association (CFA) in 1977. The CFA filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA 
over its restriction on the number of football games a team could have televised in 
a season. In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the CFA that the NCAA’s 
rule violated the antitrust laws. 
 The NCAA has also adopted rules regarding minimum grade point 
averages, recruiting activities, number and amount of financial rewards, squad 
sizes, coaching staff sizes, and coaches’ earnings, among many others. Many of 
these rules have been challenged under the antitrust laws. On some rules, the 
courts have sided with the NCAA; on others, the courts have found that the 
NCAA was in violation of the antitrust laws. 
 The NCAA is not the lone collegiate athletics association. The National 
Association of Intercollegiate Basketball (NAIB) was established in 1940 and, in 
1948, became the first national organization to permit black student-athletes to 
compete in postseason competitions. The NAIB transformed into the National 
Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) in 1952 when it began 
sponsorship of additional sports.  
The Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) was 
formed in 1971 to govern collegiate women’s athletics and administer national 
championships. At its peak, the AIAW had almost 1,000 member schools. The 
NAIA began sponsoring intercollegiate championships for women in 1980 and 
the NCAA did likewise shortly thereafter. Former AIAW powerhouses like 
Tennessee and Old Dominion decided to participate in the first Division I NCAA 
Women’s Basketball Tournament in 1982. The AIAW tournament lost its appeal 
and NBC canceled its television contract with the AIAW. The AIAW filed an 
antitrust lawsuit. In 1983, the court ruled in favor of the NCAA.  
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 Major League Soccer.6 The 1994 World Cup was awarded to the United States on 
the condition that a 1st division (or ‘Division One’) professional soccer league be 
established. Major League Soccer (MLS) was formed in December 1993 and the 
10-team league began play in 1996. Unlike the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL, MLS 
does not have individual team owners. The league owns the teams; some investors 
in MLS operate one or more teams, but they do not own those teams. They are 
‘investor-operators’, not ‘team owners.’ Thus, MLS is a ‘single entity’ 
organization. The league enters into contracts with the players, not the team. 
 MLS initially was viewed in Europe as a ‘retirement league’ in which stars 
past their prime could collect an easy paycheck; today, the league is more youth-
oriented. A number of young American players have chosen to play for MLS 
rather than languish on the bench of European teams. 
 European soccer leagues have a ‘vertical’ structure – the worst teams in a 
higher division can be demoted to a lower division, while the best teams in a 
lower division can be promoted a higher division. This is known as an ‘open’ 
league – the specific teams competing in a particular division changes over time. 
MLS, like the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL is a ‘closed’ league. An MLS team 
that performs poorly does not fear being relegated to a less prestigious league, 
whereas a non-MLS team cannot be promoted into the same division as the MLS 
teams regardless of how well it plays. 
 While most MLS teams began play in football stadiums, the league 
intended to build its own stadiums, enabling it to earn additional revenue from 
parking and concessions. The first such stadium was Columbus Crew Stadium, 
personally financed by Lamar Hunt, the investor-operator of the Columbus Crew, 
in 1999. The second was the Home Depot Center, completed in 2003 and home to 
the Los Angeles Galaxy. It was the work of Anschutz Entertainment Group 
(AEG) and the Galaxy became the first MLS team to make a profit. In 2005, a 
new expansion team, Chivas USA, joined the Galaxy in playing its home games 
at the Home Depot Center. Until recently, AEG was the investor-operator of six 
MLS teams, including DC United, Houston, and the MetroStars. 
 Two MLS teams are operated by owners of NFL teams and play their 
games in the same stadium as the football team. The New England Revolution is 
operated by Kraft Sports Group, owner of the New England Patriots, and play at 
Gillette Stadium; the Kansas City Wizards were operated by Lamar Hunt and play 
at Arrowhead Stadium.  
 The Major League Soccer Players Association (MLSPA) was formed at 
the end of the 1996 season and in February 1997 it filed an antitrust lawsuit 
against MLS. The MLSPA was organized as a trade association instead of a union 
because unions are prohibited by federal law from suing. In April 2000, the 
district court ruled that MLS’s single-entity structure did not violate the antitrust 
laws. In April 2000, an appeals court also sided with MLS. Three years later, in 
April 2003, the players formed a union, the Major League Soccer Players Union. 
The union and the league reached a collective bargaining agreement in November 
                                                 
6 This history is based on information posted on the MLS website, the Wikipedia entry 
for Major League Soccer, as well as various other soccer-related websites.  
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 2004. The agreement’s terms included minimum player salaries, but did not 
directly address the league’s salary cap of $1.73 million per team. 
 MLS was not the first professional soccer league in the United States. The 
most notable was the North American Soccer League (NASL), formed in 1968 by 
the merger of the United Soccer Association and the National Professional Soccer 
League. The league started with 17 teams, of which 12 folded after the first 
season.  The signing of soccer superstar Pele in 1975 transformed the NASL, 
which had been a ‘minor’ league – at least relative to the ‘major’ European 
leagues. It expanded to 24 teams in 1978, but soaring costs resulted in most teams 
having financial problems. Within a few years, 17 teams folded. The NASL shut 
down in March 1985. 
 
 
Women’s National Basketball Association.7 The first professional basketball 
league for women was the Women’s Professional Basketball League (WBL), 
which started play in 1978 with eight teams, expanded to 14 teams its second 
season, but folded after its third season. In 1996, two professional women’s 
basketball leagues were formed. The American Basketball League (ABL) began 
play in 1996 with eight teams; the Women’s National Basketball Association 
(WNBA) started play in 1997, also with eight teams. The ABL placed teams in 
cities with strong collegiate women’s basketball programs; the WNBA placed 
teams in cities with NBA teams. The ABL was unable to compete successfully 
against the WNBA and folded in the middle of its third season. 
 The WNBA was created by the NBA and, initially, had a single-entity 
structure. The WNBA league and teams were owned collectively by the NBA; the 
investor-operator of a specific WNBA team was the NBA owner in that city. 
After the 2002 season, the WNBA was reorganized so that teams would have 
owners, not investor-operators, and teams could locate in cities without NBA 
teams. The WNBA teams were sold to their NBA counterparts or to third-parties. 
Two teams folded prior to the 2003 season and two others moved. The Orlando 
Miracle moved to Connecticut after being purchased by the Mohegan Sun casino, 
which is run by the Mohegan Indian tribe. The WNBA allowed the team’s 
purchase by the casino so long as there is no sports betting at the facility. After 
the 2003 season, another team folded. 
 The WNBA and players signed a collective bargaining agreement prior to 
the start of the 1999 season. The players threatened to strike prior to the start of 
the 2003 season. The start of the 2003 pre-season was delayed as the players won 
a limited form of free agency while the league won caps on individual player 
salaries. Many WNBA players reportedly supplement their salaries by playing in 
European women’s basketball leagues during the WNBA’s off-season. 
 
 
                                                 
7 This history is based on various newspaper articles and the following Wikipedia entries: 
American Basketball League, Women’s National Basketball Association, and 
Women’s Professional Basketball League. 
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 Key Differences Between Sports Leagues. The preceding overview of the major sports 
leagues reveals a number of differences across leagues. Some of these differences are 
critical to an antitrust analysis of sports leagues. Four key differences are the extent of 
judicial and/or legislative protection from the antitrust laws, single entity vs. individual 
team ownership, interleague competition, and closed vs. open leagues. 
 Major League Baseball is the only sports league in the United States that has 
immunity from the antitrust laws. That immunity originates in the 1922 decision by the 
U.S. Supreme Court that the business of baseball is not interstate commerce and since the 
federal antitrust laws apply only to interstate commerce, they do not apply to the business 
of baseball. Members of Congress have often threatened to pass legislation stripping 
MLB of its antitrust exemption, but have failed to do so – although the Curt Flood Act of 
1998 did place some restrictions on the exemption. Other leagues have avoided antitrust 
scrutiny for certain actions by obtaining Congressional approval. Both the NFL-AFL and 
NBA-ABA mergers received such approval. Exemptions to the federal antitrust laws are 
examined in more detail in Chapter 2. 
 Exemption from the antitrust laws can also occur by structuring the league as a 
single entity. Many of the recently-formed sports leagues have adopted the single-entity 
organization: MLS, WNBA, and the XFL (the ill-fated Extreme Football League formed 
by the World Wrestling Federation and NBC which folded after one season). Since an 
organization cannot engage in an antitrust conspiracy only with itself, the single-entity 
structure enables the league to hold down player salaries. Players have to contract with 
the league and thus individual teams cannot drive up salaries bidding for players’ 
services. Interestingly, the WNBA has abandoned the single entity structure, suggesting 
that there are costs as well as benefits to that form of organization. Investors may be more 
willing to invest in a league’s success if they can own a specific team (and profit by 
running it well) than if they have to invest in the league itself and operate, but not own, a 
specific team.  
 A third difference across sports leagues is the extent of interleague competition. 
Professional baseball is played not only in North America, but in Japan, Mexico, and 
other countries. Professional football is not only played in the United States, but in 
Canada. There are numerous professional basketball leagues around the world other than 
the NBA. Professional hockey is not only played in North America, but in Europe as 
well. However, in their respective sports, MLB, the NFL, NBA, and NHL are the premier 
leagues in the entire world. The elite players from around the world gravitate towards 
these leagues. The elite players from these leagues do not tend to move to these other 
leagues. Some MLB players do sign with Japanese teams, but they tend to do so after 
failing to sign with a MLB team; such players are generally past their prime. Some NBA 
players sign with European teams, but those players are either past their prime or need to 
gain experience and improve their skills in the hope of one day playing in the NBA. 
Professional football players rarely choose to play in the Canadian Football League if 
they can earn a spot on an NFL team. Professional hockey players rarely choose to play 
in Europe if they can play in the NHL. 
 A major exception to the dominant position of North American sports leagues is 
soccer. It is not true that the top soccer players in the world gravitate to MLS. According 
to Noll (2003b), most of the best players on the U.S. national team play for European 
professional teams and MLS does not have the talent of the best English league – the 
Premier League. Rather, the MLS is more comparable in quality to the bottom Division 1 
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 or top Division 2 English leagues. This competition for talent curbs MLS’s monopsony 
power over players. 
 A fourth difference across sports leagues relates to their ‘openness.’ The major 
sports leagues in the United States are closed – a non-league team can only gain 
admittance to the league through the consent of the league members, who typically 
require payment of a substantial entry fee. This is in contrast to the typical sports league 
in Europe, which has an open, hierarchical structure. Consider the case of English Soccer. 
The top league is the English Premier League. The second-tier league is Division 1. 
There are lower-tier leagues as well. The three worst performing teams in the Premier 
League are relegated to Division 1 the next season, while the top two teams in Division 1 
are promoted to the Premier League, as is the winner of a playoff among those finishing 
in positions 3 through 7 in Division 1. 
 Open sports leagues are believed to give teams a greater incentive to win since 
playing against higher quality opponents presumably attracts greater fan interest and thus 
yields higher revenues for the team. As a result, teams will bid more aggressively for 
players.8 This implies that player salaries will be higher in an open sports league than in a 
closed one, all else equal. Consistent with this prediction, Noll (2002) examines English 
soccer and finds that ‘promotion and relegation’ has a net positive impact on attendance 
and results in higher player salaries. However, Noll finds the impact of promotion and 
relegation on competitive balance among teams to be ambiguous because some teams 
may be promoted to a division in which they do not have a realistic chance of fielding a 
competitive team and, as a result, these teams spend less on players once they are in the 
higher league (albeit briefly) than they did when they were attempting to be promoted 
into the higher league. 
Sports leagues in the United States seek to maintain ‘competitive balance’ among 
teams by a number of means, including the sharing of gate and broadcast revenues and 
restrictions on player movement and salaries. Such revenue-sharing does not occur in 
Europe. Nor do European leagues have a reserve clause, draft, salary cap, luxury tax, or 
collective merchandising agreement – although some European leagues collectively sell 
broadcast rights.  
Individual teams in open sports leagues not only have less market power over 
players, they have less market power over municipalities seeking to attract or retain a 
team. As Ross and Szymanski (2002) explain, “a club’s threat to relocate without tax 
subsidies is diluted by the possibility that the team itself may be relegated and, more 
importantly, by the creation of alternative entry routes for cities that do not possess a 
major league team.” (p. 629) 
Of the sports leagues in the United States, only the NHL has seen some of its 
teams declare bankruptcy. In contrast, Szymanski and Valletti (2003) observe that 16 
English soccer teams have fallen into the U.K. equivalent of Chapter 11 in the last three 
years. They conclude that the system of promotion and relegation may enhance social 
welfare by dissipating rents earned by teams (which take the form of stadium subsidies, 
the gap between players’ marginal revenue product and their salaries, and so on), but may 
                                                 
8 See Ross and Szymanski (2002); the economic literature on ‘European Football’ is 
surveyed by Matheson (2003).  
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 reduce social welfare by making games less competitive (i.e., the quality of the product is 
reduced).9 
A number of economists have advocated that the ‘closed’ sports leagues in the 
United States be required to establish a system of promotion and relegation. They believe 
that introduction of such a system will curb the market power of leagues and individual 
teams.10 This proposal, as well as other proposals for the reform of sports leagues in the 
United States, is discussed in Chapter 12. 
 
 
Sanctioning Bodies as a Form of Sports League. Some professional sports have 
‘sanctioning bodies’ – auto racing, boxing, golf, tennis, among others. A sanctioning 
body sets the rules for a competition (including rules regarding who may participate), 
enforces those rules, guarantees the purse, provides rankings of players or teams, and 
declares the champion. For example, courts have found that the United States Tennis 
Association  “legitimately functions as a private, nonprofit regulating body to ensure that 
competitive tennis is conducted in an orderly fashion and to preserve the essential 
character of the game as played in organized competition.”11 The PGA Tour “sponsors 
and cosponsors professional golf tournaments conducted on three annual tours” (i.e., the 
PGA Tour, the NIKE Tour, and the Senior PGA Tour), has rules on how a player can 
gain entry into a particular tour, and sets rules for each tournament.12 Boxing has a 
multitude of sanctioning bodies, each declaring its own champion. The failure of boxing 
to produce a single undisputed champion at each weight category reduces its appeal to 
fans.  
 The National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) was formed in 
1948 by Bill France “to unite all stock car racing under one set of rules; to set up a 
benevolent fund and a national point standings whereby only one stock car driver would 
be crowned National Champion.”13 NASCAR also guaranteed the purse for each race it 
sanctioned – an act that earned NASCAR the respect of the drivers, who in the past 
sometimes went unpaid. NASCAR developed penalties for those found in violation of its 
rules. NASCAR is 100% owned by the France family, which also controls about 60% of 
International Speedway Corporation, which owns numerous tracks that host NASCAR 
races. NASCAR decides which racetracks get which race dates. The teams that compete 
in NASCAR races are neither direct, nor indirect, owners of NASCAR. Teams are 
independent businesses – they enter into their own deals with sponsors. Prior to 1999, the 
broadcast rights for each race belonged to the racetrack, with NASCAR receiving 10% of 
whatever the track negotiated with a network. The Fox Sports network told NASCAR it 
                                                 
9 Szymanski and Smith (1997) and Dobson and Goddard (1998) examine the financial 
performance of the English soccer industry; Medcalfe (2003) finds an improvement 
in competitive balance after the introduction of promotion and relegation in English 
soccer and cricket.  
10 Noll (2003b) argues that both the American closed league system and the European 
open league system produce less than the optimal number of major-league teams, 
because both have monopoly power.  
11 Gunter Harz Sports v. United States Tennis Association, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981). 
12 PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
13 The discussion in this paragraph is based primarily on Hagstrom (1998). 
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 would bid to broadcast NASCAR races if it could negotiate directly with NASCAR 
instead of having to negotiate separately with each racetrack.14 NASCAR now negotiates 
broadcast rights with the television networks. For example, in 2005, NASCAR negotiated 
a $4.4 billion, 8-year contract with four networks, of which 65% will go to the racetracks, 
25% will be split among the racing teams, and 10% will go to NASCAR.15  
 Some economists believe the market power of professional sports leagues such as 
the NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB could be curbed by forcing the leagues to function more 
like sanctioning bodies such as NASCAR. Teams no longer would be direct or indirect 
owners of the league. Rival sanctioning bodies would compete for the participation of 
teams. One problem is how to design a system that benefits fans by producing an 
undisputed champion – the problem that plagues boxing. This proposal, and others, will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 12. 
 
 
Economic Theories of Sports Leagues. Many, but not all, economists agree that sports 
leagues are natural monopolies – there are a number of economic factors pushing teams 
in a particular sport to consolidate into a single league. Economists also generally agree 
that sports leagues are a type of joint venture. Economists disagree, however, as to 
whether particular joint ventures/natural monopolies such as the NCAA, NFL, NBA, 
NHL, and MLB operate as cartels. 
 
Sports leagues as natural monopolies: If total production costs are lower when 
one firm produces all an industry’s output compared to when it is produced by 
more than one firm, the market is said to be a ‘natural monopoly’ and the single 
firm in the market a ‘natural monopolist.’16 In a 1964 article titled “The Peculiar 
Economics of Professional Sports,” Walter Neale argued that sports leagues are 
natural monopolies.17 Their products include not only the games themselves, but 
also the excitement of the pennant race, the league standings, and the 
championship. A single team alone cannot produce these products – it needs an 
opponent. Neale argues: “The several joint products which are products joint of 
legally separate business firms are really the complex joint products of one firm, 
and this firm is necessarily an all-embracing firm or natural monopoly.” (p. 4) 
The “most useful of all products” is the World Championship, which can only be 
produced by a single league. As a result, there is a strong tendency toward a 
single league in each professional sport. At the time Neale wrote, the National 
Football League and American Football League had not yet merged. Neale did 
not find the coexistence of the two professional football leagues to be an anomaly. 
Rather, he predicted that “this is inherently a temporary state of affairs.” (p. 6) He 
was right. A few years later, the NFL and AFL merged.  
 Ross (1989) disagrees that sports leagues are natural monopolies. He 
argues that there are two theoretical reasons why sports leagues may be natural 
                                                 
14 See Schlosser (2001). 
15 See Hiestand (2005). 
16 See Carlton and Perloff (2005), pp. 104-05.  
17 Other studies arguing that sports leagues are natural monopolies include Roberts 
(1995) and Heintel (1996). 
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 monopolies, neither of which are supported by facts. One possible reason is that 
the minimum size of a sports league is too large to support more than one league. 
Suppose a league needs a least eight teams to function, but only 12 franchise 
locations are viable (each of which can support only one team). A second league 
could place franchises in the four viable locations without teams but would need 
to add at least four more teams, either by convincing four teams from the initial 
league to switch to the new league or by adding second teams to locations already 
with a team in the initial league. In either case, either some of the teams in the 
initial league fold, and thus the initial league fails to be of minimum viable size 
and itself folds, or the second league fails to add enough franchises to achieve the 
minimum viable size of eight teams and thus the second league folds. In either 
case, only one league survives. Ross dismisses this argument, arguing that, in 
practice, sports leagues now contain so many teams that they could be split into a 
number of smaller, but still economically viable, leagues.  
Heintel (1996) counters that Ross’s argument “has no bearing on whether 
the NFL is a natural monopoly, however; it merely shows that the NFL has more 
teams than absolutely necessary to operate.” 
 A second theoretical reason why sports leagues may be natural 
monopolies is that it may be less costly to expand an existing league than to form 
and operate a new league. Ross dismisses this argument, asserting that the only 
cost savings to having only one league would be the incidental administrative 
savings from the elimination of duplicate league offices. He contends that there is 
no evidence that a second league would have to pay higher stadium rental 
charges, player salaries, or administrative costs than would a monopoly league. It 
is true that player salaries soar when leagues have to compete for talent, as 
evidenced by the impact of NBA-ABA competition for professional basketball 
players and NHL-WHA competition of professional hockey players. The key 
point, Ross explains, is that a distinction must be drawn between actual dollar 
expenses and costs (i.e., the value to society of the resource). A monopoly league 
can depress player salaries and will have actual dollar expenses which are lower 
than if it had to compete with another league. The higher player salaries which it 
would have to pay if a second league existed are a higher dollar expense, but they 
are not a cost – the value to society of the players’ services has not changed. 
Society does not benefit from the monopsonistic exploitation of players. In other 
words, a single league may be able to add new teams at lower cost than a second 
league can be formed, but this lower cost is attributable to its monopsony power. 
Heintel counters that Ross’s assertion that costs for a second league would 
be no higher than for a monopoly league is incorrect and irrelevant. It is incorrect 
because a new league would have to invest in intangible capital (e.g., rivalries, fan 
loyalty) which the NFL has already generated, resulting in higher costs for a new 
league. It is irrelevant because simply showing a second league could operate at 
the same cost as the NFL does not prove that the NFL is not a natural monopoly. 
The question is what happens to the NFL’s average cost per unit of output (e.g., 
games played) as output increases. Heintel asserts that it decreases, and thus the 
NFL is a natural monopoly. 
 Ross also addresses the question as to why rival leagues generally do not 
co-exist for long. In the case of Major League Baseball, Ross answers that MLB 
“acquired monopoly power by engaging in mergers and anticompetitive acts that 
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 clearly would constitute illegal monopolization in violation of section two of the 
Sherman Act” and “maintained its monopoly position by creating new franchises 
to deprive new leagues of the base necessary to begin competition,” conduct 
which “also probably would constitute illegal monopolization absent the 
exemption.” In the case of the NFL, Ross argues that the NFL-AFL merger 
created a giant incumbent which is entrenched in most of the largest markets in 
the United States. The World Football League and United States Football League 
were unable to compete with the NFL, in part due to disastrous managerial 
decisions by the new leagues. The failed entry of these leagues does not imply the 
professional football industry is a natural monopoly any more than the failure of 
new entrants to compete against Alcoa implied that the aluminum industry was a 
natural monopoly. 
 Ross agrees that fans value championship games, but believes that rival 
leagues can agree jointly to produce a champion. Heintel counters that the rival 
leagues would have to coordinate to produce a championship, reaching agreement 
on a schedule and common rules – and thus the rival leagues would cease to be 
distinct. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, during the early 1900s, 
rival professional hockey leagues did agree to hold a championship, with the 
winner receiving the Stanley Cup. The NHL supplied one of the teams in the 
championship; its opponent for the Stanley Cup came from a rival league. 
 Finally, Ross disputes that competition between leagues for players will 
result in “ruinous competition.” He points out that franchise values are a better 
indication of a league’s financial health than are teams’ balance sheets. During the 
alleged “ruinous competition” between the NBA and ABA, the value of 
professional basketball franchises rose, not fell. 
 
Sports leagues as joint ventures: A single team can only produce scrimmage (or 
‘exhibition’) games, which are unlikely to generate much fan interest.18 To 
produce a ‘real’ game, it needs an opponent, and it needs to agree with the 
opponent on the rules and scheduling of the game. Unlike a typical business 
which benefits if its competitors fold, a single team does not benefit if its 
opponents fold. The team wants to beat its opponents on the field, and possibly 
also outperform them financially, but it does not want its opponents to fold. 
Therefore, the characterization of individual teams as individual firms does not 
quite fit. 
 Nor does the characterization of a sports league as an individual firm. The 
interests of the league do not always coincide with that of each of its member 
teams (see Chapter 3). The league acts on behalf, and with the consent, of its 
                                                 
18 The Green Bay Packers hold a scrimmage game during the NFL preseason and tens of 
thousands of fans attend. However, this does not mean that the same number of fans 
would attend if the Packers were the sole NFL team. The huge attendance is due to a 
number of reasons. Fans want a sneak preview of the team for the upcoming regular 
season; if not for the upcoming season, fans would have little incentive to size up this 
year’s team. Moreover, Packers’ home games are always sold-out so securing tickets 
to games can be difficult and expensive; therefore, the scrimmage game is a poor 
quality (but also low cost) substitute for attending a regular season game.    
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 members. Sometimes a league may take actions that some of its members do not 
support. Consider the issue of how many teams to have in the league. Ross and 
Szymanski (2002) show that, in a simple model of a league seeking to maximize 
league profits, the number of teams in the league expands to the point where 
marginal revenue is zero. In contrast, the individual teams comprising the league 
will want to expand the number of teams only to the point which maximizes 
average revenue per team.  In general, the size of the league desired by the 
individual teams will be smaller than the size of the league desired by the league 
itself. 19 
 Economists generally prefer to think about sports leagues as joint 
ventures.20 As Flynn and Gilbert (2001) explain, the term “joint venture” does not 
have an exact meaning in economics. Nor does it have an exact meaning in 
antitrust law. The basic idea, however, is that two or more independent entities 
collaborate to achieve a commercial objective. Pharmaceutical companies form 
joint ventures with biotechnology companies to conduct drug-related research. 
General Motors and Toyota entered into a joint venture to produce automobiles. 
Flynn and Gilbert write: “The central economic issue for antitrust analysis 
is whether the coordination of professional sports teams harms competition, and if 
so, whether the lessening of competition is more than offset by benefits to 
consumers from that coordination.” (p. F28) Viewing sports leagues as joint 
ventures does not immediately determine whether their activities are anti-
competitive or pro-competitive.21 A joint venture may engage in either, or some 
of both. Moreover, an action of a joint venture may be pro-competitive in some 
respects and anti-competitive in others – it depends on whether the existence of 
the league and its success are taken as a given (ex post) or whether the creation of 
the league and its future success are taken as uncertain (ex ante). An action which 
appears to be anti-competitive from an ex post perspective may be pro-
competitive from an ex ante perspective. (Chapter 2 examines the basics of 
antitrust analysis in more detail.) 
From the joint venture perspective, a sports league, in the words of 
Tollison (2000), “competes as a single entity in the relevant product market in 
both live attendance and television markets” and “has incentives to mute 
intrabrand  competition (among teams) in the interest of promoting interbrand 
competition so that league revenues (which are partially shared) are maximized in 
competition with other sports and possibly also with a myriad of alternative ways 
that consumers can spend their entertainment dollars.” (p. 22) 
  
 
                                                 
19 See Ross and Szymanski (2002), pp. 630-31. 
20 The characterization of sports leagues as joint ventures is advocated by Rascher and 
Schwarz (2000), Tollison (2000), and Flynn and Gilbert (2001), among others. 
21 In contrast, viewing a sports league as a cartel immediately suggests its activities are 
anti-competitive; viewing a sports league as a single-entity suggests that its activities 
do not constitute an antitrust conspiracy since a single-entity cannot conspire only 
with itself.  
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 Sports leagues as cartels: A cartel is defined as “an association of firms that 
explicitly agree to coordinate their activities, typically to maximize joint 
profits.”22 Some economists believe sports leagues are a form of cartel. For 
example, Fort and Quirk (1995) write: “Professional team sports leagues are 
classic, even textbook, examples of business cartels… However, sports leagues 
differ from other cartels in one important and paradoxical respect. Sports leagues 
are in the business of selling competition on the playing field… The special 
problem for sports leagues is the need to establish a degree of competitive balance 
on the field that is acceptable to fans.” (p. 1265) Adams and Brock (1997) 
characterize the relationship between a sports league and its players union as a 
bilateral monopoly. 
Sports leagues often cite the need to maintain ‘competitive balance’ as the 
pro-competitive rationale for imposing a wide range of restrictions, including 
salary caps, revenue sharing, luxury taxes, and restriction on free agency. 
‘Competitive balance’ seems like a fairly straightforward concept (fans want to 
watch ‘competitive’ games), until one attempts to actually define and measure it 
(fans want to watch competitive ‘good’ games, not games between evenly 
matched, but poor or mediocre quality, teams).23 Whether restrictions like salary 
caps and revenue sharing are cartel-imposed anticompetitive practices or in fact 
maintain competitive balance, and thus have a pro-competitive rationale, will be 
discussed in Chapter 3 (restrictions on teams) and Chapters 6 and 7 (restrictions 
on players and coaches).  
A joint venture may or may not function as a cartel. The NCAA is 
frequently cited as an example of a joint venture which functions as a cartel.24 As 
the discussion earlier in this chapter reveals, the NCAA historically has attempted 
to restrict output by limiting the number of televised football games and restrict 
competition for inputs by limiting the eligibility, recruiting, and financial aid of 
student-athletes and by limiting the compensation of ‘restricted earnings assistant 
coaches.’ These restrictions result in wealth transfers from players and assistant 
coaches to the schools. (Chapters 6 and 7 examine the market power of sports 
leagues over players and coaches in more detail.) 
 According to Tollison (2000), the closest analogy to a professional sports 
league in college athletics is not the NCAA, but rather the college athletic 
conferences, such as the Big Ten. The NCAA, in contrast, “is an association of 
otherwise independent colleges and universities that have come together for the 
purpose of regulating intercollegiate athletics.” (p. 22) Whereas these colleges and 
universities compete against one another in a number of open markets (e.g., for 
students, for faculty, for research grants), the NCAA “provides a vehicle through 
                                                 
22 Carlton and Perloff (2005), p. 780. 
23 See, for example, Sanderson (2002), Utt and Fort (2002), Zimbalist (2002, 2003a), 
Eckard (2003), Humphreys (2003a, 2003b), Fort and Maxcy (2003), Fort ( 2003), 
Kahane (2003), Sanderson and Siegfried (2003), and Szymanski (2005).  
24 See, for example, Becker (1985), Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison (1994), Siegfried (1994), 
Blair and Romano (1997), Eckard (1998), Rascher and Schwarz (2000), and Tollison 
(2000). 
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 which competition in intercollegiate athletics can be stifled in both relevant input 
and output markets.” (p. 23) 
 Not all economists believe the NCAA is a cartel. For example, McKenzie 
and Sullivan (1987) argue that “the NCAA acts not as a cartel but as a demand-
enhancing joint venture.” (p. 387) They point out that “the NCAA members are 
not a single unified firm, but are a collection of many independent firms with 
different cost structures and different market demands” and thus they “have the 
same incentive to improve their profits by cheating on the cartel – even forming 
alternative collegiate or semiprofessional sports associations that permit explicit 
wage payments to athletes – as they do to form the cartel in the first place.” (p. 
385) McKenzie and Sullivan question “how any effective, exploitive sports cartel 
can be maintained in the long run in the absence of forced membership or barriers 
to exit from the NCAA by member colleges and barriers to entry into the sports 
market by alternative sports associations.” (p. 385) They believe that “NCAA 
rules are an efficient contract among participants in a joint venture” and “are 
prudent measures by colleges to increase the demand for intercollegiate athletics 
and college education.” (p. 376) 
  
 
In summary, sports leagues are a form of joint venture by which individual teams 
cooperatively produce a product, namely games (both live and televised) which culminate 
in the declaration of a league champion. They typically devise schedules and rules by 
which their member teams are expected to comply. Some of those rules, such as those 
imposing restrictions on player salaries and mobility, allegedly are pro-competitive 
because they maintain ‘competitive balance’ among teams. Whether this is in fact the 
case is hotly disputed by economists. Also hotly disputed is whether the existence of only 
one major sports league in each sport (except for relatively brief periods) is evidence that 
sports leagues are natural monopolies, or alternatively, evidence that the major sports 
leagues have engaged in anticompetitive conduct against their rival leagues.  
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 Chapter 2 
 
Basics of Antitrust Analysis 
 
 
 
 
                                                
Monopolies and cartels restrict output, thereby raising the price of their product 
relative to the price that would prevail under competition – the so-called ‘competitive 
price.’ A monopsony is the sole buyer of an input and thus can restrict its usage, thereby 
enabling the monopsonist to pay less than the competitive price for the input. Sports 
leagues have monopoly power with respect to their output – games – and monopsony 
power over some of their inputs – the players. Thus, fans are forced to pay a higher-than-
competitive price to attend games and players are paid less-than-competitive salaries. 
 The antitrust laws seek to protect consumers by preserving competition. They do 
not, however, seek to protect competitors – a critical distinction. Introduction of a 
superior product, for example, benefits consumers but may have disastrous consequences 
for competitors. It is not an antitrust violation to simply sell a product which consumers 
find so superior to its alternatives that it becomes the sole product in the market; in effect, 
the superior product becomes the market. However, it may be an antitrust violation if the 
product’s producer engages in certain actions to prevent competition to the product.  
 How does one determine whether a producer’s actions are antitrust violations? 
This chapter provides the answer. It begins with a discussion of the antitrust laws, then 
examines the several exemptions to the antitrust laws, and concludes with an overview of 
how to prove antitrust violations. 
 
 
The Antitrust Laws:25 The Sherman Act of 1890 was the first federal antitrust legislation 
and contains two main provisions. Section 1 outlaws “every contract, combination …, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations.” Notice that Section 1 outlaws ‘every’ such contract, combination, or conspiracy. 
Thus, a literal application of Section 1 would invalidate virtually every commercial 
arrangement. As early as 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, despite its broad 
language, Section 1 applies only to contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that are 
‘unreasonable’ restraints of trade or commerce. Courts decide what is ‘unreasonable.’ 
Some activities are per se illegal; others have to be evaluated under the so-called ‘rule of 
reason’ – the anticompetitive effect of the activity in dispute is weighed against its 
business justification and purported pro-competitive effect. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that “every person who shall monopolize or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” In other words, Section 2 makes it illegal for 
 
25 This discussion is based on Carlton and Perloff (2005), the Federal Trade Commission 
publication “Promoting Competition, Protecting Consumers: A Plain English Guide 
to Antitrust Laws,” and “Executive Summary of the Antitrust Laws” by Richard M. 
Steuer of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, LLP, which is posted on the 
Findlaw website at http://profs.lp.findlaw.com/antitrust/. 
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 a company to “monopolize or attempt to monopolize” trade or commerce. Notice that 
Section 2 does not make it illegal simply to be a monopoly. As courts have interpreted 
Section 2, it is not even necessarily illegal for a company to try to achieve a monopoly; it 
is illegal to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize” through ‘unreasonable’ methods. A 
key factor in the court’s determination of what is ‘unreasonable’ is whether the practice 
in dispute has a legitimate business justification. 
 Note that both Section 1 and Section 2 apply to “trade or commerce among the 
several States.” In other words, the Sherman Act applies to ‘interstate commerce,’ and 
not to ‘intrastate commerce’ or interstate activity which is not ‘commerce.’ This 
distinction is the source of Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption; in 1922, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the business of baseball is not interstate commerce and 
thus the federal antitrust laws do not apply. Interestingly, courts have found other sports 
leagues to be engaged in ‘interstate commerce’ and thus only Major League Baseball has 
a judicial exemption from the federal antitrust laws. 
 The Clayton Act of 1914 covers several specific types of restraints. Section 2, 
which was amended by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, prohibits price discrimination 
that lessens competition. Section 3 prohibits competition-lessening tie-ins and exclusive 
dealing. Section 7, which was amended by the Cellar-Kefauver Act of 1950, prohibits 
mergers and acquisitions where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or 
to create a monopoly.” Section 7A, known as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, mandates the 
prior notification of large mergers to both the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. 
Department of Justice, the two federal government agencies responsible for enforcing the 
antitrust laws. Section 8 deals with interlocking directorates among firms.  
 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1914 created the FTC. Section 5 
outlaws “unfair methods of competition” – but does not define ‘unfair.’ Violations of the 
Sherman Act have been found by the U.S. Supreme Court to also be violations of Section 
5, but Section 5 covers some practices not covered by the Sherman Act. In this sense, the 
Act may be considered a ‘catch-all enactment’ which fills loopholes in other statutes. 
 Individual states also have their own antitrust laws. Antitrust challenges to sports 
leagues almost always allege violation of federal, not state, antitrust laws. 
 
 
Exceptions to the Antitrust Laws. There are four general categories of exemptions from 
the federal antitrust laws applicable to sports leagues: a judicial ‘interstate commerce’ 
exemption which applies specifically to Major League Baseball; a judicial ‘single-entity’ 
exemption which applies to sports leagues structured as single-entities, such as Major 
League Soccer; statutory exemptions in which Congress mandates that certain 
transactions be exempt from antitrust scrutiny, such as the NFL-AFL and NBA-ABA 
mergers; and non-statutory exemptions which facilitate the collective bargaining process 
between professional sports leagues and their respective players’ unions. 
 
 
Judicial ‘interstate commerce’ exemption: In 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided the case of Federal Club v. National League. The plaintiffs were 
members of a baseball league that attempted to compete with MLB. Plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants, MLB’s National League and American League, 
“destroyed the Federal League by buying up some of the constituent clubs and in 
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 one way or another inducing all those clubs except the plaintiff to leave their 
League,” in violation of the Sherman Act. The Court decided: 
 
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state 
affairs. It is true that in order to attain for these exhibitions the great 
popularity that they have achieved, competitions must be arranged 
between clubs from different cities and States. But the fact that in order to 
give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state 
lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to change 
the character of the business. According to the distinction insisted upon in 
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655, 15 S. Sup. Ct. 207, the transport 
is a mere incident, not the essential thing. That to which it is incident, the 
exhibition, although made for money would not be called trade of 
commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words. As it is put by 
defendant, personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of 
commerce. That which in its consummation is not commerce does not 
become commerce among the States because the transportation that we 
have mentioned takes place. To repeat the illustrations given by the Court 
below, a firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue a case, or the 
Chautauqua lecture bureau sending out lecturers, does not engage in such 
commerce because the lawyer or lecturer goes to another State. 
 
If we are right the plaintiff’s business is to be described in the same way 
and the restrictions by contract that prevented the plaintiff from getting 
players to break their bargains and the other conduct charged against the 
defendants were not an interference with commerce among the States. 
 
In other words, the business of baseball is not interstate commerce, and thus is not 
covered by the Sherman Act.  
 Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions reaffirmed the decision in 
Federal Club v. National League. In 1953, the Court decided the case of Toolson 
v. New York Yankees concerning an antitrust challenge to MLB’s reserve clause, 
which gave the first team to sign a player a continuing and exclusive right to his 
services. The Court ruled: 
 
In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), this Court held that the business of 
providing public baseball games for profit between clubs of professional 
baseball players was not within the scope of the federal antitrust laws. 
Congress has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit to 
bring such business under these laws by legislation having prospective 
effect. The business has thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the 
understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation. The 
present cases ask us to overrule the prior decision and, with retrospective 
effect, hold the legislation applicable. We think that if there are evils in 
this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should 
be by legislation. 
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In other words, if MLB’s antitrust exemption is to be removed, it will have to be 
by Congressional action. 
 Another antitrust challenge to MLB’s reserve clause was brought by 
Curtis Flood, who had signed with the Cincinnati Reds in 1956, was traded to the 
St. Louis Cardinals before the 1958 season, and then traded to the Philadelphia 
Phillies in 1969. Flood filed a lawsuit in 1970 charging violations of the federal 
antitrust laws, as well as civil rights and other statutes. The Supreme Court’s 
ruling contained an eight-point summary of its view: 
 
1. Professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate 
commerce. 
2. With its reserve system enjoying exemption from the antitrust laws, 
baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly. 
Federal Baseball and Toolson have become an aberration confined to 
baseball. 
3. Even though others might regard this as “unrealistic, inconsistent, or 
illogical,” see Radovich, 352 U.S., at 452, the aberration is an 
established one, and one that has been recognized not only in Federal 
Baseball and Toolson, but in Shubert, International Boxing, and 
Radovich, as well, a total of five cases in this Court. It is an aberration 
that has been with us now for half a century, one heretofore deemed 
fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived 
the Court’s expanding concept of interstate commerce. It rests on a 
recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics and 
needs. 
4. Other professional sports operating interstate – football, boxing, 
basketball, and presumably, hockey and golf – are not so exempt. 
5. The advent of radio and television, with their consequent increased 
coverage and additional revenues, has not occasioned an overruling of 
Federal Baseball and Toolson. 
6. The Court has emphasized that since 1922 baseball, with full and 
continuing congressional awareness, has been allowed to develop and 
to expand unhindered by federal legislative action. Remedial 
legislation has been introduced repeatedly in Congress but none has 
ever been enacted. The Court, accordingly, has concluded that 
Congress as yet has had no intention to subject baseball’s reserve 
system to the reach of the antitrust statutes. This, obviously, has been 
deemed to be something other than mere congressional silence and 
passivity… 
7. The Court has expressed concern about the confusion and the 
retroactivity problems that inevitably would result with a judicial 
overturning of Federal Baseball. It has voiced a preference that if any 
change is to be made, it come by legislative action that, by its nature, 
is only prospective in operation. 
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 8. The Court noted in Radovich, 352 U.S., at 452, that the slate with 
respect to baseball is not clean. Indeed, it has not been clean for half a 
century. 
This emphasis and this concern are still with us. We continue to be loath, 
50 years after Federal Baseball and almost two decades after Toolson, to 
overturn those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction has 
allowed those decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere 
inference and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove 
them legislatively. 
 
In other words, MLB’s antitrust exemption, if it is to be stripped at all, must be 
stripped by Congress, not by the courts.  
 Congress did step in to limit MLB’s antitrust exemption in one area. The 
Curt Flood Act of 1998 states that “major league baseball players are covered 
under the antitrust laws (i.e., that major league baseball players will have the same 
rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football and 
basketball players).” For example, if baseball owners declared negotiations with 
the players’ union at an impasse and sought to impose their own terms, major 
league baseball players could decertify their union, and then challenge the 
owners’ actions under the antitrust laws – just as professional football and 
basketball players can. Note that the Act applies only to “major league” baseball 
players, not players in the minor leagues. 
 While the Curt Flood Act limited MLB’s antitrust exemption in one area, 
it reaffirmed it in all other areas: the business of baseball at the minor league 
level; the relationship between major and minor league baseball; decisions about 
franchise expansion, location, and relocation; decisions about franchise ownership 
transfers; dealings with umpires; television contracts with the broadcast networks; 
and so on.  
 The limits of MLB’s antitrust exemption were addressed by the 2003 
decision by the Appeals Court for the Eleventh Circuit in the case of MLB v. 
Charlie Crist, which concerned MLB’s attempt to stop the Florida Attorney 
General from investigating MLB’s contraction plans (Florida’s two teams, the 
Florida Marlins and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, were the only teams to oppose 
contraction and were leading candidates to be eliminated.) The appeals court ruled 
that MLB’s antitrust exemption is not limited to the reserve clause, as the Florida 
Attorney General argued, by rather extends to the “business of baseball.” The 
contraction issue relates to the number of teams participating in league play and 
thus is “obviously” part of the business of baseball. Moreover, baseball teams 
cannot be prosecuted under state antitrust laws for activity which falls under the 
“business-of-baseball” exemption. However, MLB’s antitrust exemption does not 
apply to dealings between teams and third-parties. 
 Given MLB’s antitrust exemption, the question naturally arises: what can 
MLB do that the NFL, NBA, and NHL cannot? In terms of restrictions on player 
salaries and mobility, possibly very little. The reason is that each league has to 
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with its players’ union. While MLB, 
in theory, has an antitrust exemption that permits implementation of a reserve 
clause and other restrictions on player mobility, it ultimately has to reach an 
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 agreement with its (very strong) players’ union, which invariably will demand 
some form of quid pro quo. When MLB owners purportedly colluded in refusing 
to sign free agents during the period 1986-88, they did not violate the federal 
antitrust laws, but they did violate their collective bargaining agreement’s anti-
collusion provision – Article XX(F).26 (The impact on players is examined in 
more detail in Chapter 6.) 
 On the other hand, MLB may be able to impose restrictions on teams that 
other leagues cannot. For example, team relocation is far less common in MLB 
than in other sports leagues. The only recent relocation of a MLB team is the 
Montreal Expo’s move to Washington D.C. The NFL and NHL, in contrast, have 
experienced numerous team relocations. Sometimes these leagues have succeeded 
in preventing a relocation (e.g., the St. Louis Blues’ move to Saskatoon); 
sometimes they have not (e.g., the Oakland Raiders’ move to Los Angeles). (The 
impact of relocation restrictions on teams is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
3).   
 What would be the impact if MLB lost its antitrust exemption? Opinions 
vary.27 The largest impact may be on baseball’s minor league system. As Hylton 
(1999) explains, baseball’s antitrust exemption applies not only to MLB, but to an 
entity called “Organized Baseball” of which MLB is just one part. There are a 
number of minor leagues (Class A, AA, and AAA) and they are bound together 
contractually with MLB by the National Agreement, which dates back to 1883. 
Hylton observes: “From the time of the first National Agreement in 1883, 
member teams and leagues have agreed to respect the territorial rights of other 
teams and to refrain from competing for the services of players except by those 
rules specifically set out in the agreement… Key to the operation of this system 
have been the concepts of league classification, salary caps, and reserved rights to 
players.” (p. 393) Without Organized Baseball’s antitrust exemption, this system 
could not continue in its present form. It should be noted that the NFL and NBA, 
in contrast, have a much less developed minor league system, with college 
football and basketball programs basically serving as their minor league systems.  
 Another possible impact could be a wave of team relocations, as small 
market clubs move to more profitable locations. Such relocations, in turn, could 
affect MLB owner support for a luxury tax on teams with the highest player 
payrolls. 
 
 
Judicial ‘single-entity’ exemption: In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the 
case of Copperweld v. Independence Tube, which dealt with the question of 
whether Copperweld and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Regal Tube, were capable 
of conspiring with each other in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The 
Court ruled they were not: 
 
                                                 
26 See Ferguson, Jones, and Stewart (2000) and Silverman v. MLB Players Relations 
Committee. 
27 See, for example, Ross (1989), Scully (1989), Roberts (1994, 2003) and Zimbalist 
(1994). 
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 The coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must 
be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of §1 of the Sherman 
Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of 
interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate, and their general 
corporate objectives are guided or determined not by two separate 
corporate consciousnesses, but one. With or without a formal 
“agreement,” the subsidiary acts for the parent’s benefit. If the parent and 
subsidiary “agree” to a course of action, there is no sudden joining of 
economic resources that had previously served different interests, and 
there is no justification for §1 scrutiny. In reality, the parent and subsidiary 
always have a “unity of purpose or a common design.” The “intra-
enterprise conspiracy” doctrine relies on artificial distinctions, looking to 
the form of an enterprise’s structure and ignoring the reality. Antitrust 
liability should not depend on whether a corporate subunit is organized as 
an unincorporated division or a wholly owned subsidiary. 
 
In other words, a parent company cannot engage in an antitrust conspiracy with 
only its wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
 Suppose that instead of forming a sports league whose members are 
independent teams, a newly-formed sports league itself owned the teams and 
permitted investors in the league to operate, but not own, specific teams. Would 
such a league be analogous to a parent company and its wholly-owned 
subsidiaries? If so, the Supreme Court’s Copperweld decision would seem to 
suggest that the league and its teams would be incapable of conspiring to violate 
the antitrust laws. The league would seemingly be free to adopt, for example, 
restrictions on player salaries and mobility without fear of being found guilty of 
an antitrust violation. 
 Major League Soccer adopted such an organizational structure when it 
formed in 1995. MLS began play the next year. In February 1997, eight MLS 
players sued the league, the league’s operator/investors, and the United States 
Soccer Federation (USSF) under a number of antitrust theories: Count I alleged 
that the league and the operator/investors violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
by agreeing not to compete for player services; Count III alleged that the league 
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing, attempting to 
monopolize, or combining or conspiring with the USSF to monopolize the market 
for the services of Division I professional soccer players in the United States by 
preventing the sanctioning of any other entity as a Division I professional soccer 
league in the United States; and Count IV alleged that the operator/investors 
violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act by combining assets in such a way as to 
substantially lessen competition and tend to create monopoly. 
 In its 2002 decision, the Appeals Court for the First Circuit rejected the 
players’ arguments, but declined to express total support for the league’s view 
that it is a single-entity and falls inside the Copperweld safe harbor. The appeals 
court observed: “In many ways, MLS does resemble an ordinary company: it 
owns substantial assets (teams, player contracts, stadium rights, intellectual 
property) critical to the performance of the league; a substantial portion of 
generated revenues belongs to it and is to be shared conventionally with both 
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 operator/investors and passive investors.” The court then added a number of 
reservations: 
 
Nevertheless, it is hard to treat the corporate integration as conclusive. The 
challenge here is primarily to the operator/investors’ role as team 
managers, not as ordinary stockholders, and to restrictions imposed on 
them in that role preventing competition for player services. That a 
stockholder may be insulated by Copperweld when making ordinary 
governance decisions does not mean automatic protection when the 
stockholder is also an entrepreneur separately contracting with the 
company. Above all, there are functional differences between this case and 
Copperweld that are significant for antitrust policy. 
 
First, there is a diversity of entrepreneurial interests that goes well beyond 
the ordinary company. MLS and its operator/investors have separate 
contractual relationships giving the operator/investors rights that take them 
part way along the path to ordinary sports team owners: they do some 
independent hiring and make out-of-pocket investments in their own 
teams; they retain a large portion of the revenues from the activities of 
their teams; and each has limited sale rights in its own team that relate to 
specific assets and not just shares in the common enterprise. One might 
well ask why the formal difference in corporate structure should warrant 
treating MLS differently than the National Football League or other 
traditionally structured sports leagues. 
 
This contrasts with Copperweld’s observation that the parent and its 
wholly owned subsidiary in that case shared a “complete unity of 
interests.”… 
 
Second, in this case the analogy to a single entity is weakened, and the 
resemblance to a collaborative venture strengthened, by the fact that the 
operator/investors are not mere servants of MLS; effectively, they control 
it, having the majority of votes on the managing board. The problem is 
especially serious where, as here, the stockholders are themselves 
potential competitors with MLS and with each other. Here, it is the MLS 
that has two roles: one as an entrepreneur with its own assets and 
revenues; the other (arguably) as a nominally vertical device for producing 
horizontal coordination, i.e., limiting competition among 
operator/investors. 
 
From the standpoint of antitrust policy, this prospect of horizontal 
coordination among the operator/investors through a common entity is a 
distinct concern. 
 
The appeals court ultimately concluded that it did not have to reach a definite 
decision on whether MLS is a ‘single-entity’ for antitrust purposes: 
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 To sum up, the present case is not Copperweld but presents a more 
doubtful situation; MLS and its operator/investors comprise a hybrid 
arrangement, somewhere between a single company (with or without 
wholly owned subsidiaries) and a cooperative arrangement between 
existing competitors. And, of course, there is not one kind of hybrid but a 
range of possibilities (imagine the operator/investors with their separate 
entrepreneurial interests but without their control of MLS). The question is 
what legal approach to take… 
 
In all events, we conclude that the single entity problem need not be 
answered definitely in this case. 
 
Stuck (2004) explores whether MLS’s push to build soccer-specific 
stadiums jeopardizes and erodes the league’s single-entity defense in future 
antitrust litigation. In February 2000, the league had twelve teams and nine 
operator-investors. The number of teams has since dropped to ten, while the 
number of operator-investors plunged to three: Anschutz Entertainment Group 
(operating six teams – the Chicago Fire, Colorado Rapids, D.C. United, Los 
Angeles Galaxy, San Jose Earthquakes, and New York/New Jersey MetroStars), 
the Hunt family (operating two teams – the Columbus Crew and Kansas City 
Wizards), and the Kraft family (operating one team – the New England 
Revolution). Lamar Hunt privately financed the Columbia Crew stadium himself, 
but he insists he needs a dual-purpose football/soccer, not a soccer-specific, 
stadium for Kansas City. Kraft built a dual-purpose stadium for the New England 
football and soccer teams, a plan embraced by MLS. The interests of the operator-
owners and MLS may diverge as public funding is sought for more soccer-
specific stadiums. Stuck argues: “MLS’s current inability to coordinate facility 
issues among its three primary investors further erodes the appearance of a true 
‘unity of interest,’ and thus, further erodes the league’s single-entity defense.” (p. 
569)  
MLS’s single-entity structure has also been attacked as a ‘sham’ 
corporation and therefore not entitled to antitrust immunity.28  
 
 
Statutory exemptions:29 On a number of occasions, the U.S. Congress passed, and 
the president signed, bills granting limited antitrust immunity to sports leagues. 
 In 1953, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an antitrust lawsuit 
against the NFL seeking an injunction against continued enforcement of Article X 
of the NFL’s Bylaws which prohibited the telecasting of any NFL games into the 
‘home territory’ (generally defined as a 75-mile zone) of a team playing a home 
game the same day. The league was concerned about the impact of televising 
games on live attendance. At the time, television rights fees were insignificant 
relative to ticket and other stadium revenue. Article X, however, also prohibited 
                                                 
28 See Brill (1999), Sullivan (2000), and Waxman (2001). 
29 The discussion in this section is based primarily on the Voluntary Trade Council 
(2005), and to a much lesser extent on Cohen (1994). 
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 teams from broadcasting their games in another team’s home territory, even if that 
team was playing an away game (unless permission was received from both teams 
playing that game). The DOJ contended that Article X was an unreasonable 
restraint of trade and thus a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district 
court ruled that the restriction on telecasts in the home territories of teams playing 
a home game was pro-competitive, but the restriction on telecasts in the home 
territories of teams playing away games was ‘unreasonable’ and a violation of the 
antitrust laws. 
 Prior to 1961, NFL teams negotiated individual television contracts. In 
1961, the NFL authorized its commissioner, Alvin ‘Pete’ Rozelle to negotiate a 
single national television contract with CBS. Once the contract was signed, the 
NFL filed a petition asking the district court to find that the deal did not violate 
the antitrust laws. The district court decided, however, that the contract violated 
its previous order. (Interestingly, at this time, the AFL, NBA, and NHL also had 
single network contracts.)  
 The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 was passed in response to the district 
court’s decision. The Act stated: 
 
The antitrust laws … shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among 
persons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports 
of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs 
participating in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey 
contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such 
league’s member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of 
football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or 
conducted by such clubs. 
 
In other words, the four major professional sports leagues in the U.S. could 
negotiate contracts with the broadcast networks to televise their games and those 
contracts would be immune from challenge under the antitrust laws.  
Note that the Act applies only to “professional” sports. The NCAA, for 
example, was not given an antitrust exemption to negotiate television deals. 
Moreover, the Act applies only to the mentioned four sports – football, baseball, 
basketball, and hockey – and thus a professional soccer league, for instance, 
would not be covered by the antitrust exemption. 
Note also that the Act does not apply to all telecasting, but rather only to 
“sponsored” telecasting, which has been interpreted as mean ‘free’ television – 
broadcast networks such as ABC, CBS, and NBC. As a result, the appeals court 
ruled in Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys that the NFL’s deal with the satellite broadcaster 
DIRECTV to offer ‘NFL Sunday Ticket,’ an all-or-nothing package, was not 
covered by the Act’s antitrust exemption.  
The Sports Broadcasting Act was amended by the Football Merger Act of 
1966 to provide an antitrust exemption for the merger of the NFL and AFL. The 
amendment read: 
 
In addition, such laws shall not apply to a joint agreement by which the 
member clubs of two or more professional football leagues … combine 
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 their operations in expanded single league … if such agreement increases 
rather than decreases the number of professional football clubs so 
operating, and the provisions of which are directly relevant thereto. 
  
Note that the amendment applies only to professional football league mergers, and 
even more, only to those that do not result in a decrease in the combined number 
of teams.30 Thus, when the NBA and ABA sought to merge in the early 1970s, the 
proposed merger was not covered by the Sports Broadcasting Act and the leagues 
had to obtain separate congressional approval. 
 The Football Merger Act was attached to a minor tax bill by Senator 
Russell Long of Louisiana. Press rumors suggested that the NFL would express 
its appreciation by awarding the next NFL franchise to New Orleans. Soon 
thereafter, New Orleans was in fact awarded an NFL franchise.  
 
 
Non-statutory exemptions: Labor unions have a ‘statutory’ exemption from the 
antitrust laws. As the Appeals Court for the Eighth Circuit explained in Mackey v. 
NFL, the Clayton Act and other statutes “declare that labor unions are not 
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, and specifically exempt certain 
union activities such as secondary picketing and group boycotts from the 
coverage of the antitrust laws.” The purpose of this statutory exemption was “to 
insulate legitimate collective activity by employees, which is inherently 
anticompetitive but is favored by federal labor policy, from the proscriptions of 
the antitrust laws.” This statutory exemption “extends to legitimate labor activities 
unilaterally undertaken by a union in furtherance of its own interests,” but “does 
not extend to concerted action or agreements between unions and non-labor 
groups.” However, the U.S. Supreme Court had earlier ruled, in the words of the 
appeals court, “that in order to properly accommodate the congressional policy 
favoring free competition in business markets with the congressional policy 
favoring collective bargaining under the Federal Labor Relations Act … certain 
union-employer agreements must be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption 
from the antitrust sanctions.” 
 Mackey v. NFL was a lawsuit brought by professional football players 
alleging that the NFL’s “Rozelle Rule” violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
The Rozelle Rule, named after the NFL commissioner, required a team signing a 
player whose contract had expired with another team to pay compensation to the 
player’s former team. One of the questions the appeals court had to decide in 
1976 was whether the Rozelle Rule fell under the non-statutory labor exemption, 
and it enumerated three necessary conditions: (1) “the restraint on trade primarily 
affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship”; (2) “the 
agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining”; and (3) “the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona 
fide arm’s-length bargaining.” The appeals court concluded that the Rozelle Rule 
failed to satisfy the third condition because the Rule pre-dated the advent of the 
                                                 
30 The Act specifies a few other restrictions as well. For example, the separate and 
combined leagues must be not-for-profit tax-exempt associations. 
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 collective bargaining relationship (the Rule was imposed in 1963, well before the 
collective bargaining agreements of 1968 and 1970) and, furthermore, there was 
insufficient evidence of a quid pro quo (the NFL claimed that there was a quid 
pro quo and players received increased pension benefits and the right to 
individually negotiate their salaries). Thus, the Rozelle Rule was not covered by 
the non-statutory labor exemption and the appeals court found that “the Rule, as 
implemented, contravenes the Rule of Reason and thus constitutes an 
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act.” 
 While the business practice in dispute in Mackey v. NFL was not covered 
by the non-statutory labor exemption, numerous league activities have been found 
to be so covered. In 1987, the Appeals Court for the Second Circuit ruled in Wood 
v. NBA that the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement governing a 
salary cap and the college draft are covered and, in January 1995, ruled in NBA v. 
Williams that “the antitrust laws do not prohibit employers from bargaining 
jointly with a union, from implementing their joint proposals in the absence of a 
CBA [collective bargaining agreement], or from using economic force to obtain 
agreement to those proposals. What limits on such conduct that exist are found in 
the labor laws.” 
In September 1995, the same appeals court ruled in the case of Caldwell v. 
ABA. Caldwell alleged that he was blacklisted for his ABA union activities and 
rested his antitrust claim on two interrelated propositions: (1) he should have the 
right to seek the best terms for his services as a professional basketball player and 
(2) he should have the right not to have teams collusively agree upon the terms 
upon which he will or will not be hired. The appeals court disagreed: “Once the 
ABA became obligated to recognize the ABA Players Association as the 
exclusive bargaining representative of the ABA players, therefore, Caldwell lost 
the right to seek the best bargain from individual ABA teams” and, moreover, 
“those teams became exempt from any antitrust rule that might have compelled 
them to compete individually for players represented by the Union.” 
In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Brown v. Pro 
Football. When negotiations with the players’ union reached an impasse in 1989, 
the NFL had unilaterally implemented a plan to permit each team to establish a 
‘developmental squad’ of substitute players, each of whom would be paid the 
same fixed salary of $1,000 per week. In 1990, 235 developmental squad players 
sued the NFL alleging the fixed $1,000 weekly salary violated section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. The Court noted that the question at issue is: “Does it [the non-
statutory labor exemption] apply to an agreement among several employers 
bargaining together to implement after impasse the terms of their last best good-
faith wage offer?” The Court concluded it does. 
In 2004, the Appeals Court for the Second Circuit decided the case of 
Clarett v. NFL, which challenged the NFL’s eligibility rules for the NFL draft. 
Those rules required a player to be more than three football seasons removed 
from high school before being eligible to be drafted by an NFL team. The appeals 
court observed that, although the eligibility rules do not appear in the collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA), they do appear in the NFL Constitution and 
Bylaws, which are mentioned in the CBA. The appeals court ruled: 
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 Clarett argues that the NFL clubs are horizontal competitors for the 
labor of professional football players and thus may not agree that a 
player will be hired only after three full football seasons have 
elapsed following that player’s high school graduation. That 
characterization, however, neglects that the labor market for NFL 
players is organized around a collective bargaining relationship 
that is provided for and promoted by federal labor law, and that the 
NFL clubs, as a multi-employer bargaining unit, can act jointly in 
setting the terms and conditions of players’ employment and the 
rules of the sport without risking antitrust liability. For those 
reasons, the NFL argues that federal labor law favoring and 
governing the collective bargaining process precludes the 
application of the antitrust laws to its eligibility rules. We agree. 
 
It should be noted that the boundaries of the non-statutory labor exemption 
remain imprecise.31 The U.S. Supreme Court held in Brown v. Pro Football that 
the exemption applied, but did not define its precise contours. The Appeals Court 
for the Second Circuit does not regard the three conditions set forth by the 
Appeals Court for the Eighth District in Mackey v. NFL as defining the 
appropriate limits.  
 
 
Proving Antitrust Violations: Proving an antitrust conspiracy is somewhat different than 
proving an attempt to monopolize, and both are somewhat different than proving an 
anticompetitive merger. 32 
 
Proving violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act: When is a restraint of trade 
‘unreasonable’? For some types of conduct, the answer is clear. Courts have 
developed the doctrine of ‘per se’ illegality to deal with blatantly anticompetitive 
conduct. In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote: “Per se 
rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of 
anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of 
the challenged conduct.” For conduct which is a per se offense, it is sufficient to 
demonstrate that the defendant engaged in the conduct. If so, the defendant is 
guilty; it is no defense to argue that the conduct had little anticompetitive effect – 
the size of the effect is irrelevant to the question of guilt.    
 Per se violations include horizontal price fixing (i.e., price fixing by 
producers of competing products), vertical price fixing (i.e., the seller and buyer 
agree on the specific price at which the buyer will resell the product – as opposed 
to the seller ‘suggesting’ a resale price), and allocation of markets or customers. 
Concerted refusal to deal (i.e., horizontal boycotts such as sellers of competing 
products agreeing not to deal with a competitor known to have cut prices or 
                                                 
31 See Clarett v. NFL. 
32 This discussion is based, in part, on “Executive Summary of the Antitrust Laws” by 
Richard M. Steuer of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, LLP, which is posted 
on the Findlaw website at http://profs.lp.findlaw.com/antitrust/. 
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 buyers of a product agreeing not to deal with a particular seller) formerly was 
considered a ‘classic’ per se offense, but courts now are somewhat more selective 
in applying the per se rule in such cases. 
 Conduct which is not a per se offense is judged under the ‘Rule of 
Reason.’ The U.S. Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents acknowledged 
that there is no “bright line” separating the two: 
 
Indeed, there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason 
analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market 
conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive 
conduct. For example, while the Court has spoken of a “per se” rule 
against tying arrangements, it has also recognized that tying may have 
procompetitive justifications that make it inappropriate to condemn 
without considerable market analysis. 
 
 The basics of a Rule of Reason analysis were described by the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Law v. NCAA: 
 
Courts have imposed a consistent structure on rule of reason analysis by 
casting it in terms of shifting burdens of proof… Under this approach, the 
plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that an agreement had a 
substantially adverse effect on competition… If the plaintiff meets this 
burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence 
of the procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct… If the 
defendant is able to demonstrate procompetitive effects, the plaintiff then 
must prove that the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to 
achieve the legitimate objectives or that those objectives can be achieved 
in a substantially less restrictive manner… Ultimately, if these steps are 
met, the harms and benefits must be weighed against each other in order to 
judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable. 
  
Thus, a rule of reason analysis generally involves three categories of 
economic evidence: (1) evidence that the conduct had a “substantially adverse 
effect on competition”; (2) evidence that the conduct has “procompetitive 
virtues”; and (3) evidence that the conduct “is not reasonably necessary to achieve 
the legitimate objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a substantially 
less restrictive manner.” 
A “substantially adverse effect on competition” may be demonstrated, for 
example, by a showing that players and/or coaches are being paid less – or sports 
fans and television networks are paying more – than they would be in a 
competitive market. A “procompetitive virtue” of a league rule or practice may be 
demonstrated by showing its effectiveness in maintaining competitive balance 
among teams. Whether the rule or practice “is not reasonably necessary” to 
maintain competitive balance or whether competitive balance “can be achieved in 
a substantially less restrictive manner” may be demonstrated by showing the 
ineffectiveness of the challenged rule or practice in maintaining competitive 
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 balance or showing the effectiveness of less restrictive rules and practices in 
maintaining competitive balance. 
Economists have developed a number of measures of competitive balance. 
One measure is the season-to-season correlation in team winning percentage. If 
the correlation is relatively low, a ‘bad’ team one season has a reasonable 
probability of becoming a ‘mediocre’ or ‘good’ team the next season, whereas a 
‘good’ team faces a reasonably probability of being less-good the next season. A 
second measure of competitive balance is the within-season variance of team 
winning percentages. The lower the variance, the more ‘parity’ among teams.  
  
 
Proving violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act: Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
prohibits the act of monopolization and the attempt to monopolize; it does not 
prohibit simply being a monopoly.  
Proof of the act of monopolization requires a showing that the defendant 
(1) possesses ‘monopoly power’ in the ‘relevant market’ and (2) willfully 
acquired or maintained that power. ‘Monopoly power,’ as defined by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, is the power to control prices or exclude competition.33 The 
‘relevant market’ is determined by identifying the ‘product market’ (i.e., the 
products that buyers would substitute in response to a small but significant and 
nontransitory price increase) and ‘geographic market’ (i.e., the area that buyers 
would patronize given a small but significant and nontransitory price increase). 
The question of whether monopoly power has been ‘willfully acquired or 
maintained’ is, in the words of one attorney, “ephemeral and difficult to 
determine.” 34 Monopoly power has been ‘willfully acquired or maintained’ if it is 
‘abused’ or used to intentionally drive out the competition; monopoly power has 
also been ‘willfully acquired or maintained’ if the defendant engaged in conscious 
acts to further or maintain its market position by such acts as acquisitions of 
competitors, exclusive dealing, and predatory pricing; however, monopoly power 
has not been ‘willfully acquired or maintained’ if the defendant’s market position 
is achieved by offering a superior product, possessing superior business acumen, 
or being the beneficiary of a historical accident (or just dumb luck).   
Proof of the attempt to monopolize requires a showing that (1) the 
defendant had a ‘specific intent’ to monopolize, (2) the defendant engaged in 
anticompetitive acts designed to injure actual or potential competition, and (3) a 
‘dangerous probability of success’ existed that the defendant would in fact 
achieve monopoly power.  
Economists have identified several indicators that a defendant possesses 
monopoly power, including high price-cost margins, high barriers to entry, and 
                                                 
33 Landes and Posner (1981) define ‘market power’ as “the ability of a firm (or a group of 
firms, acting jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing so 
many sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded”; 
they define ‘monopoly power’ as “a high degree of market power.” (p. 937) 
34 See “Executive Summary of the Antitrust Laws” by Richard M. Steuer of Kaye, 
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, LLP, which is posted on the Findlaw website at 
http://profs.lp.findlaw.com/antitrust/. 
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 high risk-adjusted rates of return.35 To be evidence of monopoly power, however, 
these indicators must persist for a significant period of time – long enough for 
new competitors to enter the market if they choose to do so and long enough for 
the current firms in the industry to adjust their production. 
Price-cost margins are generally used to approximate the amount by which 
the current price exceeds the price that would prevail under competition. Since 
price equals marginal cost in a ‘purely competitive’ industry, the price-cost 
margin is typically calculated as the difference between the market price and 
marginal cost, expressed as a percentage of the market price. Calculated in this 
way, the price-cost margin is known as the ‘Lerner Index.’ The Lerner Index does 
not reflect risk. Thus, an industry may have an average price-cost margin far 
above that of other industries not because the firms in that industry have 
monopoly power, but because the industry is very risky – as would be the case if 
the cost of developing new innovative products is high and product life is short 
due to rapid technological change in the industry. The Lerner Index also may be 
positive simply because there are fixed costs of operating in the industry. 
One drawback of the Lerner Index is the need to measure marginal cost – 
the cost of producing the last unit of output. One way to finesse this problem is to 
develop an economic model and derive an alternative expression for the price-cost 
margin whose variables are more easily measured. It can be shown using a simple 
single-period model that a monopolist maximizes profits at the output level where 
the price-cost margin equals the inverse of the industry (and, in the case of a 
monopoly, the firm’s) price elasticity of demand, (p-c)/p = -1/ε, where p is the 
market price, c is marginal cost, and ε is the industry price elasticity of demand.36 
Thus, there is a direct relationship between the Lerner Index and the industry 
elasticity of demand. If the industry elasticity of demand is -2, for example, then 
the market price is two times marginal cost.37 In industries where marginal cost 
increases as output expands, the Lerner Index gives an upper bound on the 
deviation of the monopoly price from the price that would prevail under 
competition because, c, the marginal cost at the monopolist’s profit-maximizing 
output level will be less than the marginal cost at the higher output level under 
competition.  
 If instead of a single firm (a monopolist), the industry consists of a 
‘dominant firm’ and a ‘competitive fringe,’ the Lerner Index for dominant firm i, 
Li, is  
Li = (pi – ci)/pi = Si/(εdm + εsj (1-Si)), 
where pi is the price charged by firm i, ci is the marginal cost of firm i, Si is the 
market share of firm i, εdm is the industry price elasticity of demand, and εsj is the 
                                                 
35 See Landes and Posner (1981), Brennan (1982), Kaplow (1982), Ordover, Sykes, and 
Willig (1982), and Schmalensee (1982). 
36 The elasticity of demand, ε, is the percentage change in quantity purchased in response 
to a 1% change in the market price. See Landes and Posner (1981) for the derivation 
of this equation. 
37 A profit-maximizing monopolist maximizes output in the elastic area of the industry 
demand curve and thus ε is at least 1 in absolute value. The closer ε is to 1, the higher 
the Lerner Index. 
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 elasticity of supply of the fringe firms.38 Thus, the Lerner Index is higher (1) the 
larger the market share of the dominant firm, (2) the more inelastic the industry 
demand, and (3) the more inelastic the supply of fringe firms. Note that the 
dominant firm’s market share, in isolation, may provide a misleading indication 
of the amount by which the market price exceeds that which would prevail in a 
competitive market. A dominant firm may have little ability to price above the 
competitive level if industry demand is very elastic (for example, if there are a lot 
of good substitutes for the firm’s product) and if the supply elasticity of fringe 
firms is very elastic (i.e., fringe firms significantly increase their output in 
response to even a small increase in the market price). 
If there is no single dominant firm (i.e., if the market is an ‘oligopoly’), 
then the Lerner Index for firm i is  
Li = (pi – ci)/pi = Si(1+ki)/(εdm + εsj (1-Si)), 
where ki is the ‘conjectural variation’ of firm i (i.e., firm i’s estimate of the 
aggregate amount that its rivals will change their output if it changes its output by 
one unit).39 If ki is positive, firm i expects its rivals to parallel its actions – if firm 
i expands output, its rivals expand their output; if firm i cuts back its output, its 
rivals cut back their output. If ki is negative, firm i expects its rivals to counteract 
its actions – if firm i expands output, its rivals cut back their output; if firm i cuts 
back its output, its rivals expand their output. Note that the derivation of the 
Lerner Index for a dominant firm implicitly assumed ki = 0 – firm i does not 
believe its rivals will change their output in response to a change in its output. 
Note also that firm i has greater monopoly power when it expects its rivals to 
parallel its actions (ki  > 0) than when it expects its rivals to counter its actions (ki 
< 0). 
Another indicator of monopoly power is barriers to entry. If an industry is 
highly profitable, existing firms in the industry may seek to expand and firms not 
in the industry may seek to enter. In either case, the profitability of the industry 
should fall so that, on a risk-adjusted basis, it is no more or less profitable than 
other industries. Moreover, even if the existing firms refrain from expanding so as 
to preserve their above-average risk-adjusted returns, potential entrants will 
nevertheless have an incentive to enter to capture some of those returns. One 
reason why there may be no entry even if an industry is experiencing a prolonged 
period of above-average risk-adjusted returns that that there are ‘barriers to entry.’  
According to Ross (2003), sports leagues engage in practices that create 
barriers to entry, such as assigning exclusive territories to teams and limiting the 
number of teams in the league. Rascher (1996) argues that a number of barriers to 
entry exist in the case of sports leagues. One barrier to entry is the fixed supply of 
stadiums – exclusive territories prevent teams in the same league from competing 
with one another and creation of a rival league would require securing sufficient 
unused stadium capacity to operate a league with the minimum number of teams. 
A second barrier to entry is the limited number of television outlets (although 
Rascher observes that this barrier has fallen as the number of television networks 
has proliferated in recent years). A third barrier to entry is the ‘winner-take-all’ 
                                                 
38 See Landes and Posner (1981) for the derivation of this equation. 
39 See Ordover, Sykes, and Willig (1982) for the derivation of this equation. 
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 nature of the market – high fixed costs and low marginal costs mean that 
consumers will purchase only the highest quality product since it will not cost 
significantly more than lower-quality products. Thus, “there is no room for 
second-tier talent in winner-take-all markets.” (p. 6)  
Persistently high profitability is another indicator of monopoly power. 
Risk-adjusted rates of return should equalize across industries over time; in the 
words of Schmalensee (1982), “persistent excess profits provide a good 
indication of long-run power; they show clearly that there is some impediment to 
effective imitation of the firm in question.” (p. 1806) One problem, however, is 
how to measure risk-adjusted profitability. In theory, it should be possible to 
calculate the rate of return earned by the original owners of teams in a sports 
league. It should also be possible to calculate the rate of return earned by buyers 
of established teams. The rate of return earned by the latter, in theory, should be 
far lower than that of the former – established teams are far less risky investments 
than investing in a team that is part of a startup league, as the sports league 
histories of Chapter 1 would suggest. There have been numerous sports leagues 
formed since 1900. Only a handful did not fold. While these surviving leagues – 
the NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB – appear today to be formidable competitors for 
any startup league, they were not always so. 
One attempt to estimate the profitability of sports franchise ownership was 
conducted by Scully (1995). He finds that, in the early 1990s, sports franchises 
earned an average return of 27%; it was larger for franchises located in large 
metropolitan areas (33.3%) than in smaller ones (20.5%). In comparison, stock 
market investors tend to earn about 10% annually and the median profit rate of the 
500 largest industrial companies is between 3.9% and 5.5% of sales. Scully 
believes that “it would be fair to conclude that a number of clubs do evidence a 
monopoly return.” (p. 135) He adds: “If a 30-percent or greater return to franchise 
ownership is taken as evidence of monopoly, then about half of the clubs in 
professional team sports earn a monopoly return.” (p. 135) 
Monopoly power may also be inferred from the conduct of firms in an 
industry.40 For example, industries with histories of price fixing or dividing 
markets likely are composed of firms with monopoly power. Similarly, a firm 
which price discriminates or engages in predatory pricing likely has monopoly 
power.  
Thus, there are a number of indicators of monopoly power. None by itself 
is infallible, but together they provide strong evidence of whether a firm possesses 
monopoly power.  
Similarly, economists have developed measures of monopsony power. In 
the sports league context, monopsony power over players is typically inferred by 
estimating players’ marginal revenue product (MRP) net of training costs. Studies 
generally find that, prior to the introduction of free agency, players were paid far 
below their net MRP, which has been interpreted as evidence that sports leagues 
had monopsony power over players. Of course, an alternative explanation is that 
the estimated net MRPs are measured with considerable error resulting (i.e., a 
considerable upward bias). Each study has to make some assumptions about how 
                                                 
40 See Schmalensee (1982). 
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 a player impacts team revenue. An econometric model is needed to link player 
performance to live attendance or broadcast viewership ratings. There are many 
possible proxies for player performance. For example, in the baseball context, a 
pitcher’s performance could be proxied by his walks-to-strikeouts ratio, whereas a 
hitter’s performance could be proxied by his slugging percentage. Alternatively, a 
player’s performance could be measured by examining the impact on the team’s 
winning percentage when the player does not play (e.g., the player goes on the 
disabled list). The player’s marginal impact on team winning percentage is 
multiplied by the marginal impact of team winning percentage on live attendance 
or broadcast ratings. The player’s marginal impact on live attendance or broadcast 
ratings is then converted into monetary terms. For example, the player’s marginal 
impact on live attendance may be multiplied by average fan expenditures at 
games to get an estimate of the player’s marginal impact on team revenue from 
live attendance at its games.41  
Economists have also addressed the question of how to define the 
‘relevant market’ in which the monopoly power, if any, occurs. Unfortunately, 
little has been written specifically about the relevant market in antitrust litigation 
involving sports leagues. Seal (1993), however, does tackle this issue. He makes 
two key points: (1) “the general principles of market definition – with their focus 
on interchangeability of products and services from the point of view of those 
utilizing them – are equally applicable to antitrust claims arising in the sports and 
entertainment industries as they are in other contexts” and (2) courts and litigants 
“must always focus on the nature of the claim being asserted to make certain that 
they correctly determine whose view of interchangeability is relevant in resolving 
product market definition issues.” (p. 764) 
For example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 
a number of universities challenged the NCAA’s rules limiting the number of 
televised games any one team could play and restricting the total amount of 
televised intercollegiate football. The rules were not being challenged by, for 
example, television broadcasters or advertisers. Thus, Seal explains, “the issue 
was whether there were athletic organizations other than the NCAA to which the 
plaintiff universities could have turned if they were unhappy with the restrictions 
placed by the NCAA on their ability to televise their football games.” (pp. 754-
55) If the lawsuit had been brought by television broadcasters or advertisers, in 
contrast, the issue would have been “whether college football telecasts compete 
with other sports and entertainment programming.” (p. 754) Seal writes: “This 
restraint caused ‘antitrust injury’ to the colleges because of the market power the 
NCAA held over suppliers of the product, the universities with college football 
programs, not because of the market power which the NCAA had with respect to 
the demand for the product, broadcasts of college football games.” (p. 756) (The 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3.)  
Similarly, restrictions on player mobility may be challenged by the players 
for depressing salaries below the competitive level (i.e., the exercise of leagues’ 
monopsony power) or by rival leagues for foreclosing access to the market for 
                                                 
41 See, for example, Baade and Tuttle (1991). 
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 player services. In the case of antitrust lawsuit brought by players, the relevant 
market depends on players’ alternative employment possibilities, whereas in the 
case of an antitrust lawsuit brought by a rival league, the relevant market depends 
on alternative potential sources of players for the league. For example, from the 
perspective of NFL players, is playing in the Canadian Football League a 
substitute for playing in the NFL? Is the Canadian Football League a source for 
professional football players that can be tapped by a newly-created rival to the 
NFL? 
In International Boxing Club of New York v. U.S., the United States 
brought an antitrust suit against promoters of professional boxing matches who 
allegedly were able to control both championship boxing matches and boxers by 
means of their control over arenas suitable for professional boxing matches. The 
question was whether the relevant market was all professional boxing events (as 
the promoters argued) or just championship boxing contests, as the U.S. argued. 
Based of the large difference in average revenues, televisions ratings, movie 
rights, and ticket prices between championship and non-championship bouts, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that ‘a separate, identifiable market’ exists for 
championship boxing contests. Seal agrees:  
 
The foregoing market definition seems correct whether the 
antitrust concerns generated by the promoters’ market dominance 
are viewed from the point of view of suppliers in the market (the 
fighters) or the customers (broadcasters or fight fans). A fighter 
wishing to be a championship contender does not consider being 
relegated to participation in nontitle bouts as a substitute for his 
ability to fight in championship boxing events. The customers, too, 
apparently felt championship bouts were uniquely different from 
nontitle bouts as evidenced by their willingness to pay higher 
admission prices or broadcast fees for the privilege of viewing or 
broadcasting championship as opposed to nontitle fights. 
Championship boxing thus represented a distinct product market, 
whether the restraints being challenged were viewed from the point 
of view of the customer (broadcasters and boxing fans) or suppliers 
(boxers).  (p. 760) 
 
Likewise, in Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey 
Club, a rival hockey league brought an antitrust lawsuit against the NHL alleging 
that the NHL’s reserve clause and expansion violated Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act because it enabled the NHL to tie up virtually every professional-caliber 
hockey player. The question was whether the relevant market should include not 
only major league professional hockey leagues, but also minor league 
professional hockey leagues, semi-professional hockey leagues, and amateur 
hockey leagues. Given the higher ticket prices, higher television revenues, and 
higher player salaries of major league professional hockey relative to the other 
leagues, the district court found “the relevant product market to be major league 
professional hockey as it is currently played in the NHL.” Once again, Seal 
agrees: 
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This provision thus precluded the new league from competing for 
the supply of workers it needed by foreclosing the league from 
negotiating with NHL players. Of course, the new league was free 
to negotiate with players outside the NHL, but the court concluded 
that availability of such hockey players in minor league, semi-
professional, or amateur leagues did not provide the new league 
with suitable substitutes for professional hockey players bound by 
the reserve clauses in their contracts with NHL teams. Hockey fans 
did not view these minor league players’ skills as interchangeable 
with NHL players’ skills and thus these minor league players were 
not properly viewed as part of the market when the NHL’s market 
power over the supply of available players was measured. The 
court thus correctly focused on the availability of suitable product 
substitutes (hockey players) to the party challenging the restraint 
which limited availability of certain players needed by the plaintiff 
to compete. (p. 761)  
 
 
Proving violations of section 7 of the Clayton Act: Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
prohibits corporate acquisitions, whether of whole companies or only specific 
assets, if the likely result is a ‘substantial lessening of competition’ or a ‘tendency 
toward monopoly’ in any ‘relevant market.’ According to the Federal Trade 
Commission, there are at least two necessary conditions for a merger to likely 
have an anticompetitive effect: (1) the market must be “substantially 
concentrated” after the merger and (2) “it must be difficult for new firms to enter 
the market in the near term and provide effective competition.”42  
 
 
To summarize, the antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors. The 
antitrust laws do not outlaw simply being a monopoly (or monopsony) – the antitrust 
question, instead, is what did the monopoly (or monopsony) do to achieve and/or 
preserve its market position? In general, the actions of sports leagues are evaluated under 
a ‘rule of reason’ analysis.  It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to show that the actions had 
a ‘substantially adverse effect on competition.’ Nor is it necessarily sufficient, given the 
plaintiff proves a substantially adverse effect on competition, for the defendant to show 
that the actions have a pro-competitive (or ‘efficiency’) rationale – the plaintiff may be 
able to counter that the pro-competitive benefits could be achieved in a less restrictive 
manner. 
 One critical step in a rule of reason analysis is the delineation of the relevant 
product market. As Seal (1993) explains, the relevant product market would have been 
different if television broadcasters or advertisers, rather than universities, had been the 
plaintiffs in NCAA v. Board of Regents. As a result, antitrust analysis of a sports league’s 
actions depends on the identity of the party challenging those actions. Consequently, the 
                                                 
42 See the Federal Trade Commission publication titled “Promoting Competition, 
Protecting Consumers: A Plain English Guide to Antitrust Laws.” 
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 following chapters will be organized according to the identity of the challenging party: 
the league’s own team members (Chapter 3), rival leagues (Chapter 4), prospective teams 
and owners (Chapter 5), players (Chapter 6), coaches (Chapter 7), stadium owners 
(Chapter 8), equipment suppliers (Chapter 9), promoters/sponsors, for-profit sports camp 
operators, merchandisers, and the media (Chapter 10), and fans, taxpayers, and the 
federal government (Chapter 11). 
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 Chapter 3 
 
Sports Leagues vs. Their Own Member Teams 
 
 
 
 The interests of a sports league are not necessarily identical to the self-interests of 
its individual member teams. Sometimes an individual team wants to move to a more 
profitable location, while the league wants it to stay put. Sometimes a team wants to 
control its own merchandising, while the league wants to negotiate deals covering all 
teams. Sometimes a team wants to televise additional games beyond those covered by the 
league’s television deal. One common method by which the team seeks to pursue its own 
self-interest is to file a lawsuit alleging the onerous league rule violates the antitrust laws. 
 Noll (2003b) observes that teams seeking to form a league have five sets of 
decisions they have to make regarding league structure: (1) format – how will games be 
scheduled to determine a champion?; (2) hierarchy – how will the league relate to other 
leagues with higher or lower quality players?; (3) multiplicity – how many leagues will 
be at the same level in the hierarchy?; (4) membership – under what conditions can a 
team enter or exit the league?; and (5) governance – how will league rules and policies be 
decided and enforced? It is unlikely that teams will be unanimous in how they would like 
the league to be structured. Moreover, even if they agree on how the league’s rules and 
policies should be decided and enforced, they are unlikely to be unanimous in what those 
rules and policies should be. Thus, there is ample opportunity for the interests of a 
particular team to conflict with that of the league, which is determined by majority vote 
of the team owners.    
 This chapter begins with a discussion of the basics of cartels and joint ventures, 
each of which commonly has conflict with its members. Cartels use detection and 
punishment to hold its members in line. Joint ventures, somewhat similarly, may adopt 
certain rules to prevent individual member self-interest from destroying cooperation. 
Sports leagues attempt to prevent the self-interest of their individual teams from 
destroying the league by imposing a wide variety of rules. This chapter reviews a number 
of such rules, the antitrust challenges to those rules, and their alleged pro-competitive 
rationale.   
 
Basics of Cartels. The goal of a cartel is to maximize the aggregate profits of its 
individual members. Typically, it does so by restricting the output of its members relative 
to what they would produce if they competed with one another. If the non-cartel members 
do not expand their output sufficiently in response to the cartel’s output restriction, price 
will rise and the cartel members will earn higher aggregate profits than they could under 
competition. 
 Conflict may arise because each cartel member seeks to maximize its own profits, 
not the aggregate profits of the cartel. Thus, each cartel member would like to expand its 
output (i.e., sell more than its ‘quota’ at the higher price) and thus earn even higher 
profits than it would by obeying the cartel’s quota. However, if each cartel member 
‘cheats’ on the quota, aggregate output will not restrict as much as it otherwise would 
and, consequently, price will not rise as high. The cartel will therefore adopt a system to 
detect and punish cheating.  
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 Consider NCAA football. Fleisher, Shughart, Tollison, and Goff (1988) analyze 
data for the period 1953-83 and estimate an econometric model of whether a school’s 
football program has been put on probation. Schools with more variable winning 
percentages are found to be more likely to be put on probation, whereas schools with 
consistently high winning percentages are not more likely to be placed on probation. 
NCAA enforcement apparently protects the top-tier teams from up-and-coming teams. In 
short, the authors present “theoretical and empirical evidence on the methods that the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and its member schools use to detect 
violations of its cartel agreement” and conclude that “the enforcement of the NCAA rules 
has a redistributive effect that benefits consistent winners at the expense of up-and-
coming schools.” (p. 433)  
Similarly, Eckard (1998) examines ‘competitive balance’ before and after the 
NCAA enforcement system began in 1952. Although the NCAA apparently believes that 
such enforcement promotes competitive balance, Eckard documents that competitive 
balance has decreased since 1952, a result consistent with cartel theory: “Economic 
theory predicts that cartel enforcement should reduce playing-field balance over time; 
i.e., produce more stability (less ‘churning’) in conference standings and national 
rankings.” (p. 368) 
 Thus, there are likely to be conflicts between cartel members and these conflicts 
may make the cartel unstable. Ferguson, Jones, and Stewart (2000) observe that teams, 
“through the medium of the league, jointly promulgate rules that determine, in general, 
interteam behavior and, more specifically, the amount of output to be produced (number 
of games), all entry conditions, the negotiation and disposition of all national media 
contracts, interteam revenue sharing, and the basic conditions of player employment,” 
whereas each team simultaneously “is explicitly recognized as a spatial monopolist, 
setting its own output prices, negotiating local stadium and media contracts, and dealing 
with players within the general limits set by league-wide rules.” (p. 422) They argue that 
Major League Baseball acts as a cartel in setting rules that restrict teams’ willingness to 
pay for players and impose costs on the transfer of players between teams, but within the 
cartel, each MLB team acts like a price-taker in the market for player services. Under 
such a system, it is hardly surprising that the interest of an individual team may 
sometimes conflict with the interest of the league. 
The ‘stability’ or ‘longevity’ of cartels has been examined in a number of 
economic studies. Levenstein and Suslow (2002) review the results of a number of 
studies and observe that the average duration of a cartel is between 3.7 years and 7.5 
years. However, the range of cartel durations is very large. One study reports the shortest 
duration of a cartel to be one year and the longest to be 18 years; another study gives the 
range as 1 to 29 years; a third study reports a range of 1 to 13 years. Similarly, one study 
reports that about 60% of cartels last less than 5 years and less than 20% last 10 or more 
years; another study reports that 43% of cartels last less than five years and 32% last 10 
years or more; a third study reports that 40% of cartels last less than five years and 37% 
last 10 or more years; a fourth study finds that 39% of cartels last less than five years and 
24% last 10 or more years.  Levenstein and Suslow conclude that “cartels are neither 
short-lived nor long-lived; they are both” and, consistent with economic theory, “cheating 
is a common cause” of cartel breakdown. 
 As Levenstein and Suslow report, there is conflicting evidence whether the 
number of firms in a cartel increases, decreases, or has no effect on cartel duration. On 
the one hand, having more cartel members may make it more difficult to agree on a quota 
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 and detect cheating. On the other hand, the more industry output produced by cartel 
members, the less ‘fringe’ production and thus the greater the rewards to the cartel from 
restricting output. Studies reported by Levenstein and Suslow find that between 60% and 
79% of cartels have 10 or fewer members. 
 The major sports leagues have many more members. The NFL has 32 teams; the 
NBA, NHL, and MLB have 30 teams. Each league has existed for decades. Many other 
leagues have failed after only a few years. The long life of the NFL, NBA, NHL, MLB, 
and NCAA may suggest that their league rules successfully prevent cheating on the 
cartel. Alternatively, their long life may suggest that their league rules facilitate operation 
of their demand-enhancing joint venture.  
 
 
Basics of Joint Ventures. Sports leagues are a form of joint venture. One rationale for 
joint venture formation is to produce a product that requires the skills of a number of 
independent business firms. In the case of a sports league, the joint venture’s product is 
games leading to the declaration of a league champion. Although a single team can 
produce ‘intrasquad’ exhibition games by itself, those games attract fan interest largely 
because they offer a preview of the team that will later compete against other teams. 
Unlike most industries where a firm typically profits if its rivals falter, a sports team may 
be hurt if its rivals falter since their resulting joint product – their games – may become 
less appealing to fans.  
While joint ventures have advantages over other forms of organization, they have 
disadvantages as well. Chang, Evans, and Schmalensee (1998) identify three categories 
of disadvantages: divergent objectives, externalities, and organizational problems.  
 
Divergent objectives. Joint venture members may have divergent objectives 
regarding the venture’s purpose and strategy, the division of financial 
contributions, and the division of the resulting benefits. As an example of conflict 
over a venture’s strategy, consider open-wheel auto racing.43 In 1978, a rebel 
group of team owners complained to the United States Automobile Club (USAC) 
about poor promotion and small purses. After their proposals were rejected by the 
USAC’s board, they left the organization and, in 1979, formed Championship 
Auto Racing Teams (CART), which quickly dominated open-wheel racing. In the 
1990s, the owner of the Indianapolis Motor Speedway, Tony George, vigorously 
disagreed with CART’s strategy and sought to control the high cost of putting a 
car on the racetrack. When CART failed to adopt George’s proposed strategy, he 
left CART and, in 1994, formed his own racing organization, the Indy Racing 
League, as a lower-cost open-wheel alternative. CART declared bankruptcy in 
2003. 
 Divergent objectives across sports league members can arise for numerous 
reasons. For example, some teams have greater revenue potential than others. 
Major market teams like the New York Yankees can attract more fans to their 
games and negotiate local television deals many times larger than small market 
teams like the Pittsburgh Pirates. Krautmann (1999), Zimbalist (1992), and 
                                                 
43 This discussion is largely based on the Wikipedia entries for Champ Car and Indy 
Racing League. 
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 Bruggink and Rose (1990) estimate that each additional one million people in a 
MLB team’s market increases team revenue by $2.12 million, $2.40 million, and 
$1.47 million, respectively; moreover, MacDonald and Reynolds (1994) find that 
each $1 billion increase in metropolitan income increases MLB team revenue by 
$750,000. Not surprisingly, the major market teams want to keep their revenue; 
small market teams want team revenues to be shared. The league has an interest in 
producing games that fans want to watch. Yankees fans may love watching their 
team outbid opposing teams for the most talented players and then beating those 
teams on the field; on the other hand, fans of small market teams may become 
disgusted as they watch their team’s emerging stars depart to the major market 
teams. Some leagues have implemented revenue-sharing schemes to preserve 
‘competitive balance’ in the league.  
 Economic studies have shown that revenue-sharing decreases player 
salaries, but does not necessarily improve competitive balance.44 If the goal of 
each team owner is to maximize profits, then revenue-sharing shifts the demand 
curve for players downward, resulting in lower equilibrium salaries. If the 
downward demand shift is the same for all teams, the distribution of playing talent 
across teams will be unaffected, and thus revenue-sharing does not affect 
competitive balance.  If, on the other hand, the downward shift is larger for the 
large-market teams, those teams will reduce their demand for player talent more 
than will the small market teams, resulting in a shift in player talent toward the 
small-market teams and thus greater competitive balance within the league.  
 Whether the downward shift is the same for all teams is an empirical issue 
and depends, in part, on what attracts fans to games (e.g., playing a bad team so 
the home team has a good chance to win, playing a good team so even if the home 
team loses the quality of play should be high) and on how revenue is shared (i.e., 
symmetrically as is generally done in U.S. sports leagues or performance-based as 
is generally done in European sports leagues).45 For example, Brown (1994b) 
examines revenue sharing in college football conferences and finds that the 
conferences which tend to have the weakest teams also tend to engage in the most 
sharing of revenue. However, Surdam (2002) argues that, in the American League 
during the 1950s, the stronger a baseball team, the greater its ability to draw fans 
while on the road, and thus the sharing of gate revenue would actually have had 
the effect of shifting revenue from the weaker teams to the stronger teams. 
Therefore, depending on the demand for a sport and precisely how revenue is 
shared, a revenue-sharing plan may or may not promote competitive balance; such 
a plan could even exacerbate inequalities among the teams. 
 Members of sports leagues may also have divergent objectives with 
respect to profits and winning (or ‘sportsmanship’). While Yankees owner George 
Steinbrenner has his share of critics, no one criticizes him for not trying to field a 
winning team. The Yankees are the prime example of a ‘deep pocketed’ team that 
is willing to reach deeply into that pocket to field a winner. Other teams, 
                                                 
44 See Marburger (1997), Késenne (2000), Sanderson & Siegfried (2003), Késenne 
(2004), and Szymanski & Késenne (2004). 
45 For a discussion of revenue-sharing in U.S. and European sports leagues, see Palomino 
and Rigotti (2000) and Palomino and Sákovics (2004). 
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 including the Chicago Cubs, the Chicago Bears, and the Los Angeles Clippers, 
have a reputation for being tightfisted, more concerned with earning a profit than 
winning the championship. Sometimes, as with the Cubs, the team is owned by a 
‘deep pocketed’ corporation; sometimes, as with the Bears, the team is owned by 
a family without ‘deep pockets.’ Still other teams, such as the former Montreal 
Expos, excelled at developing young talent which they could not afford to pay 
once their players became established stars. Some leagues have established a 
‘luxury tax’ system in an attempt to penalize teams with the largest player 
payrolls. 
 Economists have explored the operation of leagues under the assumption 
that team owners seek to maximize profits and under the assumption that team 
owners seek to maximize their winning percentage. Fort and Quirk (2004) find 
that, relative to a league of profit-maximizing owners, a league of winning-
percentage-maximizing owners will have a greater demand for player talent and 
will spend more to acquire that talent. However, which of the two leagues will 
have greater competitive balance is indeterminant. Vrooman (1997a) assumes a 
‘sportsman’ owner jointly maximizes franchise value and the satisfaction from 
winning and shows that a sportsman owner expands the team’s talent beyond the 
point that maximizes franchise value. Consistent with this effect, he finds that 
owners looking to sell their franchise often reduce their player costs (and thus 
increase franchise value) prior to the sale.46 In fact, if all owners are sportsmen, 
all franchises will be ‘undervalued’ relative to what they would be worth if all 
owners were profit-maximizers. Vrooman also shows that a syndicated sportsman 
owner expands the team’s talent even more than does the sole syndicated 
sportsman, which Vrooman terms the ‘Steinbrenner’ effect of syndication. Thus, 
franchise ‘undervaluation’ is even greater in a league of syndicated sportsman 
owners. Vrooman argues that Major League Baseball has moved toward a league 
composed of highly leveraged team ownership syndicates in the 1980s. MLB 
adopted a rule that had the effect of limiting the leverage of its larger franchises 
(e.g., the New York Yankees).  
Some studies have attempted to identify the ‘true’ objective function of 
team owners. Zimbalist (2003b) argues that these studies have yielded 
inconclusive results. He contends that team owner objectives vary by team, 
league, and country and depend strongly on how the team relates to the owner’s 
other assets. DeBrock and Hendricks (1996) examine roll call voting in the 
NCAA and report that they “cannot attribute NCAA actions entirely to the 
economic motive or the educational motive.” (p. 498)   
Still other studies investigate whether teams play in such a way as to 
maximize their chances of winning. Romer (2006) analyzes play-by-play data on 
NFL games and, specifically, the choice on fourth down of whether to kick or try 
for a first down. He documents “systematic, clear-cut, and overwhelmingly 
statistically significant departures from the decisions that would maximize teams’ 
chances of winning.” (p. 340) 
                                                 
46 Interestingly, the Chicago Tribune – the owner of the Chicago Cubs – dramatically 
increased the team’s payroll prior to putting the team up for sale. 
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 The impact of some league rules will depend on whether team owners are 
solely profit maximizers, solely winning-percentage-maximizers, or derive utility 
from both the monetary and non-monetary benefits associated with team 
ownership. For example, Késenne (2005) finds that revenue-sharing worsens 
competitive balance in leagues of profit-maximizing owners but improves 
competitive balance in leagues of winning-percentage-maximizing owners. In 
contrast, Atkinson, Stanley, and Tschirhart (1988) show that the effectiveness of 
revenue-sharing in improving competitive balance is mitigated when owners are 
not exclusively profit-maximizers but enjoy private (i.e., non-shared) non-
monetary benefits of team ownership as well. 
In short, there are numerous areas in which the interests of an individual 
team owner can diverge from the interests of the majority of team owners, who 
determine the league’s rules and policies.  
 
Externalities. A joint venture member can take actions that impose costs on the 
joint venture’s other members. For example, a member may attempt to ‘free-ride’ 
on the joint venture’s investments by using them for its individual gain; 
alternatively, it may ‘free-ride’ by supporting the joint venture only to the extent 
that it benefits individually, rather than to the extent that the joint venture as a 
whole benefits. Chang, Evans, and Schmalensee (1998) argue that joint ventures 
generally seek to maximize the total value that all members receive and thus will 
want to provide incentives for members to increase the joint venture’s value, 
adopt rules to prevent free-riding, and penalize members that engage in actions 
that impose negative externalities on the other members.  
 The product of sports leagues is games leading to the crowning of a league 
champion and sports leagues attempt to maximize the value of those games. 
Sometimes the actions of an individual team may be optimal for that team but 
detrimental to the league itself. For example, a team may find it optimal to 
relocate to another city, but doing so may make it a less attractive opponent for 
the other teams. Although the team’s gate receipts may be higher in the other city, 
the gate receipts of the other teams may fall because it attracts less fan interest. 
Such a negative externality may occur if the team relocates to a remote city in a 
different time zone – fans may feel less rivalry towards a remote team and the 
different time zone may reduce television viewership of the game. As a result, 
sports leagues have an interest in teams’ relocation decisions. 
 A deep-pocketed, winning-obsessed team owner could impose a negative 
externality on other team owners by ‘overpaying’ for star players to win the 
championship. Such an owner may be willing to incur losses in order to win the 
championship and thus be willing for the franchise to be ‘undervalued.’ Such an 
owner may also be willing to go heavily into debt in a quest to win the 
championship. The ‘win at any cost’ mentality of one owner, however, may 
depress the value of the franchises of the other owners. Consequently, sports 
leagues have an interest in the ownership and financing of teams. 
 
Organizational problems. The operation of a joint venture requires that its 
members cooperate to some extent, even though they may be aggressive 
competitors in other regards. Such cooperation may be difficult to elicit and 
sustain, as each member needs to cede some control over its assets to the joint 
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 venture, and thus partly to its competitors. Unless the members trust one another, 
they may refuse to cooperate. The joint venture also must establish a decision-
making mechanism. If a subset of members effectively makes decisions on behalf 
of the joint venture, the other members may become frustrated and uncooperative. 
Therefore, joint ventures adopt rules and policies to promote member cooperation. 
Chang, Evans, and Schmalensee (1998) caution that “it is important for 
people who engage in antitrust analysis to understand the general nature of these 
problems and to recognize that joint ventures may require some latitude to 
implement rules and practices that are designed to deal with them.” (p. 247) They 
add: “This is not to say that antitrust policy should defer to all claims by a joint 
venture that its practices are necessary for viability. Rather, the courts and 
regulators should be careful about substituting their judgments for those made by 
the people who are intimately involved in running the joint venture in question, 
especially when the challenged practice is not likely to be an effective exercise of 
market power.” (p. 247)  
 
Joint venture instability. Divergent objectives across members, externalities, and 
organizational problems all may contribute to the instability of joint ventures. 
Economists have documented that joint ventures tend to be relatively short-lived 
and many are terminated earlier than planned. Kogut (1989) examined 92 U.S.-
based joint ventures and found that about half terminated within six years. Studies 
by McKinsey & Co. and Coopers & Lybrand reportedly have found that roughly 
70% of joint ventures fall short of expectations or are disbanded.47 Another study 
suggests that, on average, joint ventures do not survive even one-half as long as 
the term of their joint venture agreement.48 
The major sports leagues currently in existence – the NFL, NHL, NBA, 
and MLB – have survived for decades; other sports leagues like the World 
Hockey Association, United States Football League, and North American Soccer 
League survived for only a few years. One possible reason is that the rules and 
policies of the major sports leagues reduce conflict between members and thus 
enable the league to operate more smoothly and efficiently. Even if true, this does 
not mean that an individual member will not bitterly oppose a particular rule or 
policy and seek to remove it by filing an antitrust lawsuit against the league.  
 
Team antitrust challenges to sports league rules and policies. When a team opposes a 
particular sports league rule or policy, it has a number of options. It could lobby fellow 
team owners to oppose it and thereby get the league to change it. If that fails, the team 
may file a lawsuit alleging that the rule or policy violates the antitrust laws. This has 
happened on numerous occasions. The remainder of this chapter focuses on four types of 
league rules or policies that have been challenged by teams on antitrust grounds: public 
ownership restrictions, sponsorship and licensing arrangements, television restrictions, 
and team relocation. 
 
                                                 
47 Business Week (July 21, 1986). 
48 Berg, Duncan, and Friedman (1982). 
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 Public ownership restrictions.49 The NBA’s Boston Celtics, NHL’s Florida 
Panthers, and MLB’s Cleveland Indians have publicly traded stock. If one wants 
to own part of these teams, their shares can be purchased, just like one can buy 
shares in IBM, Google, and Wal-Mart. The Celtics went public in 1986, selling a 
40% ownership stake of dividend-paying stock.50 The Panthers went public in 
1996 and, at least initially, the team did not intend to pay a dividend. In 1997, 
Major League Baseball passed a rule allowing teams to sell shares to the public, 
but required an individual or group of no more than 20 persons to maintain at 
least a 10% economic stake and 90% voting interest in the team. The Indians went 
public in 1998, issuing two classes of stock with Indians owner and Chairman 
Richard E. Jacobs retaining 99.98% of the team’s voting control. 
Some teams are owned by publicly-traded corporations. For example, the 
Tribune Company owns MLB’s Chicago Cubs, the Walt Disney Company owns 
the NHL’s Anaheim Mighty Ducks and has partial control of MLB’s Anaheim 
Angels, and Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. owns MLB’s Los Angeles Dodgers. 
Thus, it is easy to be a part-owner of the owner of such professional sports teams. 
No NFL team is publicly-traded. The Green Bay Packers are publicly-
owned, but the stock is not publicly traded. The Packers sold 1,000 shares for $5 
per share in 1923; each buyer was expected to simultaneously purchase at least 
six season tickets. The Packers went into receivership in 1935 and were 
reorganized as a nonprofit corporation, with a $15,000 capital infusion from the 
sale of 300 shares. A third stock sale occurred in 1950 and raised $118,000 in new 
capital at $25 per share.  
There were about 4,627 shares of Packers stock outstanding in 1997 when 
the team proposed to sell 400,000 shares at $200 per share to raise funds to make 
improvements to Lambeau Field and, in the future, finance construction of a new 
stadium. Some teams, including the Jacksonville Jaguars and Tennessee Oilers, 
expressed concerned about the Packers’ proposal, fearing the Packers would use 
part of the new capital to buy free agents. Other owners, including Jerry Jones of 
the Dallas Cowboys, believed the Packers did not need league approval for the 
stock sale. Although the Packers also believed they did not need the NFL’s 
approval, the team did not intend to proceed without that approval, which it 
eventually received. 
Prospective purchasers of the Packers stock were required to represent that 
they had not been accused of fraud in any litigation, been convicted of a felony, or 
participated in sports gambling. The shares would not – and according to the 
Corporation’s Restated Articles of Incorporation could not – pay a dividend. 
Stockholders would have the right to vote at the team’s annual meeting, but their 
shares could not earn a financial return. Other terms of the Articles of 
Incorporation made it virtually impossible for the buyer of Packers stock to make 
a profit on the purchase. For example, the shares could not be resold. The Packers 
reclassified the 4,627 ‘original’ shares on a 1,000-for-1 basis, resulting in 
                                                 
49 The discussion in this section is based on Aukofer (1997), Nawrocki and O’Brien 
(1997), and Lascari (1999). 
50 For an analysis of the stock price behavior of the Celtics shares, see Brown and 
Hartzell (2001). 
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 4,627,000 shares for the original shareholders, and succeeded in selling an 
additional 120,000 shares at $200 per share, raising $24 million in new capital. 
The Packers are not the only NFL team to desire to raise new capital by 
selling stock. William H. Sullivan, owner of the New England Patriots since the 
team’s inception in 1959, had sold non-voting shares to the public beginning in 
1960 when the team was in the old American Football League (AFL), which did 
not have a policy against selling shares to the public. The AFL merged with the 
NFL into a single league in 1966 and the terms of the merger specified that the 
post-merger league would adopt the NFL’s policy against public ownership. The 
Patriots received a special exception. Article 3.5 of the NFL’s constitution and 
bylaws requires that three-fourths of NFL owners approve all transfers of 
ownership interests in a team, except for transfers within a family. The NFL also 
has an ‘uncodified’ policy against the sale of shares to the public, although 
members have the authority to approve a given transfer by a three-quarters vote. 
In 1976, Sullivan acquired the publicly-traded Patriots shares and the team thus 
became fully privately-owned.  
In the mid-1980s, William Sullivan and his son, Charles, who owned the 
stadium where the Patriots played, began experiencing financial problems and, 
after observing the Celtics’ initial public offering in 1986, decided to similarly 
raise capital. The plan was for them to receive a loan for $80 million, half of 
which would go to the Patriots, the other half to the stadium. The Patriots were to 
repay their half of the debt by selling a 49% stake in the team to the public. 
William Sullivan raised his planned stock sale at the NFL owners meeting on 
October 27, 1987. Although Sullivan believed that 17 of the 21 owners would 
vote to approval the sale, NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle reportedly told him 
that he opposed the sale and that league approval was “very dubious.” Sullivan 
did not ask for a vote, believing it to be futile. Sullivan sold the Patriots for $83.7 
million in October 1988. On May 16, 1991, Sullivan filed an antitrust lawsuit 
against the NFL, claiming that the league had prevented him from selling a 49% 
equity stake to the public and, as a result, he was forced to pay off his debts by 
selling the team at a fire-sale price to a private buyer. The district court dismissed 
Sullivan’s claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, but allowed a trial on his 
Section 1 claims.  
Sullivan claimed that ‘but for’ the NFL’s public ownership policy, he 
would have been able to sell a 49% equity stake to the public for $70 million, pay 
off his debts, and retain ownership of a more valuable and profitable team. He 
argued that the NFL’s policy against public ownership restricts competition 
between teams for the sale of their ownership interests and thereby depresses the 
prices of such ownership interests. For example, the team’s fans may be willing to 
pay a premium in order to own a piece of the team and thus the inability to sell 
shares to fans may lower the price at which an ownership interest in the team can 
be sold. The NFL’s policy therefore harms (1) consumers who want to purchase 
the team’s stock and (2) team owners seeking to purchase investment capital. The 
NFL offered evidence to the contrary and argued that its public ownership policy 
is ancillary to legitimate joint venture activity.  
The jury determined that the relevant market is the “nationwide market for 
the sale and purchase of ownership interests in the National Football League 
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 member clubs, in general, and in the New England Patriots, in particular” and that 
the NFL’s policy had an “actual harmful effect” on competition in this market.  
The jury awarded damages of $38 million, which the judge reduced to $17 
million. The trebling of antitrust damages led the district court to award Sullivan a 
total of $51 million in damages.  
The NFL appealed the judgment, but did not challenge the jury’s finding 
of the relevant market. 51 Rather, the NFL argued “(1) that NFL clubs do not 
compete with each other for the sale of ownership interests in their teams so there 
exists no competition to be injured in the first place; and (2) Sullivan did not 
present sufficient evidence of injury to competition from which a reasonable jury 
could conclude that the NFL’s policy restrains trade.” The Appeals Court for the 
First Circuit countered: “Although we agree with the NFL that conceptualizing 
the harm to competition in this case is rather difficult, precedent and deference to 
the jury verdict ultimately require us to reject the NFL’s challenge to the finding 
of injury to competition.” The appeals court also rejected the NFL’s argument that 
it is a ‘single entity.’ Moreover, the appeals court wrote: 
 
We take no issue with the proposition that certain joint ventures enable 
separate business entities to combine their skills and resources in pursuit 
of a common goal that cannot be effectively pursued by the venturers 
acting alone… We also do not dispute that a “restraint” that is ancillary to 
the functioning of such a joint activity – i.e. one that is required to make 
the joint activity more efficient – does not necessarily violate the antitrust 
laws… We further accept, for purposes of this appeal, that rules 
controlling who may join a joint venture can be ancillary to a legitimate 
joint activity and that the NFL’s own policy against public ownership 
constitutes one example of such an ancillary rule. Finally, we accept the 
NFL’s claim that its public ownership policy contributes to the ability of 
the NFL to function as an effective sports league, and that the NFL’s 
functioning would be impaired if publicly owned teams were permitted, 
because the short-term dividend interests of a club’s shareholder would 
often conflict with the long-term interests of the league as a whole. That 
is, the policy avoids a detrimental conflict of interests between team 
shareholders and the league. 
 
We disagree, however, that these factors are sufficient to establish as a 
matter of law that the NFL’s ownership policy does not unreasonably 
restrain trade in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. 
 
There is evidence in the record, according to the appeals court, “of a 
clearly less restrictive alternative to the NFL’s ownership policy that would yield 
the same benefits as the current policy” – namely, “allowing for the sale of 
minority, nonvoting shares of team stock to the public with restrictions on the size 
of the holdings by any one individual.” It would be up to a jury to decide whether 
such a sale would indeed be a less restrictive but equally beneficial policy. 
                                                 
51 See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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 Ultimately, however, the appeals court found that several prejudicial 
errors were committed during the trial. The judgment was vacated and a new trial 
ordered. In August 1996, Sullivan and the NFL reached an out-of-court settlement 
in which Sullivan would receive $11.5 million.52 
It is unclear why public ownership would interfere with the functioning of 
the NFL joint venture, and yet apparently not interfere with the functioning of the 
NBA, NHL, and MLB joint ventures. Perhaps it is because the latter have 
permitted public ownership, but with certain restrictions. The NFL arguably could 
adopt a public ownership policy with similar restrictions. If so, the NFL’s current 
public ownership policy may fail the “less restrictive alternative” test of a rule of 
reason analysis.53  
 
 
Sponsorship and licensing arrangements. Sports leagues often enter into 
sponsorship and licensing arrangements involving large sums of money and then 
distribute the revenue to member teams according to set formula, such as equal 
shares. Suppose a team accounts for a disproportionate share of sponsorship and 
licensing money, or suppose a team believes it can enter into more lucrative 
sponsorship and licensing arrangements by itself and should not have to share that 
revenue with other teams. Conflict between the team and the league is likely. 
Such conflict has indeed occurred, with two notable cases involving the NFL’s 
Dallas Cowboys and MLB’s New York Yankees. In both cases, the team accused 
the league’s marketing arm of being a cartel; in both cases, the antitrust lawsuits 
were settled out-of-court and on terms generally believed to favor the Cowboys 
and Yankees. 
 
 
Dallas Cowboys.54 In September 1995, Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones 
signed a deal making Nike an official sponsor of Texas Stadium, the 
Cowboys’ home field. Nike was a competitor of the apparel licensee with 
which NFL Properties, the NFL’s marketing arm, had reached an 
exclusive apparel licensing deal. Jones also signed stadium advertising 
contracts with PepsiCo, the competitor of Coca-Cola Co. which had a 
league-wide sponsorship deal with NFL Properties. In addition, Jones had 
a sponsorship deal with Dr. Pepper. Jones was in the process of 
negotiating a deal for American Express to become the official charge 
card of “Texas Stadium, the home of the Dallas Cowboys” even though 
VISA was the official charge card of the NFL, having negotiated a license 
with NFL Properties earlier in the year. 
                                                 
52 New York Times (Aug. 12 1996).  
53 For further discussion of sports league restrictions on public ownership, see Lopatka 
and Herndon (1997) and Cheffins (1999). 
54 The discussion in this section is based primarily on Abilene Reporter-News (2001), 
Kass (1996), New York Times (October 24, 1995; February 21, 1996; December 14, 
1996), and the complaint in NFL Properties v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club 
(September 18, 1995). 
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  NFL Properties quickly filed a $300 million lawsuit alleging that 
the Cowboys’ sponsorship deals violated the NFL’s revenue-sharing 
agreements, which specified that such revenue would be distributed evenly 
among teams. NFL Properties alleged that the Cowboys “have engaged in 
an unlawful plan and scheme, in violation of contractual and fiduciary 
obligations, to misappropriate for themselves valuable business 
opportunities and revenues that rightfully belong to plaintiff NFL 
Properties.” NFL Properties stressed the importance of revenue-sharing to 
the league: 
 
10. The cornerstone of the NFL system, however, is revenue sharing. 
To produce competitive games, it is essential that teams be well-
matched. The NFL and its Member Clubs thus have a strong 
interest in having strong, viable teams. Revenue sharing is critical 
to achieve this end: it ensures that all NFL Member Clubs, not just 
those in larger or better situated markets, will have the financial 
resources to field a competitive team. 
11. The Dallas Cowboys franchise itself is a case in point: revenue 
sharing has contributed to its present success… The system 
allowed Jones to rebuild the Cowboys into a commanding NFL 
team – one that has now made three straight trips to the National 
Football Conference Championship Game and has won two of the 
last three Super Bowls. 
12. One important source of revenue shared by NFL Member Clubs is 
that which derives from the various identifying marks of the NFL’s 
teams… 
13. The Member Clubs recognized long ago that the Club Marks and 
NFL Marks would be more competitive in the market place and 
that their value would be maximized and thus more effective in 
promoting the NFL, if they were licensed as a package. 
Accordingly, in 1963, the Member Clubs created plaintiff NFL 
Properties to market the Club Marks and NFL Marks jointly; from 
its existence, NFL Properties has conducted advertising campaigns 
and promotional ventures on behalf of the NFL and all of its 
Member Clubs. In 1982, NFL Properties’ ability to market the 
Club Marks was greatly enhanced by a series of agreements 
entered into and approved by the Member Clubs, including the 
Dallas Cowboys, to facilitate a long-term unified program of 
promotional activities involving the Club Marks and NFL Marks. 
Under these agreements (the “Licensing Agreements”), each 
Member Club transferred exclusive rights to its Club Marks to a 
trust pursuant to a plan whereby the trust would then exclusively 
license all such Club Marks to NFL Properties; NFL Properties 
became solely responsible for licensing the Club Marks for 
commercial use… The proceeds of NFL Properties’ licensing 
activities would be shared equally among all Member Clubs, with 
some portion to be used for charitable and educational purposes. 
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 The Licensing Agreements have served as a critical component of 
the joint-venture goals of the NFL. 
 
NFL Properties alleged: “While continuing to enjoy all of the other 
benefits of the NFL joint venture, he [Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones] 
determined to embark upon a wrongful plan and scheme to destroy the 
structure and operations of NFL Properties in order to gain for the 
Cowboys more than an equal share of licensing revenue and to deny that 
revenue to the other Member Clubs.” It also alleged: “Jones understands 
that, if defendants are permitted to ‘cherry-pick’ among the benefits and 
obligations of the NFL and NFL Properties and to enter into separate deals 
with competitors of sponsors or licensees that have contracted with NFL 
Properties, the entire collective marketing and revenue-sharing system of 
NFL Properties will unravel.” In particular, if Jones’s plans are permitted 
to continue, there will be two main effects: (1) sponsors and licensees will 
reduce their willingness to pay for ‘exclusive’ league sponsorships and 
licenses and (2) other teams will follow the Cowboys’ lead and sign their 
own side-deals. Both effects will reduce the value of NFL Properties’ 
collective rights and ultimately lead to the abandonment of the system of 
joint promotion. 
The Cowboys tried unsuccessfully to get the court to dismiss the 
lawsuit, contending that NFL Properties is a “marketing cartel” whose 
goal in filing the lawsuit “is to punish a critic of the cartel.” In November 
1995, Jones filed a $750 million antitrust lawsuit against NFL Properties, 
alleging that it restricted competition between NFL teams. Jones sought to 
break up NFL Properties and give the Cowboys control over the team’s 
trademarks and logos. 
 In December 1996, the Dallas Cowboys and the NFL reached an 
out-of-court settlement. Jones was allowed to not only keep his sponsors, 
but to sign new ones as well. Other owners were permitted to enter into 
similar sponsorship deals. Because the revenue from such deals would not 
be shared with other teams, the settlement was expected to reduce the 
funds available for the NFL’s revenue-sharing pool, thereby harming 
small-market teams like the Green Bay Packers.  
 In May 2001, the NFL approved a 10-year, $250 million deal 
making Reebok the league’s exclusive apparel licensee beginning in 2002. 
The deal contained a clause giving each team the option to be the private 
wholesaler, retailer, and distributor of its own apparel. The Dallas 
Cowboys were the only team to exercise that option. The Cowboys had 
led the league in merchandise sales in four of the last five years and Jones 
believed he could do a better job of marketing the Cowboys than could 
NFL Properties. The Cowboys were required to guarantee the league 16% 
of sales (the team’s share of sales over the previous five years). In other 
words, if the Cowboys accounted for less than 16% of NFL merchandise 
sales, the Cowboys would have to make up the shortfall and pay the NFL 
an amount equal to 16% of league merchandise sales, but if the Cowboys 
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 accounted for more than 16%, the Cowboys would pocket all sales beyond 
that threshold.  
 
 
New York Yankees.55  After winning the 1996 World Series, the New York 
Yankees on March 2, 1997 signed a 10-year, $95 million sponsorship deal 
with Adidas – far more revenue than the team could receive from the 
league-wide sponsorship deal that divided revenues evenly among all 
teams. MLB responded by suspending Yankees owner George 
Steinbrenner from its Executive Council. 
 On May 6, 1997, the Yankees countered by filing an antitrust 
lawsuit against MLB and its member teams. The Yankees accused the 
defendants of engaging in a concerted action “to combine and conspire 
together to restrain competition in the businesses of the licensing of Club 
trademarks and of retail and wholesale baseball merchandise sales, and to 
misappropriate rights and revenues belonging to the Yankees and adidas.” 
In particular, the Yankees alleged that the defendants (1) “have recently 
undertaken a concerted effort to interfere with a Florida contract between 
adidas and the Yankees pursuant to which adidas and the Yankees have 
agreed that adidas will be a Yankees sponsor, that the Yankees will license 
Yankee trademarks to adidas, and that the two organizations will 
cooperate in creating and marketing more competitive merchandise using 
the Yankees and adidas trademarks”; (2) “imposed a requirement that 
Major League Clubs exchange confidential pricing and other competitive 
data for the purpose and effect of restraining competition in trademark 
licensing, corporate sponsorships, and retail and wholesale baseball 
merchandise sales”; and (3) “have combined to prevent individual Clubs 
from marketing merchandise under the individual Club’s own trademarks, 
and to impose sanctions on any Club or licensee that seeks to do so.” 
Furthermore, the Yankees alleged: 
 
9. Defendants have combined and agreed not to license their 
trademarks to adidas or to do business with adidas except on 
monopolistic terms and conditions. By combining and agreeing to 
prevent Major League Clubs from competing against one another 
in licensing of trademarks, defendants have created a horizontal 
restraint – an agreement among competitors on the way in which 
they will compete with one another. For example, through the 
1995 Agency Agreement, defendants have illegally conspired to 
establish a horizontal division of markets, the sole purpose of 
which is to stifle competition among Major League Clubs who 
might wish to do business with adidas. Defendants’ conduct in 
this respect also has included a group boycott, in concert with 
                                                 
55 The discussion in this section is based on Bambauer (2005) and the complaint in New 
York Yankees Partnership and Adidas America v. Major League Baseball Enterprises 
(May 6, 1997). 
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 Nike and Reebok, and other restraints of trade without legitimate 
justification. 
10. Defendants have also acted to penalize adidas for entering a 
sponsorship agreement with the Yankees, including threats of 
litigation against adidas for entering an agreement with the 
Yankees, and to restrain competition by adidas which they find 
against their narrow self interest. 
11. Defendants’ actions to restrict and prevent competition in 
trademark licensing, corporate sponsorships, and retail and 
wholesale baseball merchandise sales are unrelated to, and outside 
the reasonable scope of, any exception the business of baseball 
may have from the antitrust laws… 
12. The defendants’ actions adversely affect consumers and consumer 
welfare by limiting consumer choice, increasing the prices 
consumers pay, and adversely affecting the quality of goods 
available.  
 
The Yankees contended that they have attempted to resolve their 
differences short of litigation, but to no avail: “Rather than reconsider their 
decision to implement a cartel for the licensing of club trademarks and for 
retail and wholesale baseball merchandise sales, defendants have 
reaffirmed their intent to continue and even expand their cartel.” The 
‘cartel’ is MLB Properties, which was established with the January 1, 
1984 Agency Agreement, renewed and amended with the January 1, 1991 
Agency Agreement, and then established with the Amended and Restated 
Agency Agreement dated December 1, 1995. Although the Yankees 
refused to sign any of these agreements, they obtained the support of more 
than three-fourths of the MLB teams and thus the defendants took the 
position that the Yankees were nevertheless bound by the agreements. 
The 1995 Agreement designates MLB Properties, according to the 
Yankees’ complaint, “as the exclusive agent for the promotional and retail 
licensing of the marks of the Major League Clubs both in the United 
States and in international markets” and, under the Agreement, “the 
individual Clubs retain only certain rights to license and otherwise exploit 
their marks within their limited Home Licensing Territory (rights which 
MLB Properties has repeatedly sought to curtail.)” The income of MLB 
Properties is split evenly among the MLB teams. Small market teams like 
the Montreal Expos and Milwaukee Brewers were thus strong supporters 
of MLB Properties – they were able to free-ride on the efforts of the more 
successful teams like the Yankees that account for the great bulk of MLB 
Properties’ income. The Yankees alleged: “Clubs opposed to the cartel, 
such as the Yankees, have been routinely harassed, received threats from 
MLB Properties, and have had contracts clearly outside MLB Properties’ 
agency obstructed by the Office of the Commissioner, the Executive 
Council, and MLB Properties itself.” 
The MLB Properties cartel “hinders efficiency by creating the 
incentive for free-riding,” while the equal distribution of MLB Properties’ 
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 revenues “diminishes the incentives for individual Clubs to promote and 
invest in their marks and in the success of their own Clubs.” The Yankees 
contended: “In the absence of the cartel established and enforced by Major 
League Baseball through the Agency Agreement and MLB Properties, the 
Major League Clubs would compete with one another in the markets for 
professional baseball trademark licensing, sponsorships, and retail and 
wholesale merchandise – which would in turn lead to more competitive 
pricing, increased output, improved quality, and greater market 
efficiency.”   
The Yankees identified two relevant product markets: (1) 
“professional baseball retail licensing markets” and (2) “professional 
baseball sponsorship markets.” The former “involve the sale of rights to 
use the marks of professional baseball clubs on apparel or other goods” 
and, at competitive prices, “rights of this type have no close substitutes 
and are not reasonably interchangeable with any other products or rights, 
and the prices of rights of this type are not highly elastic with respect to 
prices of other products or rights.” The latter “involve the sale of rights to 
affiliate a company or a product with a major league professional baseball 
club or clubs to promote the company or product” and, at competitive 
prices, “rights of this type have no close substitutes and are not reasonably 
interchangeable in use with any other products or rights, and the prices of 
rights of this type are not highly elastic with respect to prices of other 
products or rights.” The relevant geographic markets for evaluating both 
sets of relevant product markets are the North American market, the non-
North American market, and the worldwide market. The Yankees alleged: 
“As a result of their joint and concerted action, defendants have and 
exercise market power and monopoly power in the professional baseball 
sponsorship markets and in the professional baseball retail licensing 
markets.” 
The Yankees argued that there is no efficiency rationale for MLB’s 
challenged practices: 
 
118. Major League Baseball frequently advances the protection of 
on-field competitive balance as a justification for organized 
anticompetitive behavior. However, to the extent such balance 
is deemed desirable or necessary, the restriction of competition 
in corporate promotion and retail licensing activities has no 
reasonable relationship to achieving on-field competitive 
balance of the Major League Clubs. In fact, such sharing often 
creates incentives for inactivity by poor-performing Clubs, who 
will derive revenue from other Clubs more concerned with the 
success of their teams and their marks. Further, other 
mechanisms are far more likely to achieve results and far less 
likely to impede competition between the Clubs. 
119. There is also no efficiency created by the bundling of Club 
marks for licensing as a unit to promotional sponsors or retail 
products manufacturers. Rather, corporate sponsors and 
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 licensees often prefer to associate themselves with the marks of 
one or a few teams beyond the local areas of such teams. The 
cartel, instead of generating a superior product, forces the 30 
Clubs to sell together a product that sponsors and licensees 
often find unnecessary to pay for and generally unwieldy. 
 
Importantly, the Yankees explained why the defendants’ actions 
fall outside of MLB’s antitrust exemption: “Although the Executive 
Council Defendants and the Major League Club Defendants are involved 
in the exhibition of major league professional baseball games, their 
participation in the markets discussed above is not a reasonably necessary 
facet or unique characteristic of baseball exhibitions” and, furthermore, 
“the activities of these defendants in the markets described are not a 
function of, dependent on, or related to the Major League Baseball reserve 
system or to the ownership and organizational structure of the game of 
baseball as operated by these defendants.” Interestingly, the Yankees 
admitted: “Major league baseball has supply and demand characteristics 
sufficiently distinct from the supply and demand characteristics of other 
baseball exhibitions and other sporting events so that at reasonably 
competitive prices major league baseball has no reasonably close 
substitutes and constitutes a separate market.” 
 In the spring of 1998, MLB and the Yankees reached an out-of-
court settlement – Steinbrenner was restored to MLB’s Executive Council 
and MLB signed a sponsorship agreement with Adidas. 
 
The Cowboys and Yankees cases are interesting. Both teams explicitly use the 
term ‘cartel’ to describe the marketing arms of their respective leagues. A cartel is 
typically assumed to restrict output and maximize profits. Both teams believe that 
given their league’s revenue-sharing scheme, they can earn greater profits by 
‘going it alone.’ Neither team believes there is an efficiency rationale for 
assigning exclusive sponsorship and licensing rights to their respective league’s 
marketing arm: Jerry Jones thinks he can market the Cowboys more effectively 
than can NFL Properties, while the Yankees do not believe that the sharing of 
sponsorship and licensing revenue promotes competitive balance and that 
bundling those rights is necessarily efficient. Since neither case went to trial, it is 
remains to be seen whether league marketing arms can survive a rule of reason 
analysis.56  
 
 
Television restrictions. The invention of the television slowly changed the 
economics of sports leagues. Prior to television, teams earned the bulk of their 
revenue from selling tickets to games. The televising of games thus posed a threat 
to game attendance. Watching the game on television was a substitute for 
attending the game in person. Depending on the particular fan and other factors 
                                                 
56 For further discussion of sports leagues’ collective licensing and merchandising 
arrangements, see Grusd (1999) and Roberts (2001). 
-  - 67
 such as the weather, watching the game on television may be either a good or bad 
substitute for watching it in person. Whether it is a good or bad substitute may 
also depend on the particular sport; the excitement of a hockey game is generally 
believed to be lost when watched on television – you have to be there. On the 
other hand, many fans may prefer to watch a December Chicago Bears home 
football game from the comfort of their living room rather than braving the cold 
in the stadium.  
And there was another concern. Fans may not attend one game because 
they can watch a different game on television. Suppose a fan’s team is poor and 
unexciting, while top-notch teams are playing a game broadcast on television. A 
fan may decide to sit home and watch the game between high-quality teams on 
television rather than attend a game between poor-quality teams, even if the 
person is a fan of one of those low-quality teams. In a sense, television allows a 
team to ‘encroach’ on the ‘home territory’ of other teams. 
 Initially, television broadcast rights were tiny relative to the revenue from 
game attendance. Sports leagues were concerned about the impact of televising 
games on attendance and sought to assert greater control over the broadcasting of 
games. Sometimes the rules and policies adopted by a sports league were strongly 
opposed by one or more league teams, and in some cases these teams filed 
antitrust lawsuits against the league over its television restrictions.  The NCAA 
was involved in one important case regarding the number of football games a 
school could have televised each season; the NBA’s Chicago Bulls, who had 
superstar Michael Jordan, were involved in two others regarding the number of 
Bulls games that could be televised nationally. 
 
 
NCAA.57 The first live college football game was televised in 1938; it had 
only six viewers. Initially, schools individually negotiated the broadcast 
rights to their team’s football games. There were no limitations on such 
things as the number of games to be televised. After receiving complaints 
from members that televising games was reducing game attendance, the 
NCAA in 1950 commissioned the National Opinion Research Center 
(NORC) to analyze the impact. The NORC study determined that the 
impact depended on the percentage of homes that had a television in the 
area – in areas where 30% or more of homes had a television, televising a 
game reduced game attendance by 10%; in areas where fewer than 5% of 
homes had a television, televising a game increased game attendance by 
10%. The NCAA’s television committee decided that televising college 
football games into an area where another college football game is being 
played negatively impacts live attendance and gate receipts and therefore 
recommended a moratorium on live broadcasts of college football games. 
 The NCAA’s policy permitting schools to individually negotiate 
the broadcast rights to their team’s athletic events without limitation was 
revoked at the NCAA convention in 1951. The revocation was opposed by 
                                                 
57 The discussion at the beginning of this section is based primarily on Greenspan (1988) 
and Siegfried and Burba (2004). 
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 the University of Pennsylvania. The NCAA responded by declaring the 
University of Pennsylvania to be a “member in bad standing” and 
arranged a group boycott of the school’s football games. Four of the 
school’s football opponents cancelled their games for the 1951 season, 
leading the University of Pennsylvania to give up its opposition to the 
NCAA’s actions. 
 The NCAA negotiated a 1-year, $1.14 million deal with NBC to 
broadcast 12 national college football games. A team was limited to two 
appearances (thereby expanding the number of teams that would appear on 
national television and securing broader support for the NCAA’s 
centralized sale of broadcast rights) and the revenue was split between the 
teams playing the game and the NCAA. NBC could select a game to be 
broadcast on Saturday afternoons, knowing that no other NCAA college 
football game would be broadcast on a competing network. Despite the 
limitation on the number of appearances, only games involving top 
collegiate football teams tended to be selected. Thus, the top teams 
complained about the limitation on the maximum number of appearances, 
while lower-quality teams supported such limitations. 
 In 1977, members of several major collegiate football conferences 
(i.e., Atlantic Coast, the Big Eight, Southeastern, Southwestern, and 
Western Athletic) and some major independent schools (e.g., Penn State, 
Notre Dame) formed the College Football Association (CFA). All of the 
CFA’s members also belonged to the NCAA. The Big 10 and Pacific 10 
were the only two major conferences not to join the CFA. The CFA sought 
to secure a larger share of broadcast revenues for the teams that generated 
most of that revenue – the top-ranked and most popular teams. Although it 
obtained a modest relaxation of the limitation on the number of 
appearances, the CFA lacked the votes in the NCAA for more substantial 
changes.  
 In 1981, the CFA and NBC negotiated a 4-year, $180 million 
contract. Splitting that revenue among the CFA’s 62 members would have 
been much more lucrative than what the schools would receive under the 
NCAA’s broadcast deal. The NCAA responded by informing CFA 
members that the CFA-NBC contract would violate the NCAA rule 
prohibiting members from independently negotiating broadcast rights to 
individual games. Violators of the rule would be excluded from NCAA 
meets and tournaments, including the lucrative NCAA men’s basketball 
tournament. The CFA members did not have enough top men’s basketball 
teams to form their own tournament and they decided not to sign the deal 
with NBC. 
On September 8, 1981, two members of the CFA, the University of 
Oklahoma and the University of Georgia (both of whose legal expenses 
were paid by all CFA members) filed an antitrust lawsuit against the 
NCAA alleging that the NCAA’s control of college football telecasts 
violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act.58 The U.S. District Court for the 
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 Western District of Oklahoma defined the relevant market to be “live 
college football television” and found that competition in this market had 
been restrained because, for example, the NCAA fixed the price of some 
telecasts and the NCAA’s restriction artificially limited the production of 
televised college football. The NCAA defended its restriction by arguing 
that it protected live attendance at college football games and promoted 
competitive balance among the football programs. The district court found 
neither argument persuasive. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit sided with the district court in finding that the NCAA’s television 
plan constituted price fixing.  
The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court and was decided on June 
27, 1984. The Court found that: (1) “The NCAA television plan on its face 
constitutes a restraint upon the operation of a free market, and the district 
court’s findings establish that the plan has operated to raise price and 
reduce output, both of which are unresponsive to consumer preference” 
and “these hallmarks of anticompetitive behavior place upon the NCAA a 
heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense that competitively 
justifies that apparent deviation from the operations of a free market”; (2)  
“The record does not support the NCAA’s proffered justification for its 
television plan that it constitutes a cooperative ‘joint venture’ which 
assists in the marketing of broadcast rights and hence is procompetitive”; 
(3) “Nor, contrary to the NCAA’s assertion, does the television plan 
protect live attendance, since, under the plan, games are televised during 
all hours that college football games are played” and, moreover, “by 
seeking to insulate live ticket sales from the full spectrum of competition 
because of its assumption that the product itself is insufficiently attractive 
to draw live attendance when faced with competition from televised 
games, the NCAA forwards a justification that is inconsistent with the 
Sherman Act’s basic policy”; and (4) “The interest in maintaining a 
competitive balance among amateur athletic teams that the NCAA asserts 
as a further justification for its television plan is not related to any neutral 
standard or to any readily identifiable group of competitors. The television 
plan is not even arguably tailored to serve such an interest.” As a result, 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA’s television plan violated the 
Sherman Act. 
On the issue of market definition, the Court observed that “the 
NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football – college football” 
and “[t]he identification of this ‘product’ with an academic tradition 
differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than 
professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for 
example, minor league baseball.” The Court noted that the district court 
“employed the correct test for determining whether college football 
broadcasts constitute a separate market – whether there are other products 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussion of earlier challenges to the NCAA’s control of college football telecasts, 
see footnote 47 of Greenspan (1988). For a discussion of the eventual demise of the 
CFA, see Siegfried and Burba (2004). 
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 that are reasonably substitutable for televised NCAA football games” and 
“found that intercollegiate football telecasts generate an audience uniquely 
attractive to advertisers and that competitors are unable to offer 
programming that can attract a similar audience.” Thus, “there can be no 
doubt that college football constitutes a separate market for which there is 
no reasonable substitute” and “we agree with the district court that it 
makes no difference whether the market is defined from the standpoint of 
broadcasters, advertisers, or viewers.”  
The Supreme Court’s findings have been put to the test in a 
number of economic studies. If the courts were correct that the NCAA’s 
television plan restricted output and raised price, fees for televising 
college football games should have fallen following the Supreme Court’s 
decision. Greenspan (1988) shows that this is what happened. In 1983, 95 
games were televised and fees paid totaled $74.2 million. The number of 
games televised in 1984, 1985, and 1986 were 63, 97, and 99, respectively 
(excluding regional telecasts packaged by individual conferences), and the 
corresponding fees paid were $42.0 million, $50.1 million, and $52.7 
million.  
If the NCAA’s pro-competitive arguments were valid, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in 1984 should have had a negative impact on 
(1) attendance at college football games and (2) competitive balance 
among football programs. The empirical evidence is, at best, weakly 
consistent with the first prediction and inconsistent with the second. Fizel 
and Bennett (1989) test the impact of college football telecasts on college 
football attendance during the period 1980-85. Although they conclude 
that the general increase in the number of telecasts reduces attendance, the 
relevant regression coefficients are statistically significant only at the 0.10 
level. At the 0.05 significance level, the surge in college football telecasts 
had no impact on college football attendance. Bennett and Fizel (1995) 
test the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on competitive 
balance in college football, using such measures as the dispersion of 
winning percentages in conferences and the average team winning 
percentages of strong and weak football programs. Contrary to the 
NCAA’s claim, they conclude that playing strength among Division I 
football teams has become more equal following the Supreme Court’s 
1984 decision. The same conclusion is reached by Eckard (1998), who 
observes that the number of schools appearing in the Top 10 rose from 27 
during the period 1973-81 to 37 in the period 1987-95, and the Herfindahl 
Index fell from 560 to 449. A similar result is obtained by focusing on the 
Top 20.  
Were the courts correct that there are no good substitutes for 
college football telecasts? Pacey and Wickham (1985) analyzed the 
Nielsen ratings of nationally televised college football games during the 
period 1976-81.  They found the number of hours of professional football 
and baseball televised during the week had no statistically significant 
impact on the Nielsen rating of the college football game. However, 
simultaneous broadcast of a World Series game reduced the Nielsen rating 
of the college football game by 1.9 points. Thus, although professional 
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 football and baseball telecasts are not a good substitute for college football 
telecasts generally, telecasts of professional sports’ “championship” games 
may be.  
Did consumers benefit from the Supreme Court’s decision? Pacey 
and Wickham (1985) observe that since the decision, many more college 
football games are being broadcast and television viewership has 
increased. They conclude: “Clearly, the short run impact has been 
beneficial to the consumer while the long run economic consequences 
cannot yet be determined.” (p. 94) However, Greenspan (1988) contends 
that, although fans who watch college football on television have 
benefited from the increase in the number of televised games, fans who 
attend college football games are harmed because, for example, game 
starting times are set to accommodate television coverage. 
Overall, the economic evidence suggests that the U.S. Supreme 
Court got it right – the NCAA’s television restrictions reduced output, 
raised prices, and lacked a pro-competitive rationale. 
 
 
Chicago Bulls. In the early 1990s, the NBA’s Chicago Bulls were 
wildly popular, with superstars Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen. 
The Bulls had a strong incentive to broadcast their games to as large 
an audience as possible. A regional cable channel has a smaller 
potential audience than does a station whose signal is carried 
nationwide by cable systems, a so-called ‘superstation.’ As a 
superstation, WGN had a larger potential audience than did 
SportsChannel, the regional cable television station that broadcast 
many Bulls’ games, and thus the Bulls had an incentive to broadcast 
as many games as possible on WGN. The nationwide broadcast of 
Bulls games, however, meant that on some occasions the Bulls would 
be playing on WGN while two other NBA teams would be playing on 
another channel. Quite possibly, a significant number of basketball 
fans – even fans of the teams playing the other game – would choose 
to watch the Bulls game. Given the star-power of the Bulls, it is 
unsurprising that other NBA teams did not want to have their televised 
games competing against a televised Bulls game. In fact, Hausman 
and Leonard (1997) document that, during the 1989-90 season, 
Nielsen ratings for games on Turner Network Television (TNT) were 
significantly reduced if WGN was airing a Bulls game at the same 
time.59 
In 1990, the NBA adopted a 20-game cap on the number of 
games a team could broadcast nationally, over the objections of the 
Chicago Bulls and New Jersey Nets. Teams were allowed to broadcast 
41 games over-the-air in their home markets and another 41 games 
could be shown on local cable. The games could not be televised in 
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 competition with a game being shown on NBC. Moreover, no more 
than 20 games could be televised on a superstation, and no game on a 
superstation could be televised in competition with a game airing on 
TNT.  
The Bulls and WGN filed an antitrust lawsuit which 
characterized the NBA as a cartel whose television restriction limited 
the output of broadcast games in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
Eastern Division, enjoined the NBA from enforcing its restriction. The 
NBA appealed.60 
The appeals court held that the NBA’s television restriction 
does not fall under the antitrust exemption in the Sport Broadcasting 
Act because the NBA has not “transferred” a right to sponsored 
telecasting. Nor does it fall under the ‘single entity’ antitrust 
exemption because the district court “concluded that the best 
characterization of the NBA is the third we have mentioned: a joint 
venture in the production of games but more like a cartel in the sale of 
its output.” The appeals court added: “Whether this is the best 
characterization of professional sports is a subject that has divided 
courts and scholars for some years, making it hard to characterize the 
district judge’s choice as clear error.”  
Since the NBA’s television restriction is not covered by any 
antitrust exemption, it must be analyzed under the Rule of Reason. 
The NBA complained that the district court had condemned the 20-
game limit without a finding that the NBA had a significant market 
share in a particular market. The appeals court interpreted the district 
court’s analysis as a ‘quick look’ version of the Rule of Reason: “any 
agreement to reduce output measured by the number of televised 
games requires some justification – some explanation connecting the 
practice to consumers’ benefits – before the court attempts an analysis 
of market power.”  
The appeals court acknowledged that the NBA’s contention 
that its television restrictions control free-riding deserves “serious 
analysis.” The NBA identified three forms of free-riding: (1) “the 
contracts with NBC and TNT require these networks to advertise NBA 
basketball on other shows” and “the Bulls and WGN receive the 
benefit of this promotion without paying the cost”; (2) “the NBA has 
revenue-sharing devices and a draft to prop up the weaker teams” and 
the Bulls “took advantage of these while they were weak (and through 
the draft obtained their current stars) but, according to the league, are 
siphoning viewers (and thus revenues) to their own telecasts, thus 
diminishing the pot available for distribution to today’s weaker 
teams”; and (3) “the Bulls and WGN are taking a free ride on the 
benefits of the cooperative efforts during the 1980s to build up 
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 professional basketball as a rival to baseball and football – efforts that 
bore fruit just as the Bulls produced a championship team, and which 
the Bulls would undermine.” The appeals court rejected the NBA’s 
free-rider defense: 
 
When payment is possible, free-riding is not a problem because the 
“ride” is not free. Here lies the flaw in the NBA’s story. It may (and 
does) charge members for value delivered. As the NBA itself 
emphasizes, there are substantial revenue transfers, propping up 
the weaker clubs in order to promote vigorous competition on the 
court. Without skipping a beat the NBA may change these 
payments to charge for the Bulls’ ride. If the $40 million of 
advertising time that NBC will provide during the four years of its 
current contract also promotes WGN’s games, then the league may 
levy a charge for each game shown on a superstation, or require the 
club to surrender a portion of its revenues. Major league baseball 
does exactly this and otherwise allows its teams access to 
superstations… Avoidance of free-riding therefore does not justify 
the NBA’s 20-game limit. 
  
The appeals court ruled that it would not overturn the district 
court’s decision to enjoin the NBA from enforcing its 20-game cap. 
A few years later, the Bulls sought to increase the number of 
games televised on WGN from the 25 or 30 games authorized by 
injunction since 1991, to 41 games, while the NBA sought to impose a 
“tax” on games broadcast to a national audience. The Bulls and WGN 
went to court; the district court made a 30-game allowance permanent, 
to the chagrin of the Bulls and WGN, but also ruled the NBA’s fees to 
be excessive, leading both sides to appeal the decision.61 The appeals 
court vacated the district court’s judgment, arguing the district judge 
erroneously required the NBA to have a complete unity of interest in 
order to be treated as a single entity. The appeals court ruled that, 
“when acting in the broadcast market the NBA is closer to a single 
firm than to a group of independent firms” and therefore “plaintiffs 
cannot prevail without establishing that the NBA possesses power in a 
relevant market, and that its exercise of this power has injured 
consumers.” The appeals court distinguished its current decision from 
its 1992 ruling in favor of the Bulls and WGN: “We affirmed the 
district court’s original injunction after applying the ‘quick look’ 
version because the district court had characterized the NBA as 
something close to a cartel, and the league had not then made a 
Copperweld argument.” 
As for the fee sought by the NBA on games broadcast to a 
national audience, the appeals court criticized the district court’s 
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 ruling that the per game fee should be reduced from $138,000 to 
$39,400: 
 
The district court’s opinion concerning the fee reads like 
the ruling of an agency exercising a power to regulate 
prices. Yet the antitrust laws do not deputize district judges 
as one-man regulatory agencies. The core question in 
antitrust is output. Unless a contract reduces output in some 
market, to the detriment of consumers, there is no antitrust 
problem. A high price is not itself a violation of the 
Sherman Act… WGN and the Bulls argue that the league’s 
fee is excessive, unfair, and the like. But they do not say 
that it will reduce output… Lack of an effect on output 
means that the fee does not have antitrust significance. 
Once antitrust issues are put aside, how much the NBA 
charges for national telecasts is for the league to resolve 
under its internal governance procedures. It is no different 
in principle from the question how much (if any) of the live 
gate goes to the visiting team, who profits from the sale of 
cotton candy at the stadium, and how the clubs divide 
revenues from merchandise bearing their logos and 
trademarks. Courts must respect a league’s disposition of 
these issues, just as they respect contracts and decisions by 
a corporation’s board of directors. 
  
Thus, the U.S. Court of Appeals required the Bulls and WGN, pending 
further proceedings in the district court or an agreement among the 
parties, to abide by the NBA’s limitations on the maximum number of 
superstation broadcasts. 
 
 
Team relocation. A team may believe it would be more profitable if it moved to 
another location. Such a move, depending on league rules and policies, may 
require approval of the other league members. The league has an understandable 
interest in the relocation activities of its members. For example, the team may be 
seeking to move to a city where the league planned to add an expansion team, and 
thus the team is attempting to seize a new franchise opportunity that ‘belongs’ to 
the league. The relocation to a smaller city may reduce the league’s broadcast 
revenue, even if the relocating team’s revenue increases due to public subsidies 
and a more lucrative stadium deal. The relocation of a team from an above-
average sized city to an even larger city may decrease competitive balance among 
the teams in the league. Furthermore, the relocation may disrupt rivalries, hurting 
fan interest when the team is on the road. When teams wishing to relocate fail to 
obtain the support of the league for the move, they sometimes file an antitrust 
lawsuit challenging the league’s relocation rules and policies. Teams which have 
done so include the NHL’s San Francisco Seals, the NFL’s Oakland Raiders, the 
NBA’s San Diego Clippers, and the NFL’s New England Patriots. 
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San Francisco Seals.62 In 1969, the NHL’s San Francisco Seals formally 
applied to the league to exchange its current franchise for a new one 
located in Vancouver. Thus, instead of ‘relocating’ to Vancouver, the 
Seals were actually applying for a new franchise in a new location 
(Vancouver). The NHL’s Board of Governors denied the request and the 
Seals filed an antitrust lawsuit alleging that the defendants combined to 
prevent it from playing its games in Vancouver, where it believed its gate 
receipts would be higher. The Seals did not challenge the league’s 
allocation to individual teams of ‘home territories’ with exclusive rights 
within those territories. Rather, it wanted to obtain such a home territory in 
Vancouver. 
 The district court found that “the relevant product market with 
which we are here concerned is the production of professional hockey 
games before live audiences, and that the relevant geographical market is 
the United States and Canada.” Within this market, the Seals and the other 
members of the NHL are not competitors “in the economic sense” but 
rather “are, in fact, all members of a single unit competing as such with 
other similar professional leagues.” Consequently, “the organizational 
scheme of the National Hockey League, by which all its members are 
bound, imposes no restraint upon trade or commerce in this relevant 
market, but rather makes possible a segment of commercial activity which 
could hardly exist without it.” Thus, the district court concluded that “the 
actions of the Board of Governors pursuant to the constitution and bylaws 
of the National Hockey League do not violate section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, as they do not restrain trade or commerce within the relevant market.” 
 The Seals also alleged that the defendants violated Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act by attempting to monopolize the business of major league 
hockey. In particular, the Seals alleged that the NHL wanted to keep the 
team in San Francisco to discourage a rival league from expanding into 
San Francisco. Since the Seals did not belong to a rival league, even if the 
Seals’ accusation was true, they would not have been the target of the 
NHL’s alleged anticompetitive acts and would not have been injured by 
those acts. Therefore, the district court ruled that the Seals did not have 
standing to sue on Section 2 claims. 
 The district court thus granted the NHL’s motion for summary 
judgment in July 1974. By that date, the Seals had already declared 
bankruptcy and changed ownership. In 1976, the franchise was transferred 
to Cleveland and became the Cleveland Barons. In June 1978, the 
financially-troubled Barons were merged with the Minnesota North Stars. 
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 Oakland Raiders. After the Los Angeles Rams moved to Anaheim in 
1978, the Los Angeles Coliseum, where the Rams had played, was left 
without an NFL tenant. The Coliseum asked the NFL to place an 
expansion franchise in Los Angeles, but was told it was not possible at the 
time. The Coliseum attempted to lure an existing NFL team, but such a 
relocation would have required unanimous approval of all 28 teams under 
the NFL Constitution’s Rule 4.3 of Article IV. In September 1978, the 
Coliseum filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL alleging that Rule 4.3 
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The lawsuit failed because the 
Coliseum did not have a NFL team committed to relocating to Los 
Angeles. Nevertheless, the NFL responded by amending Rule 4.3 so that a 
relocation had to be approved by only three-quarters of the 28 teams. 
 The Oakland Raiders’ lease with the Oakland Coliseum expired in 
1978 and Al Davis, the Raiders’ general managing partner, began 
negotiations with the Los Angeles Coliseum. A deal was imminent in 
January 1980 so the L.A. Coliseum reactivated its lawsuit against the NFL 
in an attempt to thwart the NFL from preventing the Raiders’ relocation. 
Although the district court granted the injunction, the appeals court 
reversed. 
 The Raiders and the L.A. Coliseum reached a ‘memorandum of 
agreement’ on March 1, 1980 and two days later at an NFL meeting Davis 
announced his intention to move the Raiders to Los Angeles. The league 
obtained an injunction preventing the move. On March 10, 1980, the 
league voted on the move – 22 teams voted against the move and 5 
abstained. The L.A. Coliseum renewed its antitrust lawsuit against the 
NFL and its member teams, with the Oakland Raiders aligned as a party 
plaintiff. On June 14, 1982, the court permanently enjoined the NFL and 
its member clubs from interfering with the Raiders’ move to Los Angeles. 
In May 1983, a jury awarded the Raiders $11.55 million in damages and 
the L.A. Coliseum $4.86 million; the district court then trebled the 
antitrust damages. The NFL and its member teams appealed the decision.63 
 The NFL argued that (1) it is a single entity and thus incapable of 
restraining trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and (2) Rule 
4.3 is not an unreasonable restraint of trade under Section 1. The appeals 
court sided with the district court in rejecting the single entity argument, 
noting, for example, that profits vary widely across teams and this 
“disparity in profits can be attributed to independent management policies 
regarding coaches, players, management personnel, ticket prices, 
concessions, luxury box seats, as well as franchise location, all of which 
contribute to fan support and other income sources.” 
 To determine whether Rule 4.3 is an unreasonable restraint of 
trade, the appeals courts noted that it “must examine Rule 4.3 to determine 
whether it reasonably serves the legitimate collective concerns of the 
owners or instead permits them to reap excess profits at the expense of the 
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 consuming public.” The appeals court agreed with the NFL that the Rule 
served legitimate collective concerns: 
 
We agree that the nature of NFL football requires some territorial 
restrictions in order both to encourage participation in the venture 
and to secure each venturer the legitimate fruits of that 
participation.  
 
Rule 4.3 aids the League, the NFL claims, in determining its 
overall geographic scope, regional balance and coverage of major 
and minor markets. Exclusive territories aid new franchises in 
achieving financial stability, which protects the large initial 
investment an owner must make to start up a football team. 
Stability arguably helps ensure no one team has an undue 
advantage on the field. Territories foster fan loyalty which in turn 
promotes traditional rivalries between teams, each contributing to 
attendance at games and television viewing. 
 
Joint marketing decisions are surely legitimate because of the 
importance of television… 
 
Last, there is some legitimacy to the NFL’s argument that it has an 
interest in preventing transfers from areas before local 
governments, which have made a substantial investment in stadia 
and other facilities, can recover their expenditures. In such a 
situation, local confidence in the NFL is eroded, possibly resulting 
in a decline in interest. 
 
However, the appeals court added: 
 
All of these factors considered, we nevertheless are not persuaded 
the jury should have concluded that Rule 4.3 is a reasonable 
restraint of trade. The same goals can be achieved in a variety of 
ways which are less harmful to competition. 
 
The appeals court advised: 
 
To withstand antitrust scrutiny, restrictions on team movement 
should be more closely tailored to serve the needs inherent in 
producing the NFL “product” and competing with other forms of 
entertainment. An express recognition and consideration of those 
objective factors espoused by the NFL as important, such as 
population, economic projections, facilities, regional balance, etc., 
would be well advised… Fan loyalty and location continuity could 
also be considered. 
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 Thus, the Raiders were free to move to Los Angeles. On June 16, 
1986, the appeals court issued its opinion regarding the jury’s damage 
awards and the trebling of damages by the district court.64 The appeals 
court ruled that “the jury could properly have found that the amount of the 
Raiders’ lost profits from the delay of two years in moving to Los Angeles 
amounted to $11,554,382” but “the district court erred in limiting the 
NFL’s damage offset defense, when it excluded from the jury’s 
consideration in calculating damages the benefits the Raiders realized by 
taking from the NFL the opportunity to establish an expansion franchise in 
Los Angeles.” Al Davis testified that the Raiders’ franchise value 
increased by $25 million when it moved to Los Angeles. Since the appeals 
court ruled that “Rule 4.3 was illegal only as it was applied in 1980,” the 
NFL “legitimately possessed the value of that expansion opportunity that 
had accrued until 1980.” Therefore, “the excess portion of the injunctive 
relief can be measured as the value of the NFL’s Los Angeles expansion 
opportunity in 1980, prior to the NFL’s illegal conduct, less the value of 
the Oakland opportunity returned to the league.”  
In other words, by moving to Los Angeles, the Raiders seized for 
themselves a valuable expansion opportunity and returned to the NFL a 
less valuable expansion opportunity in Oakland. The net value of the 
Raiders’ seizure had to be subtracted from the Raiders’ damage award. 
A few years later, the NFL began imposing relocation fees.65 In 
1988, the St. Louis Cardinals’ move to Arizona involved payment of a 
$7.5 million relocation fee. Relocation fees were also paid for the Los 
Angeles Rams’ move to St. Louis in 1995 and the Cleveland Browns’ 
move to Baltimore in 1996. On the other hand, there was no relocation fee 
for the Los Angeles Raiders’ move back to Oakland in 1995; nor was 
there a relocation fee for the Houston Oilers’ move to Nashville in 1996.  
The 1984 court decision in the Raiders case is controversial. 
Among those who believe it was wrongly decided are Lehn and Sykuta 
(1997), who have two primary criticisms: (1) “in its rejection of the single 
entity argument, the court failed to properly distinguish between the 
cooperation that is necessary to promote the value of the league as a whole 
and the ability of teams to compete in input markets” and the court “also 
adopted internally inconsistent arguments with respect to the value of 
teams independent of the league” and (2) “it failed to recognize that 
territorial restrictions promote incentives for individual franchisees, or 
clubs, to invest in product quality and the reputation of the franchisor, the 
NFL.” (pp. 562-63)  
In support of the latter criticism, Lehn and Sykuta examine the 
impact of the Raiders’ move to Los Angeles on the Los Angeles Rams and 
the San Francisco 49ers. They document that the product quality of the 
Rams, as measured by the Rams’ won-loss record, plunged after the 
Raiders’ move to Los Angeles, consistent with the hypothesis that the 
                                                 
64 Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986). 
65 Vrooman (1997b). 
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 Rams’ incentive to invest in their team’s quality diminished. On the other 
hand, the product quality of the 49ers soared, suggesting that after the 
Raiders’ move from Oakland, the 49ers had greater incentive to invest in 
their team’s quality. Interestingly, the product quality of the Raiders also 
fell after moving to Los Angeles. Lehn and Sykuta conclude: “A cursory 
examination of the evidence suggests that the league has in fact been 
injured and that the arguments underlying the court’s decision were 
incorrect.” (p. 563)  
 
 
San Diego Clippers. In the early 1980s, prior to the appeals court decision 
in the lawsuit over the NFL’s Oakland Raiders’ move to Los Angeles, the 
NBA’s San Diego Clippers sought to move to Los Angeles, but abandoned 
their quest after the NBA filed suit. After the appeals court decided the 
Oakland Raiders’ case, the Clippers believed they were now free to 
relocate. On May 14, 1984, the Clippers announced that they would move 
to Los Angeles the next day and any attempt by the NBA to stop them 
would be a violation of the antitrust laws. The Clippers complied with 
Article 9 of the NBA’s constitution, which prevents teams from moving 
into the territory operated by another team, by getting the Los Angeles 
Lakers to agree in writing to waive their rights under Article 9. The NBA 
sought to avoid antitrust liability by scheduling the Clippers’ games in Los 
Angeles. However, the NBA also went to court seeking a declaratory 
judgment that it could restrain the movement of its member teams and that 
it could impose a fee for the unilateral usurpation of the NBA’s franchise 
opportunity. 
 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Clippers. The NBA appealed and the appeals court reversed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment because there were numerous issues of 
fact to be resolved and the case was remanded to the district court for 
trial.66 The appeals court stressed: “Neither the jury’s verdict in Raiders, 
nor the court’s affirmation of that verdict, held that a franchise movement 
rule, in and of itself, was invalid under the antitrust laws.” It repeated that 
“a careful analysis of Raiders I makes clear that franchise movement 
restrictions are not invalid as a matter of law.”  
Whether the application of the NBA’s franchise movement 
restrictions to stop the Clippers’ move would be a violation of the antitrust 
laws would have to be decided at trial. The NBA sought either the return 
of the Clippers to San Diego or termination of the franchise.67 In 
September 1987, less than a week before the trial was to commence, the 
NBA and the Clippers reached an out-of-court settlement. The Clippers’ 
owner, Donald T. Sterling, agreed to pay the league approximately $6 
million in fines, signed documents stating that the NBA’s rules regarding 
                                                 
66 NBA v. SDC Basketball Club and Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 815 F.2d 562 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
67 New York Times (March 9, 1985; October 1, 1987). 
-  - 80
 franchise moves are valid and binding, and dropped all claims against the 
NBA including his $100 million lawsuit filed against the NBA in March 
1985 alleging “various fraudulent acts.” In return, the NBA allowed the 
Clippers to remain in Los Angeles. 
 
 
New England Patriots. Victor K. Kiam II acquired majority-control of the 
NFL’s New England Patriots in 1988 and, as a condition for the NFL’s 
approval of his purchase, Kiam signed a contract agreeing to comply with 
the NFL’s Constitution and Bylaws and to obtain advance approval from 
the NFL before any transfer of ownership of the team. Kiam also agreed to 
“continue to operate the Patriots’ franchise within its existing home 
territory, unless a transfer of the franchise … to a different city is 
approved by the member clubs of the League.” In 1989, NFL 
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue issued a statement that sale of a team would 
require the approval of at least three-quarters of the NFL’s members. 
At the time, the Patriots played their home games in Foxboro, 
Massachusetts, and experienced financial difficulties due in part to the 
inadequate Foxboro facility and the restrictive lease the team had with the 
facility. The team was not profitable the first two seasons under Kiam’s 
ownership and he had to personally guarantee loans and use personal 
funds to cover cash flow shortfalls. He attempted unsuccessfully to 
negotiate with Boston city officials for a new stadium. In 1990, Kiam 
began to consider moving the Patriots to another region of the country; 
there appeared no chance of getting a new stadium in New England and, 
according to Kiam, then-Commissioner Pete Rozelle had told him prior to 
purchasing the team that if he was unable to secure a new stadium in New 
England that he would be permitted to move the team. 
Kiam negotiated with a group named Touchdown Jacksonville, 
Inc. (TJI) to move the team to Jacksonville. After TJI officials informed 
the NFL that they were close to a deal, the NFL told TJI that it “did not 
favor the move” and that if TJI wanted the NFL’s support (without which 
it could not secure a franchise), it should cease negotiations with the 
Patriots. TJI did so and, several months later in the fall of 1991, 
Touchdown Jacksonville, LTD (TJL) was formed, with TJI president 
David Seldin as the president of TJL’s corporate general partner. Some of 
TJI’s assets were transferred to TJL.  
In 1991, Kiam informed Commissioner Tagliabue that the Patriots 
would have to move for financial reasons. Tagliabue opposed any move. 
The NFL increased the team’s debt limit by $10 million after requiring 
Kiam to agree not move the team before the end of the 1993 season. In 
1992, Kiam negotiated to sell the team to James Orthwein, who the NFL 
required to sign an “iron clad commitment” not to move the team to St. 
Louis, his hometown. A few weeks prior to the close of the sale of the 
Patriots to Orthwein, the NFL announced that the sale would not be 
approved unless Kiam signed a release of all claims against the NFL, 
including potential antitrust claims. On May 8, 1992, Kiam signed the 
release and three days later the transaction closed. 
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 The NFL awarded an expansion franchise to TJL in November 
1993. It was around this time that Kiam alleges he first learned of the 
NFL’s role in the collapse of negotiations between himself and TJI. On 
November 16, 1994, Kiam filed an antitrust complaint against the NFL 
alleging that its monopolistic and conspiratorial conduct illegally lowered 
the value of the Patriots franchise and had anticompetitive effects in 
several markets. Kiam argued that he had signed the claims release under 
economic duress, and that the release itself was an instrument of the 
anticompetitive conduct. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the NFL 
on the issue of economic duress and the district court granted the NFL’s 
motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims. 
Kiam appealed.68 The appeals court found that the antitrust claims 
involved issues of fact that could not be resolved by means of summary 
judgment on the current record. However, the appeals court also found 
that the claims release signed by Kiam was valid. Thus, Kiam could not 
pursue the antitrust claims against the NFL and its members, but Kiam 
could pursue them against TJI and TJL because they were not covered by 
the claims release.  
 
 
The impact of relocation on professional sports franchise values has been 
investigated by Alexander and Kern (2004), who estimate a cross-sectional 
regression model of franchise values using data on the U.S.-based franchises 
(Canadian-based franchises are excluded from the sample) of the four major 
North American sports leagues over the period 1991-97. Interestingly, they find 
that relocation does not have a statistically significant impact on franchise value, 
but playing in a new facility does. In other words, holding whether the team plays 
in a new facility constant, whether the team is playing in a new city does not 
significantly affect franchise value.  
This finding suggests that teams may first try to obtain a new facility in 
their current city and, if that fails, attempt to relocate to a new facility in another 
city.  Of course, the threat to relocate to a new facility in another city may add 
leverage to the team’s negotiations for a new facility in its current city – and this 
may explain why playing in a new facility, regardless of whether the location is 
old or new, raises franchise value. 
Note, once again, that Alexander and Kern excluded Canadian-based 
franchises from their analysis. This omission may be particularly important in the 
case of the NHL, which in its 1979 expansion added three Canadian-based 
franchises (Edmonton, Quebec City, and Winnipeg) and one U.S.-based franchise 
(Hartford).69 In 1980, the Atlanta franchise relocated to Calgary. Thus, there was 
a trend toward more Canadian-based franchises, although most NHL franchises 
continued to be based in the U.S. More recently, however, the trend has been for 
Canadian-based teams to relocate in the United States, despite the continuing 
huge popularity of hockey in Canada. The Quebec team, which had been 
                                                 
68 VKK Corporation v. NFL, 244 F.3d 114 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
69 Jones and Ferguson (1988). 
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 purchased for $15 million in 1988, was sold for $75 million and a side-payment 
and relocated to Denver; the Winnipeg team was sold in 1996 for roughly the 
same amount and relocated to Phoenix.70  
Jones and Ferguson (1988) and Cocco and Jones (1997) examine franchise 
profitability, viability, and relocation of NHL teams, particularly the Canadian-
based teams. Jones and Ferguson analyzed data from the 1977-78 season and 
concluded that several Canadian cities were more attractive expansion 
opportunities for the NHL than any potential U.S. cities – and more attractive than 
at least eight cities with current NHL teams. This finding is consistent with the 
trend toward more Canadian-based franchises. However, Cocco and Jones, using 
data from the 1989-90 season, reach a very different conclusion, finding evidence 
that “the viability of Canadian Small Market Franchises (SMF) is in doubt 
because of a combination of inadequate revenue (due to the quality of their 
locations) and escalating salary cost.” (p. 1537) They consider a number of 
possible solutions, including revenue sharing, salary caps, and public subsidies, 
but conclude that “none are as attractive or as realistic as relocating south to US 
cities.” (p. 1537) 
In 1983, the NHL rejected the proposed relocation of the St. Louis team to 
Saskatoon. Saskatoon was one of the three Canadian cities without an NHL 
franchise which Jones and Ferguson (1988) had estimated was preferable to all 
potential, and at least eight existing, U.S. locations. Why then did the NHL reject 
the relocation? 
One possible answer is externalities. In the NHL (as in the NBA), gate 
receipts were not shared between the home and visiting teams. The home team 
kept it all, unlike the NFL where 60% of the gate receipts are kept by the home 
team and 40% are given to the visiting team and unlike MLB which splits gate 
receipts 85%-15% between the home and visiting team.71 By moving from St. 
Louis to Saskatoon, the team may become a less attractive opponent (for example, 
the rivalry that the St. Louis team has with the Chicago Blackhawks would be 
disrupted).  Since gate receipts are not shared, the negative impact on gate 
receipts at Blackhawks home games would be borne entirely by the Blackhawks. 
Thus, it is possible that the negative externality that the move to Saskatoon would 
have on other NHL franchises would far outweigh the private benefits of the 
relocation to the St. Louis franchise. 
This hypothesis was tested by Carlton, Frankel, and Landes (2004), who 
examine the impact of the relocation of four NHL franchises on attendance at 
games where they were the visiting team. 72 The change in ‘away’ attendance is 
calculated as the difference between actual attendance and the attendance 
predicted by their econometric model if the move had not occurred. When 
California moved to Cleveland, attendance at games where it was the visiting 
team fell 0.22% the first year and 0.90% the second. When Kansas City moved to 
Colorado, ‘away’ attendance rose 2.63% the first year, but then fell 1.59% and 
                                                 
70 Cocco and Jones (1997). 
71 Alexander and Kern (2004). 
72 The NHL hired Lexecon, an economic consulting firm, to conduct an economic 
analysis of the proposed move and Carlton served as the NHL’s economic expert. 
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 8.79% in the second and third years, respectively. The corresponding declines in 
away attendance when Atlanta moved to Calgary were 9.22%, 9.70%, and 5.61%. 
When Colorado moved to New Jersey, away attendance declined 5.59% the first 
year and 1.04% the second. Since the NHL approved these relocations, one would 
expect the negative impact on ‘away’ attendance to be relatively minor. The 
model is used to predict the impact of the proposed move of the St. Louis Blues to 
Saskatoon under the assumption that the effect on away attendance will be the 
same in each of the first three years after the move and then have no effect. The 
predicted decline in away attendance in each of the first three years is 9.21%, and, 
not surprisingly, the NHL blocked the move.  
Sports leagues may also oppose the relocation of one of their members 
because of the negative impact on competitive balance. Quirk (1973) uses 
population as a crude measure of revenue potential and assumes that a move 
increases competitive balance if the population of the city to which the franchise 
moves is closer to the average population of franchise cities than the population of 
the city from which the team moved. Only three of the ten major league baseball 
franchise relocations which Quirk examines meet his criteria for increasing 
competitive balance. Moreover, when the effect of the move on the drawing 
potential of nearby teams is taken into account, Quirk concludes that only one 
move – the St. Louis Browns to Baltimore – increased competitive balance. Thus, 
sports leagues – or at least Major League Baseball – have approved relocations 
even if they negatively impacted competitive balance. 
Legislators have been conflicted when it comes to franchise relocation. On 
the one hand, they often rail against MLB’s antitrust exemption; yet, legislation 
has been introduced to give other professional sports leagues antitrust immunity 
on issues of franchise relocation. For example, the Fan Freedom and Community 
Protection Act of 1995 (which did not pass) contained the following provision: “It 
is not unlawful by reason of the antitrust laws for a professional sports league to 
enforce rules or agreements authorizing the membership of such league to decide 
whether a professional sports team that is a member of the league may relocate 
from one community to another.”  
The Act would have required leagues to make specific findings on ten 
issues: (1) “the extent to which fan loyalty to and support for the team has been 
demonstrated during the team’s tenure in the community”; (2) “the degree to 
which the team has engaged in good faith negotiations with appropriate persons 
concerning terms and conditions under which the team would continue to play its 
games in the community”; (3) “the degree to which the owners or managers of the 
team have contributed to any circumstances which might demonstrate the need for 
the relocation”; (4) “the extent to which the team, directly or indirectly, received 
public financial support by means of any publicly financed playing facility, 
special tax treatment, or any other form of public financial support”;  (5) “the 
adequacy of the stadium in which the team played its home games in the previous 
season, and the willingness of the stadium, arena authority, or the local 
government to remedy any deficiencies in such facility”; (6) “whether the team 
has incurred net operating losses, exclusive of depreciation and amortization, 
sufficient to threaten the continued financial viability of the team”; (7) “whether 
any other team in the league is located in the community in which the team is 
currently located”; (8) “whether the team proposes to relocate to a community in 
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 which no other team in the league is located”; (9) “whether the stadium authority, 
if public, is not opposed to such relocation”; and (10) “whether there is a bona 
fide investor offering fair market value for the professional sports team and will 
retain the team in the current community.” 
Gattuso (1985) makes the case that Congress should not get involved in 
the NFL’s franchise relocation decisions in the aftermath of the court’s ruling in 
the case involving the Oakland Raiders’ move to Los Angeles. Ross and 
Dimitroff (1997) argue that, although the majority of court decisions hold that 
MLB’s antitrust exemption covers the “business of baseball” (and thus covers 
franchise relocation issues), some courts have held that the exemption applies 
only to the reserve clause in players’ contract (and thus relocation issues would 
not be covered by the exemption). They contend that if relocation issues are not 
within MLB’s antitrust exemption, “a solid case can be made that the present 
restrictions on the sale or relocation of major league baseball teams violate section 
1 of the Sherman Act.” (p. 539) 
 
 
In summary, sports leagues require the cooperation of their members in order to 
produce their output. Despite the fact that the four major North American sports leagues 
have survived (although not necessarily flourished) for decades, many other sports 
leagues lasted only a few years before they disappeared. One possible reason for the 
longevity of the major sports leagues is their rules and policies, which reduce conflict 
between members and between members and the league. Nevertheless, some rules and 
policies have been attacked on antitrust grounds by disgruntled league members. Four 
examples are public ownership restrictions, sponsorship and licensing restrictions, 
television restrictions, and restrictions on franchise relocation.  
-  - 85
 Chapter 4 
 
Sports Leagues vs. Rival Leagues 
 
 
 
 The four major North American sports leagues have each been challenged by rival 
leagues, which either folded without a trace (Federal League of Professional Base Ball 
Clubs, United States Football League), folded after merging some of their teams with the 
major league (American Basketball Association, World Hockey Association), or merged 
completely with the major league (American Football League). Competition between 
rival leagues occurs in both input (players and coaches) and output (games) markets. One 
clear effect of such interleague competition is soaring player salaries – player salaries are 
much closer to their marginal revenue product when leagues have to compete for players 
than when they do not. Not surprisingly, the incumbent league may attempt to deter or 
frustrate the entry of a rival league by attempting to restrict the ability of its players to 
sign with a team in the rival league. Similarly, the incumbent league may attempt to 
prevent teams in the rival league from playing games in the stadiums used by the 
incumbent’s teams. The incumbent, in addition, could expand by putting new teams into 
cities which could support a team but lack one. Such tactics have been tried. It should 
come as no surprise that the newly-created league often brings an antitrust lawsuit against 
its incumbent competitor alleging, for example, that the incumbent is acting illegally to 
maintain its monopoly. 
 Interleague competition occurs in the output market as well. Typically, 
competition leads to lower prices and/or higher quality. This is not necessarily true in the 
case of competition between sports leagues, however, because the expanded demand for 
players results in a dilution of talent, and consequently may reduce the quality of the 
resulting games. Suppose the new entrant has the same number of teams and the same 
number of players per team as the incumbent. Unless the incumbent contracts by merging 
or folding some teams, the demand for players will double. Many players who were not 
good enough to be on a team in the incumbent league prior to the entry of the new league 
will now be able to find a spot on a team in one of the leagues. Thus, a reduction in the 
incumbent league’s ticket prices or broadcast fees following the entry of a new league 
may reflect, at least in part, the poorer quality of the league’s product, its games. 
 This chapter focuses on five instances of antitrust litigation involving a newly-
created league and an incumbent league for the same sport: Federal League vs. Major 
League Baseball, American Football League vs. National Football League, American 
Basketball Association vs. National Basketball Association, World Hockey Association 
vs. National Hockey League, and United States Football League vs. National Football 
League. The chapter concludes with a discussion of an antitrust lawsuit involving leagues 
in different sports: North American Soccer League vs. National Football League.  
 
 
Federal League vs. Major League Baseball. The National League introduced the 
‘reserve clause’ in 1879, thereby binding players to the team that originally 
acquired the right to contract with them and giving National League teams 
monopsony power over their players. As one would expect, player salaries fell. 
This fall was rapidly reversed after the formation of a new league, the American 
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 Association, in 1882. Between 1882 and 1891, the average nominal salary of 
National League players jumped from $1,375 to $3,500 – or about $63,000 in 
1998 dollars. After four American Association teams were absorbed into the 
National League and five other American Association teams were bought out by 
the surviving teams, average National League players salaries plunged from 
$3,500 in 1891 to $2,400 in 1892, a drop of 31%, and to $1,800 in 1893, a further 
drop of 25%. In 1893, the National League capped player salaries at $2,400, and 
some teams imposed even lower caps. The decline in player salaries coincided 
with rising, not falling attendance.73 
 In 1901, a new rival league appeared – the American League. By 
successfully luring players from the National League, the American League in 
1902 actually had higher attendance (2.2 million) than the National League (1.7 
million). The National League attempted to have state courts enforce its reserve 
clause but the effort failed because those courts did not have jurisdiction for 
player movements across state lines. Player salaries soared and, during the 1903 
season, the two leagues merged and at the end of the season played the first World 
Series. That season, player salaries dropped roughly 15%. 
 In 1913, the Federal League began play as a minor league.74 The next year 
the league sought to attract major league players by doing without a reserve 
clause, thereby giving Federal League players the freedom to move between 
teams. The Federal League lured a number of star players, although most of the 
players it lured were past their prime. On the other hand, Federal League teams 
played in new, state-of-the-art stadiums. The Major League teams responded to 
the competition from the Federal League by offering higher player salaries and 
three-year contracts. Between 1913 and 1915, when the Federal League was in 
existence, player salaries rose 67%, from $3,000 to $5,000.  
The Federal League filed an antitrust lawsuit against the National League 
and American League in January 1915 in an attempt to break their reserve clause 
and thereby aid the Federal League in attracting players from those leagues. After 
the 1915 season, a deal was reached whereby the American and National leagues 
would help the Federal League owners who were in debt in exchange for the 
disbanding of the Federal League and the dropping of the antitrust lawsuit. Teams 
in all three leagues were struggling financially. In some cases, a Federal League 
team played in the same city as an American or National league team, and all 
teams with such direct competition were having financial problems. The owner of 
the Federal League’s Chicago Whales was allowed to purchase the National 
League’s Cubs and move them to the Whales’ new ballpark – known today as 
Wrigley Field. The owner of the Federal League’s St. Louis Terriers was allowed 
to takeover the American League’s Browns. Harry Sinclair, owner of a Federal 
League team, sold his players’ contracts and reportedly made a fortune. By 1917, 
after the buy-out of most Federal League team owners, player salaries had fallen 
from $5,000 in 1915 to $4,000 in nominal terms (and even smaller in real terms 
given the inflation of the World War I period).  
                                                 
73 The information in this paragraph and the next comes from Kahn (2000). 
74 The information in this paragraph and the next comes from Tarantino (2005), except 
for the player salary figures, which come from Kahn (2000). 
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 The Federal League’s Baltimore Terrapins were denied a Major League 
team, declined a $50,000 settlement, and filed an antitrust lawsuit not only against 
the National and American leagues but, among others, three executives of the 
Federal League. The Terrapins alleged, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
that “the defendants destroyed the Federal League by buying up some of the 
constituent clubs and in one way or another inducing all those clubs except the 
plaintiff to leave their League, and that the three persons connected with the 
Federal League and named as defendants, one of them being the President of the 
League, took part in the conspiracy.”75 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that 
“the restrictions by contract that prevented the plaintiff from getting players to 
break their bargains and the other conduct charged against the defendants were 
not an interference with commerce among the States.” In other words, the 
business of baseball is not interstate commerce and thus not subject to federal 
antitrust laws. 
Another economic threat to Major League Baseball came from the African 
American league, which prospered from the 1920s to the early 1940s. After the 
racial integration of MLB in 1947, the exodus of talent from the African 
American league led to its demise a few years later.76  
As will be discussed further in Chapter 6, numerous economic studies 
have documented that MLB’s reserve clause had a negative impact on player 
salaries. For example, Scully (1974) estimates players’ marginal revenue products 
(MRPs) net of training and capital costs for the 1968 and 1969 seasons and finds 
that ‘star’ and ‘average’ players received salaries equal to 15% and 20% of their 
net MRPs, respectively. Medoff (1976) estimates that, during the 1972-74 
seasons, ‘star’, ‘average’, and ‘mediocre’ hitters were paid 41%, 36%, and 30% of 
their MRP, respectively, while the corresponding figures for star, average, and 
mediocre pitchers were 49%, 51%, and 55%. Sommers and Quinton (1982) 
examine the 14 most sought-after players who became free agents after the 1976 
season and find that the five pitchers were paid, on average, 99% of their MRPs 
during the 1977 season and the nine hitters were paid 84%, which suggests that 
non-free agents (i.e., players still bound by the reserve clause) were underpaid. 
Lehn (1982) compares average real salaries before (1971-76) and after (1977-80) 
the introduction of free agency and finds that, in the first year of free agency 
(1977), average real salaries rose 39%, from $51,501 to $76,066, and rose an 
additional 22%, to $99,876, the next year. The increases then dropped to 2.2% in 
1979 and 1.2% in 1980. In addition, Lehn documents that the number of 
guaranteed years on players’ contracts rose sharply after the introduction of free 
agency. Raimondo (1983), Hill and Spellman (1983), and Hill (1985) also 
compare player salaries to their MRPs before and after the introduction of free 
agency in 1977 and conclude that free agent salaries are much closer to players’ 
MRPs than are non-free agent salaries. Thus, there is little dispute that, prior to 
the introduction of free agency, MLB’s reserve clause enabled teams to pay 
players less than the value of their marginal revenue product, even after adjusting 
for the training costs which teams invest in their players.  
                                                 
75 Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
76 See Fort and Maxcy (2001). 
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 Did the reserve clause have any procompetitive rationale? One possibility 
is that it maintained competitive balance. Cash-rich teams like the Yankees could 
not simply outbid other teams for the best players. Since teams were able to trade 
players, however, a team such as the Yankees could simply acquire the best 
players by offering the best trades. Therefore, at least in theory, the reserve clause 
should have no effect on competitive balance in the league – a result known as the 
“Coase Theorem”, named as Ronald Coase, winner of the 1991 Nobel Prize in 
Economics.  
Many economic studies investigate the impact of MLB’s reserve clause on 
‘competitive balance’, as proxied by the standard deviation of teams’ winning 
percentages, changes in the relationship between market size and team winning 
percentage, and the season-to-season correlation in team winning percentage. 
Evidence of an increase in competitive balance would include a decrease in the 
standard deviation of team winning percentages, a smaller (albeit positive) 
correlation between market size and team winning percentage, and a smaller 
season-to-season correlation in team winning percentage. If the reserve clause 
maintained competitive balance, then competitive balance should fall after the 
introduction of free agency. If the Coase Theorem is correct, the introduction of 
free agency should have no effect on competitive balance. As will be discussed 
further in Chapter 6, the studies yield conflicting results.  
Some studies find little or no impact. For example, Besanko and Simon 
(1985) compare player movements over the period 1969-81, competitive equality 
over the period 1970-83, and the relationship between market size and team 
winning percentage over the period 1970-83; they find no statistically significant 
change in any of these measures before and after the introduction of free agency. 
Dolan and Schmidt (1985) examine the period 1969-83 and find no statistically 
significant change in the standard deviation of team standings and the Gini 
coefficient for total wins before and after the introduction of free agency; they 
find that the concentration of team revenue rose significantly in the American 
League, but not in the National League. Fort and Quirk (1995) compare the 
standard deviation of winning percentage in the period before (1966-75) and after 
(1976-85) the introduction of free agency and find no statistically significant 
change for either the American or National League. Hylan, Lage, and Treglia 
(1996) examine the movement of free agent and non-free agent pitchers across 
teams over the period 1961-92 and find that attaining free agent status does not 
significantly affect the probability of a pitcher changing teams, although pitchers 
with seven or more years of service are less likely to move to a new team during 
the free agency era. Cymrot, Dunlevy, and Even (2001) compare the movement of 
free agent and non-free agent hitters across teams using data on players who 
played both the 1979 and 1980 season; they document that the impact of the gain 
from moving on the probability of changing teams is the same for free agents 
(who pocket the gain) as non-free agents (whose gain is pocketed by the team). 
On the other hand, some studies do find that competitive balance has been 
altered by the introduction of free agency – and not necessarily for the worst. For 
example, Drahozal (1986) examines the movement of players signing guaranteed 
contracts of five or more years during the period 1977-81 and found no evidence 
that free agents moved from teams in small cities to ones in large cities. However, 
over the period 1972-82, excluding expansion teams, the standard deviation of 
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 winning percentage fell in the National League, but rose in the American League, 
after the introduction of free agency. Likewise, the Spearman correlation 
coefficient for population and winning percentage fell for the National League 
and rose in the American League. If the Coase Theorem held, no change should 
have been detected. Balfour and Porter (1991) examine the period 1961-1989 and 
find some evidence that the variance of winning percentage fell after the 
introduction of free agency; they also find that the correlation of winning 
percentage across seasons fell dramatically after the introduction of free agency, 
which together suggest that the reserve clause may have hindered, rather than 
maintained, competitive balance. Butler (1995) examines the period 1946-92 and 
finds no statistically significant impact of free agency on the standard deviation of 
team winning percentage within a season, but shows that free agency significantly 
lowered the season-to-season correlation of team winning percentage. Horowitz 
(1997) constructs an ‘relative entropy’ measure of competitive balance for the 
period before (1903-75) and after (1976-95) the introduction of free agency and 
finds that competitive balance declined in the National League, consistent with 
the hypothesis that the reserve clause maintained competitive balance, but not in 
the American League. Depken (1999) calculates a Herfindahl Index based on each 
team’s percentage of total wins before (1920-76) and after (1977-96) the 
introduction of free agency and finds that the concentration of wins increased in 
the American League, as one would expect if the reserve clause maintained 
competitive balance, but not in the National League. Eckard (2001b) finds that, 
excluding expansion teams, the variance of team winning percentage falls in the 
American League between the periods 1961-76 and 1977-92, but rises in the 
National League; in both leagues, the Herfindahl Index of teams with the highest 
winning percentage falls, suggesting the reserve clause hindered competitive 
balance. 
Thus, the economic evidence suggests that MLB’s reserve clause clearly 
depressed player salaries. Whether the reserve clause maintained, hindered, or had 
no effect on, competitive balance is unclear. If the reserve clause had a 
procompetitive rationale, it is not obvious. 
 
 
American Football League vs. National Football League.77 In 1958, and again in 
1959, the son and heir of Texas oilman H.L. Hunt, Lamar Hunt, tried 
unsuccessfully to obtain an NFL franchise to be located in Dallas. He was also 
offered a 20% stake in the NFL’s Chicago Cardinals, but declined. Hunt began 
formulating plans for a new professional football league which he naively 
believed – by his own later admission – would not be a rival to the NFL. In fact, 
he sought the NFL’s blessing for the new league. He did not receive it. The 
American Football League was formed in August 1959 with six teams (Dallas, 
                                                 
77 The discussion in this section is based primarily on the Wikipedia entries for 
“American Football League” and “AFL-NFL Merger”, the two-part series titled “The 
AFL: A Football Legacy” posted on the Sports Illustrated website and dated January 
22, 2001, and the appeals court decision in American Football League v. National 
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 Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and New York), with two more 
teams (Buffalo and Boston) added later the same year. Team owners were 
required to post a $100,000 performance bond and contribute $25,000 of earnest 
money. 
The Minneapolis team was owned by Max Winter, who in November 
1959 announced that he was leaving the AFL to accept an NFL franchise offer – 
the Minnesota Vikings. The NFL offered Hunt an NFL expansion franchise in 
Dallas, which he rejected because he did not think it right to abandon his fellow 
AFL owners. The NFL awarded an expansion franchise to Dallas in January 1960 
which would compete directly with Hunt’s AFL team in Dallas. The Minneapolis 
franchise formally withdrew from the AFL on January 27, 1960 and three days 
later the AFL awarded a franchise to Oakland. The AFL filed an antitrust lawsuit 
against the NFL on June 17, 1960 over the NFL’s awarding of an expansion 
franchise to Dallas and alleging the NFL interfered with the AFL’s attempt to 
obtain a television contract. Its first contract with ABC averaged only $2,125,000 
a year for the entire league. 
 The AFL began play in September 1960, drawing about 10,000-20,000 
fans per game, whereas NFL games regularly had attendance in excess of 50,000 
fans. Among the innovations introduced by the AFL were the two-point 
conversion, putting the official time on the scoreboard clock, putting players’ 
names on their jerseys, network television broadcasting of league games, and the 
sharing of gate and television revenues by home and visiting teams. 
 In 1962, after a two-month trial, a federal court ruled against the AFL. The 
AFL appealed. In September 1963, the Appeals Court for the Fourth Circuit 
upheld the lower court’s decision.78 The district court had found that the two 
leagues competed in a national market for outstanding players and coaches, a 
national market for television coverage, and 31 metropolitan areas (cities with a 
population of at least 700,000 persons according to the 1960 census) for 
spectators. The AFL had argued that the relevant market for spectators should 
consist only of the 17 cities where the NFL either had a franchise or was seriously 
considering adding one in 1959. The appeals court rejected the AFL’s proposed 
relevant market: 
 
It is not unlike the choice a chain store company makes when it selects a 
particular corner lot as the location of a new store. It preempts that lot 
when it acquires it for that purpose, but, as long as there are other 
desirable locations for similar stores in a much broader area, it cannot be 
said to have monopolized the area, or, in a legal sense, the lot or its 
immediate vicinity. 
 
The National League was first upon the scene… It now has franchises in 
fourteen cities, some of which the district court found capable of 
supporting more than one professional football team. Obviously, the 
American League was of that opinion, for it placed teams in New York, 
Los Angeles, and the San Francisco-Oakland area, where National, at the 
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 time, had well established teams. Most of the other cities in which each 
league operates, however, are incapable of supporting more than one 
professional football team. In such a city, a professional football team, 
once located there, enjoys a natural monopoly, whether it be affiliated 
with the National or American League, but the fact that National had 
teams located in such cities before American’s advent does not mean that 
National had the power to prevent or impede the formation of a new 
league, or that National’s closed cities should be included in the relevant 
market if American’s closed cities are to be excluded… 
 
Though there may be in the nation no more than some thirty desirable sites 
for the location of professional football teams, those sites, scattered 
throughout the United States, do not constitute the relevant market. The 
relevant market is nationwide, though the fact that there are a limited 
number of desirable sites for team locations bears upon the question of 
National’s power to monopolize the national market. 
  
 The district court had observed that the NFL had franchises in only 11 of 
the 31 apparently desirable sites, leaving 20 entirely open to the AFL – and 
several sites were believed to be sufficiently large to support a team from each 
league. The appeals court rejected the AFL’s argument that the NFL had grabbed 
the most desirable sites: 
 
There is no basis in antitrust laws for a contention that American, whose 
Boston, Buffalo, Houston, Denver and San Diego teams enjoy natural 
monopolies, has a right to complain that National does not surrender to it 
other natural monopoly locations so that they too may be enjoyed by 
American rather than by National. When one has acquired a natural 
monopoly by means which are neither exclusionary, unfair, nor predatory, 
he is not disempowered to defend his position fairly. 
 
The AFL also argued that the NFL’s expansion into Minneapolis and 
Dallas constituted an attempt to monopolize. The court rejected the argument, 
noting that the NFL had discussed expansion prior to the creation of the AFL. For 
example, in early 1956, the owner of the NFL’s Chicago Bears, George Halas, 
predicted that the NFL would expand from 12 to 16 teams during the period 1960-
65. The appeals court concluded “that the District Court properly held that the 
plaintiffs have shown no monopolization by the National League, or its owners, of 
the relevant market, and no attempt or conspiracy by them, or any of them, to 
monopolize it or any part of it.” 
In May 1963, having concluded that his Dallas team could not compete 
successfully with the NFL’s Dallas Cowboys, Hunt moved his AFL franchise to 
Kansas City and renamed it the Kansas City Chiefs. On January 29, 1964, the 
AFL signed a five-year, $36 million deal to have its games broadcast on NBC 
beginning with the 1965 season. As a result, the AFL could better compete with 
the NFL for talent. Sometimes teams from the two leagues drafted the same 
collegiate player; sometimes the player chose to sign with the AFL team (e.g., Joe 
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 Namath), sometimes the player signed with the NFL team (e.g., Gale Sayers). The 
competition for player talent increased further when Oakland Raiders general 
manager Al Davis became AFL commissioner in April 1966. Davis sought to 
actively recruit players already on NFL rosters. 
 Meanwhile in April 1966, Hunt and Dallas Cowboy owner Tex Schramm 
were meeting secretly in Dallas to discuss concerns over soaring player salaries 
and the practice of player poaching. By the end of May, they had completed the 
groundwork for a merger of the two leagues. The merger was announced on June 
8, 1966, the terms of which included the full merger of the two leagues by 1970 
and an agreement by the AFL to pay indemnities of $18 million to the NFL over 
20 years due to the potential harm to the NFL’s San Francisco Forty-Niners and 
New York Giants from having to compete with the AFL’s Oakland Raiders and 
New York Jets, respectively. Davis was so furious he resigned as AFL 
commissioner on July 25 rather than serve until completion of the merger. Davis 
opposed the merger because he believed that in a competition between the AFL 
and NFL, the AFL would prevail. As discussed in Chapter 3, despite now being 
an NFL owner himself, Davis has not been reluctant to oppose NFL rules and 
policies which he believes harm his Oakland Raiders.  
 The NFL obtained an antitrust exemption from Congress to allow the 
merger to occur. An NFL expansion franchise was awarded to New Orleans, the 
Saints, allegedly because of the support given by several Louisiana politicians to 
the legislation. Testifying before a Congressional hearing in support of the 
legislation, NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle promised that, if the merger was 
allowed, none of the existing franchises in either league would relocate from their 
current city. Since then, many of these franchises have, in fact, relocated, 
including the Oakland Raiders (which moved to Los Angeles in 1982 and back to 
Oakland in 1995), the Baltimore Colts (which moved to Indianapolis in 1984), the 
St. Louis Cardinals (which moved to Arizona in 1988), the Los Angeles Rams 
(which moved to St. Louis in 1995), the Cleveland Browns (which moved to 
Baltimore in 1996), and the Houston Oilers (which moved temporarily to 
Memphis in 1997 and then permanently to Nashville in 1998).  
 
 
American Basketball Association vs. National Basketball Association.79 The 
American Basketball Association was formed in 1967 by a group of investors 
unwilling to pay the NBA’s high price for a new franchise. The ABA placed 
teams in cities believed to have the potential fan base to support an NBA 
franchise but which had not received one. The backup plan of the ABA team 
owners was to merge with the NBA. The ABA played without a television 
contract until the 1969-70 season when its All Star Game and several playoff 
games aired on CBS. 
                                                 
79 The discussion in this section is based primarily on an article by Pete Madzelan titled 
“The ABA Changed the Game: Will It Change It Again” which appeared on the MLN 
Sports Zone website and the description of the ABA v. NBA lawsuit appearing on the 
website of Zelle Hofmann Voelbel Mason & Gette. 
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 The ABA sought to make professional basketball more exciting, 
promoting superstars and introducing innovations such as the 3-point shot and a 
red, white, and blue basketball. It also did not follow the NBA’s lead in adopting 
a ‘four-year rule’ whereby players had to be four years removed from high school 
before they could be drafted by an NBA team; the ABA recruited college 
underclassmen. The ABA also signed a number of NBA players. A U.S. district 
court found the NBA’s four-year rule to be a restraint of trade in violation of the 
Sherman Act and the NBA amended its rule to allow the drafting of 
underclassmen showing financial hardship. In 1974, the ABA allowed the signing 
of high school players, once again forcing the NBA to amend its own draft rules. 
The two leagues competed for talent, to the benefit of the players but to the 
detriment of some of the financially shaky ABA teams. 
In 1969, the ABA brought an antitrust lawsuit against the NBA alleging 
that it attempted to eliminate competition and restrain trade via the control or 
monopolization of players, facilities, and television coverage. The two leagues 
reached a tentative merger agreement in April 1970, which was unanimously 
approved by the ABA team owners, but an antitrust lawsuit brought by the NBA 
Players Association sought to block the merger. A federal court issued a 
restraining order preventing the merger. In 1971, the two leagues agreed to 
petition Congress for an antitrust exemption so that they could merge. The ABA 
brought another lawsuit against the NBA in 1974, believing that the NBA was not 
honoring the agreement and continuing to restrain trade. A few weeks prior to 
their scheduled trial in 1976, the two leagues reached a settlement in which four 
ABA teams (i.e., the Denver Nuggets, Indiana Pacers, San Antonio Spurs, and 
New York Nets) would join the NBA. Each of the four franchises paid $3.2 
million to join the NBA, agreed not to receive any television revenue for the first 
three years, and agreed not to participate in the 1976 college draft. 
Between 1967 and 1977, the average player salary in the NBA rose 615%, 
rising from $20,000 to $143,000; in comparison, player salaries rose 402% in the 
NHL (rising from $19,133 to $96,000 in the face of competition from the World 
Hockey Association), 302% in Major League Baseball (rising from $19,000 to 
$76,349 in the face of an adverse arbitration ruling resulting in the introduction of 
free agency), and 121% in the NFL (rising from $25,000 to $55,288).80 
 
 
World Hockey Association vs. National Hockey League. The World Hockey 
Association was formed in 1971 and played its first games in the 1972-73 season. 
Prior to its formation, the NHL was the only major professional hockey league in 
North America. The three other professional hockey leagues in existence in North 
America at that time were the American Hockey League (AHL), the Western 
Hockey League (WHL), and the Central Hockey League (CHL), with the latter 
tending to have less talented players than the other two leagues. Among the 
amateur or semi-professional hockey leagues in existence were the International 
Hockey League and the Eastern Hockey League. The NHL required its member 
teams to have an affiliation with at least one ‘player development team’ and, in 
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 fact, 16 of the 24 professional minor league teams had some form of affiliation 
with an NHL team – and all teams in the Central Hockey League were owned by 
NHL teams. Unlike the NFL and NBA which benefit from the talent developed by 
college football and basketball programs, the NHL had to invest millions of 
dollars in the amateur and minor leagues to develop potential major league-caliber 
players. 
 The NHL has had a reserve clause in its player contracts since at least 
1952. In order for NHL teams to invest in young players, they allegedly needed 
assurance that they would have the right to sign the players they developed. 
However, player contracts in the AHL, WHL, and CHL also contained reserve 
clauses.  
On August 18, 1972, the WHA filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NHL 
alleging that the NHL’s reserve clause violated both Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act. The district court issued its ruling on November 8, 1972. 81 Given 
that the WHA was seeking a preliminary injunction against the NHL’s 
enforcement of its reserve clause, the district court refrained from ruling whether 
the reserve clause violated Section 1; however, the district court agreed with the 
plaintiffs on the Section 2 charge and therefore granted a preliminary injunction 
against the NHL. 
 The district court rejected the NHL’s argument that it needed the reserve 
clause to protect competitive balance, noting that in the past 20 years, Montreal 
had won the Stanley Cup 12 times, Toronto four times, Detroit three times, and 
Chicago once. Thus, there did not appear to be much competitive balance even 
with the reserve clause. The district court also rejected the NHL’s argument that 
the reserve clause is protected by the labor antitrust exemption, noting that (1) 
NHL players have sought to eliminate the reserve clause but the NHL has not 
granted any type of concession on the issue and (2) even if the reserve clause was 
the product of a collective bargaining agreement, a third-party such as a rival 
league would nevertheless have the right to challenge the reserve clause on 
antitrust grounds. 
 The relevant market was found to be major league professional hockey 
and the relevant geographic market was the United States and Canada. In 
particular, using the criteria set forth in International Boxing Club of New York v. 
United States, the court observed that major league hockey is quite different from 
minor league hockey in terms of “higher ticket prices, increased television 
revenues, and greater players’ skill and salaries.” Of the 158 players signed by the 
WHA as of July 21, 1972 to play the 1972-73 season, 111 (70%) were subject to 
the reserve clause in their contracts with the NHL, AHL, WHL, and CHL for the 
1971-72 season. As of November 1972, more than 200 (58%) of the 345 players 
signed by the WHA for the 1972-73 season were subject to the reserve clause in 
their contract with the NHL, AHL, WHL, and CHL for the 1971-72 season. The 
district court found: 
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 The similarities of phraseology and basic incorporation of Clause 17 in the 
Standard Player’s Contract of the AHL, CHL, WHL, and NHL is the 
result of a common agreement, mutual understanding, and conspiracy by 
the NHL and its affiliated minor leagues to maintain a monopolistic 
position so strong that the NHL precludes effective competition by the 
entry of another major professional hockey league. Through the totality of 
many interlocking arrangements, including the Joint Affiliation 
Agreement, the Pro-Amateur Agreement, and Clause 17 in the Standard 
Player’s Contract, the NHL perpetuates a conspiracy and combination 
with the intent to monopolize and which monopolizes major league 
professional hockey. These concerted efforts were done not solely to 
maintain a high level of professional competition among the NHL teams, 
but rather the major reason was the desire to preclude others from ever 
having immediate access to the reservoir of players who could become 
part of another major professional hockey league which could be a 
material and viable competitor to the NHL. 
 
The WHA folded after the 1978 season and four of its teams (Edmonton, 
Hartford, Quebec City, and Winnipeg) were absorbed into the NHL. Between 
1970 and 1977, the average NHL salary jumped 284% (from $25,000 to $96,000); 
in comparison, NBA salaries rose 257.5% (from $40,000 to $143,000), MLB 
salaries rose 163% (from $29,000 to $76,349), and NFL salaries rose 60% (from 
$34,600 to $55,288).82  
Jones and Walsh (1987) estimate NHL player salaries for the 1977-78 
season and find evidence that some free agents were “overpaid” – their salary 
exceeded their gross marginal revenue product (GMRP). In particular, of the 14 
players appearing in one of their tables, eight were paid more than $5,000 in 
excess of their GMRP, four were paid within $5,000 of their GMRP, and only two 
were ‘underpaid’ by more than $5,000. Moreover, separate analyses of player 
salaries and marginal revenue products for forwards and defensemen shows that, 
on average, no category of player was being paid less than his net marginal 
revenue product. Jones and Walsh argue that “the activities of the WHA were 
primarily responsible for the increased NHL salaries in the 1970s and brought an 
end to any presumption of persistent player exploitation.” (p. 96) They also 
observe that, “if press reports are to be believed, …  the NHL has not been able to 
use its reestablished monopolistic position to force salaries to their former levels.” 
(p. 96) Thus, they conclude: “Obviously, institutional changes, partially prompted 
by WHA entry – antitrust rulings, the strength of the Players Association, and so 
on – have dulled the NHL’s monopsony power.” (p. 96) 
 
 
United States Football League vs. National Football League. The United States 
Football League was founded in May 1982 as a 12-team league to play 
professional football in the spring, whereas the NFL plays its games in the fall 
and winter. The USFL began play in March 1983. It had network and cable 
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 television contracts with ABC and ESPN. The USFL made the fateful decision to 
switch to a fall season in direct competition with the NFL beginning with the 
1986 season. The broadcast and cable television networks, which were interested 
in showing spring football, were not interested in broadcasting non-NFL 
professional football games during the NFL season, especially given the fact that 
they were already under contract to broadcast the NFL games. Without a 
television contract for the 1986 season, the USFL found itself in a hopeless 
situation. In three seasons, the USFL lost approximately $200 million. It played 
its last game in July 1985.  
 In October 1984, the USFL filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL 
seeking damages totaling $1.701 billion and appropriate injunctive relief. The 
USFL alleged, for example, that the NFL had (1) prevented it from obtaining a 
television contract for the fall 1986 season, (2) attempted to co-opt some USFL 
team owners by offering NFL franchises to Donald Trump, owner of the USFL’s 
New Jersey Generals, and Alfred Taubman, owner of the USFL’s Michigan 
Panthers (Taubman denied being offered an NFL franchise), (3) holding a 
supplemental draft for players still under contract with an USFL team, and (4) 
expanding NFL team rosters from 45 to 49 players. The case went to a jury trial in 
1986. The jury found that the relevant market was major league professional 
football in the United States and that the NFL had willfully acquired or 
maintained monopoly power in that market. Furthermore, the jury found that the 
USFL had been injured by the NFL’s unlawful monopolization. Nevertheless, the 
jury awarded the USFL only $1 in damages, which were to be trebled – or a total 
damage award of $3. Following the jury’s verdict, the USFL abandoned plans to 
play the 1986 season and folded. 
 The jury did not find that the defendants had violated Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act by attempting or conspiring to monopolize a relevant market. 
Although the jury found that the defendants had participated in a contract, 
combination, or conspiracy to restrain trade, the jury did not find it an 
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Nor 
did the jury find the NFL’s contracts with the three television networks for the 
right to broadcast NFL games to be an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation 
of Section 1. The jury also rejected the USFL’s ‘essential facilities’ claim, finding 
that the NFL did not have the ability to deny the USFL access to a national 
television contract. 
 The USFL moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on each of 
the antitrust counts rejected by the jury and sought a new trial that would be 
limited to the issue of damages. The NFL filed a motion regarding the jury’s 
determination that the NFL had unlawfully monopolized professional football in 
the United States. The district court rejected both motions.83 The USFL appealed. 
On March 10, 1988, the appeals court affirmed the jury’s verdict and held that 
“the anti-competitive activities on which the jury based its verdict did not justify a 
large damages verdict or sweeping injunctive relief.”84 The USFL was awarded 
treble damages totaling $3.   
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  The appeals court observed that “the USFL candidly admits that ‘at the 
heart of this case’ are its claims that the NFL, by contracting with the three major 
networks and by acting coercively toward them, prevented the USFL from 
acquiring a network television contract indispensable to its survival”; these claims 
had been expressly rejected by the jury. The appeals court ruled that the jury “was 
clearly entitled by the evidence to find that the NFL’s fall contracts with the three 
networks were not an anticompetitive barrier to the USFL’s bidding against the 
NFL to acquire a network contract.” It also noted that “there was ample evidence 
that the USFL failed because it did not make the painstaking investment and 
patient efforts that bring credibility, stability and public recognition to a sports 
league.” The appeals court added: 
 
In particular, there was evidence that the USFL abandoned its original 
strategy of patiently building up fan loyalty and public recognition by 
playing in the spring. The original plan to contain costs by adherence to 
team salary guidelines was discarded from the start. Faced with rising 
costs and some new team owners impatient for immediate parity with the 
NFL, the idea of spring play itself was abandoned even though network 
and cable contracts were available. Plans for a fall season were therefore 
announced, thereby making 1985 spring play a ‘lame-duck’ season. These 
actions were taken in the hope of forcing a merger with the NFL through 
the threat of competition and this litigation. The merger strategy, however, 
required that USFL franchises move out of large television markets and 
into likely NFL expansion cities. Because these moves further eroded fan 
loyalty and reduced the value of USFL games to television, the USFL 
thereby ended by its own hand any chance of a network contract. 
 
In other words, it was the USFL’s own actions that led to its demise, not 
the actions – lawful or unlawful – of the NFL. The appeals court rejected the 
USFL’s appeal: 
 
Notwithstanding the jury’s evident conclusions that the USFL’s product 
was not appealing largely for reasons of the USFL’s own doing and that 
the networks chose freely not to purchase it, the USFL asks us to grant 
sweeping injunctive relief that will reward its impatience and self-
destructive conduct with a fall network contract. It thus seeks through 
court decree the success it failed to achieve among football fans. Absent a 
showing of some unlawful harm to competition, we cannot prevent a 
network from showing NFL games, in the hope that the network and fans 
will turn to the USFL. The Sherman Act does not outlaw an industry 
structure simply because it prevents competitors from achieving 
immediate parity. This is particularly so in the case of major-league 
professional football because Congress authorized a merger of the two 
leagues existing in 1966 and thus created the industry structure in 
question. 
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 Yet, despite the laughably small damages award, the competition between 
the USFL and NFL produced a clear winner – the players. Between the years 
1977 and 1982, the real (inflation-adjusted) NFL salary grew an average of 4% 
annually. The average annual increase surged to 20% during the period 1982-85 
when the NFL had to compete with the USFL for players. After the demise of the 
USFL, the increase between the years 1985 and 1989 plunged to 5%.85 As Kahn 
(2000) explains, changes in NFL attendance and television revenues cannot 
account for these changes in player salaries.  
 
 
North American Soccer League vs. National Football League. The North 
American Soccer League (NASL) was formed by the merger of two pre-existing 
soccer leagues in 1968. The NASL’s organizer was Lamar Hunt, the founder of 
the American Football League and owner of the Kansas City Chiefs. Hunt owned 
the NASL’s Dallas franchise, and later the Tampa Bay franchise. In 1975, the 
wife of the NFL’s Miami Dolphins owner Joseph Robbie became majority owner 
of the NASL’s Fort Lauderdale franchise and Joseph Robbie operated the soccer 
team.  
The seasons of the NFL and NASL somewhat overlapped and teams from 
the two leagues often used the same stadiums. Some fans allegedly switched their 
interest from the NFL to the NASL. The two leagues competed in the sale of 
national broadcast rights and for national advertising revenue. NFL and NASL 
teams located in the same city competed for live attendance, local television 
audiences, and local advertising revenue.  
The NFL had a policy against team owners holding a controlling stake in a 
team of a competing league since the 1950s, but did not put the policy into writing 
until January 1967 – when 12 owners of (pre-merger) NFL and AFL teams were 
involved in the formation of the predecessors to the NASL. In 1972, NFL owners 
passed a resolution stating that NFL owners were not to acquire operating control 
of a team in a competing league and any owner who possessed such an interest 
should make a ‘best effort’ to dispose of it. 
The NFL’s Philadelphia Eagles were unprofitable in each year from 1969 
to 1974 and again in both 1976 and 1977. Around the same time, the NASL’s 
Philadelphia Atoms were leading the league in attendance. The Eagles’ owner 
Leonard Tose denounced Hunt for saying that soccer was the sport of the future. 
Tose suggested that fans have only so many dollars to spend on sports 
entertainment so any dollar they spend on a sport other than football may be one 
less dollar spent on football. In other words, the NASL’s Philadelphia Atoms 
were taking revenue from the NFL’s Philadelphia Eagles. Max Winter, owner of 
the NFL’s Minnesota Vikings, had a similar concern about the NASL’s 
Minnesota Kicks. 
In 1978, NFL owners proposed an amendment that would have prevented 
all majority owners, certain minority owners, officers, and directors of NFL teams 
(and certain relatives of such persons) from owning any interest in a ‘major team 
sport’ franchise. In effect, the amendment would have required both Hunt and 
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 Robbie to divest their soccer interests if they wished to continue to own an NFL 
team. On September 28, 1978, the NASL went to court to prevent the adoption of 
the proposed amendment.  The court issued a preliminary injunction on February 
21, 1979, concluding that the NASL would be irreparably injured by the 
amendment; the NFL did not appeal the injunction. After a lengthy trial, the court 
ruled that the purpose and impact of the NFL’s cross-ownership ban was to 
suppress competition from the NASL but, because the NFL and its member teams 
had to be regarded as a ‘single economic entity’ in competition with the NASL, 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act did not apply. 
The NASL appealed the decision. On January 27, 1982, the appeals court 
rejected the NFL’s ‘single entity’ defense, noting that courts have repeatedly 
rejected the theory that, by acting as a ‘joint venture’, a combination of firms can 
gain exemption from Section 1 of the Sherman Act:86 
 
The characterization of NFL as a single economic entity does not exempt 
from the Sherman Act an agreement between its members to restrain 
competition. To tolerate such a loophole would permit league members to 
escape antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that 
would benefit their league or enhance their ability to compete even though 
the benefit would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects. Moreover, 
the restraint might be one adopted more for the protection of individual 
league members from competition than to help the league. For instance, 
the cross-ownership ban in the present case is not aimed merely at 
protecting the NFL as a league or “single economic entity” from 
competition from the NASL as a league. Its objective also is to shield 
certain individual NFL member teams as discrete economic entities from 
competition in their respective home territories on the part of individual 
NASL teams that are gaining economic strength in those localities, 
threatening the revenues of such individual teams as the NFL Philadelphia 
Eagles, owned by Leonard Tose, because of competition by the NASL’s 
Philadelphia team, and the revenues of the NFL Minnesota Vikings 
because of competition by the successful NASL Minnesota Kicks. The 
NFL members have combined to protect and restrain not only leagues but 
individual teams. The sound and more just procedure is to judge the 
legality of such restraints according to well-recognized standards of our 
antitrust laws rather than permit their exemption on the ground that since 
they in some measure strengthen the league competitively as a “single 
economic entity,” the combination’s anticompetitive effects must be 
disregarded. 
 
The appeals court rejected the NASL’s claim that the NFL’s cross-
ownership ban should be condemned as a per se violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, deciding instead to analyze the ban under the rule of reason. The 
NFL defended the ban as being pro-competitive because it was necessary for NFL 
owners to compete efficiently in the professional sports league market, but the 
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 appeals court noted that “the voluminous trial record discloses that the NFL’s 
cross-ownership ban would foreclose NASL’s teams from continued enjoyment 
of and access to a significant segment of the market supply of sports capital and 
skill, thereby restraining at least some NASL teams from competing effectively 
against NFL teams for fan support and TV revenues” and any resulting restraint 
“would benefit not merely the NFL as a league but those NFL teams that would 
be otherwise weakened individually and disproportionately (as compared with 
other NFL teams) by competing NASL teams.”  
The NFL argued that there is no market (or ‘submarket’) for sports capital 
and skill – any difficulty the NASL or its teams had in obtaining such capital and 
skill would be due to the poor financial outlook of the franchises and not because 
of any inability to attract capital and skill due to the ban. The NASL argued that a 
market for sports capital and skill exists and is limited to existing or prospective 
major sports team owners. The district court had decided that a sports capital and 
skill market exists, but it is neither as narrow as the NASL, nor as broad as the 
NFL, asserts. The appeals court found that a sports capital and skill market exists 
and is not limited to existing or prospective sports team owners, but such owners 
constitute a significant portion of the market. The appeals court noted that the 
NFL does not believe its own argument that all sources of capital are fungible 
substitutes because, if that were true, the NFL would not have gone through the 
trouble of adopting the cross-ownership ban. Thus, given that the ban clearly 
restrains competition in this market, the question is whether its anticompetitive 
effect is outweighed by its pro-competitive effect.  
The NFL argued that the ban was pro-competitive because it (1) assured 
the undivided loyalty of NFL owners in competing with the NASL in the sale of 
tickets and broadcasting rights, (2) prevented disclosure of confidential 
information to NASL competitors, (3) protected the personnel and resources of 
NFL owners from conflicting or excessive demands, (4) prevented the dilution of 
goodwill developed by the NFL, (5) avoided disputes between NFL cross-owners 
and other NFL owners, and (6) prevented interleague collusion in violation of the 
antitrust laws. The appeals court ruled that the first two pro-competitive rationales 
can be achieved by less-restrictive means, the third is unsupported since many 
NFL owners have other business interests, and the other pro-competitive effects 
are outweighed by the ban’s anticompetitive effect. Thus, the Appeal Court ruled 
in favor of a permanent injunction prohibiting the NFL’s cross-ownership ban. 
The Philadelphia Eagles and Minnesota Vikings were concerned that they 
were being hurt by competition from NASL teams. There do not appear to any 
economic studies which test whether this in fact was the case. In general, the 
evidence from North American sports leagues provides little support for such a 
concern for the NFL and NBA, although there may be some effect on MLB and 
NHL live attendance. Table 4.1 summarizes the economic literature. Zuber and 
Gandar (1988) and Noll (1974) report no statistically significant effect on live 
attendance at NFL games from the presence of other professional sports teams in 
the same city. Burdekin and Idson (1991), Kahn and Sherer (1988), and Noll 
(1974) all report no statistically significant effect on live attendance at NBA 
games from the presence of other professional sports teams in the same city. On 
the other hand, Noll (1974) estimates that average NHL per game live attendance 
is 2,800 lower in the ‘average’ city with 3 other professional sports teams and that 
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 inter-sport competition reduces MLB season live attendance by 250,000 (21%) in 
the ‘average’ baseball city (3.5 million metropolitan population and 3 other 
professional sports teams). Demmert (1973) finds that the presence of a team with 
a winning record in another sport raises the season attendance of the MLB in the 
same city by 40,000, but reduces per capita attendance by 1.3 attendees.  
Mixed results are also reported in England. Baimbridge, Cameron, and 
Dawson (1995) find no statistically significant effect on First Division rugby 
match attendance from other major sporting activities in the same area, but 
Baimbridge, Cameron, and Dawson (1996) find that the presence of an alternative 
sporting activity reduces English Premier soccer league match attendance by 
28%. 
 
Table 4.1 
The Impact of Teams in Other Sports Leagues on Live Attendance 
Sport  Study Data 
Attendance 
Measure 
Measure of Teams in 
Other Sports Leagues Estimate 
MLB Noll (1974) Major League 
team season 
data for the 1970 
and 1971 
seasons. 
Official paid 
admissions. 
Number of other 
professional sports 
teams (baseball, 
basketball, football, 
hockey) located in the 
city. 
Baseball attendance 
in the average 
baseball city (3.5 
million metropolitan 
population and 3 
other professional 
sports teams) is 
reduced by 250,000 
(21%) due to 
intersport 
competition. 
 
 Demmert 
(1973) 
Major League 
team season 
data for 16 teams 
over the period 
1951-69. 
Team 
season 
attendance. 
Sum of one plus 
winning percentage of 
all non-baseball 
professional sports 
teams within the same 
locality (if any). 
Presence of one team 
with .500 record 
raises season 
attendance by 40,000 
attendees, but lowers 
season attendance 
per capita by 1.3 
attendees. 
 
NBA Burdekin & 
Idson (1991) 
NBA team 
season data from 
the 1980-81 to 
the 1985-86 
season. 
Team 
season 
attendance. 
Total number of other 
professional sports 
franchises (including 
other NBA teams) in 
home SMSA. 
 
Not statistically 
significant. 
 Kahn & 
Sherer 
(1988) 
NBA team 
season data from 
the 1980-81 to 
the 1985-86 
season. 
Team 
season 
attendance. 
Number of other major 
league sports 
franchises in the 
locality. 
 
Not statistically 
significant. 
 Noll (1974) NBA and ABA 
team season 
data for the 
Average 
attendance 
per game. 
Number of other 
professional sports 
teams (baseball, 
Not statistically 
significant. 
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 Table 4.1 
The Impact of Teams in Other Sports Leagues on Live Attendance 
Sport  Study Data 
Attendance 
Measure 
Measure of Teams in 
Other Sports Leagues Estimate 
1969-70 and 
1970-71 
seasons. 
basketball, football, 
hockey) located in the 
city. 
 
NFL  Zuber & 
Gandar 
(1988) 
NFL games in 
the 1983 and 
1984 seasons. 
Game-day 
no-shows 
as a 
percentage 
of stadium 
capacity. 
Dummy variable 
denotes another 
professional sports 
event (baseball, 
basketball, football, 
hockey) on the same 
day in the same city. 
 
Not statistically 
significant. 
 Noll (1974) NFL team 
season data for 
the 1970 season. 
Official paid 
admissions. 
Number of other 
professional sports 
teams (baseball, 
basketball, football, 
hockey) located in the 
city. 
 
Not statistically 
significant. 
NHL & 
WHA 
Noll (1974) NHL and WHA 
team season 
data for the 
1972-73 season 
for games played 
up to Feb. 15, 
1973. 
 
Average 
attendance 
per game. 
Number of other 
professional sports 
teams (baseball, 
basketball, football, 
hockey) located in the 
city. 
 
 
 
2,800 fewer 
attendees per hockey 
game in average city 
with 3 other 
professional sports 
teams. 
Rugby 
(England) 
Baimbridge, 
Cameron & 
Dawson 
(1995) 
First Division 
matches in the 
1993-94 season. 
Match 
attendance. 
Number of other major 
sporting activities in the 
area. 
 
Not statistically 
significant. 
Soccer 
(England) 
Baimbridge, 
Cameron & 
Dawson 
(1996) 
English Premier 
League matches 
in the 1993-94 
season. 
Match 
attendance. 
Number of other major 
winter sporting activities 
(rugby league, rugby 
union, speedway, 
Endsleigh Football 
League teams) within 
the team’s catchment 
area. 
Presence of an 
alternative sporting 
activity reduces 
attendance by 28%. 
 
There is also some evidence that television viewership of NBA and 
NCAA football games is reduced by the presence of teams in other sports leagues, 
particularly if those other teams are competing in playoff (as opposed to regular 
season) games. Table 4.2 summarizes these studies. Kanazawa and Funk (2001) 
analyze Nielsen television viewership ratings for local non-cable NBA games in 
the second half of the 1996-97 season and find that each additional professional 
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 franchise (MLB, NBA, NFL, NHL) in the viewing market reduces the Nielsen 
rating by between 0.50 and 0.68 points in their Generalized Least Squares model 
(the effect is not statistically significant in the Random Effects model). Hausman 
and Leonard (1997) analyze Nielsen ratings for NBA games broadcast on NBC 
from the 1990-91 through the 1992-93 season and find that the simultaneous 
broadcast of a NCAA basketball tournament game significantly reduces the 
Nielsen rating of the NBA game, but the simultaneous broadcast of a NCAA 
basketball regular season game does not. Pacey and Wickham (1985) examine 
nationally televised NCAA football games during the period 1976-81 and find 
that the simultaneous broadcast of a MLB World Series game lowers the Nielsen 
rating of the NCAA football game by 1.9 points, but the total number of hours of 
NFL and MLB games televised during the week does not. 
 
Table 4.2 
The Impact of Teams in Other Sports Leagues on Television Viewership 
Sport Study Data 
Television 
Viewership 
Measure 
Measure of Teams in 
Other Sports Leagues Estimate 
NBA Kanazawa 
& Funk 
(2001) 
NBA games 
in the second 
half of the 
1996-97 
season. 
Nielsen 
ratings for 
local non-
cable 
games. 
Number of major 
professional sports 
franchises (i.e., 
baseball, basketball, 
football, hockey) in the 
viewing market. 
Each additional 
professional franchise 
reduces the Nielsen rating 
by 0.50-0.68 points 
(Generalized Least 
Squares model); not 
statistically significant in 
Random Effects model. 
 
Dummy variable 
denotes games played 
while an NCAA 
basketball tournament 
game is being televised. 
Simultaneous broadcast 
of NCAA basketball 
tournament game 
significantly reduces 
Nielsen rating of the NBA 
game. 
 
 Hausman 
& Leonard 
(1997) 
NBA games 
broadcast on 
NBC from the 
1990-91 
through the 
1992-93 
season. 
Nielsen 
ratings. 
Dummy variable 
denotes games played 
while an NCAA regular 
season basketball game 
is being televised. 
 
Not statistically significant. 
Number of hours of 
professional football 
and baseball televised 
during the week. 
 
Not statistically significant. NCAA 
Football 
Pacey & 
Wickham 
(1985) 
Nationally 
televised 
games during 
the period 
1976-81. 
Nielsen 
ratings. 
Dummy variable 
denotes games played 
while a World Series 
baseball game is being 
televised. 
Simultaneous broadcast 
of a World Series game 
lowers the Nielsen rating 
of the college football 
game by 1.9 points. 
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In summary, the formation of a rival sports league tends to be good news for 
players – their salaries invariably rise. Sports leagues have attempted to ‘tie-up’ their 
players with a reserve clause, thereby hindering a rival league’s access to established 
players. Sports leagues contend that the reserve clause has a procompetitive rationale – it 
promotes competitive balance. Economic studies, however, have – at best – produced 
conflicting evidence on the impact of the reserve clause on competitive balance. 
Although rival leagues have successfully challenged some restraints on antitrust grounds, 
eventually the rival league has generally either folded and its teams disappeared, or it has 
merged in whole – or in part – with the incumbent league. In either case, player salaries 
suffer when the competition between leagues for players disappears. 
 Competition between leagues in different sports would not be expected to 
significantly raise player salaries, except for the relatively rare individual who excels at 
more than one professional sport, such as Bo Jackson who played in both NFL and MLB 
games. Cross-ownership bans have pro-competitive effects, such as aligning the 
incentives of owners, but those pro-competitive benefits have been found by courts to be 
either outweighed by their anticompetitive effect or achievable by less restrictive means.  
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 Chapter 5 
 
Sports Leagues vs. Prospective Teams and Owners 
 
 
 
Sports leagues decide which teams will be members and who can own them. 
Given the instability of joint ventures discussed in Chapter 3, this should come as no 
surprise. Sports league members have to cooperate, at least to some extent, in order to 
produce their product. Just because a team from a rival league, say, is of a quality 
comparable to that of teams in the incumbent league does not mean that the incumbent 
will necessarily admit the team into the league – just as an automotive joint venture 
between General Motors and Toyota would not necessarily admit Ford into the joint 
venture if it made such a request. The costs of admitting a particular new member may 
simply not be worth the cost. 
On the other hand, by restricting membership, a sports league arguably raises the 
market price of its product. If more teams were admitted into the league, the supply of 
tickets to league games would rise, which would tend to have a negative effect on ticket 
prices.  
Sports leagues also have an interest in who owns the member teams. Once again, 
the league needs cooperation among its members. A prospective owner who is not 
expected to be a good joint venture partner will not be approved. For example, sports 
leagues have an interest in ensuring that their games are viewed as honest and fair. 
Therefore, a league may not approve the sale of a member team, for example, to someone 
with connections to gambling or organized crime. (Interestingly, the Women’s National 
Basketball Association approved the ownership of one of its teams by a casino.) 
This chapter focuses on attempts by prospective teams to gain admittance into a 
major sports league and by prospective (or current minority) owners to acquire control of 
a professional sports franchise.87 One tactic has been to file an antitrust lawsuit against 
the league if admittance is denied. These lawsuits have generally not succeeded. 
 
                                                 
87 For an interesting case involving a prospective team owner who allegedly failed to 
obtain an AFL expansion franchise (this was prior to the AFL-NFL merger) because 
of a restrictive covenant between the NFL’s Washington Redskins and RFK Stadium, 
where the Redskins played, see Hecht v. Pro-Football. The restrictive covenant 
prevented any team other than the Redskins from playing professional football at 
RFK and thus Hecht was unable to obtain a stadium lease for the expansion team he 
hoped to receive. Hecht sued the Redskins and RFK Stadium, arguing that RFK was 
an ‘essential facility’ for the hosting of professional football games in Washington, 
D.C., and the restrictive covenant was a restraint of trade. Plaintiffs and Defendants 
agreed that the relevant product market was the business of professional football, but 
disagreed on the geographic market. Plaintiffs contended it was limited to 
Washington, D.C.; Defendants contended it was national in scope. The district court 
essentially sided with the Defendants’ definition and the jury found in favor of the 
Defendants. The appeals court, however, ruled that the geographic market was only 
Washington, D.C. and therefore ordered a new trial. 
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Prospective Teams Seeking Admittance Into a Closed League. There are numerous 
reasons why a sports league will want to control who can become a member, as the 
discussion in Chapter 3 on the instability of joint ventures shows. The refusal to add a 
new member may harm the prospective member seeking to be admitted, but it does not 
harm consumers. There is no reduction in competition when a prospective member is 
refused admission – the prospective member was seeking to share in the league’s profits, 
not compete with the league. This distinction is crucial for understanding why sports 
leagues’ refusals to admit new members were not found to be a violation of the antitrust 
laws in Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL and Seattle Totems v. NHL. 
 
 
Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL.88 The World Football League (WFL) played its first 
season in 1974 but folded halfway through the 1975 season. The WFL’s rules 
differed from those of the NFL in a number of respects. For example, a 
touchdown was worth 7 points and an ‘action’ point (as opposed to an ‘extra’ 
point) could only be scored by running or passing – not a kick). One of the WFL’s 
teams was the Memphis Southmen, which had made a splash by signing three 
players from the NFL’s Miami Dolphins – running backs Larry Csonka and Jim 
Kiick and wide receiver Paul Warfield. The Southmen finished the 1974 season in 
first place in its division with a record of 17-3, but lost in the playoff semi-finals. 
After the league folded, the team changed its name to the Memphis Grizzlies and 
applied for admission to the NFL. 
 The NFL’s Constitution and Bylaws stated that a new league member 
could only be added to the ‘home territory’ of a current member by the unanimous 
consent of league members. A prospective league member who would not 
encroach on the home territory of a current member would need the approval of at 
least 20 NFL members or three-fourths of the NFL members, whichever was 
greater. The NFL did not have a franchise in Memphis and a Memphis-based 
team would not encroach on the home territory of any NFL member. The NFL 
rejected the Grizzlies’ application. On December 3, 1979, the Grizzlies filed an 
antitrust lawsuit against the NFL alleging that the rejection amounted to an 
unreasonable restraint of trade – a group boycott.  
 The Grizzlies, it should be noted, did not challenge the NFL’s franchise 
exclusivity for designated home territories, the NFL’s revenue-sharing 
arrangement requiring a 60-40 revenue split between the home and visiting team, 
and the NFL’s joint sale of television rights. Rather, the Grizzlies wanted to 
become a participant in these arrangements and the NFL had refused. The 
Grizzlies suggested that the NFL’s refusal was an attempt to punish, intimidate, 
and restrain it for participating in the WFL and thereby competing against the 
NFL. The Grizzlies alleged that the NFL’s refusal to admit it as a member 
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and, in addition, the NFL was attempting to 
monopolize interstate trade and commerce in professional football in violation of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
                                                 
88 The discussion in this section is based primarily on the Wikipedia entry for the World 
Football League and the appeals court decision in Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL. 
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  The district court granted summary judgment to the NFL. The Grizzlies 
appealed. On November 4, 1983, the appeals court affirmed the district court’s 
decision.89 
 The Grizzlies had argued that the relevant product market is major league 
professional football and the relevant geographic market is the United States. The 
district court agreed and observed that “there is no doubt that the NFL currently 
has a monopoly in the United States in major league football.” The question posed 
by the Grizzlies on appeal was thus “whether it can be said as a matter of law that 
defendant neither acquired nor maintained monopoly power over any relevant 
market in an unlawful manner.” The appeals court answered that the NFL’s 
market power is based, at least in part, on the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 
and its 1966 amendment approving the NFL-AFL merger: 
 
As to the acquisition of dominant position and monopoly power, the facts 
are undisputed. Long before the Grizzlies and the World Football League 
came into existence, Congress authorized the merger of the two major 
football leagues extant in 1966, and granted to the merged league the 
power to pool television revenues. That congressional decision conferred 
on the NFL the market power which it holds in the market for professional 
football. Congress could not have been unaware that the necessary effect 
of the television revenue sharing scheme which it approved for the NFL 
would be that all members of that league would be strengthened in their 
ability to bid for the best available playing and coaching personnel, to the 
potential disadvantage of new entrants. 
 
… It would take a court bolder than this to claim that the congressionally 
authorized acquisition of market power, even market power amounting to 
monopoly power, was unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
… Since the 1966 statute is not directed at preservation of competition in 
the market for professional football, and cannot be construed as conferring 
any economic benefit on the class to which the Grizzlies belong, we 
conclude that it does not oblige the NFL to permit entry by any particular 
applicant to the NFL shared market power. 
 
The appeals court then considered whether any NFL obligation to permit 
entry to its shared market power arises from the Sherman Act. According to the 
Grizzlies, the NFL’s antitrust violation was the refusal of its application for 
membership. The appeals court found that “the exclusion was patently pro-
competitive since it left the Memphis area, with a large stadium and a significant 
metropolitan area population, available as a site for another league’s franchise, 
and it left the Grizzlies’ organization as a potential competitor in such a league.” 
Thus, the refusal to admit the Grizzlies into the NFL did not harm interleague 
competition and the question becomes whether it harmed intraleague competition. 
The NFL argued that there is no intraleague competition – the NFL is a single 
entity and a joint venture. The Grizzles, according to the appeals court, failed to 
                                                 
89 Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
-  - 108
 show that their franchise would compete for the same ticket and team 
paraphernalia purchasers and local broadcast outlets as the NFL team based in St. 
Louis, the nearest NFL franchise (which was over 280 miles away). Moreover, 
the Grizzlies competed for players and coaches when they were in the WFL, so 
interleague competition for players and coaches was not harmed by the refusal to 
admit the Grizzlies into the NFL. Finally, the Grizzlies argued that the NFL is an 
‘essential facility’ and thus has an obligation to admit members on fair, 
reasonable, and equal terms unless there is some pro-competitive rationale for 
denying admission. The appeals court rejected the essential facilities argument, 
noting that there is no evidence that competition (in the economic, not athletic, 
sense) would be improved if the Grizzlies joined the NFL. 
As for the Section 2 claims, the appeals court noted that the same analysis 
applies. The congressional legislation of 1961 and 1966 authorized the NFL’s 
acquisition of market power and the Grizzlies only challenged their exclusion 
from that shared monopoly. The Grizzlies did not show how their admittance into 
the NFL would promote competition in the economic sense. 
 
 
Seattle Totems v. NHL.90 The Seattle Totems played in the Western Hockey 
League. Despite winning the WHL championship in both the 1966-67 and 1967-
68 seasons, the team’s on-the-ice performance plunged in the early 1970s and, 
after the financially disastrous 1971-72 season, the Totems owners, Vince Abbey 
and Eldred Barnes, sold a majority interest in the team to the owner of the NHL’s 
Vancouver Canucks, Northwest Sports. The Totems became a farm team for the 
Canucks. However, the agreement included a provision that said that if an NHL 
franchise were offered to Seattle, Abbey and Barnes had the right to repurchase 
the Totems from Northwest Sports. 
 In April 1974, the NHL announced that Seattle and Denver would receive 
franchises and begin play with the 1976-77 season. The WHL folded after the 
1973-74 season and the Totems moved to the Central Hockey League in 
anticipation of becoming an NHL franchise. The Totems finished in last place in 
the 1974-75 season and, even worse, Abbey had difficulty finding money to pay 
the NHL’s franchise fee. Abbey also explored moving either the NHL’s San 
Francisco or Pittsburgh franchise to Seattle to begin play in the 1974-75 season. 
The Totems had lost $2 million since Northwest Sports had acquired a majority 
interest in the team. 
 The NHL’s plan to add franchises to Seattle and Denver failed, with 
neither city obtaining an NHL franchise (the newly-formed World Hockey 
Association did locate a team in Denver, however). Abbey sued the NHL for 
antitrust violations, while Northwest Sports sued Abbey for his share of the 
Totems’ losses (eventually winning $1.3 million). In particular, Abbey alleged 
that the NFL and its member teams had monopolized professional hockey in 
North America, in violation of the Sherman Act. Abbey also alleged that the 
                                                 
90 The discussion in this section is based primarily on information posted on the 
seattlehockey.net website and on the appeals court decision in Seattle Totems Hockey 
Club v. NHL. 
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 NFL’s anticompetitive activities prevented the Totems from securing a WHA 
franchise and from forming a new league with other WHA teams. Abbey’s 
lawsuit against the NHL did not succeed, as an appeals court finally threw out the 
case in 1986.91 The appeals court found that there was no reduction of 
competition because the Totems were seeking to join the NHL and share in its 
profits, not compete against the NHL: 
 
The Totems were not competing with the NFL; they were seeking to join 
it. They were granted a conditional NHL franchise but failed to fulfill the 
conditions precedent to obtaining a final franchise. The WHA was 
competing as a major professional hockey league at that time. Without an 
NHL franchise Seattle constituted a potential WHA site, and the denial, if 
any, of an NHL franchise under these circumstances did not injure 
competition… There is no contention or showing that the denial was to 
protect any other major league team in the Seattle market; there was 
none… 
 
The Totems argue that there is more here than the mere denial of a sports 
franchise. They argue that there was a grand scheme on the part of the 
NHL to destroy the WHA by promising franchises to WHL teams so that 
those teams would not join the WHA. “Once peace had been made 
between the NHL and WHA, however, the NHL moved to avoid its 
responsibilities” under its White Paper agreement with the WHL. One of 
those alleged “moves” was apparently to deny Seattle a franchise. This 
argument misses the point. The Totems’ allegations of wrongful conduct 
by the NFL do not establish that competition in the relevant market was 
injured by those acts. Consequently, the Totems have failed to meet their 
burden of proof on this issue. 
 
 
Bowl Championship Series.92 Prior to the 1998 season, Division I-A college 
football was unique in that it did not have a formal system for deciding a national 
champion. Unlike, for example, college basketball with its ‘March Madness’ post-
season tournament, the top college football teams played in a single post-season 
bowl game and only by chance would the top two teams play each other. (Of 
course, fans disagreed vehemently over who the top two teams were.) For 
example, the champions of the Big Ten and Pac-10 conferences would meet each 
year in the Rose Bowl. Thus, if the Big Ten or Pac-10 champion was ranked #1 or 
#2, the only way a #1 versus #2 matchup could occur is if its Rose Bowl opponent 
was ranked #1 or #2 as well. In other words, prior to the 1998 season, a ‘true’ 
national championship game, if it was to occur at all, would occur by accident. 
                                                 
91 Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. NHL, 783 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1986). 
92 The discussion in this section is based primarily on the Wikipedia entry “Bowl 
Championship Series”, an article on the ESPN website titled “Utah’s Attorney 
General Considers Move” dated November 15, 2003, Carroll (2004), and Moreland 
(2005). 
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 The conferences participating in a bowl game did not share their bowl revenue 
with non-participating conferences. 
 The six most prominent Division I-A football conferences – the Atlantic 
Coast Conference (ACC), Big East, Big Ten, Big Twelve, Pacific Ten (Pac-10), 
and Southeastern Conference (SEC) – along with independent Notre Dame, 
created the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) for the 1998 season. As it was 
initially formulated, the champions of each of those six conferences would play in 
the four most prestigious bowl games (i.e., the Rose Bowl, Sugar Bowl, Fiesta 
Bowl, and Orange Bowl). Thus, at least six of the eight spots in the ‘BCS Bowls’ 
would be filled by ‘BCS teams.’ If Notre Dame finished the season ranked 
sufficiently highly, it would automatically receive one of the two ‘at-large’ spots. 
If a team from a non-BCS conference finished sufficiently highly, it would also 
automatically receive one of the ‘at-large’ spots. 
 The four BCS Bowls alternated hosting the championship game between 
the #1- and #2-ranked teams based on the BCS formula, which depended on polls, 
computer rankings, strength of schedule, number of losses, and victories over top-
10 ranked teams. The BCS has generated revenues of approximately $100 million 
annually, with roughly 95% distributed to the six BCS conferences and the 
remainder distributed to non-BCS conferences. 
 The non-BCS conferences complained that the BCS made it almost 
impossible for one of their teams to ever play in the national championship. 
Moreover, the disparity in revenue received by the conferences made it virtually 
impossible for a non-BCS conference to improve to the point where its champion 
would one day play in the national championship. Congress held hearings on the 
antitrust implications of the BCS in 2003. Utah’s Attorney General, whose state 
was host to three non-BCS teams (i.e., Brigham Young University, Utah, and 
Utah State) called for an antitrust investigation. The BCS allegedly represented a 
‘group boycott’ of non-BCS conferences. 
 In response to these complaints, the BCS added a fifth bowl – the national 
championship game – for the 2004 season. By adding a fifth bowl, there are now 
four at-large slots (with Notre Dame automatically getting one of those slots if it 
is ranked sufficiently highly). 
 Carroll (2004) and Moreland (2005) analyze the antitrust implications of 
the BCS prior to its addition of a fifth bowl game. Both agree that the BCS’s 
alleged group boycott should not be treated as a per se violation of the antitrust 
laws. Rather, the BCS must be examined under the rule of reason. Both conclude 
that the BCS does not violate the Sherman Act. Moreland points out that the 
addition of a fifth BCS bowl game and the consequent increase in the number of 
‘at-large’ slots makes the BCS as it is configured today even less likely to violate 
the antitrust laws. 
 The BCS had the pro-competitive effect of creating a new product – a 
Division I-A national football champion. Not surprisingly, some fans continued to 
complain that their team was denied a chance to play for the national 
championship because their team ‘deserved’ to be ranked either #1 or #2. In other 
words, if there is no consensus as to which two teams are the best at the end of the 
regular season, there will be no consensus as to which two teams should play in 
the national championship game. Nonetheless, compared to the situation 
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 prevailing prior to the creation of the BCS, today there is greater consensus as to 
which team is the ‘true’ national champion. 
 Is there a ‘less restrictive’ alternative to the BCS? BCS critics argue that 
the national champion should be determined via a playoff system. As Carroll 
(2004) explains, a playoff would destroy two of the BCS’s primary objectives – to 
remain faithful to college football’s long bowl game tradition and to place a 
premium on success over the course of an entire season. The BCS as it is 
currently structured makes every game during the season meaningful – one loss 
makes a team’s chances of a national championship precarious and two losses are 
likely fatal. In a playoff format, in contrast, a few losses may be ‘good enough’ in 
that the team may still be sufficiently highly rated to qualify for the playoff, and 
thus still have a chance for the national championship. Fan interest in regular 
season games would likely be lower under a playoff system than under the current 
BCS format. 
 
 
The ‘closed’ nature of North American sports leagues enhances the market power 
of the individual league members. Teams frequently use the threat of relocation to extract 
public subsidies for new stadiums.93 The “closed” nature of North American sports 
leagues is quite different from the relatively “open” nature of European sports leagues. As 
Ross and Szymanski (2002) explain, European sports leagues for such sports as soccer, 
rugby, basketball, and cricket are comprised of multiple tiers, or divisions, and each year 
the worst-performing teams in a division are demoted to the next lower division while the 
top performers are promoted to the next higher division. Due to the possibility of 
promotion to a higher quality division, teams in lower divisions have an incentive to 
invest in higher quality players and fan interest in the lower leagues is enhanced. 
Moreover, the entry and exit of teams in a division each year hinders the ability of the 
incumbent franchises to exercise market power, particularly with respect to obtaining tax 
subsidies for new stadiums. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 12, Szymanski 
and Ross believe that the decision by current North American teams to maintain a closed-
league structure constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade and they advocate a system 
of promotion and relegation so as to promote entry and curb market power.  
Market power may also be curbed by simply adding more teams. As the 
discussion in Chapter 4 shows, leagues sometimes allegedly expand into new cities in 
order to make it harder for a rival league to compete. In such cases, expansion may 
enhance market power. However, not all expansion decisions are driven by a desire to 
make it more difficult for a rival to enter. Jones and Ferguson (1988) examine the NHL’s 
expansion and find that, according to their model, the most profitable cities to add a NHL 
franchise were Winnipeg, Quebec City, Edmonton, and Calgary. The NHL did, in fact, 
expand to the first three cities by absorbing the WHA franchises located in those cities 
and allowed the NHL’s Atlanta franchise to relocate to Calgary. 
Not only would adding more teams to a league potentially reduce market power, it 
may actually improve the league’s competitive balance. Schmidt (2001) finds that 
competitive balance increased markedly when the American League and National League 
began expanding in 1962 and 1963, respectively. One possible reason is the expansion 
                                                 
93 See Vrooman (1997b). 
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 draft, in which strong teams lose talented young players, key situational players, and 
established quality players (albeit ones who are overpaid, suffering from declining skills, 
or difficult to manage). 
A few years ago, the talk in Major League Baseball was not about expansion, but 
contraction. Noll (2003a) argues that MLB teams create enormous social benefits because 
the alternative employment of MLB players pays so much less than they earn as MLB 
players. Nevertheless, Noll estimates that the elimination of the two weakest teams – 
Montreal and Florida – would benefit the remaining teams by approximately $1 billion. 
Litigation pushed back the contraction date to no earlier than 2003 and the new collective 
bargaining agreement pushed it back further to at least 2007. The Montreal franchise has 
since been relocated to Washington, D.C. and is now known as the Washington 
Nationals.  
 
 
Prospective owners. Sports leagues generally require that franchise ownership changes be 
approved by the league. A prospective owner who fails to receive league approval may 
challenge the rejection on antitrust grounds, typically alleging an illegal group boycott. 
This section reviews several such lawsuits. In no case was the league rejection of a 
purchase by a prospective owner found to be an antitrust violation. It should be noted, 
however, that the league is not always named as a defendant. In some instances, the 
named defendant was found to be guilty of an antitrust violation, such as a refusal to deal, 
but the league’s rejection of the purchase was not found to be anticompetitive.  
 
 
Levin v. NBA. In 1972, Irving Levin and Harold Lipton had an agreement to 
purchase the Boston Celtics. The purchase had to be approved by at least three-
quarters of the NBA Board of Governors, which consists of one governor 
designated by each league member. At its June 1972 meeting, only two votes 
were cast in favor of the purchase, thirteen votes were cast against the purchase, 
and one governor was not present. Thus, the NBA Board of Governors rejected 
the proposed purchase.  
Levin and Lipton filed an antitrust lawsuit against the league alleging that 
its rejection was the result of an illegal group boycott motivated by the 
Governors’ antipathy for Sam Schulman, owner of the Seattle Supersonics. Levin 
and Lipton were shareholders and officers of First Northwest Industries, the 
company that operated the Supersonics. Schulman was the president and principal 
shareholder of First Northwest. The NBA argued that this business relationship 
violated the ‘conflict of interest’ provision of the NBA constitution, which states: 
“A member shall not exercise control, directly or indirectly, over any other 
member of the Association.” The provision was intended to maintain public 
confidence that NBA teams compete intensely within the league framework. 
Levin and Lipton, in contrast, argued that the NBA president and other  league 
members regarded Schulman as a renegade, rebel, and troublemaker – and were 
concerned that the Celtics would vote the same way as the Supersonics in the 
future if the proposed purchase was approved.  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the NBA, noting 
that “plaintiffs wanted to join with those unwilling to accept them, not to compete 
with them, but to be partners in the operation of a sports league for plaintiff’s 
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 profit” and “no matter which reason one credits for the rejection, it was not an 
anti-competitive reason.”94 Thus, the court concluded that, “regardless of the 
financial impact of this rejection upon the plaintiffs, if any, the exclusion of the 
plaintiffs from membership in the league did not have an anticompetitive effect 
nor an effect upon the public interest.”  
 
 
Fishman v. Estate of Arthur M. Wirtz. In January 1972, Marvin Fishman and his 
investors’ group had an agreement in principle to purchase the NBA’s Chicago 
Bulls for $3.3 million. The Bulls had been playing at Chicago Stadium, which 
was controlled by Arthur Wirtz and his son William, under a series of short-term 
leases. Prior to seeking the NBA’s approval for the purchase, Fishman sought a 3-
year lease at a lower rate than the Bulls were currently paying; Wirtz refused. 
When Fishman tried to get the Bulls to lower their selling price, the Bulls refused. 
Some of the investors in Fishman’s group split off and joined with Arthur Wirtz 
to form Chicago Professional Sports Corporation (CSPC) to attempt to acquire the 
Bulls. Fishman formed a new group, Illinois Basketball, Inc., (IBI) to pursue the 
purchase of the Bulls. Peter Graham, a Vancouver investor, also was attempting 
to acquire the team; when his offer was rejected by the Bulls, he dropped out of 
the competition.  
 On June 2, 1972, IBI submitted a signed offer to buy the Bulls for $3.3 
million and, the same day, the Bulls’ Executive Committee recommended that 
IBI’s offer be accepted. CPSC attempted to renew negotiations with the Bulls, 
pointing out that IBI did not have anywhere for the Bulls to play and IBI would 
need the NBA’s approval for the purchase. On June 9, CPSC submitted an 
executed stock purchase agreement to the Bulls along with a cashier’s check for 
$3.3 million. Three days later, CPSC increased its offer by $50,000 in order to top 
IBI’s offer. Nevertheless, on June 14, the Bulls formally accepted IBI’s offer. 
 The NBA Board of Governors is comprised of one representative from 
each team and the NBA Constitution mandates that the transfer or sale of 10% or 
more of a franchise must be approved by at least three-quarters of the Board. 
Thus, IBI’s purchase required the approval of at least 13 of the 17 Governors. By 
the time of the NBA Board of Governors meeting on June 15-16, 1972, the NBA 
Commissioner and the NBA Finance Committee had approved IBI’s financial and 
‘moral’ fitness to be an NBA owner. 
 Prior to the meeting, the NBA was informed by CPSC that its cash offer 
for the Bulls was higher than IBI’s and that it had reached a 10-year deal with 
Arthur Wirtz to lease Chicago Stadium. On the evening prior to the meeting,  the 
CPSC’s president met with several NBA members and later admitted that “his 
purpose was to secure nonapproval of the transfer to IBI as this would be the only 
possible way his group could possibly acquire the Bulls.” On June 15, only 10 of 
the 17 Governors voted to approve the sale to IBI – three less than needed for the 
NBA’s approval.  
One of the reasons why the transaction did not receive NBA approval was 
that IBI did not have a stadium lease and it was suggested that, if IBI could secure 
                                                 
94 Levin v. NBA, 385 F. Supp. 149 (1974). 
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 a lease, the proposed transfer could be voted on at the NBA’s upcoming July 11 
meeting. IBI attempted to discuss a lease with Wirtz, but Wirtz refused to meet 
with IBI or return its phone calls. Wirtz did discuss a lease with the Bulls’ current 
owner, who was told that no lease would be entered into directly with IBI and that 
the Bulls should agree to be purchased by CPSC instead. On July 5, having failed 
to secure a lease with Wirtz, IBI executed a lease for the Bulls to play at the 
International Amphitheatre. Prior to the meeting, CPSC lobbied against IBI’s 
purchase and made it clear to NBA members, in the words of the district court, 
that, “although the Chicago Stadium was not available to the Bulls (and the NBA) 
if the Bulls were sold to IBI, the Chicago Stadium would be available to the Bulls 
(and the NBA) if the IBI sale was aborted, and the Bulls sold to the Crown-Wirtz 
group.” Once again, the IBI purchase received only 10 votes in favor, and thus 
failed to obtain the NBA’s approval. Six of the seven no votes based their 
decision, at least in part, on their belief that the International Amphitheatre was 
entirely inadequate and unacceptable. (The seventh, Phoenix, could not recall why 
it voted no.) Some NBA members admitted that they were persuaded by CPSC to 
aid its attempt to acquire the Bulls. 
On July 19, 1972, pursuant to having failed to gain NBA approval, the 
contract between IBI and the Bulls was terminated. On July 28, the Bulls reached 
an agreement to be purchased by CPSC. The NBA approved the purchase on 
August 10.  
Fishman and IBI filed an antitrust lawsuit alleging that (1) Wirtz had 
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by his ‘refusal to deal’ with the plaintiffs 
regarding a lease for Chicago Stadium, and thus prevented plaintiffs from entering 
the market for the presentation of live basketball in Chicago, (2) the other 
participants in CPSC violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by conspiring 
with Wirtz to withhold a lease for Chicago Stadium from IBI and instead to make 
such a lease only available to CPSC, and (3) defendants had violated Sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with the NBA and certain NBA members 
in a group boycott to prevent IBI from acquiring the Bulls. On October 28, 1981, 
the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on all counts. 
The defendants appealed, questioning the district court’s delineation of the 
relevant market and its conclusion that the antitrust laws apply to competition for 
the acquisition of a natural monopoly. The appeals court issued its decision on 
November 21, 1986.95  
The district court had found that the relevant market was competition for 
the presentation of live professional basketball in Chicago, that this was a natural 
monopoly market, and the bidding competition to acquire a natural monopoly 
falls within the purview of the antitrust laws. In particular, the district court found 
that Chicago Stadium was an ‘essential facility’ for the presentation of live 
professional basketball in Chicago and the Wirtzes had exercised their ‘strategic 
dominance’ of the market for suitable arenas to exclude IBI from the relevant 
market. Defendants argued that the relevant market was the nationwide market for 
the purchase of professional sports franchises. The appeals court sided with the 
district court, observing: “It is not clearly erroneous to define the relevant market 
                                                 
95 Fishman v. Estate of Arthur M. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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 in these circumstances as the market to which access is sought.” Although the 
case could be viewed from the perspective of a national sports franchise market, 
doing so would change the ‘theory’ of the case, with the issue being whether 
CPSC had acquired a monopsony on basketball franchises in Chicago. 
The district court found that the market for the presentation of live 
professional basketball in Chicago is a natural monopoly because, as a practical 
matter, the city could not support two such franchises. Moreover, the NBA grants 
exclusive territories to its teams so if one wanted to present live professional 
basketball in Chicago, one would have to buy the Bulls. Thus, defendants argued 
that IBI and CPSC competed for a natural monopoly and it is irrelevant to Bulls 
fans whether IBI or CPSC acquired the team since they would face a monopolist 
in any event. Defendants alleged that the antitrust laws do not apply, since they 
are designed to protect competition, not competitors. The appeals court sided with 
the district court in concluding that the Sherman Act protects competition to 
acquire a natural monopoly. 
The district court found that Chicago Stadium was an ‘essential facility’ – 
it could not be reasonably duplicated and access to it was necessary if one wished 
to compete – and, therefore, its owner was obligated to make the facility available 
to competitors on nondiscriminatory terms. By refusing to lease to IBI for no 
sound reason, defendants had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Defendants 
argued that Chicago Stadium was not an essential facility and there was no refusal 
to deal. The appeals court disagreed on both counts. Chicago Stadium “was not 
duplicable without an expenditure that would have been unreasonable in light of 
the size of the transaction such duplication would have facilitated” – building a 
new stadium would cost $19 million, several times the cost of purchasing the 
Bulls’ franchise. Furthermore, Wirtz had no legitimate business reason not to 
negotiate with IBI regarding a lease.  
The appeals court disagreed with the district court’s finding that the 
NBA’s refusal to approve the transfer of the Bulls to IBI constituted a ‘concerted 
refusal to deal’ or ‘group boycott.’ The appeals court countered: “We cannot 
approve the district court’s treatment of this alleged violation, however, because 
the evidence supporting this common scheme shows only that CPSC shareholders 
successfully lobbied certain NBA members so as to ultimately win league 
approval for themselves.” Citing Levin v. NBA, the appeals court argued that the 
act of voting to reject a proposed transfer of ownership, by itself, is not an 
antitrust violation. Thus, the appeals court asserted: “In the case before us, the 
NBA decision, on its own, was not an anticompetitive act.” 
In his dissent, Judge Easterbrook attacked the court’s finding as to the 
relevant market, arguing that the relevant market is the national market for sports 
franchises, and in this market, Chicago Stadium has no market power – and thus 
there is no injury to consumers: 
 
The market definition in this case shows why you can’t pick a market 
without knowing the purpose of the choice. The court has defined a 
market of professional basketball in Chicago. This is a plausible market, if 
the question is whether anything injured consumers. It looks at demand 
elasticity (can fans travel to Milwaukee? Switch allegiance from 
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 basketball to hockey or opera?) and at a supply elasticity (can new teams 
sell their product if the Bulls cut back output? can TV pipe other NBA 
games into Chicago?). Defining the market in this way shows that if the 
Stadium had contrived to prevent the start-up of a second basketball team 
– as the stadium in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 187 U.S. App. D.C. 73, 
570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956, 57 L. Ed. 2d 
1121, 98 S. Ct. 3069 (1978), contrived to stop the advent of a second pro 
football team in Washington, D.C. – there would be a serious antitrust 
problem. This definition also shows that the sale of the Bulls to CPSC 
rather than IBI could not injure consumers; it did nothing to conditions of 
either demand or supply. 
 
If, instead, we seek to learn whether CPSC harmed competition for a 
sports franchise, we must define a market that looks at the demand and 
supply possibilities facing Rich [the Bulls’ owner] and IBI. Rich could 
have been injured if IBI and CPSC, in cahoots, rigged their bids, or if 
CPSC had prevented IBI from bidding. But Rich has not complained. To 
tell whether IBI’s opportunities as a would-be operator of professional 
sports teams were hampered, we must look at its options, not those of fans 
in Chicago. There is a national market in sports franchises, as the makeup 
of IBI and CPSC shows. Each syndicate includes owners of sports teams 
in other cities (and in other sports) around the country; Fishman himself 
had an interest in the Milwaukee Bucks basketball team. The Second 
Circuit has held that there is a national market in “sports capital”. North 
American Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1074, 74 L. Ed. 2d 639, 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982). There is also a 
national market in which arenas compete for teams. See Los Angeles 
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 990, 105 S. Ct. 397, 83 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1984), and 
consider the saga of the Indianapolis … Colts, Indianapolis Colts v. 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985). We 
need not discuss the Brooklyn Dodgers … or the Washington Senators. 
Which market matters depends on the theory of competition involved… 
The court today chooses a market (pro basketball in Chicago) the buyers 
in which were unaffected by the conduct in issue; a market looking at the 
opportunities of Fishman and IBI, such as a market in sports franchises, 
would reveal that the Stadium lacked market power; either way, the lack 
of injury to consumers reveals that there is no violation.  
 
Judge Easterbrook also disputed the contention that Chicago Stadium is an 
‘essential facility.’ The Bulls, in fact, formerly played their games at the 
International Amphitheatre, until the burning of McCormick Place forced them to 
move. Moreover, Fishman could have built the Rosemont Center, which was built 
after 1972, and become its prime tenant: 
 
The majority’s observation (slip op. at 30-31) that $19 million is a lot of 
money, more than the initial cost of the Bulls (though certainly not more 
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 than the ongoing cost of running the Bulls) is irrelevant; a new arena 
would have had more tenants than the Bulls. The observation is like 
saying that if DeLorean wants to build only 1,000 cars a year, it is 
“uneconomic” to build a new plant, and therefore General Motors must 
build DeLorean’s cars for him. Antitrust law requires nothing of the sort. 
A stadium is the place in which sporting contests are “manufactured.” A 
would-be manufacturer cannot hire a crew of employees (the team) and 
demand that someone else supply the plant.  
 
While Judge Easterbrook seriously disagreed with the court’s decision on 
a number of points, he concurred in the court’s decision that the NBA’s rejection 
of the transfer of the Chicago Bulls to IBI, and the lobbying which produced the 
rejection, did not violate the antitrust laws.  
 
 
Piazza v. MLB. Vincent Piazza and Vincent Tirendi, both of Pennsylvania,  
organized a group of investors with the goal of purchasing MLB’s San Francisco 
Giants and moving the team to the Tampa Bay area. On August 6, 1992, Piazza’s 
group executed a Letter of Intent with the Giants’ owner, Robert Lurie, to 
purchase the team for $115 million. Lurie agreed not to negotiate with other 
prospective buyers and to help the group obtain MLB’s approval for the purchase 
and relocation of the team to the Suncoast Dome in St. Petersburg, Florida. A few 
weeks later, Piazza’s group entered into an agreement with the City of St. 
Petersburg to use the Suncoast Dome. 
 On September 4, Piazza’s group submitted an application to MLB for the 
purchase and relocation of the Giants. MLB conducted personal background 
checks on the investors, which raised, in the words of the Chairman of the 
Ownership Committee, a “serious question in terms of some of the people who 
were part of that group.” The Chairman announced that “a couple of investors will 
not be in the group.” Another member of the Committee, Jerry Reinsdorf, stated 
that the Committee was concerned about “out-of-state” money and that the 
“Pennsylvania People” had “dropped out.”  Since both Piazza and Tirendi are 
Italian, they interpreted the comments as suggesting that the background checks 
raised the possibility that they were connected to organized crime, which they 
denied. They also denied that they had “dropped out” of the investor group. On 
September 12, the Chairman admitted to reporters that “there was no problem 
with the security check.” 
 Meanwhile, MLB was working to obtain other bids. In fact, on the same 
day as Piazza’s group submitted their application, the Chairman of the Ownership 
Committee asked Lurie to consider other offers for the Giants, despite knowing of 
Lurie’s exclusive agreement with Piazza’s group. Five days later, on September 9, 
the President of the National League invited George Shinn of North Carolina to 
make an offer to purchase the Giants and keep them in San Francisco. Eventually, 
another investor group emerged and offered $15 million less than the $115 
million offer of Piazza’s group, but offered to keep the team in San Francisco. On 
November 10, 1992, MLB formally rejected the Piazza group’s offer.  
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  Piazza sued, alleging both antitrust and constitutional violations.96 With 
respect to the antitrust claims, Piazza alleged that the defendants had monopolized 
the market for MLB teams and placed direct and indirect restraints on the 
purchase, sale, transfer, and relocation of MLB teams, as well as on the 
competition for MLB teams. Piazza alleged that these actions unlawfully 
restrained and impeded his opportunities to engage in the business of major 
league baseball. The alleged constitutional violations included being deprived of 
one’s liberty and property interests and privileges without due process of law, 
being denied equal protection of the laws, and being denied freedom of contract 
and association. 
 Piazza argued that the relevant market is the market for American League 
and National League baseball teams and that the Defendants directly and 
substantially interfered with competition in that market. The district court agreed 
with Piazza’s relevant market delineation.  
The Defendants sought to have the case dismissed because MLB is 
exempt from the antitrust laws, as evidenced by the court decisions in Federal 
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs 
(1922), Toolson v. New York Yankees (1953), and Flood v. Kuhn (1972). (These 
cases were discussed in Chapter 2.) The district court reviewed these court 
decisions and concluded: “Although the Supreme Court has not couched its 
explanation of the exemption in these terms, I believe that the only arguably 
surviving rule to be gleaned from the Court’s baseball trilogy is that if the relevant 
product market involved is the market defined as the ‘business of baseball,’ injury 
to competition in that market may not be redressed under the Sherman Act.” 
Courts have defined the ‘business of baseball’ as that which is central to the 
‘unique characteristics and needs’ of baseball and, therefore, the exempted market 
includes (1) the reserve system and (2) matters of league structure. 
In other words, the market to which MLB’s antitrust exemption applies 
has the following characteristics: “(1) the product is the exhibition of baseball 
games; (2) the sellers, as with the market defined by plaintiffs, are team owners; 
and (3) the buyers are fans and, perhaps, the broadcast industry.” However, in this 
case, the market has the following characteristics: “(1) the product being sold is 
an ownership interest in professional sports teams; (2) the sellers are team owners; 
and (3) the buyers are those who would like to become team owners.” Thus, the 
market to which MLB’s antitrust exemption applies is not the market at issue in 
this case. As a result, although the district court dismissed Piazza’s constitutional 
claims, it denied MLB’s motion to dismiss the antitrust claims.  
 In November 1994, with their trial about to begin, Piazza and MLB 
reached an out-of-court settlement for an undisclosed amount, reported to be $16 
million.97 
 
 
                                                 
96 Piazza v. MLB, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa 1993). 
97 The $16 million figure appears in a blog posted on the Athletics Nation website on 
February 2, 2005. The settlement became the subject of a lawsuit between MLB and 
its insurance carrier, Marsh & McLennan. 
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 Murray v. NFL. Francis Murray acquired an option to purchase the NFL’s New 
England Patriots, which were having financial problems in part due to an 
unfavorable lease for Foxboro Stadium, for $63 million in April 1986; the NFL 
approved the option. The Patriots were owned by William Sullivan, to whom 
Murray extended a $21 million line of credit. According to Murray, as of April 
1987, he had performed all of the obligations under the option agreement and 
should have been able to acquire the Patriots from Sullivan, who with the aid of 
the NFL sought alternative buyers. Although Murray obtained a court order 
preventing the sale of the Patriots, Sullivan negotiated a sale to Victor Kiam. 
Murray then joined with Kiam to acquire the Patriots, with Murray as the 49% 
general partner and Kiam owning the remaining 51%. The partnership deal 
between Murray and Kiam included a ‘put’ option for Murray to sell his 49% 
stake to Kiam in exchange for a $38 million payment.  
Murray also held a 40% interest in a venture seeking to bring a NFL 
franchise to St. Louis and he intended to use the money from exercising the put 
option for that purpose. According to Murray, if Kiam failed to pay the $38 
million, Murray would become the Patriots’ sole general partner, in which case he 
intended to relocate the Patriots to St. Louis or Hartford, Connecticut. In his 
pursuit to get an NFL expansion franchise for St. Louis, Murray had partnered 
with James Orthwein, who in July 1990 extended a line of credit to Murray and 
obtained a secured interest in Murray’s 49% stake in the Patriots. Murray also had 
obtained a loan from National Westminster Bank. 
 Murray notified Kiam on July 8, 1991 that he would exercise the put 
option on October 10, 1991. Murray learned on September 30 that Kiam had 
given a secured interest in his 51% Patriots stake to IBJ Schoeder Bank in 
exchange for a loan. The NFL had rules regarding the amount of debt a franchise 
could take on, and the IBJ loan allegedly violated the NFL’s limit. Murray 
notified the NFL of the debt limit violation on October 9. Kiam refused to pay 
Murray the $38 million and instead requested an extension because he disputed 
whether the partnership agreement called for Murray to become sole general 
partner in the event of nonpayment. Pursuant to the NFL’s policy, Murray 
submitted the matter to the league for compulsory arbitration. On October 14, 
Orthwein informed the NFL that he would foreclose on Murray if Kiam failed to 
make the payment. On November 4, Murray requested immediate action by the 
NFL. A week later, National Westminster Bank sued Murray to collect on its 
loan. 
 According to Murray, the NFL ignored his pleas for expedited arbitration 
so that Orthwein could gain ownership of the Patriots and thereby oust Murray 
from the league so he could not challenge its policies regarding financing, team 
relocation, and compulsory arbitration. On November 22, 1991, the NFL 
allegedly offered to purchase the Patriots from Murray; he refused. At Orthwein’s 
urging, Murray attended an NFL owners meeting to convince Kiam to sell the 
Patriots to Orthwein. According to Murray, Orthwein told him that if he 
succeeded in getting Kiam to sell, Murray could keep his stake in both the Patriots 
and the St. Louis venture. Murray agreed to pay Kiam $1 million over three years 
to get a deal. On March 16, 1992, Orthwein purchased National Westminster 
Bank’s loan to Murray and assumed control of the bank’s litigation against him. 
Orthwein allegedly demanded Murray’s stakes in the Patriots and St. Louis 
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 venture to settle the bank’s loan. On May 11, 1992, Murray and Orthwein reached 
a settlement in which Orthwein would take possession of Murray’s 49% stake in 
the Patriots and Orthwein agreed that if St. Louis failed to obtain an expansion 
franchise, he would relocate the Patriots to St. Louis, with Murray allegedly 
preserving his stake in a St. Louis franchise. Orthwein allegedly undermined 
Murray’s attempt to bring an expansion franchise to St. Louis by cooperating with 
a competing group. Moreover, he did not relocate the Patriots to St. Louis. 
Orthwein eventually sold the Patriots to Robert Kraft for $160 million – money to 
which Murray believed he was entitled. 
 Murray sued, alleging that the NFL and other Defendants conspired to 
restrain trade in the market for the purchase and sale of professional football 
franchises in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In particular, 
Murray alleged that NFL rules unlawfully restrained and affected his rights to sell 
the Patriots, causing him to sell his interest in the team at a loss in an 
anticompetitive market. The allegedly anticompetitive NFL practices were its 
restriction on the use of public financing to buy out an existing franchise partner 
or to purchase another NFL franchise, its compulsory arbitration requirement, and 
its team relocation policy. Murray alleged that the NFL conspired to divest him of 
his ownership interest in the Patriots and an expansion franchise so as to prevent 
him from challenging these league practices. The NFL sought to have the lawsuit 
dismissed because the joint activities of its members cannot form the basis of an 
antitrust violation. 
 The district court ruled on a motion to dismiss on June 26, 1996.98 For the 
purpose of a motion to dismiss, the district court accepted Murray’s assertion that 
the relevant product market is the “market for the sale and purchase of ownership 
and control interests in NFL professional football franchises” and that the relevant 
geographic market is nationwide generally and, specifically, the “market for NFL 
professional football franchises in the metropolitan areas of Boston, 
Massachusetts; Hartford, Connecticut and St. Louis, Missouri.”  
The district court refused to grant the NFL’s request for summary 
judgment (1) on the public financing allegation, concluding that Murray had 
presented sufficient facts for a Section 1 challenge; (2) on the compulsory 
arbitration allegation, ruling that whether the policy “restrains competition 
unreasonably by eliminating competitors from the field of prospective purchasers 
is a question of fact to be determined by the jury under the ‘rule of reason 
doctrine’”; and (3) on the Section 2 monopolization or attempted monopolization 
claim that Murray was denied the ‘essential facility’ of compulsory arbitration. 
The district court did grant the NFL’s request for summary judgment on the 
relocation allegation because Murray never actually applied to relocate the 
Patriots and what action the NFL would have taken in that event is speculative. 
Furthermore, the district court concluded that Murray’s failure to obtain an NFL 
expansion franchise for either St. Louis or Hartford is not an antitrust injury 
because existing NFL franchises, expansion franchises, and franchises of rival 
leagues can continue to compete to locate in these two cities. 
                                                 
98 Murray v. NFL, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9108 (E.D. Pa 1996). 
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  On April 28, 1998, the district court granted Defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment in its entirety.99 The district court noted that Murray was not 
denied arbitration by the NFL because he did not comply with the agreed-upon 
prerequisites for such a hearing. Thus, Murray failed to present evidence in 
support of an essential facilities claim. Moreover, Murray did not present 
evidence that the NFL used its arbitration policy to exclude prospective 
purchasers of the Patriots who wanted to relocate the team. As for the public 
financing allegation, the district court observed that Murray did not present 
evidence that a public offering would have been viable and that he ever 
implemented a plan to conduct such an offering.  
 
 
Baseball at Trotwood v. Dayton Professional Baseball Club. In 1997, several 
groups were competing to bring a minor league baseball team to Dayton, Ohio. In 
order to do so, a group would have to negotiate the purchase of an existing 
Midwest League franchise, get approval from the Midwest League for the 
purchase, and then get the approval of the National Association of Professional 
Baseball Leagues (NAPBL) and MLB for the purchase – and then the group 
would have to go back to those organizations to get approval to move the 
franchise to Dayton. Moreover, since Dayton lies within the ‘home territory’ of 
MLB’s Cincinnati Reds, the group would have to obtain a territorial waiver from 
the Reds. Thus, there were many obstacles to bringing a minor league baseball 
franchise to Dayton. 
 In January 1997, Sports Spectrum, Inc. (SSI) executed an option 
agreement giving it the right to acquire the Midwest League’s Michigan Battle 
Cats for $3 million. Afterward, SSI allegedly received assurances from the Reds 
that if the Reds were to waive their territorial rights, they would only do so for 
SSI. With that assurance, SSI entered into an agreement for a stadium project. On 
March 21, 1997, SSI executed a contract to purchase the Battle Cats. A few weeks 
later, SSI agreed to sell a 55% interest in the team to Rock Newman, Inc. (RNI) 
for $2 million if permission to relocate the team to the Dayton area was obtained. 
 Meanwhile, on March 28, a married couple, Sherrie Myers and Tom 
Dickson, reached an agreement with Downtown Dayton Partnership (DDP) to 
locate a minor league franchise in the Dayton area and, later, Dayton’s City 
Commission approved the agreement, which stated that Myers and/or Dickson 
would own or manage the minor league baseball franchise that located in the 
Dayton area. Dickson was the principal owner of the Midwest League’s Lansing 
Lugnuts and a member of the league’s Board of Directors. On May 30, the Reds 
issued a conditional territorial exclusivity waiver to DDP. Myers succeeded in 
getting the approval of the Midwest League and the NAPBL for the purchase of 
the Rockford Cubbies from the Chicago Tribune, but MLB refused to give its 
approval. The Reds then terminated their conditional waiver and, in November 
1997, Myers announced she was terminating her efforts to acquire the Rockford 
Cubbies and relocate them to Dayton – and that she intended to sue MLB for 
reverse discrimination. 
                                                 
99 Murray v. NFL, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5894 (E.D. Pa 1998). 
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  The same month, the Reds granted a conditional territorial exclusivity 
waiver to SSI that would expire on January 26, 1998. When SSI met with Dayton 
and DDP, it discovered that SSI would be expected to make a much larger 
financial contribution than had been expected from Myers and that neither wanted 
Rock Newman involved in minor league baseball in Dayton. SSI concluded that it 
would not get a stadium in downtown Dayton and finalized an agreement to 
locate a stadium in Trotwood, Ohio. However, when SSI filed documents to get 
the Midwest League’s and NAPBL’s approval for the purchase of the Battle Cats 
on January 14, both refused to even consider the application because Myers had 
not withdrawn her application. Myers refused to withdraw her application and the 
expiration date on the Reds’ waiver passed. 
 Myers had been negotiating to sell her interest in the Rockford Cubbies to 
the “Mandalay Defendants”, who included Hank Stickney, a trustee of the 
NAPBL. DDP and Dayton had been negotiating with the Mandalay Defendants to 
locate a minor league baseball team in downtown Dayton. The Mandalay 
Defendants ultimately received the necessary league approvals and the waiver 
from the Reds. 
 Baseball at Trotwood (which was owned by RNI and four individuals 
from SSI) sued, alleging that the Defendants, which included the ‘Mandalay 
Defendants’, the NAPBL, and the Midwest League, had conspired and acted in 
concert to restrain trade and to create a monopoly in violation of Sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act. In particular, Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants had 
imposed direct and indirect restraints on the purchase, sale, transfer, and 
relocation of minor league baseball teams, as well as on the competition for the 
purchase, sale, transfer, and relocation of such teams. The Mandalay Defendants 
asked the district court to dismiss the claims because Plaintiffs failed to allege an 
antitrust injury. The district court agreed and dismissed the case against the 
Mandalay Defendants, but noted that “the Court cannot conceive that those 
claims, as they are presently drafted and as they relate to the other Defendants, 
retain viability, in light of the Decision herein.”100 Thus, the district court directed 
the other Defendants named in the antitrust claims to move for dismissal as well. 
 The district court’s reasoning was based on Judge Easterbrook’s dissent in 
Fishman v. Estate of Arthur M. Wirtz in which he argued that, for an antitrust 
injury to occur, consumers had to be harmed, and in the case of a natural 
monopoly, consumers are in the same position regardless of who wins the contest 
to be the natural monopolist serving those consumers – in other words, regardless 
of who wins, the consumer is at the mercy of a monopolist. The district court 
observed that “given that the Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Defendants’ 
actions limited the number of franchises that would be allowed to be located in 
the Dayton area, there is no allegation that the actions of the Defendants altered 
the market structure for minor league baseball in the Dayton area, increased prices 
or reduced the quality of minor league baseball supplied in that area”; in short, 
“there are no allegations that the Defendants’ actions curtailed competition in the 
minor league baseball market in the Dayton area, only that those actions curtailed 
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 the Plaintiffs’ ability to be the entity servicing the market.” In other words, “there 
was bound to be one winner and one loser of that competition, and one and only 
one monopolist would emerge to provide minor league baseball in this area.” 
 The district court also argued that by seeking to join, rather than compete, 
with the Midwest League, there was no reduction in competition because the 
Mandalay Defendants rather than the Plaintiffs became the provider of minor 
league baseball to the Dayton area. The district court noted that the courts in 
Levin, Seattle Totems, and Mid-South Grizzlies had reached a similar conclusion. 
The district court summed up its decision as follows: 
 
In sum, the Court concludes that, where two groups compete for one right, 
the losing group does not have a valid antitrust claim, merely because the 
winning side conspired with those who would make the award and acted 
tortiously. An example demonstrates the Court’s point. A and B compete 
with each other to enter into a contract with C. The fact that A obtains the 
contract by bribing C does not give B a valid antitrust claim against A, 
even though its ability to compete for the contract with C has been 
compromised by the fact that A acted in concert with C, by bribing the 
latter, in the absence of proof that the concerted activity harmed 
consumers by reducing output or raising prices. 
 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have not 
alleged that they suffered an antitrust injury. Rather, they have asserted 
nothing more than business torts that allegedly harmed a competitor. 
Accordingly, the Court sustains the Mandalay Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss… 
 
 
In summary, courts have interpreted the antitrust laws in such a way as to give 
sports leagues broad discretion in selecting which franchises will be allowed as members 
and who will be allowed to own those franchises. The courts repeatedly stress the 
distinction between seeking to compete with the league and seeking to join the league. 
Preventing a franchise or owner from joining the league does not harm competition, but 
preventing a franchise or owner from competing with the league may.  
Courts have not agreed on whether competition to become a natural monopolist 
can result in an antitrust injury. One view, advocated by Judge Easterbrook, is that 
consumers are not impacted by which firm prevails in the competition to be the natural 
monopolist and thus no antitrust injury (which by necessity must be an injury suffered by 
consumers) can occur – and if there is no antitrust injury, there is no violation of the 
antitrust laws. However, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion was a minority view even in the 
Fishman case where it was issued. 
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 Chapter 6  
 
Sports Leagues vs. Players 
 
 
 
Sports leagues have implemented a variety of restrictions that players have 
generally opposed. These restrictions fall into three broad categories: eligibility, 
sanctions, and compensation.  Eligibility standards include the NCAA’s requirement that 
players be ‘amateurs’, the NFL’s requirement that players be out of high school for a 
number of years before they can be drafted, and the NBA’s (now discarded) policy 
against drafting high school players. Leagues also impose sanctions on players who 
violate league rules. The compensation-related restrictions of sports leagues include 
reserve clauses, rookie drafts, salary caps, luxury taxes, and player transfer fees. Players 
have challenged all of these restrictions on antitrust grounds, with fairly little success. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, in some instances, these restrictions were topics of the collective 
bargaining agreements between the sports leagues and their respective players unions and 
thus were exempt from the antitrust laws. 
One may expect the impact of such restrictions to be more onerous in some 
leagues than in others. NFL players do have other employment options, including the 
Canadian Football League (CFL), but the best CFL players are more likely to move to the 
NFL than the best NFL players are to move to the CFL. Likewise, MLB players could 
play in Japan, but they generally choose not to unless they have difficulty signing with an 
MLB team. There are numerous professional basketball and hockey leagues throughout 
the world, but they do not generally attract established NBA and NHL players, but rather 
attract marginal players hoping to eventually sign with an NBA or NHL team. On the 
other hand, it is not unusual for a top U.S. soccer player to sign with an European team 
instead of playing Major League Soccer. Thus, sports leagues vary in the extent of their 
monopsony power over players. 
For the NCAA and the four major North American professional sports leagues, 
economists have documented that league restrictions on players have succeeded in 
maintaining player compensation below the value of the players’ marginal revenue 
product. One strong piece of evidence is the behavior of players’ salaries when a rival 
sports league forms.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the formation of a rival sports league 
leads to a surge in player salaries as the leagues compete for players. When the rival 
league either folds or merges with the incumbent league, the growth in player salaries 
slows dramatically. Economists have documented similar surges in player salaries when 
players become eligible for salary arbitration or free agency.  
This chapter will analyze the restrictions on players imposed by the NCAA, MLB, 
NFL, NBA, and NHL. It then discusses players’ antitrust challenge to Major League 
Soccer (a ‘single-entity’ league). The chapter concludes with a discussion of an 
interesting case involving the Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA) and its 
attempt to sanction a player for allegedly cheating.  
 
NCAA. The NCAA produces and markets ‘amateur’ athletics and thus imposes 
numerous restrictions on collegiate players so as to preserve their ‘amateur’ 
status. Some of these restrictions relate directly to player eligibility – for example, 
a player cannot have signed with an agent or entered a professional sports league 
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 draft. Other restrictions are placed on player compensation – schools can offer 
players a limited number of scholarships, but cannot pay the players for their 
athletic services. The NCAA also has the authority to sanction teams for violating 
NCAA rules – for example, if a school’s coach is found to be secretly paying his 
or her players, the entire team may be suspended from competition. The NCAA 
also imposes numerous other restrictions, including academic eligibility 
requirements and transfer restrictions. Collegiate players have challenged these 
restrictions on antitrust grounds, largely without success. Collegiate players are 
currently challenging on antitrust grounds limits on the number of scholarships an 
athletic program can award and limits on the dollar value of those scholarships. 
 
 Restrictions on player compensation and team sanctions for compensation 
restriction violations. In 1983, several student-athletes challenged the NCAA’s 
sanctions on the University of Arizona football team making the team ineligible to 
participate in post-season competition in the 1983 and 1984 seasons and 
prohibiting the team from making television appearances in the 1984 and 1985 
seasons. On May 17, 1983, the NCAA’s Committee on Infractions had issued a 
confidential report which documented that, during the period 1975-79, 
representatives of the University’s football program had provided current players 
and players under recruitment with compensation or extra benefits such as free 
airline transportation, free lodging, as well as cash and bank loans for the athletes’ 
car payments, rental payments, and personal use. The athletes did not dispute that 
the violations occurred, but alleged that the vote of the Infractions Committee 
imposing the sanctions represented an agreement among member institutions to 
exclude the University of Arizona from the market for televised and post-season 
competition, and thus constituted a group boycott in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. The district court granted the NCAA’s request for summary 
judgment on the antitrust claim, ruling that “the attributes of a per se illegal 
boycott simply do not exist.”101 The district court explained: 
 
There has been no showing by the plaintiffs that the NCAA, its member 
institutions, or the Infractions Committee had any purpose to insulate 
themselves from competition by imposing sanctions on the University of 
Arizona or any of the other universities currently on probation. To the 
contrary, the purpose of the sanction is not only to preserve amateurism 
but to enhance fair competition among the association’s member 
institutions. 
 
Similarly, Southern Methodist University’s (SMU’s) football program was 
suspended by the NCAA for the entire 1987 season and other restrictions were 
imposed for the 1988 season. The NCAA found that SMU had exceeded limits on 
compensation for student-athletes. An antitrust lawsuit was brought by David 
McCormack, an attorney and SMU alumnus. The plaintiffs included several 
members of the football team. Plaintiffs alleged that (1) the limitations on 
compensation to football players constitute illegal price fixing in violation of 
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 Section 1 of the Sherman Act and (2) the suspension of SMU constitutes a group 
boycott by other NCAA members, also in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. The plaintiff football players argued that they had suffered an injury to their 
business (i.e., playing football), that they effectively sold their labor to SMU, and 
that the NCAA rules restrict the amount that they can be paid, preventing them 
from selling their labor to the highest bidder. The appeals court decided that the 
NCAA rules had to be analyzed under the rule of reason and that, on this basis, 
the rules are reasonable:102 
 
The NCAA markets college football as a product distinct from 
professional football. The eligibility rules create the product and allow its 
survival in the face of commercializing pressures. The goal of the NCAA 
is to integrate athletics with academics. Its requirements reasonably further 
this goal. 
 
After amending their complaint once and withdrawing another 
amendment, the plaintiffs still produce only two allegations to support 
their claim that the NCAA’s rules are designed to stifle competition: that 
the NCAA permits some compensation through scholarships and allows a 
student to be a professional in one sport and an amateur in another. 
Accepting these facts as true, however, they do not undermine the 
rationality of the eligibility requirements. That the NCAA has not distilled 
amateurism to its purest form does not mean its attempts to maintain a 
mixture containing some amateur elements are unreasonable. We therefore 
conclude that the plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts that would carry 
their antitrust claim and that the motion to dismiss was properly granted. 
 
Because the eligibility rules do not violate the antitrust laws, enforcement 
of them through suspension and other restrictions does not constitute an 
illegal group boycott. 
  
Thus, courts have found that the NCAA’s restrictions on player 
compensation do not violate the antitrust laws – the compensation restrictions are 
reasonable given that the NCAA produces and markets ‘amateur’ athletics. 
Moreover, suspension of teams found in violation of the restrictions on player 
compensation is also ‘reasonable.’ 
Some commentators disagree. A 1992 Harvard Law Review article titled 
“Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules” argues that “the 
defining characteristic of intercollegiate athletics is merely the college attendance 
of all of its athletes” and that the NCAA’s ‘amateurism’ requirements “are based 
on the outdated ideal of amateurism that is in no way necessary to the product of 
college sports.” (p. 1301) Therefore, the article concludes: “Courts should thus 
invalidate these rules as clear restraints of trade in the market for the skills of 
student-athletes.” (p. 1301) 
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 As discussed in Chapter 1, some economists view the NCAA as a cartel 
with monopsony power over student-athletes, while others view the NCAA as a 
demand-enhancing joint venture. The NCAA’s monopsony power is typically 
demonstrated by comparing the compensation of student-athletes to their marginal 
revenue product (MRP). Most such studies conclude that student-athletes receive 
far less than their MRP in the two major revenue-generating NCAA sports – 
football and basketball. Table 6.1 summarizes the economic literature. 
Star players are particularly valuable to their teams – not only athletically, 
but financially as well. Brown and Jewell (2004) estimate that, during the 1995-96 
men’s college basketball season, having an additional player who is subsequently 
selected in the NBA draft on a basketball team raises the team’s revenue by 
$1,194,469. Tollison (2000) presents a back-of-envelop-type calculation of the 
MRP of a typical player in the NCAA men’s basketball tournament and finds that 
the MRP for a tournament victory in the early rounds is $30,000, but soars to 
$220,000 if the team advances to the Final Four – whereas the implicit annual 
compensation of tuition, room, and board at most schools is in the $5,000-$10,000 
range. Brown (1994b) examines the revenue of 46 Division I basketball teams for 
the 1988-89 season and finds that team revenue increases by between $871,310 
and $1 million for each additional player subsequently drafted by the NBA, even 
though the NCAA limits the value of a scholarship to a maximum $20,000 
annually – which suggests that a future NBA draftee generates rents for his 
collegiate basketball team of approximately $1 million annually.  
Similar results are found for men’s football. Brown and Jewell (2004) 
estimate that, during the 1995 college football season, having an additional player 
who is subsequently selected in the NFL draft on a football team raises the team’s 
revenue by $406,914. Brown (1993) examines the revenue of 39 Division 1-A 
football teams for the 1988 season and finds that team revenue increases by 
between $538,760 and $646,150 for each additional player subsequently drafted 
by the NFL – whereas even adding in recruiting costs, scholarship players cost 
less than $30,000 per year. Leonard and Prinzinger (1984) analyze data on 40 
Division I college football teams for the 1981 season and estimate that MRP 
ranges from $37,825 to $129,435 depending on ticket price, whereas scholarships 
for college football players are valued at only $4,150 – which suggests that 
college football players receive only between 3% and 11% of their MRP.  
Likewise, similar results are found for women’s basketball. Brown and 
Jewell (2006) estimate that an additional ‘premium’ women’s basketball player 
generates almost $250,000 annually for her team. However, the impact is 
considerably larger (in excess of $400,000) for the ‘elite’ women’s basketball 
programs than for the less-successful ones. Brown and Jewell (2006) conclude: 
“Since a college player’s effective pay is limited to a maximum $36,000 value of 
an athletic scholarship, schools appear to extract sizable rents from the best 
college players.” (p. 96) 
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Table 6.1 
The Impact of NCAA Player Compensation Restrictions on Rents Earned by Universities on Their Athletes 
 
Sport Study Test Result 
Basketball 
(Men’s) 
Brown & Jewell 
(2004) 
 
Estimates MRP of a premium 
(subsequently drafted into the 
NBA) player using data for the 
1995-96 season. 
 
Adding a premium player raises team revenue 
by $1,194,469 annually. 
 Tollison (2000) Estimates MRP of typical player in 
the NCAA tournament via a back-
of-envelop-type calculation. 
MRP for a tournament victory in the early 
rounds is $30,000. If the team advances to the 
Final Four, MRP rises to $220,000. However, 
the implicit annual compensation of tuition, 
room, and board at most schools is in the 
$5,000-$10,000 range. 
 
 Brown (1994b) Estimates rents (the difference 
between MRP and the maximum 
compensation allowed by the 
NCAA) for premium (subsequently 
drafted into the NBA) players 
using data on 46 Division I teams 
for the 1988-89 season. 
 
NCAA limits the value of a scholarship to a 
maximum of $20,000 annually. Adding an 
additional premium player raises team revenue 
by between $871,310 and $1,283,000 
annually. Thus, future NBA draftees generate 
rents for their teams of approximately $1 
million annually. 
Basketball 
(Women’s) 
Brown & Jewell 
(2006) 
 
Estimates MRP of a premium 
(subsequently drafted into the 
WNBA) player using data for the 
top 10 women’s basketball 
conferences during the 2000-2001 
season. 
 
Adding a premium player raises team revenue 
by $241,337 annually, on average. However, 
for elite programs, adding an elite player raises 
team revenue by an average of $403,303 
annually. The maximum value of an athletic 
scholarship is $36,000. 
Football Brown & Jewell 
(2004) 
 
Estimates MRP of a premium 
(subsequently drafted into the 
NFL) player using data for the 
1995 season. 
 
Adding a premium player raises team revenue 
by $406,914 annually. 
  Brown (1993) Estimates rents (the difference 
between MRP and the maximum 
compensation allowed by the 
NCAA) for premium (subsequently 
drafted into the NFL) players using 
data on 39 Division I-A teams for 
the 1988-89 season. 
 
NCAA limits the value of a scholarship to a 
maximum of $20,000 annually. Even if other 
costs, such as recruiting costs, are added, 
scholarship players cost less than $30,000 
annually. Adding an additional premium 
player raises team revenue by between 
$538,760 and $646,150 annually. 
 Leonard and 
Prinzinger (1984) 
Compares MRPs and scholarship 
values using data on 40 Division I 
teams for the 1981 season. 
Depending on ticket price, the MRP ranges 
from $37,825 to $129,435. Since scholarships 
were valued at $4,150, collegiate football 
players received only between 3% and 11% of 
their MRP. 
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Similarly, Brown and Jewell (2004) conclude: 
 
Our updated MRP estimates from these 1995-96 data underscore Brown’s 
earlier estimates: Athletic departments extract sizable monopsony rents 
from college football and basketball players. Given that the NCAA limits 
effective compensation for student athletes, our estimates suggest that a 
college program can extract nearly $400,000 from a premium college 
football player and over $1 million from a premium college basketball 
player per year. These rents, in turn, often amount to transfers to coaches 
and administrators in the form of higher salaries as well as to support non-
revenue producing sports or even academic programs. (pp. 160-61) 
  
Tollison (2000) makes a similar point: 
 
The revenue is there to have a pay system; it is simply not presently 
flowing to the players in proportion to their contribution to revenue. It is 
flowing to (head) coaches, athletic departments to prop up non-revenue 
sports, and, yes, to the English Department. This redistribution of wealth 
is real, large, and ongoing in any major athletic program in the country. (p. 
24) 
 
Some commentators have rejected analyses comparing the value of 
scholarships received by student-athletes to their marginal revenue product. One 
problem is how to incorporate the training costs incurred by collegiate athletic 
programs. Moreover, McKenzie and Sullivan (1987) argue that the NCAA 
compensation rules enhance the demand for student-athletes and that the relevant 
question is not whether MRP is less than the actual compensation received by 
student-athletes, but whether MRP is less than the expected compensation of 
student-athletes (which would include not only the value of the athletic 
scholarship but also the present value of the expected future income stream from 
professional employment). 
NCAA sanctions can have a large impact on the disciplined member. 
Brown (1993) estimates that a one-year 10% reduction in the number of allowed 
football scholarships would reduce the sanctioned team’s revenues by roughly 
$600,000 annually, or more than $2 million over a four-year collegiate career, and 
a one-year prohibition on television appearances would reduce the sanctioned 
team’s revenues by $543,925 – ignoring the effect of revenue-sharing within the 
sanctioned team’s athletic conference. 
From an economic standpoint, NCAA sanctions can be viewed as (1) a 
means by which a cartel polices its members so as to prevent cheating on the 
cartel, (2) a system via which a joint venture maximizes the venture’s joint 
revenue, or (3) a method by which a franchisor sets and enforces rules on its 
franchisees so as to prevent free-riding. The latter interpretation is suggested by 
McKenzie and Sullivan (1987), who liken the NCAA’s rules to the rules that 
McDonald’s imposes on its fast-food franchises, which benefit the franchisees 
collectively even though each individual franchisee has an incentive to cheat on 
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 those rules. Somewhat similarly, DeBrock and Hendricks (1997) argue on the 
basis of a median voter model of NCAA roll-call voting on important policy 
matters that the median NCAA member may find it optimal to force poor quality 
teams to improve and to restrict the quality of the strongest teams, thereby leading 
to greater competitive balance, which in turn may lead to higher joint revenue. 
Depken and Wilson (2006) analyze data for 11 major Division I-A football 
conferences over the period 1953-2003 and find that a greater level of NCAA 
enforcement actions (i.e., investigations and probations) in a conference is 
associated with an improvement in competitive balance, whereas a greater 
severity of punishment is associated with a reduction in competitive balance; they 
conclude that, “on average, the net effect of NCAA enforcement is an 
improvement in competitive balance.” (p. 826) Likewise, Depken and Wilson 
(2004b) analyze data for 10 major Division I-A football conferences over the 
period 1888-2001, but they reach a more ambiguous conclusion: “Our pooled 
results do support the claim that NCAA enforcement may have the unintended 
consequence of reducing competitive balance, although we do find evidence that 
might support the NCAA’s stated goal of enforcement, namely to improve 
competitive balance.” (p. 241)  
Eckard (1998), however, argues that cartel theory predicts that the NCAA 
will attempt to inhibit poor teams from improving and work to protect the strong 
teams from competition. Consistent with this prediction, Eckard finds that year-
to-year changes in national rankings and conference standings declined in 1952 
when the NCAA introduced a workable mechanism for enforcing player 
eligibility, recruiting, and financial aid restrictions. Also consistent with Eckard’s 
prediction is the finding of Fleisher, Shughart, Tollison, and Goff (1988) that 
enforcement of the NCAA’s rules benefit teams which have been consistent 
winners at the expense of lower quality (but rapidly improving) teams. 
 
Restrictions on player eligibility – the no-draft and no-agent rules. 
Compensation restrictions are not the only restrictions that the NCAA imposes on 
players who wish to compete in NCAA events. The NCAA also places 
restrictions on players’ signing with agents and taking part in the entry drafts of 
the professional sports leagues. Moreover, the NCAA has a rule preventing a 
player from competing in intercollegiate athletics while in a graduate program 
other than one at the student’s undergraduate institution. Student-athletes have 
been unsuccessful in challenging these restrictions on antitrust grounds. 
 The NCAA’s no-draft and no-agent rules were challenged as illegal 
restraints on trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act by Braxston 
Banks, a Notre Dame football player who entered the 1990 NFL draft after sitting 
out his senior year (1989) due to a knee injury. Banks was not selected in the draft 
and failed to join a team as a free agent. Therefore, Banks wanted to return to 
Notre Dame to play one more year, but by entering the NFL draft and signing 
with an agent he had violated two NCAA eligibility rules and thus lost his final 
year of intercollegiate eligibility. Banks filed an antitrust lawsuit alleging that the 
NCAA rules restricted the labor market opportunities for collegiate football 
players and constituted a group boycott by NCAA and NFL teams. The district 
court dismissed Banks’ claims, finding that Banks failed to tie his allegations to 
any competitive impact on any identifiable market. The appeals court agreed, and 
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 noted that the no-draft rule and other similar NCAA regulations preserve the 
bright line of demarcation between college and “play for pay” football.103 The 
appeals court also rejected Banks’ contention that NCAA member schools are 
‘purchasers of labor’ via grant-in-aid athletic scholarships because the value of 
those scholarships depends on a school’s tuition and room and board, and not on 
the supply and demand for players. Moreover, the appeals court argued that the 
NCAA is not, and should not become, a minor league farm system for the NFL: 
 
The involvement of professional sports agents in NCAA football would 
turn amateur intercollegiate athletics into a sham because the focus of 
college football would shift from educating the student-athlete to creating 
a “minor-league” farm system out of college football that would operate 
solely to improve players’ skills for professional football in the NFL. We 
should not permit the entry of professional athletes and their agents into 
NCAA sports because the cold commercial nature of professional sports 
would not only destroy the amateur status of college athletics but more 
importantly would interfere with the athletes’ proper focus on their 
educational pursuits and direct their attention to the quick buck in pro 
sports. 
 
The no-agent and no-draft rules are vital and must work in conjunction 
with other eligibility requirements to preserve the amateur status of 
college athletics, and prevent the sports agents from further intruding into 
the collegiate educational system. 
 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Flaum argued that Banks had identified a 
relevant market – the college football labor market – and explained how the 
NCAA no-draft and no-agent rules harmed competition in that market. Schools 
compete for football players by not only offering scholarships covering tuition 
and room and board, but also by offering non-monetary benefits such as the 
football coach’s or program’s reputation and the quality of the school’s academic 
program. Thus, schools pay a ‘price’, not limited to monetary terms, to obtain the 
services of football players. The no-agent and no-draft regulations eliminate some 
forms of competition in the college football labor market and, therefore, are 
anticompetitive – and, consequently, Banks’ claims should not have been 
dismissed. However, the fact that the no-agent and no-draft rules are 
anticompetitive does not mean that they necessarily would not survive a rule of 
reason analysis. In other words, the no-agent and no-draft regulations may be 
shown to have a pro-competitive rationale. As Justice Flaum observed, “It may 
very well be that the no-draft and no-agent rules are essential to the survival of 
college football as a distinct and viable product, in which case Banks would lose.” 
Bradford Gaines, a Vanderbilt University student, was ineligible to 
compete in the 1990-91 college football season because he ‘irrevocably’ 
renounced ‘any and all’ remaining football eligibility so he could enter the 1990 
NFL draft. Gaines was not selected by any NFL team and failed to sign a free 
                                                 
103 Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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 agent contract with either an NFL or Canadian Football League (CFL) team.  
Gaines sought to return to Vanderbilt to play another year of college football, in 
violation of the NCAA’s no-draft and no-agent rules. Gaines filed an antitrust 
lawsuit alleging that the NCAA’s refusal to allow collegiate players who 
unsuccessfully enter the NFL draft to return to play NCAA football is an unlawful 
exercise of monopoly power in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The 
district court noted that Gaines would have to show that the NCAA (1) possesses 
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) willfully acquired or maintained 
that monopoly power – as opposed to possessing that monopoly power due to 
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, 
or historic accident.104 Gaines argued that the relevant product market is ‘major 
college football services’ and consisted of players in Division 1-A football 
programs; the NCAA controls 100% of the market. The NCAA argued that there 
were other ‘buyers’ for major college football player services, including the NFL, 
CFL, the World League of American Football, and the Arena Football League; 
the NCAA does not have monopoly power over this broader market. The district 
court noted that it “is hard-pressed to see any validity to the parties’ interpretation 
of college football players like Brad Gaines as ‘sellers’ and NCAA schools and 
professional football leagues or teams as ‘buyers’ in an economic market.” 
However, the district court found it unnecessary to decide the proper market 
definition since Gaines had failed to demonstrate that the NCAA willfully 
acquired or maintained its monopoly power: 
 
This Court is convinced that the NCAA Rules benefit both players and the 
public by regulating college football so as to preserve its amateur appeal. 
Moreover, this regulation by the NCAA in fact makes a better ‘product’ 
available by maintaining the educational underpinnings of college football 
and preserving the stability and integrity of college football programs. 
Therefore, Gaines cannot succeed on the merits of his §2 claim because 
the NCAA has shown legitimate business justifications for the Rules at 
issue. 
 
It seems obvious to this Court that rules which are justified by legitimate 
business reasons necessarily cannot be deemed ‘unreasonably 
exclusionary’ or ‘anticompetitive.’ Thus, the legitimate business reasons 
of the NCAA justifying enforcement of the eligibility Rules negate any 
attempt by Gaines to show the second element of a §2 claim – willful 
maintenance of monopoly power. Consequently, regardless of whether the 
NCAA justifications are viewed as a defense to a §2 challenge or rather as 
proof contradicting an assertion of willful monopolization, they 
necessitate a ruling by this Court in favor of the Defendants at this 
preliminary injunction stage of the proceeding. 
 
                                                 
104 Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tn 1990). 
-  - 133
 Thus, like restrictions on player compensation, the NCAA’s no-draft and 
no-agent rules are ‘reasonable’ means employed by the NCAA to offer its unique 
product – ‘amateur’ athletics. 
 
Restrictions on academic eligibility. The NCAA imposes academic 
requirements on student-athletes. In 1965, the NCAA required incoming student-
athletes to have a minimum high school grade point average of 1.6 out of a 
possible 4.0. Such a requirement acts as an entry barrier, which may be welcomed 
by some schools and opposed by others. For example, schools with high academic 
standards may favor a high minimum high school grade point average for 
incoming student athletes because it improves their ability to compete against 
schools with lower academic standards. On the other hand, schools with major 
revenue-generating athletic programs may oppose a minimum high school grade 
point average because such a rule may impair their ability to field an elite team, 
thereby reducing the revenue generated by their athletic programs. Interestingly, 
Depken and Wilson (2004a) estimate a model of the competitive balance among 
Division I-A football teams over the period 1888-2001 and find some evidence 
that competitive balance declined after the adoption of the minimum high school 
grade point average in 1965. 
In 1986, the NCAA voted on Proposition 48, a Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT) requirement for freshmen eligibility which included a provision that a 
student-athlete’s high school grade point average could offset a low SAT score. 
An earlier proposition would have made freshmen eligibility exclusively 
dependent on the student-athlete’s SAT (or ACT) score. As in the case of the 
minimum high school grade point average requirement, the ‘exclusive’ SAT 
requirement may be supported by schools with high academic standards and 
opposed by those with low academic standards, whereas the more flexible 
Proposition 48 may be favored by institutions with low academic standards and 
opposed by those with high academic standards. Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison 
(1991) examine voting on Proposition 48 by the 82 institutions with Division I-A 
football programs and, consistent with the hypothesis that schools vote in their 
competitive self-interest, find that athletic conferences with higher average SAT 
scores were less likely to vote in favor of Proposition 48. Fleisher, Goff, and 
Tollison comment: “Proposition 48 works like an entry barrier whether it was 
conceived as such or not.” (p. 178)  
 
Restrictions on transferring to another academic institution. The NCAA 
requires that a student-athlete who transfers to another academic institution ‘sit 
out’ a year before participating in intercollegiate athletics. Some athletic 
conferences, such as the Pacific-10, have their own set of transfer restrictions. The 
NCAA also has a Postbaccalaureate Bylaw, which prohibits a student-athlete 
from participating in intercollegiate athletics after enrolling in a graduate program 
at an institution other than the student-athlete’s undergraduate institution. Both 
sets of ‘anti-transfer’ rules have been challenged on antitrust grounds, albeit 
unsuccessfully. 
Rhiannon Tanaka, a star high school soccer player, enrolled at the 
University of Southern California (USC), a member of the Pacific-10 (Pac-10) 
athletic conference, for the 1994-95 academic year. In the spring of 1995, 
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 dissatisfied with the quality of USC’s education, Tanaka sought to transfer to the 
University of California, Los Angeles, another Pac-10 member. Pac-10 Rule C 8-
3-b governed intra-conference transfers and held that, before a transferring player 
could compete for his or her new team, the student-athlete first had to fulfill a 
residence requirement of two full academic years, would be charged two years of 
eligibility in all Pac-10 sports, and, for the two years of athletic ineligibility, could 
not receive any athletically-related financial aid. USC was satisfied with a less 
severe sanction, insisting that Tanaka ‘sit out’ a single academic year and lose one 
year of eligibility. Tanaka also did not receive any athletically-related financial 
aid during her first semester at UCLA.  
Tanaka filed an antitrust lawsuit against USC, the Pac-10, and the NCAA, 
alleging the Pac-10 transfer rule violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The 
district court dismissed her complaint because the Pac-10 transfer rule was 
“noncommercial” in nature (recall that establishing a claim under Section 1 
requires a showing that the agreement unreasonably restrains “trade”) and, even if 
it was “commercial” in nature, it would still not violate the antitrust laws because 
the rule would not be found to be unreasonable under a rule of reason analysis. 
Tanaka appealed.  
The appeals court declined to decide whether the Pac-10 transfer rule was 
“commercial” in nature and instead assumed it was and proceeded to analyze the 
rule under a rule of reason analysis.105 The appeals court rejected both the relevant 
product market (i.e., UCLA women’s soccer program) and relevant geographic 
market (i.e., Los Angeles) identified by Tanaka, arguing that just because 
Tanaka’s personal preference was to play in Los Angeles did not imply that Los 
Angeles was an “area of effective competition” for student-athletes competing for 
positions in women’s intercollegiate soccer programs. Rather, the geographic 
market was national in scope, as evidenced by the fact that Tanaka was recruited 
by schools throughout the United States. Moreover, those schools were from a 
number of athletic conferences, not just the Pac-10, and thus these athletic 
conferences had to be included in the relevant product market. The appeals court 
also argued that Tanaka failed to allege that the Pac-10 transfer rule has an 
anticompetitive effect in a relevant market, however defined, because the rule 
governs only intra-conference transfers and thus would likely have no 
anticompetitive effect on a national market and, furthermore, Tanaka alleges that 
the application of the transfer rule was an isolated act of retaliation against her – 
an injury to herself as opposed to an injury to a definable market. The appeals 
court noted that an analogy could be drawn between the Pac-10 transfer rule and 
the “Rozelle Rule” which was found to fail a rule of reason analysis in Mackey v. 
NFL. The Rozelle Rule gave the NFL Commissioner the authority to award one or 
more players from a team that signed a free agent to the team losing the free agent 
as compensation, thereby discouraging the signing of free agents by other teams; 
however, unlike the Pac-10 transfer rule, the Rozelle Rule applied to every NFL 
player. (The Rozelle Rule and Mackey decision are discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter.) 
                                                 
105 Tanaka v. USC, 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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 Tanaka included the NCAA as a defendant even though the NCAA 
transfer rule was not applied to her. She alleged that the NCAA “contracted, 
combined or conspired” with the other plaintiffs. The appeals court rejected her 
argument. Thus, the appeals court affirmed the district court’s decision dismissing 
Tanaka’s complaint. 
Although Tanaka’s antitrust challenge to the Pac-10 transfer rule was 
unsuccessful, Konsky (2003) argues that the NCAA’s transfer rules do not survive 
a rule of reason analysis and therefore they violate Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.106 Konsky contends that the NCAA transfer rules are subject to the antitrust 
laws because they are “sufficiently commercial” – the rules are motivated by 
commercial rationales (e.g., the rules facilitate the maintenance of high-quality 
athletic programs at low cost by enabling coaches to “lock in” student-athletes); 
the rules are not motivated by academic goals (e.g., the rules do not take into 
account transfers done for academic reasons other than the discontinuation of the 
student-athlete’s academic program at the school); and the rules are not motivated 
by the NCAA’s amateurism goals (e.g., the amateur nature of college athletics 
would not be threatened by the mobility of student-athletes). Following a rule of 
reason analysis, Konsky then explains that the transfer rules affect a significant 
market, namely, the market for student-athlete services, and constitute a 
horizontal restraint on trade within that market. In particular, the transfer rules 
restrict the movement of players between schools and remove some players from 
the market altogether (e.g., players who have one year of eligibility remaining 
after four years of school due to being ‘redshirted’ one year and thus who cannot 
transfer without losing their remaining eligibility). Moreover, Konsky argues that 
the NCAA transfer rules have few, if any, pro-competitive effects – the rules are 
not needed to preserve the ‘unique’ product of college athletics, do not necessarily 
enhance public interest in (i.e., demand for) college sports, and do not necessarily 
enhance competitive balance because the bench players from the elite programs 
may transfer to lower-ranked programs to get more playing time, thereby 
increasing the quality of the lower-ranked teams and reducing the depth of talent 
at the elite programs. Furthermore, any pro-competitive effects of the transfer 
rules could be achieved via less restrictive means, such as allowing more 
exceptions for academically-related transfers and transfers of players recruited by 
a coach who has left the team. 
The NCAA’s Postbaccalaureate Bylaw has also been unsuccessfully 
challenged on antitrust grounds. Renee Smith graduated from St. Bonaventure in 
two and a half years, having played two seasons of intercollegiate volleyball (she 
chose not to play a third season). She then enrolled in a postbaccalaureate 
program at Hofstra and enrolled in a second postbaccalaureate program at the 
University of Pittsburgh. Neither postbaccalaureate program was offered at St. 
Bonaventure. The NCAA would not allow Smith to play volleyball for either 
Hofstra or the University of Pittsburgh. Smith filed an antitrust lawsuit alleging 
that the Postbaccalaureate Bylaw is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district court dismissed Smith’s claim 
                                                 
106 For an argument that the NCAA transfer rules can be successfully challenged under 
the laws regarding covenants not to compete, see Yasser and Fees (2005).  
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 because “the actions of the NCAA in refusing to waive the Postbaccalaureate 
Bylaw and allow the Plaintiff to participate in intercollegiate athletics is not the 
type of action to which the Sherman Act was meant to be applied.” Smith 
appealed, but the appeals court agreed with the district court:107 
 
We agree with these courts that the eligibility rules are not related to the 
NCAA’s commercial or business activities. Rather than intending to 
provide the NCAA with a commercial advantage, the eligibility rules 
primarily seek to ensure fair competition in intercollegiate athletics. Based 
upon the Supreme Court’s recognition that the Sherman Act primarily was 
intended to prevent unreasonable restraints in ‘business and commercial 
transactions,’ … and therefore has only limited applicability to 
organizations which have principally noncommercial objectives …, we 
find that the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA’s promulgation of 
eligibility requirements. 
 
Moreover, the appeals court ruled that the NCAA’s Postbaccaluareate 
Bylaw would survive a rule of reason analysis: 
 
We agree with these courts that, in general, the NCAA’s eligibility rules 
allow for the survival of the product, amateur sports, and allow for an even 
playing field… Likewise, the bylaw at issue here is a reasonable restraint 
which furthers the NCAA’s goal of fair competition and the survival of 
intercollegiate athletics and is thus procompetitive. Clearly, the rule 
discourages institutions with graduate or professional schools from 
inducing undergraduates at other institutions to forgo participating in the 
athletic programs at their undergraduate institutions in order to preserve 
eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics on a postbaccalaureate 
basis. Likewise, the rule discourages undergraduates from forgoing 
participation in athletic programs on their own initiative to preserve 
eligibility on a postbaccalaureate basis at another institution. Indeed, we 
think that the bylaw so clearly survives a rule of reason analysis that we do 
not hesitate upholding it by affirming an order granting a motion to 
dismiss Smith’s antitrust count for failure to state a claim on which relief 
can be granted. 
 
In summary, collegiate transfer rules have thus far been found by the 
courts to not violate the antitrust laws. However, some commentators believe that 
the transfer rules could be successfully attacked on antitrust grounds. 
 
Restrictions on the number of athletic scholarships.108 In August 2004, a 
group of non-scholarship (‘walk-on’) student-athletes in Division I-A football 
                                                 
107 Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
108 The discussion in this section is based primarily on the Consolidated Class Action 
Complaint, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Order in In re: 
NCAA I-A Walk-on Football Players Litigation. 
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 programs filed a consolidated class action lawsuit alleging that the NCAA’s limit 
on the number of athletic scholarships such programs could award violated 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. At the time, the average Division I-A 
football roster had roughly 117 players, but the NCAA only allowed programs to 
award 85 scholarships. Thus, the average team had 32 ‘walk-on’ players. 
Plaintiffs alleged that, but for the NCAA’s scholarship limit, all walk-on players 
in Division I-A programs would have received full scholarships because schools 
attempting to make their teams more competitive on the field would offer more 
scholarships, which would force other schools to offer more scholarships as well. 
In particular, Plaintiffs alleged: 
 
The NCAA’s artificial limit on the number of football scholarships is 
classic cartel behavior. The NCAA and its member institutions control 
big-time college football. The NCAA uses that control to maximize 
revenues and minimize costs. According to the NCAA’s own figures, 
Division I-A schools earned on the average $25.1 million in athletic 
revenue in 2003, up from $13.6 million in 1993. The agreed restrictions on 
football scholarships have allowed Division I-A schools to generate that 
revenue at a lower cost, but at the expense of the class of “walk-on” 
players who are excluded from the scholarship system by this horizontal 
and unlawful restraint of trade. 
 
The NCAA did not always limit the number of scholarships. In 1956, the 
NCAA allowed the awarding of scholarships solely on the basis of athletic ability 
and, prior to 1977, there was no limit on the number of scholarships a Division I-
A football program could award. In 1977, the NCAA capped the total number of 
scholarships at 95 and the number of new scholarships that could be awarded each 
year to 25. The cap on the total number of scholarships was lowered to 92 in 
1992, 88 in 1993, and 85 in 1994. 
Plaintiffs argued that the relevant product market is NCAA Division I-A 
football and the relevant geographic market is the United States. They allege that 
“the NCAA’s members have created a horizontal restraint of trade – an agreement 
among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another, 
whereby they have agreed to restrict competition for one of the major inputs to the 
product.” Plaintiffs contend that the scholarship limit was implemented to reduce 
the cost of one of the inputs, not to improve competitive balance among Division 
I-A football programs or achieve any other procompetitive effect.  
As evidence that the NCAA’s scholarship limit has a ‘commercial” 
purpose, Plaintiffs observe that the scholarships are not awarded based on 
financial need or academic merit. Rather, the scholarships are used to obtain 
players, one of the inputs needed to produce NCAA Division I-A football. And 
schools tend to profit enormously from the sale of that product – in 2001, the 
average Division I-A school obtained almost $11 million from its football 
program, while total football-related expenses averaged only $6.2 million. 
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 The NCAA asked the district court to dismiss the case, setting forth four 
main arguments, each of which the district court found unconvincing.109 First, the 
NCAA argued that NCAA rules preserving amateurism and fair competition have 
been found by the courts not to violate the Sherman Act and that athletic 
scholarships are not “compensation” for athletic participation – student-athletes 
are not employees of the school who are “paid to play.” According to the NCAA, 
there is no “trade” in student-athlete services – there is no commercial market for 
college football players – which implies that the NCAA scholarship limit cannot 
restrain “trade” or “commerce.” Competition between schools for student-athletes 
is not “trade” or “commerce” simply because football scholarships have a 
monetary value. The district court countered that, while courts have upheld 
NCAA bylaws protecting amateurism in college athletics, the NCAA is not 
exempt from the antitrust laws and some courts have found that NCAA rules and 
regulations implicate “trade” or “commerce.” Moreover, the district court found 
that the NCAA scholarship limit “is not on all fours with those cases which hold 
that NCAA eligibility rules are not subject to the Sherman Act.” Plaintiffs are not 
challenging amateurism in Division I-A football. 
Second, the NCAA argued that Plaintiffs have not alleged a legally 
cognizable relevant market. According to the NCAA, Plaintiffs’ relevant market 
was not defined with reference to reasonable interchangeability and the cross-
elasticity of demand. Other potential substitutes for Division I-A college football 
include Division I-AA football, Division II football, Division III football, 
professional football, college football at non-NCAA institutions, junior college 
football, other fall sports (e.g., baseball, basketball, hockey, soccer, lacrosse), and 
other forms of entertainment (e.g., movies, concerts). Thus, a high school football 
player who wants to play collegiate football has numerous options other than 
attending a Division I-A school. The district court countered that, at this stage of 
the litigation, “Plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient ‘input’ market in which NCAA 
member schools compete for skilled amateur football players.”     
Third, the NCAA argued that Plaintiffs did not allege an injury to 
competition. According to the NCAA, Plaintiffs failed to explain how consumers 
are harmed in any relevant market by the scholarship limit. The district court 
countered that Plaintiffs have described an injury to the input market – walk-ons 
are left with enormous student loans while the NCAA and its members save 
hundreds of millions in scholarship money. 
Fourth, the NCAA argued that the Plaintiffs provided insufficient factual 
allegations showing that the NCAA possessed monopoly power in any relevant 
market. According to the NCAA, Plaintiffs failed to show that (1) the NCAA has 
monopoly power in any relevant market and (2) the NCAA has willfully acquired 
or maintained its purported monopoly. The district court countered that the 
traditional definition of ‘monopoly power’ is “the power to control market prices 
or exclude competition” and Plaintiffs have alleged that the NCAA is a “classic 
cartel” which “exercises an almost absolute control over intercollegiate athletics.” 
                                                 
109 In re: NCAA I-A Walk-on Football Players Litigation, Case No. C04-1254C, W.D. 
Washington at Seattle (September 14, 2005). 
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 Thus, the district court declined the NCAA’s motion to dismiss the case. 
Of course, that by no means implies that the district court believed that Plaintiffs 
had actually proved their allegation that the NCAA scholarship limit violates the 
Sherman Act. Whether Plaintiffs will succeed in doing so remains to be seen. The 
Plaintiffs’ case suffered a blow on May 3, 2006 when the district court denied 
class certification because it was not convinced that all walk-on players would 
have received scholarships but for the NCAA scholarship limit.110 
Sutter and Winkler (2003) cite two pieces of evidence which cast doubt on 
any pro-competitive rationale for the scholarship limit. First, they compare 
competitive balance before and after the adoption of the scholarship limit and find 
that competitive balance in Division I-A football has not increased since 1977. 
Second, they show that NCAA members with stronger Division I-A football 
teams were more likely to vote in favor of a reduction in the number of football 
scholarships, which suggests that the scholarship limit functioned to protect the 
elite football programs from competition from programs seeking to field a top 
quality team. Sutter and Winkler conclude: “If traditional powers attract more and 
better walk-ons, this would suggest that marginally lower scholarship limits will 
not increase parity and may even entrench incumbents.” (p. 16) 
 
Restrictions on the dollar value of athletic scholarships.111 On February 
17, 2006, a group of student-athletes on athletic scholarships filed an antitrust 
lawsuit against the NCAA over its cap on the dollar value of such scholarships. 
The student-athletes competed in the NCAA’s two “revenue sports” – Division I-
A football and basketball. The NCAA permits “full ride” athletic scholarships to 
cover only tuition, mandatory fees, room and board, and required books. 
Expenses such as school supplies, recommended textbooks, laundry expenses, 
health and disability insurance, travel costs, and other incidental expenses are not 
covered. As a result, the NCAA caps the value of athletic scholarships at a level 
below the “full cost of attendance.” Plaintiffs allege that, but for the NCAA cap, 
competition among Division I-A schools would drive the value of athletic 
scholarships up to at least the full cost of attendance. According to the Plaintiffs, 
the NCAA’s own estimate is that a student-athlete on a full athletic scholarship 
must cover an average of $2,500 in out-of-pocket expenses. Plaintiffs allege that 
there is no cognizable justification for the NCAA’s cap on the value of athletic 
scholarships – it is not reasonably necessary to preserve ‘amateurism’ in NCAA 
athletics; it is simply a cost-containment measure. 
Effective August 1, 2004, the NCAA relaxed the cap in the sense that 
student-athletes can now receive need-based grants and loans in addition to the 
athletic scholarship. However, student-athletes still cannot receive, in excess of 
the athletic scholarship, financial aid based in whole or in part on their athletic 
talents and accomplishments. Thus, Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA continues to 
cap the value of scholarships based on athletic talent and accomplishment that 
student-athletes can receive. 
                                                 
110 In re: NCAA I-A Walk-on Football Players Litigation, 2006 WL 1207915 (W.D. 
Wash. May 3, 2006). 
111 The discussion in this section is based on the complaint in White v. NCAA (2006). 
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 According to the Plaintiffs, the relevant product markets are the markets 
for major (Division I-A) college football and basketball. The relevant markets do 
not include the Army, Navy, and Air Force Academies because they do not offer 
athletics-based financial aid. The colleges and universities in the relevant markets 
compete with one another in the recruitment of student-athletes by offering 
prospective student-athletes grants of athletics-based financial aid. The relevant 
geographic market is the United States. 
The cap on the value of athletic scholarships is binding, as evidenced by 
the fact that all (or nearly all) of such scholarships are for the maximum amount 
permitted by the NCAA. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, in the absence of the cap, the 
value of the athletic scholarships they received would have been (at least) the full 
cost of attendance.  
As evidence that the NCAA cap affects interstate commerce, Plaintiffs 
report that during the academic year 2004-2005, revenues for Division I-A 
football and basketball programs exceeded $2.2 billion and their profits exceeded 
$900 million. During academic year 2002-2003, 68% of Division I-A football 
programs were profitable, with an average profit of $9.2 million, and 70% of 
Division I-A basketball programs were profitable, with an average profit of $3 
million. The average profit at Division I-A schools from football and basketball 
was $8 million. Plaintiffs allege that athletic scholarships awarded to student-
athletes are “commercial transactions that affect interstate commerce.” 
Plaintiffs also allege: “There is no practical alternative to NCAA 
membership for any academic institution that wishes to sponsor a major college 
sports program.” There is not a single academic institution with a major college 
sports program that is not a member of the NCAA, and thus must abide by NCAA 
rules. Academic institutions that violate the NCAA cap may be subject to an array 
of sanctions and the individual student-athlete who receives athletics-based 
financial aid in excess of the cap may be declared ineligible to compete in NCAA 
sports.  
As a result, Plaintiffs allege that, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, the NCAA and its members, via the cap on the value of athletic scholarships, 
have “contracted, combined and conspired to fix, depress or stabilize the amount, 
terms and conditions of athletics-based financial assistance to student athletes.” 
It will be interesting to see how this case is decided. One question is 
whether the cap is a reasonable means to preserve the unique character of 
collegiate athletics – amateurism. If there are no limits to what schools can ‘bid’ 
for the services of student-athletes, would NCAA athletics become a different 
product?  
 
 
MLB. As discussed in Chapter 2, Major League Baseball has been found by the 
U.S. Supreme Court to be exempt from the federal antitrust laws, at least with 
respect to MLB’s actions pertaining to the “business of baseball.” Two of the 
cases upholding MLB’s antitrust exemption involved players challenging MLB’s 
reserve clause. One of those cases, Flood v. Kuhn, was decided on a 5-3 vote, 
leading MLB to offer some concessions to the players, one of which – arbitration 
– would quickly lead to the introduction of free agency. Somewhat ironically, 
despite their antitrust exemption, MLB owners were found to have engaged in 
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 collusion in the mid-1980s, not in violation of the federal antitrust laws, however, 
but rather in violation of the “anti-collusion” clause in their collective bargaining 
agreement with MLB players. In 1998, Congress passed the Curt Flood Act, the 
purpose of which was “to state that major league baseball players are covered 
under the antitrust laws (i.e., that major league baseball players will have the same 
rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football and 
basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that the passage of 
this Act does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context 
or with respect to any other person or entity.” Thus today, MLB’s antitrust 
exemption is limited in labor matters. 
 
The Reserve Clause. When the National League was organized in 1876, 
the teams competed to sign players and the best players earned as much as $4,500 
per season (a large sum given that a skilled laborer working 60 hours per week 
might earn between $1,200 and $1,500 annually). 112 Raiding of each other’s 
rosters occurred, with some players jumping to a different team in mid-season. 
Thus, competition for players was not only costly to the team owners, the 
“integrity of the game” was brought into question as the quality of a team could 
swing dramatically in the course of a single season as top players jumped to (or 
from) a team. Team owners met to discuss roster jumping during the winter of 
1878-79 and secretly agreed not to raid each other’s rosters during the season and 
to “restrain” themselves during the off-season. Specifically, each team would 
draw up a list of five players it wanted to keep on its roster the next season and 
teams agreed not to offer a contract to any of these “reserved” players. In 1883, 
the agreement was expanded from five “reserved” players on each team to all 
players. In 1887, it became a formal clause in players’ contracts. 
Minor league teams also implemented a reserve clause, which the National 
League refused to honor since it sought to be the league with the top players. 
Eventually the minor league teams reached a deal with the National League in 
which the latter could select players from the former in exchange for a fixed 
payment.  
                                                
In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1922 ruled that the business of 
providing baseball games for profit between teams of professional players was not 
interstate commerce, and thus was not covered by the federal antitrust laws. The 
Court upheld MLB’s antitrust exemption in 1953, in the case of Toolson v. New 
York Yankees, where the Plaintiff professional baseball player challenged MLB’s 
reserve clause on antitrust grounds, and again in the 1972 case of Flood v. Kuhn 
where the Plaintiff challenged MLB’s reserve clause on antitrust grounds after 
being traded without his consent to another team. The Court did not affirm the 
Federal Baseball decision because it necessarily believed that the 1922 decision 
that the exhibition of baseball games was not interstate commerce was correct, but 
 
112 The discussion in this paragraph and the next is based on Haupert (2003). For another 
discussion of the origins of the reserve clause, see Eckard (2001a), who concludes 
that the likely motive for the reserve rule was “monopolistic collusion.” 
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 rather because MLB had operated under the antitrust exemption for so long that 
the exemption should be removed by an act of Congress, not by the Court.  
However, the Court decision in Flood v. Kuhn was close, 5-3. 113 With 
three dissenting justices and one abstaining justice, MLB reportedly decided it 
was time to cut a deal with the players and, in 1973, MLB owners agreed that (1) 
players with 10 years of MLB experience and five years with the same MLB team 
could veto trades and (2) contract disputes involving players with at least two 
years of MLB experience would be handled via binding arbitration. In 1975, two 
players – Andy Messersmith of the Los Angeles Dodgers and Dave McNally of 
the Montreal Expos – on the advice of their agents, played the entire season 
without a contract and, when the season ended, claimed that the reserve clause no 
longer applied to them. In other words, the reserve clause only bound the player to 
his original team for one year after the player’s contract expired. The dispute went 
to professional arbitrator Peter Seitz, who ruled in favor of Messersmith and 
McNally – and was promptly fired by MLB. MLB owners responded by shutting 
down training camps and threatened to cancel the season unless the MLB Players 
Association (MLBPA) agreed to limits on the movement of players between 
teams. Nevertheless, the 1976 season began on schedule and, in the summer of 
that year, MLB and MLBPA signed an agreement that players would become free 
agents after six years in the major leagues and teams who lost players would 
receive compensation in the form of an additional pick in the amateur draft. 
Between 1976 and 1979, the average MLB salary more than doubled, from 
$45,000 to $100,000. 
The primary curb on what the MLB owners could do became not the 
federal antitrust laws, but rather the MLBPA. When, in 1979, MLB owners 
sought to change the form of compensation for the loss of a player to free agency 
from an additional pick in the amateur draft to a player from the free agent’s new 
team, the MLBPA objected, leading eventually to a 50-day strike during the 1981 
season. Similarly, the players went on strike during the 1994 season to oppose 
MLB’s attempt to implement a salary cap. 
Numerous economic studies have documented how MLB’s reserve clause 
depressed player salaries and how player salaries soar as they first become 
eligible for binding arbitration and finally become free agents. The economic 
literature is summarized in Table 6.2. 
                                                 
113 The discussion in this paragraph and the next comes primarily from the Encyclopedia 
of American Industries website entry for “Professional Sports Clubs and Promoters” 
and an article from the ESPN website titled “Free Agency: How It Happened” and 
dated November 20, 2000. 
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Table 6.2 
The Impact of MLB’s Reserve System on Player Salaries 
 
Study Test Result 
Krautmann, 
Gustafson & 
Hadley (2000) 
Compares salaries and MRPs of players 
ineligible for both arbitration and free agency 
(“apprentices”) and those eligible for 
arbitration but not free agency (“journeymen”) 
during the period 1988-94. 
The average apprentice is paid $475,000 less than his MRP, 
while the average journeyman is paid slightly more than his 
MRP. The typical team extracts $3 million from its players 
bound by the reserve clause, but average team player 
development expenses are roughly $6 million per season. 
 
Miller (2000) Estimates separate salary regression models for 
free agents and arbitration-eligible players 
using data on players who became free agents 
or filed for arbitration during the 1991-94 
seasons. 
 
For hitters, the salary obtained via arbitration is 
approximately 10% less than the salary the player would 
have obtained in free agency; the corresponding figure for 
pitchers is 22%. 
Krautmann 
(1999) 
Imputes the market value of hitters under the 
reserve clause by estimating a model 
explaining free agent wages (which are 
assumed to equal free agent MRPs) using data 
on 215 hitters eligible for free agency in the 
period 1990-93. 
 
“Apprentice” hitters are paid, on average, 25% of their 
MRP. Surplus extracted from the apprentices roughly 
equals the team’s training expenses. 
Bodvarsson & 
Banaian (1998) 
Estimates salary regression equation model 
using data for the 1986-88 season. Also 
estimates model of whether a player files for 
final offer arbitration. Focuses on 237 players 
eligible for final offer arbitration during the 
1986 and 1987 seasons but not eligible for free 
agency at the end of the 1987 season. 
 
For hitters, a one percent increase in the probability of 
filing for final offer arbitration increases salaries by 1.10% 
and those who do file increase their salaries by 29.3%; the 
corresponding figures for pitchers are 0.81% and 21.6%. 
Blecherman & 
Camerer (1996) 
Compares salaries and MRPs of hitters signing 
contracts after the end of the 1989 season and 
before the start of the 1990 season. 
The non-free agents signed contracts for an average of 
$712,023 and had an average MRP of $704,317. In 
contrast, the free agents obtained an average salary of 
$934,115 but had an average MRP of only $604,678. 
 
Krautmann & 
Oppenheimer 
(1996) 
Uses MRP estimates of Zimbalist (1992), but 
nets out training costs. 
The present value of the excess of MRP over salary for 
players bound by the reserve clause approximately equals 
the cost of training. 
 
Gustafson & 
Hadley (1995) 
Compares the salaries of players eligible and 
ineligible for arbitration for the 1990 season. 
For both hitters and pitchers, arbitration-eligible players 
earn higher salaries than arbitration-ineligible players; 
25.1% ($174,079) of the gap between the salaries of hitters 
eligible and ineligible for arbitration cannot be explained by 
other factors and thus is attributed to monopsony power; 
40.5% ($242,965) of the corresponding gap for pitchers is 
attributed to monopsony power. 
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 Table 6.2 
The Impact of MLB’s Reserve System on Player Salaries 
 
Study Test Result 
Telser (1995) Re-examines net MRP estimates of Scully 
(1974). 
The ratio of salary to net MRP is lower for star players than 
for average or mediocre players because of the ‘ultimatum 
game.’ 
 
MacDonald & 
Reynolds 
(1994) 
Compares salaries of pitchers and hitters with 
1-2, 3-6, and 7+ years of experience during the 
1986 and 1987 seasons. 
At the margin, hitters with 1-2 years of experience earn 5% 
of an additional increment in their career MRP, those with 
3-6 years earn 58%, and those with 7+ years earn 106%. 
The corresponding figures for pitchers are 8%, 86%, and 
122%. 
 
Marburger 
(1994) 
Compares salaries of pitchers and hitters (1) 
ineligible for both final-offer arbitration and 
free agency, (2) eligible for final-offer 
arbitration, and (3) eligible for free agency 
during the 1991 and 1992 seasons.  
For hitters, becoming eligible for final-offer arbitration 
raises average salary from $438,000 to $675,000, a 54% 
increase. For pitchers, the increase is 32%. As players 
eligible for final-offer arbitration near eligibility for free 
agency, their average salaries rise to roughly equal that of 
free agents. 
 
Kahn (1993) Compares salaries of 4 classes of players: (1) 
players under the reserve clause and more than 
one year away from free agency, (2) players 
eligible for arbitration but more than a year 
away from free agency, (3) players in their last 
year before free agency, and (4) players who 
are free agents. The sample period is 1987-90. 
 
Players eligible for arbitration but more than a year from 
free agency have higher salaries than players under the 
reserve clause. Players in their last year prior to free agency 
have salaries similar to free agents, and both have higher 
salaries than those eligible for arbitration. Free agents and 
players in their last year prior to free agency use their 
bargaining power to secure longer, guaranteed contracts. 
Fort (1992) Calculates Gini coefficients for salaries before 
(1965-74) and after (1986-90) free agency. 
Gini coefficient rose from 0.354 to 0.505, implying that 
salary inequality has increased after free agency. 
 
Johnson (1992) Compares salaries of black and white players 
who were and were not eligible for free agency 
during the 1987 season. 
No statistically significant impact of free agency eligibility 
on salaries of white players; black players eligible for free 
agency have significantly lower salaries than black non-free 
agents. 
 
Zimbalist 
(1992) 
Estimates MRPs for “apprentice” hitters under 
the reserve clause without salary arbitration 
rights, “journeymen” hitters with arbitration 
rights and the imminent prospect of free 
agency, and “master” hitters. The sample 
period is 1986-89. 
 
Apprentice hitters are paid 17-25% of their MRP; 
journeymen hitters are paid 50-64% of their MRP; master 
hitters are paid more than their MRP. 
Hadley & 
Gustafson 
(1991) 
Compares salaries of pitchers and hitters (1) 
ineligible for both final-offer arbitration and 
free agency, (2) eligible for final-offer 
arbitration, and (3) eligible for free agency 
during the 1989 season. 
The average hitter and pitcher, respectively, experiences a 
60.7% and 70.7% salary increase when eligible for 
arbitration. The average salary increase for free agents 
versus players ineligible for both free agency and 
arbitration is 43.3% for hitters and 35.2% for pitchers. 
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 Table 6.2 
The Impact of MLB’s Reserve System on Player Salaries 
 
Study Test Result 
Hill (1985) Estimates MRPs for hitters and pitchers before 
(1976) and after (1977) free agency, with the 
1977 sample restricted to players who were not 
free agents in the 1977 season. 
In 1976, below-average hitters received salaries in excess of 
their net MRP, while average and star hitters received 13-
34% of their net MRP. Average and below-average pitchers 
and some star pitchers received salaries in excess of their 
net MRPs. The most “exploited” star pitchers receive 30% 
of their net MRP. In 1977, “exploitation rates” generally 
declined. 
 
Hill & 
Spellman 
(1983) 
Compares salaries in the season before (1976) 
and after (1977) free agency. 
Holding ability and experience constant, free agents in 1977 
received higher salaries than non-free agents; for both 
pitchers and hitters, compensation in 1977 was based more 
on past performance and less on seniority. 
 
Raimondo 
(1983) 
Estimates MRPs for the 1977 (post-free 
agency) season using the methodologies of 
Scully (1974) and Medoff (1976); compares 
results to those of Scully (1974) and Medoff 
(1976) for the pre-free agency period. 
Holding player type (hitter, pitcher), quality (star, average, 
mediocre), and methodology (Scully, Medoff) constant, 
salary as a percentage of MRP is much higher for the free 
agents relative to both (1) players in the pre-free agency 
period and (2) non-free agents in the post-free agency year 
of 1977. 
 
Lehn (1982) Compares average real salaries before (1971-
76) and after (1977-80) free agency. 
In 1977, the first year of free agency, the average real salary 
rose from $51,501 to $76,066, a 39% increase. In 1978, it 
rose to $99,876, an additional 22% increase. Increases in 
1979 and 1980 were only 2.2% and 1.2%, respectively. The 
number of guaranteed years on players’ contracts rose 
sharply after free agency. 
 
Sommers & 
Quinton (1982) 
Estimates MRPs for the 14 most sought-after 
players who became free agents after the 1976 
season using data for the 1977 season. 
Although the five pitchers generated gross MRPs roughly 
equal to their annual contract costs and 7 of the 9 hitters 
also had gross MRPs in excess of their annual contract 
costs, only one free agent’s signing had a net benefit 
exceeding net cost (under the assumption the free agent 
would have been replaced on the roster with a non-free 
agent). Suggests non-free agents are underpaid. 
 
Medoff (1976) Estimates MRPs and compares them to 
players’ salaries for the 1972-74 seasons. 
Star, average, and mediocre hitters are paid 41%, 36%, and 
30% of their MRP, respectively; star, average, and 
mediocre pitchers are paid 49%, 51%, and 55% of their 
MRP, respectively. 
 
Scully (1974) Estimates net MRPs and compares them to 
players’ salaries for the 1968 and 1969 
seasons. Net MRP equals MRP net of training 
and capital costs. 
Star and average players receive salaries equal to 15% and 
20% of their net MRPs, respectively. Mediocre players 
have salaries above their net MRPs, which are negative. 
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 Several studies focus on the period prior to the introduction of free 
agency. Scully (1974) examines data for the 1968 and 1969 seasons, prior to the 
introduction of free agency, and finds that ‘star’ and ‘average’ players received 
salaries equal to 15% and 20%, respectively, of their marginal revenue product 
net of training and capital costs, whereas ‘mediocre’ players had salaries in excess 
of their net MRP, which is negative. Medoff (1976) examines data for the 1972-
74 seasons and finds that ‘star’, ‘average’, and ‘mediocre’ hitters are paid 41%, 
36%, and 30% of their MRP, respectively, while the corresponding figures for 
star, average, and mediocre pitchers are 49%, 51%, and 55%. Telser (1995) shows 
that the ratio of salary to net marginal revenue product (NMRP) was a decreasing 
function of NMRP – the larger a player’s NMRP, the greater the team’s 
bargaining power with the player in salary negotiations. The reason was that the 
team could issue an “ultimatum” by offering a relatively small fraction of the 
player’s (large) NMRP and the player would find it extremely costly to decline 
the offer. In contrast, a player with a small NMRP would find it less costly a 
refuse a salary set at a small fraction of the player’s (small) NMRP. Thus, prior to 
the introduction of free agency, MLB players were paid far less than their MRP, 
with the possible exception of the worst players, who may have been overpaid. 
A number of studies focus on the period just before and after the 
introduction of free agency. Sommers and Quinton (1982), Lehn (1982), 
Raimondo (1983), Hill and Spellman (1983), and Hill (1985) all present evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that MLB possessed monopsony power over 
baseball players prior to 1976 and that MLB’s monopsony power has diminished 
since that time.  
Economic studies also document that MLB’s monopsony power has been 
diminished by the introduction of binding arbitration. Using data for the 1989 
season, Hadley and Gustafson (1991) compare the salaries of three groups of 
pitchers and hitters: (1) those ineligible for both final-offer arbitration and free-
agency, (2) those eligible for final-offer arbitration, and (3) those eligible for free 
agency. They find that the average hitter who becomes eligible for arbitration 
experiences a 60.7% salary increase, while the corresponding figure for the 
average pitcher is 70.7%. Likewise, the average hitter and pitcher who become 
free agents (relative to players who are ineligible for both arbitration and free 
agency) experience an average salary increase of 43.3% and 35.2%, respectively. 
Similarly, Zimbalist (1992) examines data for the period 1986-89 and finds that 
‘apprentice’ hitters under the reserve clause and without salary arbitration rights 
are paid 17-25% of their MRP, ‘journeyman’ hitters with arbitration rights and the 
imminent prospect of free agency are paid 50-64% of their MRP, and ‘master’ 
hitters are paid more than their MRP. Kahn (1993) examines data for the period 
1987-90 and finds that players eligible for arbitration but who are more than one 
year from free agency have higher salaries than players under the reserve clause. 
Moreover, players in their last year prior to free agency have salaries similar to 
that of free agents; both have salaries higher than players eligible for arbitration 
and both use their bargaining power to secure longer, guaranteed contracts. Using 
data for the 1991 and 1992 seasons, Marburger (1994) finds that becoming 
eligible for final-offer arbitration raises the average salaries of hitters and pitchers 
by 54% and 32%, respectively. Furthermore, as players eligible for final-offer 
arbitration near eligibility for free-agency, their average salaries rise to roughly 
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 equal that of free agents. MacDonald and Reynolds (1994) find that, during the 
1986 and 1987 seasons, hitters with 1-2 years of experience earned 5% of an 
additional increment in their career MRP, hitters with 3-6 years of experience 
earned 58%, and hitters with 7 or more years of experience earned 106%; the 
corresponding figures for pitchers were 8%, 86%, and 122%. Gustafson and 
Hadley (1995) find that, for the 1990 season, 25.1% ($174,079) of the gap 
between the salaries of hitters eligible and ineligible for arbitration cannot be 
explained by other factors and thus is attributed to MLB’s monopsony power; the 
corresponding figure for pitchers is 40.5% ($242,965). Blecherman and Camerer 
(1996) find that the average non-free agent signing a contract between the end of 
the 1989 season and prior to the start of the 1990 season was paid roughly his 
MRP, whereas the average free agent signing a contract during this period was 
paid roughly 50% more than his MRP. Bodvarsson and Banaian (1998) examine a 
sample of 237 players eligible for final offer arbitration during the 1986 and 1987 
seasons but who were not eligible for free agency after the 1987 season. They 
document that players benefit from both the mere possession of final offer 
arbitration rights and from actually filing for arbitration. Moreover, they argue 
that these benefits are not due to player-sorting (i.e., teams are more likely to offer 
arbitration to higher-quality players). Miller (2000) examines players who became 
free agents or filed for arbitration during the 1991-94 seasons and shows that, 
although arbitration is associated with a lower salary than free agency, higher free 
agent salaries tend to lead to higher salaries awarded in arbitration.  
Some studies find that the ‘surplus’ extracted from the players bound by 
the reserve clause approximates (or may even be less than) the training costs 
incurred by the player’s team. Using the MRP estimates of Zimbalist (1992), 
Krautmann and Oppenheimer (1996) conclude that the present value of the excess 
of MRP over salary for players bound by the reserve clause approximately equals 
the cost of training. Likewise, Krautmann (1999) analyzes data for the period 
1990-93 and concludes that, while ‘apprentice’ hitters are paid an average of 25% 
of their MRP, the surplus extracted from those players roughly equals the team’s 
training expenses. Krautmann, Gustafson, and Hadley (2000) examine data for the 
period 1988-94 and conclude that the typical team extracts $3 million from its 
players bound by the reserve clause, but the team’s player development expenses 
average $6 million per season. 
Several pro-competitive rationales for MLB’s reserve clause have been 
proposed. Miceli (2004) presents a model in which the reserve clause benefits 
players because it gives teams an incentive to invest in a player’s development, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that the player will be able to play at the major 
league level. The problem is that once a player is sufficiently developed, the team 
that invested in the player’s development may find itself outbid for the player’s 
services by other teams – and if teams cannot obtain a “return” on their 
investment in a player’s development, teams have little incentive to make such an 
investment. In other words, players face a trade-off between the salary they 
receive assuming they make the major leagues and the probability of making the 
major leagues. By accepting a lower salary initially at the major league level, a 
player provides his team with an incentive to invest in his development and 
thereby increases the probability that he will develop into a major league player. 
Thus, both players and teams benefit from the reserve clause. 
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 Another possible pro-competitive rationale for MLB’s reserve clause was 
to improve competitive balance. By preventing wealthy teams from bidding for 
the players of other teams, wealthy teams could not simply offer the largest 
salaries to the league’s best players and thereby “buy” a championship. The 
dynamics of the reserve clause are not that simple, however, because teams are 
allowed to trade players and thus the wealthy teams can attract the league’s best 
players by offering the most lucrative trade. In other words, the distribution of 
players across teams should be independent of whether players are bound by a 
reserve clause or whether free agency exists. This is known as the “Coase 
Theorem.” The difference is that, under free agency, the team who loses a player 
may not receive anything in return (it depends on what free agent compensation 
rules have been agreed to by the league and the players’ association), whereas, 
under the reserve clause, the player may still go to a new team but the player’s 
original team will demand and receive something in return. 
Many studies test whether the Coase Theorem holds in major league 
baseball, with conflicting results. The economic literature is summarized in Table 
6.3. 
 
Table 6.3 
The Impact of MLB’s Reserve System on Competitive Balance 
 
Study Test Result 
Fishman (2003) Estimates a regression model of the standard 
deviation of team winning percentage using data 
for the 1950-2001 seasons.  
The regression coefficient on the number of players who 
declared free agency the prior year is positive and 
statistically significant. 
 
Depken (2002) Compares Herfindahl Indices based on each 
team’s share of total home runs and total opponent 
strikeouts before (1920-76) and after (1977-96) 
free agency. 
Concentration of home runs fell in the American 
League, but not in the National League. Concentration 
of opponent strikeouts fell (at the 90% confidence level) 
in the American League, but not in the National League. 
 
Cymrot, 
Dunlevy & 
Even (2001) 
Compares the movement of free agent and non-
free agent hitters across teams using data on 
players who played in both the 1979 and 1980 
seasons. 
 
The impact of the predicted gain from moving on the 
probability of changing teams is the same for free agents 
(who pocket the gain) and non-free agents (whose gain 
is pocketed by the club). 
Eckard (2001b) Compares variance of team winning percentage 
and the relative concentration of league 
championships (team with highest winning 
percentage at the end of the regular season) before 
(1961-76) and after (1977-92) free agency, 
excluding expansion teams. Also calculates 
average annual number of players traded or sold 
before (1973-75) free agency. 
 
 
 
The variance of team winning percentage falls in the 
American League, but rises in the National League. In 
both leagues, the Herfindahl Index of teams with the 
highest winning percentage at the end of the regular 
season falls. Only 3.6% of “regular” and 2.3% of 
“impact” players were sold or traded during the 1973-75 
period. 
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 Table 6.3 
The Impact of MLB’s Reserve System on Competitive Balance 
 
Study Test Result 
Depken (1999) Compares Herfindahl Index calculated based on 
each team’s percentage of total wins before (1920-
1976) and after (1977-96) free agency. 
 
Concentration of wins increased in the American 
League, but not in the National League. 
Horowitz 
(1997) 
Compares entropy measure of competitive balance 
before (1903-75) and after (1976-95) free agency. 
Competitive balance declined in the National League; no 
statistically significant change in the American League. 
 
Ross & Lucke 
(1997) 
Examines several measures of competitive 
balance using data from the period 1961-92: 
regresses a team’s winning percentage in the 
current season on its winning percentages for the 
prior three seasons; examines incidence of teams 
finishing the season within five games of first 
place in their division; examines incidence of 
teams going from ‘good-to-bad’ or ‘bad-to-good’; 
examines movement of pitchers on teams going 
from ‘good-to-bad’ or ‘bad-to-good.’ 
 
The coefficient on the one season lagged winning 
percentage is 0.444 in the period before free agency 
(1961-76) and 0.327 thereafter (1977-92); the incidence 
of teams finishing within five games of first place in 
their division is 1.94 during the period 1961-76 and 4.58 
during the period 1977-92; incidence of teams going 
from ‘good-to-bad’ or ‘bad-to-good’ is higher after the 
introduction of free agency; after the introduction of free 
agency, there is a greater migration of pitching talent 
away from ‘good-to-bad’ teams and towards ‘bad-to-
good’ teams. 
 
Hylan, Lage & 
Treglia (1996) 
Compares the movement of free agent and non-
free agent pitchers across teams during the period 
1961-92. 
Probit analysis shows that attaining free agent status 
does not affect the probability of the pitcher changing 
teams; however, pitchers with seven or more years of 
service are less likely to move in the free agency era. 
 
Vrooman 
(1996) 
Compares season-to-season correlation of team 
winning percentage over the period 1970-93. 
Regression coefficient on lagged winning percentage 
declines from 0.715 in 1970-76 to 0.717 during 1978-
80, 0.450 during 1983-85, 0.311 during 1986-89, and 
0.036 during 1990-93. 
 
Butler (1995) Compares the standard deviation of team winning 
percentage within a season and the season-to-
season correlation of team winning percentage 
over the period 1946-92. 
 
No statistically significant impact of free agency on the 
standard deviation of team winning percentage within a 
season; free agency significantly lowers season-to-
season correlation of team winning percentage. 
Fort & Quirk 
(1995) 
Compares the standard deviation of winning 
percentage in the period  before (1966-75) and 
after (1976-85) free agency. 
 
No statistically significant change for either the 
American or National League. 
Balfour & 
Porter (1991) 
Compares variance of winning percentage and 
correlation of winning percentage across seasons 
before (1961-76) and after (1977-89) free agency. 
Variance of winning percentage falls from 56.6 to 48.3, 
which is significant at the 90% confidence level; 
correlations of winning percentage across seasons using 
lags of one, two, and three years are sharply lower in the 
free agency era. 
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 Table 6.3 
The Impact of MLB’s Reserve System on Competitive Balance 
 
Study Test Result 
Drahozal 
(1986) 
Examines movement of players signing 
guaranteed contracts of five or more years during 
the period 1977-81; compares standard deviation 
of winning percentage (excluding expansion 
teams) before (1972-76) and after (1977-82) free 
agency; compares rankings by population and 
winning percentage before (1972-76) and after 
(1977-82) free agency. 
 
No evidence that free agents move from small cities to 
large cities. Standard deviation of winning percentage 
fell from 0.0607 to 0.0497 for National League teams, 
but rose from 0.0475 to 0.0561 for American League 
teams. Spearman correlation coefficient for population 
and winning percentage ranking fell from 0.329 to 0.231 
for National League teams, but rose from 0.140 to 0.230 
for American League teams. 
Besanko & 
Simon (1985) 
Compares player movements (1969-81), 
competitive equality (1970-83), and relationship 
between market size and team winning percentage 
(1970-83) before and after free agency. 
 
No statistically significant change in any of the 
measures. 
Dolan & 
Schmidt (1985) 
Compares the concentration of team revenue, the 
standard deviation of team standings, and the Gini 
coefficient for total wins before (1969-76) and 
after (1977-83) free agency. 
Concentration of team revenue (Gini coefficient, 
Herfindahl Index) rose significantly in the American 
League, but not in the National League; no statistically 
significant change in the standard deviation of team 
standings and Gini coefficient for total wins for either 
league. 
 
 
Consistent with the Coase Theorem, Cymrot, Dunlevy, and Even (2001) 
find that, for players who played both the 1979 and 1980 season, the impact of the 
predicted gain from moving to a new team on the probability of changing teams is 
the same for free agents (who pocket the gain) and non-free agents (whose 
original team pockets the gain). They conclude that “the invariance property of 
the Coase Theorem is empirically supported by the analysis of the 1980 baseball 
labour market, and ‘Who’s on first’ and team competitive balance are indicated to 
not be dependent on the institution of player free agency.” (p. 602) Fort and Quirk 
(1995) compare the standard deviation of winning percentage in the period before 
(1966-75) and after (1976-85) free agency and find no statistically significant 
change in either the American or National League. Drahozal (1986) finds that, 
following the introduction of free agency, there was no significant movement of 
players from small market to large market teams, which suggests that “the reserve 
system did not significantly affect the distribution of playing talent.” (p. 117) 
Besanko and Simon (1985) find no statistically significant change in player 
movements, competitive equality, or the relationship between market size and 
team winning percentage before and after the introduction of free agency. In fact, 
Besanko and Simon document that “free agents (especially good ones) tend to end 
up signing with worse teams than the ones they leave”, which suggests that 
“diminishing returns to quality place a limit on the economic incentives for a 
large city team to dominate a league.” (p. 83) Dolan and Schmidt (1985) find no 
statistically significant change in the standard deviation of team standings and the 
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 concentration of total wins before (1969-76) and after (1977-83) the introduction 
of free agency. 
On the other hand, in violation of the prediction of the Coase Theorem, 
there is some evidence that the introduction of free agency has impacted the 
movement of players across teams. Depken (2002) finds that free agency reduced 
the concentration of home runs across teams, but did not affect the concentration 
of strikeouts or runs scored. He concludes that his results are consistent with an 
increase in player mobility after the introduction of free agency, but are not 
consistent with a monopolization of player talent by a minority of teams. Using 
data for the period 1961-92, Hylan, Lage, and Treglia (1996) document that “after 
the introduction of free agency, the pitchers with greater longevity in the major 
leagues are less likely to move relative to their mobility in the pre-free agency 
period” and, “in general, better pitchers are less likely to move and that pitchers 
playing on teams with higher winning percentages or in large market cities were 
less likely to move.” (p. 1030)  
Some studies report evidence suggesting that the demise of the reserve 
clause has led to a decline in competitive balance. For example, Fishman (2003) 
estimates a model of the standard deviation of team winning percentage using 
data for the period 1950-2001 and reports that the greater the number of players 
declaring free agency in the prior year, the greater the standard deviation of team 
winning percentage the following year. Fishman concludes that “free agency does 
have an effect on competitive balance (harmful) and that (due to transaction costs 
or economic distortions) the Invariance Proposition does not perfectly hold for 
Major League Baseball.” (p. 90) Depken (1999) finds that, after the introduction 
of free agency, the concentration of wins increased in the American League (but 
not in the National League), leading him to conclude that “free-agency has 
statistically reduced parity in the AL while it has had no statistically significant 
influence on parity in the NL.” (p. 216) Horowitz (1997) shows that competitive 
balance in MLB has been on an upward trend in the 20th century, but there have 
been a number of events that have reduced that upward trend. One of those events 
was the introduction of free agency – at least in the National League (but not in 
the American League). 
In contrast, a number of other studies find that the demise of the reserve 
clause may have improved competitive balance. For example, Eckard (2001b) 
documents a diminishing return to pennant contention after the introduction of 
free agency, in the sense that there is a greater decline in attendance for teams in 
the mist of several consecutive years of pennant contention. Thus, following the 
introduction of free agency, player talent is more likely to be reallocated to 
potential new contenders rather than the same contenders year-after-year. Eckard 
documents that “year-to-year fluctuations in league standings increased after free 
agency; cumulative win percent variance decreased; and the concentration of 
pennant winners declined in both the AL and the NL” and, therefore, “the 1976 
introduction of free agency in MLB caused an increase in competitive balance.” 
(p. 442) Ross and Lucke (1997) state that “studies of Major League Baseball, 
where the labor market was transformed within a 1-year period in 1976 from a 
regime of almost complete monopsony – the famous reserve clause tying a player 
to a team for life – to virtually unlimited free agency for players with more than 6 
years of major league service, now point to the conclusion that player restraints do 
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 indeed affect the allocation of players and the competitive balance among teams.” 
(p. 655) Ross and Lucke – as well as Vrooman (1996), Butler (1995), and Balfour 
and Porter (1991) – find that the correlation between a team’s current and lagged 
winning percentage since the introduction of free agency has declined. This 
suggests that the introduction of free agency has made it easier for bad teams to 
improve and more difficult for top teams to stay on top. 
 
Amateur Draft. MLB introduced a ‘reverse order’ amateur draft in 1965. 
The team with the worst winning percentage gets the first pick in the draft; the 
team with the second-worst winning percentage gets the second pick, and so on. 
Assuming teams have roughly similar abilities in scouting and developing talent, 
the worst teams should be able to draft higher quality players than the better 
teams, thereby improving the quality of the bad teams relative to the good teams. 
In other words, the reverse order amateur draft should improve competitive 
balance. 
The economic evidence, summarized in Table 6.4, is mixed. Fishman 
(2003) estimates a regression model of the standard deviation of team winning 
percentage over the 1950-2001 seasons. Although he finds that the dummy 
variable denoting the presence of the reverse order draft is negative, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the draft improves competitive balance, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. On the other hand, 
Fort and Quirk (1995) and Daly and Moore (1981) report results generally 
consistent with the reverse order draft improving competitive balance.  
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Table 6.4 
The Impact of MLB’s Amateur Draft on Competitive Balance 
 
Study Test Result 
Fishman (2003) Estimates regression model of the 
standard deviation of team winning 
percentage using data from the 1950-
2001 seasons. 
 
Coefficient on the dummy variable denoting the presence 
of the reverse order amateur draft is negative, but not 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Compares the standard deviation of 
winning percentage in the period before 
(1952-63) and after (1964-75) the rookie 
draft. 
No statistically significant change for the National 
League; significant decrease for the American League, 
possibly due to the 1964 purchase of the Yankees by CBS 
and a large drop in the team’s winning percentage. 
 
Fort & Quirk (1995) 
Compares the Gini coefficient for the 
concentration of championships in the 
period before (1952-63) and after (1964-
75) the rookie draft. 
 
Gini coefficient fell significantly for both American 
League (0.892 vs. 0.699) and National League (0.710 vs. 
0.571). 
 
Compares coefficient of variation of 
winning percentage and rank correlation 
coefficient of league standings 
(excluding all games involving 
expansion teams) before (1955-64) and 
after (1965-73) the rookie draft. 
 
Coefficient of variation of winning percentage fell from 
0.127 to 0.082 for American League teams and from 
0.087 to 0.077 for National League teams; rank 
correlation coefficients of league standings fell sharply 
for both leagues. 
Daly & Moore (1981) 
Compares Major League player trading 
activity before (1955-64) and after 
(1965-73) the rookie draft, excluding 
the expansion years of 1961, 1962, and 
1969. 
 
Average annual number of trades per team fell from 8.73 
to 7.74. 
 
Collusion.114 The 1985 collective bargaining agreement between MLB and 
the MLB Players Association contained Article XVIII, Section H, which read: 
 
The utilization or non-utilization of rights under this Article XVIII is an 
individual matter to be determined solely by each Player and each Club for 
his or its own benefit. Players shall not act in concert with other Players 
and Clubs shall not act in concert with other Clubs. 
 
In other words, MLB owners agreed not to act jointly in signing free agents – 
Article XVIII(H) was an “anti-collusion” provision. 
 Following the 1985 season, the new crop of free agents found that there 
was little demand from other teams for their services. Of the 29 free agents, only 
                                                 
114 The discussion in this section is based primarily on Edelman (2004). 
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 one received a bona fide contract offer from another team. On January 31, 1986, 
the MLBPA filed a collusion grievance against MLB owners, alleging violation of 
Article XVIII(H). The MLBPA pointed to statements by MLB Commissioner 
Peter Ueberroth (1) encouraging MLB owners to take ‘fiscally responsible’ 
actions such as avoiding long-term contracts and agreeing not to negotiate with 
other teams’ free agents and (2) berating owners and general managers who did 
not heed his message. For example, the Kansas City Royal’s interest in signing 
free agent Kirk Gibson allegedly disappeared after a 1985 MLB owners’ meeting. 
MLB owners countered that the lack of free agent signings emerged from the 
rational, individual business decisions of each team based on legitimate baseball, 
business management, and financial factors. On September 27, 1987, MLB teams 
were found by an arbitration panel headed by Thomas Roberts to have violated 
Article XVIII(H). The MLBPA was awarded damages of $10,528,086.71. 
 Prior to Arbitrator Roberts’ decision, the MLBPA, on February 18, 1987, 
had filed a second grievance against MLB teams alleging collusion with respect to 
the players who became free agents at the end of the 1986 season. The MLBPA 
pointed to the fact that only one free agent signed with a different team – and that 
signing was highly unusual in that Andre Dawson was so willing to leave his 
current team, the Montreal Expos, that he unilaterally called a press conference 
announcing that he would sign a blank check for the Chicago Cubs. Cornered, the 
Cubs had little choice but to sign Dawson, but they did so for $500,000 – about 
half of Dawson’s salary the previous season. The MLBPA also alleged that when 
the Philadelphia Phillies expressed an interest in signing the Detroit Tigers’ free 
agent catcher Lance Parrish, two MLB owners – Milwaukee Brewers owner (now 
MLB commissioner) Alan [Bud] Selig and Chicago White Sox owner Jerry 
Reinsdorf – ‘asked’ the Phillies’ president not to sign Parrish. Once again, MLB 
owners argued that the lack of interest in signing free agents reflected the 
economic conditions of MLB teams (some of which were losing money). 
Arbitrator George Nicolau decided that case in favor of the MLBPA and awarded 
it $38 million in damages. 
 The MLBPA filed a third grievance during the 1987-88 off-season, during 
which MLB owners had resumed bidding for free agents but had created a so-
called “Information Bank” which provided teams with detailed information about 
every contract offer made to a free agent, thereby letting each team know the 
demand for each free agent. Although 12 of 76 free agents received offers from 
other teams, only three received sufficiently lucrative offers for them to actually 
switch teams. Arbitrator Nicolau again decided in favor of the MLBPA and 
awarded it $65 million in lost salaries for the 1988 season. 
 Rather than appeal the three decisions, MLB decided to settle with the 
MLBPA. In exchange for the MLBPA agreeing not to file a grievance for any 
collusion that may have occurred during the 1989-90 off-season, MLB agreed to 
pay the MLBPA $280 million. 
 Economic studies have presented evidence consistent with the hypothesis 
that MLB owners engaged in collusion in the mid-1980s. Haupert (2003) 
calculates the average MLB payroll as a percentage of total team revenue and 
shows that the payroll averaged 20.5% of total team revenue in 1974, jumped to 
25.1% in 1977 after the introduction of free agency, rose to 39.1% in 1980 and 
39.7% in 1985, but then dropped to 34.2% in 1988 and 31.6% in 1989. This 
-  - 155
 decline is consistent with the finding that MLB owners colluded in the mid-1980s. 
The percentage then began to climb, going from 33.4% in 1990 to 42.9% in 1991, 
50.7% in 1992, and 60.5% in 1994. After the strike-shortened 1994 season, it 
began to decline, dropping to 53.6% in 1997. In 2001, the average MLB payroll 
was 54.1% of total team revenue.  
 Similarly, Scully (2004) calculates player compensation as a percentage of 
revenue for major league baseball. During the period 1970-73, prior to the 
introduction of free agency, player compensation was 15.9% of revenue. In 1980, 
a few years after the introduction of free agency, it was 31.3%. Scully 
unfortunately does not report the percentage for any years between 1981 and 
1989; in 1990, however, the percentage was 31.6%, almost the same as a decade 
earlier. The percentage then soared in the early 1990s, rising to 45.3% in 1991, 
57.8% in 1992, 56.3% in 1993, and peaking at 63.4% in the strike-shortened 1994 
season. By 1998, player compensation was 48.4% of revenue. 
 Several other studies compare the period of MLB owner collusion to the 
period either before or after the collusion. For example, Ferguson, Jones, and 
Stewart (2000) estimate a hedonic model of team salaries using data for the period 
1986-91 and test the hypothesis of a common hedonic price vector. In other 
words, they test whether teams paid the same “price” for the same team 
characteristics, such as total years of major league experience by all players, team 
slugging average for the current season multiplied by the number of hitters, the 
ratio of strikeouts to walks for all pitchers during the current season multiplied by 
the number of pitchers, and the number of ‘star’ players on the team. In a 
competitive market, one would expect hedonic prices to be the same across teams. 
The hypothesis of a common hedonic price vector is rejected, which suggests that 
hedonic prices differed across teams. Thus, their evidence is consistent with 
collusion by MLB owners during the period 1986-88. 
 Durland and Sommers (1991) examine a sample of 236 pitchers and 336 
non-pitchers who played the 1987 season and had at least one year of MLB 
experience. They then divide each group depending on whether the player signed 
his contract before or after November 1985, when the alleged collusion began. 
They hypothesize that if collusion occurred, there should be a structural change in 
the determination of player salaries. They perform a regression analysis of player 
salaries, using player performance and experience as explanatory variables. 
Consistent with the collusion hypothesis, Durland and Sommers find that a 
structural shift in their model of salary determination occurred around November 
1985. 
 Bruggink and Rose (1990) estimate the gross MRPs of the free agents for 
the 1984 season (the last season before the MLB owners began colluding), as well 
as of the free agents for the 1985 and 1986 seasons. Consistent with the collusion 
hypothesis, the unweighted average of salary to gross MRP fell from 0.96 in the 
1984 season to 0.69 during the 1985-86 seasons, a drop of 28%, and the weighted 
average likewise fell from 1.22 to 0.75, a drop of 38%. Bruggink and Rose 
observe that their results are consistent with the hypothesis that MLB owners 
exhibited ‘financial restraint’, but caution: “Although financial restraint is the 
natural economic consequence of collusion, these results do not empirically 
establish that collusion occurred, since financial restraint could have been due to 
the independent decisions of the 26 baseball clubs.” (p. 1038) 
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  After settling three collusion-related grievances for a total of $280 million 
and after the 1990 collective bargaining agreement added a provision specifying a 
treble damages remedy, one would expect MLB owners to have a strong incentive 
to refrain from colluding. Yet, on December 20, 2002, MLB teams 
simultaneously released 46 arbitration-eligible players from their rosters rather 
than offer them arbitration to determine their salary for the upcoming 2003 
season. The MLBPA suspected that MLB was increasing the free agent supply so 
as to drive down free agent salaries, which in turn would have the added benefit 
(to MLB owners, not MLB players) of driving down the salaries awarded in 
arbitration. The 72 arbitration-eligible players received an average salary increase 
of 92%, compared to a 130% salary increase for arbitration-eligible players a year 
earlier. Of the 72 arbitration-eligible players, 65 reached a contract with their 
team prior to going before an arbitrator. Of the 7 players would went before an 
arbitrator, only two ‘won’ – the arbitrator chose the player’s salary request over 
the team’s offer. Edelman (2004) argues that “a concerted agreement among 
baseball clubs to increase the supply of free agent players violates baseball’s 
collusion clause, and therefore, MLB clubs are at risk of losing another collusion 
grievance.” (p. 160)  
 
 
NFL. Players in the National Football League have brought antitrust lawsuits 
against the NFL over the structure of the labor market for NFL players. This 
system, as of the early 1970s, was summarized in Mackey v. NFL:115 
 
For a number of years, the NFL has operated under a reserve system 
whereby every player who signs a contract with an NFL club is bound to 
play for that club, and no other, for the term of the contract plus one 
additional year at the option of the club. The cornerstones of this system 
are §15.1 of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, which requires that all 
club-player contracts be as prescribed in the Standard Player Contract 
adopted by the League, and the option clause embodied in the Standard 
Player Contract. Once a player signs a Standard Player Contract, he is 
bound to his team for at least two years. He may, however, become a free 
agent at the end of the option year by playing that season under a renewed 
contract rather than signing a new one. A player “playing out his option” 
is subject to a 10% salary cut during the option year. 
 
Prior to 1963, a team which signed a free agent who had previously been 
under contract to another club was not obligated to compensate the 
player’s former club. In 1963, after R.C. Owens played out his option with 
the San Francisco 49ers and signed a contract with the Baltimore Colts, 
the member clubs of the NFL unilaterally adopted the following provision, 
now known as the Rozelle Rule, as an amendment to the League’s 
Constitution and Bylaws: 
 
                                                 
115 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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 Any player, whose contract with a League club has expired, shall 
thereupon become a free agent and shall no longer be considered a 
member of the team of that club following the expiration date of such 
contract. Whenever a player, becoming a free agent in such manner, 
thereafter signed a contract with a different club in the League, then, 
unless mutually satisfactory arrangements have been concluded 
between the two League clubs, the Commissioner may name and then 
award to the former club one or more players, from the Active, 
Reserve, or Selection List (including future selection choices) of the 
acquiring club as the Commissioner in his sole discretion deems fair 
and equitable; any such decision by the Commissioner shall be final 
and conclusive. 
 
This provision, unchanged in form, is currently embodied in §12.1(H) of 
the NFL Constitution. The ostensible purposes of the rule are to maintain 
competitive balance among the NFL teams and protect the clubs’ 
investment in scouting, selecting and developing players… The NFL has 
adopted a number of other rules and practices designed to maintain 
competitive balance and protect the clubs’ investment in player 
development costs which are not at issue here. Among them are the option 
clause and Standard Player Contract, discussed above, the college draft 
and no-tampering rules. 
 
Some of the provisions challenged by NFL players on antitrust grounds were 
blacklisting, restrictions on free agent movements (i.e., the “Rozelle Rule”), the 
amateur draft, and the fixing of player salaries.116 Players succeeded in winning 
many of these lawsuits, thereby strengthening the bargaining power of the NFL’s 
Players Association in its negotiations with the league. 
 
 Blacklisting. Bill Radovich played for the NFL’s Detroit Lions from 1938 
to 1942, left the team to serve in the Navy during World War II, and then returned 
to the Lions for the 1945 season. At the time, each NFL team used a standard 
                                                 
116 The NFL has also tried to use the antitrust laws to its advantage. In Five Smiths v. NFL 
Players Association, the league sued the NFLPA on antitrust grounds, alleging that, 
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the NFLPA “has engaged, and continues 
to engage, in a combination and conspiracy with agents representing NFL players 
(“player-agents”), the purpose and effect of which is to fix, raise and/or maintain 
compensation paid to NFL players.” On March 30, 1992, the district court dismissed 
the NFL’s complaint for failing “to state a cognizable antitrust claim under either the 
per se rule or the rule of reason.”  The district court rejected the NFL’s argument that 
(1) “the NFLPA’s agreement to exchange price information with agents is a per se 
antitrust violation because it indicates the existence of a broader conspiracy to fix, 
raise, stabilize or maintain prices, that is, players’ salaries” and (2) “the salary 
exchange constitutes a rule of reason violation because it has the anti-competitive 
effect of forcing them to pay higher player salaries than they would otherwise have to 
pay in the absence of such an exchange.”  
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 player contract which prohibited a player from signing with another team without 
the consent of the team holding the player’s contract and teams enforced these 
contracts by blacklisting players who violated them. In 1946, Radovich asked the 
Lions to be transferred to the NFL’s Los Angeles team so he could be closer to his 
ill father. When the Lions refused, Radovich broke his player contract and signed 
and played the 1946 and 1947 seasons with the Los Angeles Dons of the rival All-
America Conference. In 1948, Radovich was offered the position of player-coach 
of the San Francisco Clippers of the Pacific Coast League, which was affiliated 
with the NFL. The NFL advised the Clippers that Radovich was blacklisted and 
any affiliated team signing Radovich would suffer severe penalties. The Clippers 
then refused to sign Radovich. 
 Radovich filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL alleging that NFL 
owners violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to monopolize 
and control organized professional football in the United States and that, as part of 
that conspiracy, they sought to (1) destroy the All-America Conference, (2) 
boycott him, and (3) prevent him from becoming player-coach in the Pacific 
Coast League. The U.S. Supreme Court decided the case on February 25, 1957, 
ruling that the Court’s decisions in Federal Baseball Club v. National League and 
Toolson v. New York Yankees did not apply to the NFL – in other words, “the 
business of football comes within the scope of the Sherman Act.”117 As a result, 
the Court held that “Radovich is entitled to an opportunity to prove his charges”, 
although the Court added: “Of course, we express no opinion as to whether or not 
respondents have, in fact, violated the antitrust laws, leaving that determination to 
the trial court after all the facts are in.” Three justices dissented, pointing out that 
they could not understand how the business of major league football could be 
within the scope of the federal antitrust laws if the business of major league 
baseball is not.  
After the Supreme Court’s decision, NFL owners reportedly “quietly 
granted many of the demands from the players association”, knowing that players 
would file more antitrust lawsuits unless the league made some concessions.118 
However, players continued to seek an injury protection clause, a pension plan, 
hospitalization, and other benefits. In November 1958, Billy Howton of the Green 
Bay Packers and then-president of the NFL Players Association threatened to file 
an antitrust lawsuit, resulting in the NFL creating a benefit plan for NFL players 
that included hospitalization, medical, and life insurance, as well as retirement 
benefits at age 65.  
 
 Rozelle Rule, Revenue-Sharing, and Free Agency. Joe Kapp was drafted 
by the NFL’s Washington Redskins but the two sides failed to negotiate a 
satisfactory contract and Kapp went to the Canadian Football League, where he 
played for seven seasons from 1959 to 1966. By keeping Kapp on their reserve 
list until April 1966, the Redskins prevented other NFL teams from negotiating 
with him – in accordance with the NFL’s “tampering” rule. Although Kapp’s 
Canadian team had an option to renew his contract for the 1967 season, Kapp 
                                                 
117 Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). 
118 The information in this paragraph is based on an article posted on the NFLPA website. 
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 covertly negotiated a contract with the NFL’s Houston Oilers. The NFL 
Commissioner declared the contract invalid because the NFL and the Canadian 
League had an understanding that players under contract could not negotiate a 
contract to move to the other league. The Minnesota Vikings paid Kapp’s 
Canadian team and apparently made satisfactory arrangement with the Redskins 
so that Kapp could play for the Vikings, which he did for three seasons from 1967 
to 1969. Kapp then declined the Vikings’ offer of a two-year contract. In 
accordance with the “Rozelle Rule”, any team that signed a free agent who played 
out his contract, as Kapp did, had to make a satisfactory arrangement with the free 
agent’s former team, or, absent such an arrangement, the NFL Commissioner 
(Pete Rozelle) had the power to award one or more players from the team signing 
the free agent to the team losing the free agent. The New England Patriots made 
such an arrangement with the Vikings, surrendering their first round draft choice 
in 1972 as well as their number-one draft selection in 1967. Kapp and the Patriots 
reached an agreement whereby he would play the rest of the 1970 season and the 
1971 and 1972 seasons. After playing the 1970 season, the Patriots asked Kapp to 
sign a standard player contract, as required by the NFL’s Constitution and 
Bylaws. Signing a standard player contract binds the player by all the rules 
contained in the NFL’s Constitution, including the ‘draft rule’, the ‘tampering 
rule’, the ‘option rule’, the Rozelle Rule, and the ‘one-man’ rule. Kapp refused 
and thus was barred from practicing with or playing for the Patriots, who 
nevertheless placed Kapp on their reserve list so he would still be covered by the 
Rozelle Rule lest another NFL team try to sign him. 
 Kapp’s football career came to an end and he brought an antitrust lawsuit 
against the NFL alleging that various NFL provisions such as the draft rule, 
tampering rule, option rule, Rozelle rule, and standard player contract requirement 
violated the antitrust laws and caused his ‘unlawful expulsion’ from the NFL in 
1971. On December 20, 1974, the district court found that “league enforcement of 
most of the challenged rules is so patently unreasonable that there is no genuine 
issue for trial.”119 With respect to the Rozelle Rule, the district court wrote: 
 
The “Ransom” or “Rozelle” rule provides in effect that a player, even after 
he has played out his contract under the option rule and has thereby 
become a free agent, is still restrained from pursuing his business to the 
extent that all league members with whom he might otherwise negotiate 
for new employment are prohibited from employing him unless upon 
consent of his former employer or, absent such consent, subject to the 
power of the NFL Commissioner to name and award one or more players 
to the former employer from the active reserve or selection list of the 
acquiring club – as the NFL Commissioner in his sole discretion deems 
fair and reasonable. 
 
A conceivable effect of this rule would be to perpetually restrain a player 
from pursuing his occupation among the clubs of a league that holds a 
                                                 
119 Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Ca. 1974). 
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 virtual monopoly of professional football employment in the United 
States. 
 
We conclude that such a rule imposing restraint virtually unlimited in time 
and extent, goes far beyond any possible need for fair protection of the 
interests of the club-employers or the purposes of the NFL and that it 
imposes upon the player-employees such undue hardship as to be an 
unreasonable restraint and such a rule is not susceptible of different 
inferences concerning its reasonableness; it is unreasonable under any 
legal test and there is no genuine issue about it to require or justify trial. 
 
Furthermore, the district court found that “the NFL’s rules were not 
exempt from antitrust laws by having become the subject of collective bargaining 
between the NFL and the players’ association because the collective bargaining 
agreement was not in effect at the time of the alleged illegal conduct” and “there 
was no genuine dispute as to any material fact that the rule, under which the 
player was discharged from his employment, had not been contractually accepted 
by player or the players’ association as the result of collective bargaining.” The 
trial was thus limited to a determination of the damages suffered by Kapp from 
the league rules that violated the antitrust laws. The jury found that Kapp failed to 
prove that he suffered any damages from those rules. Kapp appealed, arguing that 
the jury was given erroneous instructions, but, on August 4, 1978, the appeals 
court rejected Kapp’s argument.120 
Less than two years after the district court in Kapp v. NFL found that the 
Rozelle Rule violated the antitrust laws, an appeals court in 1976 reached a 
similar conclusion in Mackey v. NFL. 121 In 1971, the president of the NFL 
Players Association, John Mackey, and 15 other football players filed a lawsuit 
alleging that the Rozelle Rule violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district 
court found that the Rozelle Rule (1) constituted a concerted refusal to deal and a 
group boycott, and thus was a per se violation of the Sherman Act, (2) would be 
invalid under a rule of reason analysis because the alleged pro-competitive effects 
were insufficient to justify such a restrictive measure, and (3) was not immune 
from the antitrust laws because it had been the subject of a collective bargaining 
agreement between NFL owners and the NFL Players Association. The NFL 
appealed. 
On October 18, 1976, the appeals court issued its decision. It observed that 
the NFL “presently enjoys a monopoly over major league professional football in 
the United States.” It also observed that the first collective bargaining agreement 
between NFL owners and the NFL Players Association was concluded in 1968 
and was in effect from July 15, 1968 to February 1, 1970 and that the second 
collective bargaining agreement was signed on June 17, 1971, made retroactive to 
February 1, 1970, and expired on January 30, 1974. At the time of the appeals 
court decision, no new collective bargaining agreement had yet been reached. The 
appeals court reviewed the collective bargaining history and concluded that “the 
                                                 
120 Kapp v. NFL, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978). 
121 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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 agreements between the clubs and the players embodying the Rozelle Rule do not 
qualify for the labor exemption.” The appeals court explained: 
 
On the basis of our independent review of the record, including the 
parties’ bargaining history as set forth above, we find substantial evidence 
to support the finding that there was no bona fide arm’s-length bargaining 
over the Rozelle Rule preceding the execution of the 1968 and 1970 
agreements. The Rule imposes significant restrictions on players, and its 
form has remained unchanged since it was unilaterally promulgated by the 
clubs in 1963. The provisions of the collective bargaining agreements 
which operated to continue the Rozelle Rule do not in and of themselves 
inure to the benefit of the players or their union. Defendants contend that 
the players derive indirect benefit from the Rozelle Rule, claiming that the 
union’s agreement to the Rozelle Rule was a quid pro quo for increased 
pension benefits and the right of players to individually negotiate their 
salaries. The district court found, however, that there was no such quid pro 
quo, and we cannot say, on the basis of our review of the record, that this 
finding is clearly erroneous. 
 
Given that the Rozelle Rule did not qualify for the labor exemption to the 
antitrust laws, the appeals court examined whether the Rozelle Rule violated 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The appeals court argued that the Rozelle Rule 
should be examined under a rule of reason analysis, rather than as a per se 
violation. The appeals court agreed with the district court that there was 
substantial evidence that the Rozelle Rule “significantly deters clubs from 
negotiating with and signing free agents; that it acts as a substantial deterrent to 
players playing out their options and becoming free agents; that it significantly 
decreases players’ bargaining power in contract negotiations; that players are thus 
denied the right to sell their services in a free and open market; that as a result, the 
salaries paid by each club are lower than if competitive bidding were allowed to 
prevail; and that absent the Rozelle Rule, there would be increased movement in 
interstate commerce of players from one club to another.” 
The NFL countered that the Rozelle Rule was pro-competitive for three 
reasons, each of which the appeals court (agreeing with the district court) found 
unconvincing. First, the NFL argued that, without the Rozelle Rule, star players 
would flock to cities with natural advantages such as warmer climates and greater 
media opportunities, thereby destroying the league’s competitive balance, which 
in turn would diminish spectator interest in the league, lead to NFL franchise 
failures, and possibly lead to the demise of the NFL itself. The district court 
concluded that the existence of the Rozelle Rule did not have a significant impact 
on competitive balance in the NFL. The appeals court wrote: 
 
We need not decide whether a system of inter-team compensation for 
free agents moving to other teams is essential to the maintenance of 
competitive balance in the NFL. Even if it is, we agree with the 
district court’s conclusion that the Rozelle Rule is significantly more 
restrictive than necessary to serve any legitimate purposes it might 
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 have in this regard. First, little concern was manifested at trial over 
the free movement of average or below average players. Only the 
movement of the better players was urged as being detrimental to 
football. Yet the Rozelle Rule applies to every NFL player regardless 
of his status or ability. Second, the Rozelle Rule is unlimited in 
duration. It operates as a perpetual restriction on a player’s ability to 
sell his services in an open market throughout his career. Third, the 
enforcement of the Rozelle Rule is unaccompanied by procedural 
safeguards. A player has no input into the process by which fair 
compensation is determined. Moreover, the player may be unaware of 
the precise compensation demanded by his former team, and that 
other teams might be interested in him but for the degree of 
compensation sought. 
 
Second, the NFL argued that the Rozelle Rule protected teams’ investment 
in scouting and player development. The district court concluded that such 
investment expenses were similar to those incurred by other businesses, which 
had no right to compensation for such investment expenses.122 The appeals court 
wrote: 
 
We agree that the asserted need to recoup player development costs 
cannot justify the restraints of the Rozelle Rule. That expense is an 
ordinary cost of doing business and is not peculiar to professional 
football. Moreover, because of its unlimited duration, the Rozelle 
Rule is far more restrictive than necessary to fulfill that need. 
 
Third, the NFL argued that, to function well as a team, players have to 
work together for long periods and, without the Rozelle Rule, the increase in 
player movement would result in a deterioration in team quality, thereby reducing 
spectator interest, which would hurt both the NFL teams and the players. The 
district court concluded that elimination of the Rozelle Rule would impact all 
teams equally and thus quality of play would not suffer – and even if quality of 
                                                 
122 The economics literature distinguishes between “general” and “firm-specific” human 
capital. Firms will pay for training which increases an employee’s firm-specific 
human capital because they can recoup their investment by paying the employee less 
than his or her marginal revenue product (i.e., the employee’s firm-specific human 
capital is, by definition, only valuable to the current employer). In contrast, in a 
perfectly competitive labor market, an employer will be unwilling to pay for training 
which increases the employee’s general human capital since it will be unable to 
recoup its investment (i.e., if it pays the employee less than his or her marginal 
revenue product, the employee can quit and be paid his or her MRP by another 
employer). An employee can give his or her employer an incentive to provide general 
human capital by accepting an initial salary which is less than MRP. See, for 
example, Becker (1964), Acemoglu & Pischke (1998, 1999a, 1999b), and Casas-Arce 
(2004). 
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 play did suffer, this fact would not justify the anticompetitive effects of the 
Rozelle Rule. The appeals court agreed. 
Thus, the appeals court concluded that “the Rozelle Rule, as enforced, 
unreasonably restrains trade in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act.” However, it 
added: 
 
We note that our disposition of the antitrust issue does not mean that 
every restraint on competition for players’ services would necessarily 
violate the antitrust laws. Also, since the Rozelle Rule, as 
implemented, concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, 
any agreement as to interteam compensation for free agents moving to 
other teams, reached through good faith collective bargaining, might 
very well be immune from antitrust liability under the nonstatutory 
labor exemption. 
 
It may be that some reasonable restrictions relating to player transfers 
are necessary for the successful operation of the NFL. The protection 
of mutual interests of both the players and the clubs may indeed 
require this. We encourage the parties to resolve this question through 
collective bargaining. The parties are far better situated to agreeably 
resolve what rules governing player transfers are best suited for their 
mutual interests than are the courts. 
 
 
                                                
The appeals court decision finding the Rozelle Rule to violate the antitrust 
laws occurred on October 18, 1976. Less than six months later, in March 1977, 
the NFL owners and NFL Players Association reached a new collective 
bargaining agreement which did not include the Rozelle Rule. Instead, in return 
for greater financial benefits for players, the agreement included a first 
refusal/compensation system whereby a team signing a free agent would give up 
its first-round draft choice. From 1977 through 1981, there was little movement of 
free agents to new teams, apparently because giving up one’s first-round draft 
choice was considered by teams to be too high a price to sign a free agent.123 
 The NFLPA’s willingness to trade away free agency in its collective 
bargaining negotiations with the NFL has been examined in a number of 
economic studies. These studies identify a number of ways in which the NFL 
differs from other sports leagues, such as extensive sharing of revenue (which 
allegedly diminishes the incentive to field a winning team), larger team size 
(which diminishes the impact of adding any one player on the team’s quality), and 
shorter player careers (which reduces the probability of ever becoming a free 
agent).  
One argument is that the extensive revenue-sharing in the NFL smothers 
teams’ incentive to bid for free agents. For example, Scott, Long, and Somppi 
(1983) summarize the NFLPA’s lack of support for free agency as follows: 
 
 
123 The information in this paragraph is based on an article posted on the NFLPA website. 
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 A free agent system will not work in the NFL because the way football 
revenues are split eliminates the financial incentive to win. Gate revenues 
are split 65-35 percent between the home and visiting teams, but television 
revenues and playoff revenues (both television and ticket) are split evenly. 
As a result, it is argued that teams with persistently poor records do as 
well financially as those teams that contend for the league championship. 
Since the link between winning and revenues has been broken, NFL 
owners would not compete for free agents and average salaries would not 
increase under free agency. (p. 258) 
 
Scott, Long, and Somppi document that, contrary to the NFLPA’s claim, 
team revenue is an increasing function of the team’s winning percentage. 
Specifically, the difference in team revenue between winning and losing one 
game during the 16 game regular season is $169,500. This financial return to 
winning in the NFL is of the same order of magnitude as in professional baseball 
and basketball. Thus, NFL owners have an incentive to win and, consequently, 
have an incentive to bid for free agents. In order to increase the impact of bidding 
for free agents on player salaries, Scott, Long, and Somppi suggest that (1) free 
agents should be allowed to move to a new team without that team paying 
compensation to the free agent’s former team, thereby increasing the mobility and 
bargaining power of free agents, and (2) changes should be made in the NFL’s 
revenue-sharing to strengthen the incentive to win, such as dividing the gate 
receipts in playoffs games between only the competing teams or giving teams in 
the playoffs a larger share of playoff television revenue.  
On the other hand, Vrooman (2000) compares the impact of average 
winning percentage on team revenue in the NFL, NBA, and MLB using data for 
the period 1990-92 and finds that the impact is much smaller in the NFL than in 
the other two leagues. Specifically, a 10% increase in average winning percentage 
is associated with a 1.2% revenue increase in the NFL, a 4.9% revenue increase in 
the NBA, and a 6.0% revenue increase in MLB. This suggests that, relative to the 
NBA and MLB, NFL owners have relatively little incentive to bid aggressively 
for free agents to significantly improve the quality of their team. 
Staudohar (1988) discusses a number of ways in which the NFL differs 
from other sports leagues and how it allegedly decreases the benefits of free 
agency to players. He writes: 
 
The rationale for negotiating away the free agency won in court is that free 
agency may not be as meaningful in football as it is in other sports. The 
players gained increased pension and other benefits for giving up free 
agency, and felt it was a wise tradeoff. Why don’t football players receive 
higher salaries under free agency? One reason is that a single player 
doesn’t make that much difference on a team. Football is played with 22 
players – 11 on offense and 11 on defense. By contrast, one player can 
have a big impact on a five-person basketball team, but is far less 
important in football. Second, the NFL owners already operate in stadiums 
that typically average 95 percent of capacity, so they would not be able to 
sell many more tickets to justify acquiring a star free agent player. Also, 
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 there are fewer games played in football than in other team sports. More 
important, most teams fill their stadiums regardless of their won-lost 
record. Third, because football careers are much shorter, there are fewer 
opportunities for players to become free agents. Finally, the owners 
proved determined not to fundamentally change the free agency system. 
 
Supposing the players were able to achieve free agency, there may not be 
much they could make of it because the football owners would not likely 
fall victim to a bidding game for reasons stated above. (pp. 28-29) 
 
The predicted reluctance of NFL owners to bid for free agents is cast into 
doubt by their behavior in response to competition from the newly-created United 
States Football League (USFL) for professional football player services. 
Staudohar (1988) reports that average NFL salaries rose from $90,000 in 1982 to 
$230,000 in 1987, which he attributes largely to the competition between the NFL 
and USFL for players. Kahn (1992) discusses a study by Flanagan (1989) that 
estimates that NFL salaries grew an average of 24% annually during the period 
1982-85 when the USFL was in operation, but grew only 8% annually during the 
period 1985-87 when the USFL had ceased operation.  
Two studies explain the NFLPA’s preference for a collectively negotiated 
salary schedule based on experience rather than free agency using a median-voter 
model. White (1986) shows that, in 1982, 45.1% of players had three years or less 
of experience and 57.1% of players had 4 or less years of experience. Thus, the 
median-voter model predicts that the terms of the 1982 NFL-NFLPA agreement 
will favor players with about four years of experience. White argues that the 1982 
NFL-NFLPA contract resulted in substantial redistribution of compensation in 
favor of players with median experience. Overall, White concludes that “it is not 
unreasonable to believe that a majority of the players expected to gain more from 
self-interest redistribution through a salary schedule and severance pay than from 
seeking free agency.” (p. 678)  
Bishop, Finch, and Formby (1990) predict that (1) the adoption of 
unconditional free agency would increase the average NFL salary, (2) the 
adoption of unconditional free agency would increase the variance in NFL 
salaries because NFL owners and less-talented NFL players would not share the 
rents generated by the superior NFL players, (3) the NFLPA will only support 
free agency if the median player benefits, and (4) the median players’ attitude 
toward risk may affect their support for free agency. They argue that “the median 
player’s attitude toward risk, particularly downside risk, may be an important 
determinant of his willingness to support free agency” and, “under risk aversion, 
the restricted form of free agency recently adopted in the NFL may well be 
preferred by a majority of players to unconditional free agency.” (p. 115) 
 
 Amateur Draft. In 1974, the district court in Kapp v. NFL not only found 
the Rozelle Rule to violate the antitrust laws, but found that the NFL draft rule 
does as well. The district court determined that the draft rule “is also patently 
unreasonable insofar as it permits virtually perpetual boycott of a draft prospect 
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 even when the drafting club refuses or fails within a reasonable time to reach a 
contract with the player.”124  
 A similar conclusion was reached by the appeals court in Smith v. Pro 
Football. James McCoy (Yazoo) Smith, an All-American football player from the 
University of Oregon, was the twelfth player selected in the 1968 NFL draft. 
Smith signed a one year contract with the Washington Redskins, which included 
an ‘option clause’ giving the Redskins the right to unilaterally renew the contract 
for a second year at 90% of the previous year’s salary. During the final game of 
the 1968 season, Smith sustained a career-ending neck injury. The Redskins paid 
Smith an additional $19,800 – the amount that Smith would have received had he 
played out his second (‘option’) year of his contract. Two years later, Smith filed 
an antitrust lawsuit alleging that the NFL draft, as it existed in 1968 when he was 
drafted, was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and, but for the draft, he would have negotiated a far more lucrative 
contract when he signed with an NFL team. The district court rejected the 
Redskins’ and NFL’s argument that the NFL competes with the Canadian 
Football League (CFL) for the services of top American college football players 
“due to its limits on Americans permitted on CFL teams, its lack of attraction or 
glamour for the athletes, and the differences in the nature and rules of the football 
played there.” 125 Thus, the district court held that “the relevant market for this 
action is professional major league football in the United States” and, in 1968 and 
at present, “the National Football League was the sole source of purchasers of the 
product which plaintiff sought to market.” The district court ruled that the NFL 
draft constituted a “group boycott” and thus violated the antitrust laws regardless 
of whether it is judged on a per se or rule of reason basis and awarded treble 
damages totaling $276,600 (net actual damages of $92,200 × 3). 
 The Washington Redskins and the NFL appealed. The appeals court 
decided the case on November 9, 1978, affirming the district court’s finding that 
the draft is a group boycott in violation of the antitrust laws, but remanding the 
case for further damage computations.126 However, the appeals court argued that 
the NFL draft was not a per se antitrust violation and, rather, must be tested under 
the rule of reason. In a ‘classic’ group boycott, there is “a concerted attempt by a 
group of competitors at one level to protect themselves from competition from 
non-group members who seek to compete at that level.” The NFL draft differs 
from the classic group boycott in two respects: (1) NFL teams “are not 
Competitors in any economic sense” and “operate basically as a joint venture in 
producing an entertainment product football games and telecasts” and (2) NFL 
teams have not combined to exclude competitors or potential competitors from 
the market – Smith was not seeking to ‘compete’ with the NFL teams. As a result, 
the appeals court concluded that “the NFL player draft cannot properly be 
described as a group boycott at least not the type of group boycott that 
traditionally has elicited invocation of a Per se rule.” 
                                                 
124 Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Ca. 1974). 
125 Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.C. 1976). 
126 Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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  The appeals court found, however, that the draft failed a rule of reason 
analysis. The draft is “significantly anticompetitive” because it “inescapably 
forces each seller of football services to deal with one, and only one buyer, 
robbing the seller, as in any monopsonistic market, of any real bargaining power” 
and the “predictable effect of the draft, as the evidence established and as the 
district court found, was to lower the salary levels of the best college players.” 
The appeals court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the draft was pro-
competitive because it maintained competitive balance in the league. The appeals 
court argued that (1) the evidence on the impact of the draft on competitive 
balance is at best equivocal and thus there is no basis to say the district court erred 
in its determination and (2) “it is doubtful whether the draft was effective in 
maintaining whatever competitive balance did exist in the League” – competitive 
balance in the NFL appears to be related to the NFL’s revenue-sharing system and 
the impact of coaches on the success or failure of a team. The appeals court wrote: 
 
The justification asserted for the draft is that it has the legitimate business 
purpose of promoting “competitive balance” and playing-field equality 
among the teams, producing better entertainment for the public, higher 
salaries for the players, and increased financial security for the clubs. The 
NFL has endeavored to summarize this justification by saying that the 
draft ultimately has a “procompetitive” effect, yet this shorthand entails no 
small risk of confusion. The draft is “procompetitive,” if at all, in a very 
different sense from that in which it is anticompetitive. The draft is 
anticompetitive in its effect on the market for players’ services, because it 
virtually eliminates economic competition among buyers for the services 
of sellers. The draft is allegedly “procompetitive” in its effect on the 
playing field; but the NFL teams are not economic competitors on the 
playing field, and the draft, while it might heighten athletic competition 
and thus improve the entertainment product offered to the public, does not 
increase competition in the economic sense of encouraging others to enter 
the market and to offer the product at lower cost. Because the draft’s 
“anticompetitive” and “procompetitive” effects are not comparable, it is 
impossible to “net them out” in the usual rule-of-reason balancing. The 
draft’s “anticompetitive evils,” in other words, cannot be balanced against 
its “procompetitive virtues,” and the draft be upheld if the latter outweigh 
the former. In strict economic terms, the draft’s demonstrated 
procompetitive effects are nil.  
 
 Thus, the appeals court concluded that “the football player draft system 
then in effect was a group boycott that was illegal when measured under the rule 
of reason.” 
In March 1977, after the district court’s decision in Smith v. Pro-Football 
but before the appeals court decision in that case, a new collective bargaining 
agreement was reached between NFL owners and the NFL Players Association. 
The NFLPA agreed to terms sanctioning the NFL draft in return for greater 
financial benefits for players.   
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 The economic evidence on the effect of the NFL draft on competitive 
balance is mixed. Recall that the Coase Theorem, which assumes no transaction 
costs, implies that the initial distribution of players does not matter since players 
will be traded to the teams where they are more valuable. Consistent with this 
prediction, Fort and Quirk (1995) find no statistically significant change in either 
the standard deviation of winning percentages or the concentration of 
championships before (1930-35) and after (1936-41) the introduction of the NFL 
draft. On the other hand, Grier and Tollison (1994) examine the impact of lagged 
draft order on winning percentage over the period 1983-90 and find that a higher 
position in the draft order raises a team’s future winning percentage, which 
suggests that the NFL draft promotes competitive balance. However, Grier and 
Tollison also find that relative success in the draft is positively correlated with on-
field success, which suggests that some teams are better able to use the draft to 
improve their winning percentage than others. 
 
 Fixed salaries. On several occasions, the NFL has attempted to implement 
a wage scale for at least some players. The players challenged the wage scale on 
antitrust grounds and successfully opposed implementation of ‘Plan B”, but failed 
in their opposition to the fixing of salaries of developmental squad players. A key 
legal issue was whether the NFL’s actions were protected by the nonstatutory 
labor exemption. 
 The question of when the NFL’s nonstatutory labor exemptions ends 
became a key issue when NFLPA President Marvin Powell filed an antitrust 
lawsuit against the NFL.127 In January 1988, the district court ruled that the NFL’s 
nonstatutory labor exemption ended with the 1987 collective bargaining impasse. 
The NFL appealed the decision. On November 16, 1988, the NFL presented the 
NFLPA with a proposal for a new system of player restraints called “Plan B”, 
which would, among other things, replace as of February 1, 1993 the current 
system of individually negotiated player contracts with a wage scale setting the 
price of NFL player services. Plan B would also permit teams to restrict 37 
players so that they would be subject to the first refusal/compensation system, 
while unrestricted players could sign with other teams. On February 1, 1989, 
without the consent of the players or the NFLPA, the NFL implemented some of 
the provisions of Plan B, but not the wage scale provision. On November 1, 1989, 
the appeals court reversed the district court’s decision, arguing that as long as the 
players were represented by a union, they did not have the right under the antitrust 
laws to individually sue the NFL. In response, the players ended the NFLPA’s 
status as a union on December 5, 1989, thereby opening the way for them to 
individually sue the NFL on antitrust grounds. The NFLPA was re-formed as a 
professional association dedicated to protecting the individual contracting rights 
of players. The NFLPA’s new bylaws prohibited it from engaging in collective 
bargaining. 
 In May 1990, 235 players on the ‘developmental squads’ of NFL teams 
filed an antitrust lawsuit alleging that teams’ agreement to pay developmental 
                                                 
127 The information in this paragraph is based primarily on an article posted on the 
NFLPA website. 
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 squad players a $1,000 weekly salary violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In 
March 1989, the NFL had adopted Resolution G-2 permitting teams to establish a 
developmental squad of up to six rookies or ‘first-year’ players who failed to 
secure a place on the team’s regular player roster. The NFL unilaterally 
implemented the developmental squad system after reaching an impasse in 
negotiations with the NFLPA. The NFL advised teams that they would be subject 
to disciplinary action if they paid their developmental squad players more or less 
than $1,000 per week. The district court denied the NFL’s argument that its 
actions fell under the nonstatutory labor exemption. The jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the players, awarding treble-damages of more than $30 million. The NFL 
appealed and, on March 21, 1995, the appeals court reversed the district court’s 
decision, ruling that NFL owners were immune from antitrust liability under the 
federal labor laws.128 On June 20, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
appeals court’s decision.129 
Meanwhile, in the spring of 1990, eight players whose contracts expired 
on February 1, 1990, led by the New York Jets’ Freeman McNeil, filed a lawsuit 
alleging that the proposed wage scale violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In 
spring 1991, the district court ruled that NFL owners were not exempt from the 
antitrust laws because the NFLPA was no longer a union. The players sought 
summary judgment, arguing that the wage scale was a horizontal price-fixing 
agreement and thus a per se antitrust violation.130 The NFL countered that the 
wage scale had a pro-competitive rationale – the promotion of competitive 
balance in the league – and should be judged by the rule of reason. On April 15, 
1992, the district court refused to grant summary judgment for the players, but did 
grant the players partial summary judgment on two issues: (1) there exists “a 
relevant market for the services of professional league football players in the 
United States” and (2) “major league professional football in the United States 
constitutes a relevant market for purpose of plaintiffs’ claims.” However, the 
district court refused to grant the players partial summary judgment on the issue 
of whether the NFL has monopoly power in the relevant market of professional 
football player services in the United States. 
The trial began in June 1992 and lasted 50 days.131 The jury deliberated 
for two days and, in September 1992, announced its verdict: Plan B violated the 
antitrust laws because it was more restrictive than necessary to achieve its goal of 
competitive balance. Damages totaling $543,000 were awarded to four of the 
eight player-plaintiffs. Within a week, another lawsuit was filed on behalf of 
several players who were unsigned as of the date of the jury’s verdict, most 
prominently Keith Jackson of the Philadelphia Eagles. In late September, the 
district court granted the players’ motion for an injunction against Plan B, thereby 
making those players unrestricted free agents who could sign with any team. In 
                                                 
128 Brown v. Pro Football, 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. 1995). 
129 Brown v. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
130 McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871 (4th D. Mn 1992). 
131 The information in this paragraph and the next is based primarily on an article posted 
on the NFLPA website. 
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 October 1992, a class-action antitrust lawsuit in the name of the Philadelphia 
Eagles’ Reggie White was filed against the NFL. 
Settlement talks between the NFL and its players turned serious in 
November 1992 and, in January 1993, a deal was struck: NFL owners would 
accept free agency, while NFL players would agree to a salary cap so long as 
player costs exceeded 67% of league revenues. Moreover, the various court 
actions, including Reggie White’s class action, would be settled for $195 million 
in damages. The district court preliminarily approved the deal on February 26, 
1993. In March 1993, with the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer a concern, 
the NFLPA once again became a certified union.  On May 6, 1993, the NFL and 
NFLPA reached a tentative agreement on a collective bargaining agreement. 
Free agents began to be signed for large increases in salary, often with 
new teams. In 1993, unrestricted free agents saw their salaries increase by an 
average of 85% and 120 (43%) of the 276 unrestricted free agents signed with a 
new team. In 1994, unrestricted free agents received an average salary increase of 
25% and 140 (48%) of the 293 unrestricted free agents signed with a new team. In 
1995, the average salary increase was 56% and 184 (62%) of 298 unrestricted free 
agents signed with a new team. In 1996, the salary increase averaged 52% and 
125 (51%) of the 245 unrestricted free agents changed teams. 
The size of player signing bonuses soared, as it offered a means to 
circumvent, to some extent, the salary cap.132 Between 1992 and 1993, the 
average signing bonus (for players receiving a signing bonus) more than doubled, 
jumping from $224,000 to $458,000. By 1995, it had almost doubled again, 
averaging $906,000. In 1996, the average signing bonus (for players receiving a 
signing bonus) was $1,064,000. 
Interestingly, in the years following the 1993 collective bargaining 
agreement, player compensation as a percentage of revenue declined sharply.133 
Between 1980 and 1992, player compensation as a percentage of revenue soared 
from 35.4% to 59.6%, and then jumped to 69.8% in 1993. However, in 1994, it 
dropped to 64.1%, slid to 60.1% in 1996, and plunged to 53.4% in 1997.  
Kowalewski and Leeds (1999) examine the impact of the 1993 collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA) and find that it has resulted in a two-tier player 
market. They document that the distribution of player salaries was more unequal 
in 1994 than in 1992; salary became less a function of position (e.g., quarterback, 
running back, linebacker) and more a function of whether the player was a starter. 
They write: 
 
The new CBA thus brought great gains for players already at the top of the 
salary distribution while bringing substantial losses for those players in the 
middle. The new CBA is pushing the NFL toward a two-class system with 
a small group of very wealthy players and a much larger group of 
(relatively) poor players… 
 
                                                 
132 The figures in this paragraph come from Staudohar (1998). 
133 The figures in this paragraph come from Scully (2004). 
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 Our results show that the new CBA led teams to reward players for 
performance on the field rather than the position they played. The 
premium teams pay to starters are much larger under the new CBA. 
Holding position constant, starters generate more victories and revenue for 
a team and thus receive higher salaries than “less skilled” or marginal 
players. Thus, while free agency has increased the bargaining power of the 
most-desired players, the salary cap ensures that less money remains 
available for lesser players. (pp. 219-20) 
 
Similarly, Leeds and Kowalewski (2001) examine the determinants of 
player salaries but conduct separate regressions for players in the 0.25 and 0.75 
salary quantiles. They find that, under the 1993 CBA, players in the lower salary 
quantile could dramatically increase their pay by improving their performance, 
whereas under the old regime their performance did not significantly impact their 
pay. On the other hand, players in the higher salary quantile were relatively less 
able to raise their pay via their performance on the field. Thus, Leeds and 
Kowalewski conclude that, under the 1993 CBA, “a player’s bargaining power 
from having a good year is greater when he is relatively underpaid than when he 
is relatively highly paid.” (p. 256)  
 
 
NBA. Basketball players have challenged a number of NBA practices on antitrust 
grounds, including its ‘four-year rule’, the amateur draft, the Uniform Player 
Contract, right-of-first refusal, and salary cap. Some of these practices became 
part of the collective bargaining agreement between the NBA and its players.   
 
 Four-year rule. Spencer Haywood graduated from high school in 1967, 
played basketball at Trinidad Junior College during the 1967-68 season, played on 
the 1968 U.S. Olympic Basketball Team, and played basketball at the University 
of Detroit during the 1968-69 season. In August 1969, Haywood signed a contract 
with the American Basketball Association’s Denver Rockets and was named 
“Rookie of the Year” and “Most Valuable Player of the ABA” for the 1969-70 
season. Although the ABA had a rule requiring all players to be at least four years 
out of high school (i.e., a ‘four-year rule’), Haywood received a ‘hardship’ waiver 
from the ABA. Haywood signed a new six-year contract with Denver in June 
1970. A few months later, Haywood discovered that the terms of the contract 
which he signed differed from those he had understood it to contain. He informed 
Denver that he considered the contract invalid due to Denver’s fraudulent 
misrepresentations.  
 In late 1970, Haywood signed a six-year contact with the NBA’s Seattle 
Supersonics. The NBA also had a four-year rule, By-Law 2.05, but did not waive 
it for Haywood. He sought a temporary restraining order, which the district court 
granted on December 30, 1970. Seattle then included Haywood on its player 
roster.  
Haywood filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NBA, alleging that the four-
year rule violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In other words, the four-year rule 
constitutes a group boycott. On March 22, 1971, the district court agreed, granting 
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 Haywood partial summary judgment “to the limited extent of ruling that the 
NBA’s four-year college rule – as embodied in Sections 2.05 and 6.03 – is a 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”134 The district court argued that the 
group boycott at issue is a per se violation because the NBA Constitution and 
Bylaws have no provision “for even the most rudimentary hearing before the four-
year college rule is applied to exclude an individual player” and  no provision 
“whereby an individual player might petition for consideration of his specific 
case.” 
 
Player Opposition to the NBA-ABA Merger. Having observed what 
happened to professional football player salaries before and after the merger of 
the NFL and AFL, and having themselves experienced soaring salaries as the 
NBA competed for players with the American Basketball Association, NBA 
players were determined to stop the proposed NBA-ABA merger. In 1970, a 
group of NBA players, led by Oscar Robertson, filed an antitrust lawsuit against 
the NBA and ABA alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 
The players alleged that the NBA conspired to restrain trade via the college draft, 
the reserve clause in the Uniform Player Contract, the compensation plan attached 
to the reserve clause, and a number of boycott and blacklisting techniques. The 
players also alleged that the NBA and ABA sought to effectuate a non-
competition agreement, merger, or consolidation. In May 1970, the district court 
preliminarily enjoined the NBA and ABA from entering into a merger, 
consolidation, or acquisition, but did allow the two leagues to negotiate a 
proposed merger for the sole purpose of petitioning Congress to pass antitrust 
exemption legislation that would place the merger outside the scope of the 
antitrust laws. Congress and the two leagues were unable to reach a deal. In 
August 1973, the district court modified its earlier order to allow the two leagues 
to negotiate a merger, but the negotiations had to occur in the presence of 
representatives of the Plaintiffs or the NBA Players Association and any 
agreement would have to indicate the disposition of uniform player contracts, the 
college draft, and the reserve clause. As of February 14, 1975, when the district 
court reached its decision, the NBA and ABA still had not reached an agreement. 
The district court granted the players’ request for the lawsuit to be maintained as a 
class action, with the class consisting of the approximately 365 players who have 
been active in the NBA since the commencement of the lawsuit.135 
 The lawsuit was settled out-of-court on April 29, 1976. The players 
received $4.3 million and substantial modifications to the practices they had 
challenged. Four ABA teams were merged into the NBA; the other three ABA 
teams folded. 
 The same year, the NBA negotiated a new collective bargaining 
agreement with the NBA Players Association.136 In return for dropping their 
opposition to the merger, the NBA Players Association obtained a collective 
bargaining agreement that eliminated the reserve clause from non-rookie 
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 contracts. Also, similar to the NFL’s Rozelle Rule, the NBA Commissioner could 
award players, draft choices, or cash to a team losing a free agent. However, 
beginning in 1980, the NBA’s version of the Rozelle Rule was replaced by a 
right-of-first-refusal – in other words, a team about to lose a free agent to another 
team had the right to match that team’s offer. 
 
 Amateur Draft, Salary Cap, and Right-of-First-Refusal. With the 
elimination of the reserve clause, player salaries rose. Scott, Long, and Somppi 
(1985) compare the marginal revenue products and salaries of free agents and 
non-free agents in the 1980-81 season and find that the 15 non-free agents in their 
sample earned an average salary equal to 44% of their MRP, whereas the 11 free 
agents in their sample earned an average salary of 93% of their MRP.   
Some teams experienced financial problems. The NBA sought to 
implement a salary cap. On March 31, 1983, the NBA and NBA Players 
Association agreed on the first salary cap in a major professional sports league. In 
return for agreeing to the salary cap, the players were guaranteed to receive in the 
form of salary and benefits 53% of gross revenues. The 1983 agreement included 
a provision whereby teams above the salary cap could only sign their first-round 
draft choices to a one-year contract for $75,000 and their lower-round draft 
choices to a one-year contract for $65,000. As a result, there were huge disparities 
in pay to rookies. Whereas Akeem Olajuwon signed a 6-year, $6.3 million 
contract with the Houston Rockets, who were not above the salary cap, Charles 
Barkley signed a 1-year, $75,000 contract with the Philadelphia 76ers, who were 
above the salary cap. 
 Not surprisingly, one NBA player brought an antitrust lawsuit challenging 
the salary cap.  O. Leon Wood, a point guard for California State University at 
Fullerton and a member of the 1984 gold medal-winning United States Olympic 
Basketball Team, was drafted in the first round of the 1984 college draft by the 
Philadelphia 76ers, who were above the salary cap and thus could offer Wood 
only a one-year $75,000 contract. Wood refused to sign the contract and, on 
September 13, 1984, went to court seeking a preliminary injunction against 
enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. The district court rejected 
Wood’s claims because both the salary cap and college draft provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreement fell under the statutory labor exemption to the 
antitrust laws – the provisions involved mandatory subjects of bargaining and 
were the result of arm’s-length bargaining. 
 Eventually, the 76ers were able to adjust their roster so they would not be 
over the salary cap. They signed Wood to a four-year $1.02 million contract that 
included a $135,000 signing bonus. Wood was later traded. 
 On February 5, 1986, the district court granted judgment in favor of the 
defendants. Wood appealed. The appeals court affirmed the district court’s 
decision, ruling that “plaintiff’s claims were intimately related to mandatory 
subjects of collective bargaining, and the claims subverted the prime importance 
that federal labor policy attached to freedom of contract between parties to a 
collective agreement.”137 
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  The collective bargaining agreement was set to expire at the end of the 
1986-87 season. The question thus arose as to whether provisions such as the 
salary cap and college draft would lose their antitrust immunity the moment the 
collective bargaining agreement expired. In October 1987, a group of players, 
headed by Junior Bridgeman, filed a lawsuit alleging that the college draft, the 
salary cap, and the right of first refusal violated the antitrust laws. The district 
court ruled that the collective bargaining process would be inhibited if such 
provisions lost their antitrust immunity immediately, as the plaintiffs argued, and 
if the provisions maintained their antitrust immunity indefinitely as long as the 
league maintained the status quo by not imposing any new restraints, as the NBA 
argued. Thus, the question remained: at what point do the restraints lose their 
antitrust immunity? The district court found that “the exemption for a particular 
practice survives only as long as the employer continues to impose that restriction 
unchanged, and reasonably believes that the practice or a close variant of it will 
be incorporated in the next collective bargaining agreement.”138 
 The NBA Players Association attempted to eliminate the salary cap and 
college draft in the collective bargaining agreement of 1988. The union threatened 
to decertify, thereby circumventing the statutory labor exemption to the antitrust 
laws. However, decertification did not happen. The NBA and NBA Players 
Association reached a deal whereby the salary cap remained at 53% of gross 
revenue and the number of rounds in the college draft was reduced from seven to 
three in 1988, and then to two in the years thereafter. When that agreement 
expired, the Players Association once again attempted to negotiate an end to the 
salary cap, college draft, and right of first refusal. The league and its players 
failed to reach a deal and the 1994-95 season was played without a collective 
bargaining agreement.139 
 In May 1994, the players intended to let the collective bargaining 
agreement expire before resuming negotiations. The NBA filed a lawsuit on June 
17, 1994 seeking two declarations: (1) the disputed provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement concerning the salary cap, college draft, and right of first 
refusal do not violate the antitrust laws because of the statutory labor exemption 
and (2) even if the antitrust laws do apply, those provisions do not violate the 
antitrust laws because they would survive a rule of reason analysis. The district 
court agreed with the NBA, finding, for example, that the provisions promoted 
competitive balance. The players appealed. The appeals court ruled against the 
players, holding that “the antitrust laws do not prohibit employers from 
bargaining jointly with a union, from implementing their joint proposals in the 
absence of a CBA, or from using economic force to obtain agreement to those 
proposals.”140 
 The district court’s finding regarding the effect of the salary cap on 
competitive balance is inconsistent with the conclusions of a number of economic 
studies. Endo, Florio, Gerber, and Sommers (2003) regress the Gini index (a 
measure of competitive balance) for the period from the 1974-75 season through 
                                                 
138 Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D. NJ 1987). 
139 The information in this paragraph is based primarily on Staudohar (1998). 
140 NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
-  - 175
 the 2001-2002 season on a time trend and a dummy variable denoting the post-
1984 era (the period since the adoption of the salary cap). The dummy variable’s 
coefficient is found to be positive, but not statistically significant. They conclude: 
“The distribution of playing talent and hence competitive balance in the NBA 
appears to be no more equal now under a cap than it was before.” (p. 388) Berri, 
Schmidt, and Brook (2004) point out that the NBA has the least competitive 
balance of the four major North American sports leagues. Vrooman (2000) is 
particularly critical of the NBA’s salary cap, arguing that it makes the NBA a 
virtual cartel and decreases competitive balance: 
 
A third conclusion of this paper is that the payroll cap is a unique form of 
cost-sharing collusion, and that, because of its implementation in the NBA 
over the period studied, the NBA is virtually a cartel of teams acting as a 
single firm. If NBA teams collusively behave as the firm, then profit 
maximization is reduced to revenue maximization for the league. The 
salary cap and the cost-sharing collusion of the NBA predictably lead to 
the least competitive balance of the three leagues over the period studied. 
The imposition of a payroll cap allows a cartel of teams to collusively 
behave as the firm, and the capping of team payrolls leads to the increased 
exploitation of players and decreased competitive balance within the 
league. (p. 394) 
 
Hausman and Leonard (1997) agree with Vrooman’s conclusion that a 
binding salary cap shifts rents from the players to the owners. However, unlike 
Vrooman, Hausman and Leonard argue that a binding salary cap results in all 
teams having the same quality – in other words, a binding salary cap leads to too 
much competitive balance.  
 In 1995, the NBA and players reached a deal on a six-year collective 
bargaining agreement that raised players’ guaranteed share of gross revenues from 
53% to 57.5%, expanded the definition of gross revenues to include luxury box 
revenues, addressed the underreporting of revenue by NBA team owners for 
determination of the salary cap, permitted teams to sign a replacement for an 
injured player at 50% of the injured player’s salary without counting it against the 
salary cap, and placed a cap on all rookie salaries.141  Gius and Johnson (1998) 
examined player salaries for the 1996-97 season and found a surprising result: 
being a free agent, particularly a free agent who changed teams, is associated with 
a lower, not higher, salary. They attribute the lower free agent salaries to the 
salary cap: 
 
In a free market, it would be expected that this variable would be positive. 
The NBA is not truly a free market though. Unlike most labour markets, 
NBA teams have a salary cap. Teams can exceed the cap if they sign their 
own free agents, but teams cannot exceed the cap if they sign free agents 
from other teams. Since many teams in the league are very close to or over 
the salary cap, many free agents who changed teams signed for much 
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 lower salaries than they previously earned. Hence, when free agents 
changed teams, their salaries were usually lower than free agents who 
signed with their old teams. The result was that some players, such as 
Michael Jordan (US$30.14 million), Juwan Howard (US$9.75 million), 
and Alonzo Mourning (US$9.38 million), received very high salaries, 
while most other free agents do not appear to have gained from ‘free 
agency.’ The overall effect was that free agents earned lower salaries than 
nonfree agents. (p. 705) 
 
The huge disparity in player salaries led to conflict within the NBA 
Players Association.142 The conflict flared when the owners voted to exercise their 
option set out in the 1995 collective bargaining agreement enabling them to 
terminate the agreement after any season beginning with the 1997-98 season if 
player salaries exceeded 51.8% of gross revenues from basketball-related income 
(BRI). For the 1997-98 season, player salaries were approximately 57.2% of BRI 
and, on March 23, 1998, NBA team owners voted to exercise their option to 
terminate the 1995 collective bargaining agreement. The owners imposed a 
lockout after the NBA Players Association rejected adoption of a ‘hard’ salary cap 
to replace the current ‘soft’ cap. When G. William Hunter, the executive director 
of the Players Association, met with players on January 5, 1999 in what was 
supposed to be a show of support for the union’s position, he was instead met 
with demands to get a deal done by the non-elite players. In other words, a hard 
salary cap would hurt the NBA’s superstars, but not necessarily the majority of 
NBA players, who were not superstars. On January 6, 1999, the NBA and the 
Players Association agreed on a 6-year deal which included maximum limits on 
the salaries that could be paid to individual players. For example, a player with six 
years or less of experience could not have an annual salary of more than $9 
million (or 25% of the salary cap), a player with 7-9 years of experience could not 
have an annual salary in excess of $11 million (or 30% of the salary cap), and a 
player with 10 or more years of experience could not have an annual salary in 
excess of $14 million (or 35.5% of the salary cap). Hill and Groothuis (2001) 
show that the 1999 collective bargaining agreement redistributed rents from the 
NBA’s superstars to its much more numerous non-star players. 
 
 
NHL. Hockey players have challenged a number of league practices, including the 
reserve clause, equalization payments, and the ‘Van Ryn Rule.’ The NHL fought 
for a luxury tax on team payrolls, but succeeded in getting the players to agree to 
a salary cap. 
 
Reserve Clause, Equalization payments, Standard Players Contract, and 
Amateur Draft. In the early 1970s, the legality of the NHL’s reserve clause 
became an issue in a breach of contract dispute between the NHL’s Boston Bruins 
and two of its players – Gerry Cheevers and Derek Sanderson – who were 
attempting to play in the World Hockey Association (WHA), the NHL’s rival 
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 league. The standard NHL player contract signed by the two players included a 
reserve clause. The Bruins tendered a new contract to both players, who refused 
to sign. The Bruins brought breach of contract lawsuits against both players and 
sought a preliminary injunction. The players argued that the standard player 
contract violates the antitrust laws because the reserve clause operates as a 
restraint on trade. The Bruins countered that the standard player contract is 
covered by the nonstatutory labor exemption because it arose from a valid 
collective bargaining relationship. In September 1972, the district court rejected 
the Bruins’ argument after finding no evidence that the reserve clause was a 
subject of negotiation between the NHL and the NHL Players Association.143 The 
district court ruled that “the Bruins have not shown a probability that these 
Standard Player’s Contracts will be found to be legally valid and enforceable in 
the face of the serious threat to their legality posed by the provisions of the 
Sherman Act.” Thus, the court refused to grant the Bruins’ request for a 
preliminary injunction. 
 Also in 1972, the World Hockey Association sought a preliminary 
injunction enjoining the NHL and its member teams from enforcing the reserve 
clause. This case, Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 
was discussed in Chapter 4. The district court found that the reserve clause was 
not the subject of bona fide, good faith collective bargaining and granted the 
WHA’s request for an injunction. After a breakdown of negotiations with the 
Players Association, the NHL unilaterally incorporated a new reserve clause into 
the 1974 Uniform Standard Player’s Contract (paragraph 17) and adopted a new 
bylaw (Section 9A). Paragraph 17 explained that at the expiration of a player’s 
contract, the player could be required to contract with the team for an additional 
year (the ‘option’ year). After playing out the option year, the player would 
become a free agent. Bylaw 9A was the NHL’s version of the NFL’s Rozelle 
Rule. A NHL team signing a free agent was required to make an equalization 
payment in the form of the assignment of player contracts, draft choices, and/or 
cash to the free agent’s former team. If the two teams could not agree on an 
equalization payment within three business days of the player’s signing, both 
teams had two business days to submit their ‘last best offer’ to an arbitrator who 
was required to choose between only those two offers. 
 Paragraph 17 and Section 9A were challenged on antitrust grounds by 
Dale McCourt, whose contract with the Detroit Red Wings was assigned to the 
Los Angeles Kings as an equalization payment for the Red Wings’ signing of free 
agent Rogatien Vachon, who had played for the Kings. McCourt sought a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the arbitrator’s award, arguing that the two 
provisions were unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. In September 1978, the district court granted McCourt’s request for 
an injunction, concluding that there was evidence that Section 9A unreasonably 
restrained McCourt from marketing his services and deterred NHL teams from 
signing free agents due to the uncertainty surrounding the required equalization 
payment, and since Section 9A applied to all players – both superstars and 
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 average players alike – it was broader than necessary to promote competitive 
balance and preserve the economic solvency of teams.144 The district court was 
persuaded by the testimony of McCourt’s expert witness, economist Dr. Koch, 
who argued that the NHL has monopsony power over its players, despite the 
existence of a rival professional hockey league, the WHA: 
 
Plaintiff next called Dr. Koch, an eminent economist whom we credit 
fully. Dr. Koch testified that a cartel theory was applicable to the input 
side of the market for hockey players in the NHL. He testified that the 
NHL had monopsony power as indicated by the draft, the Standard 
Player’s Contract and the reserve clause. He testified that the existence of 
the World Hockey Association was not a significant factor affecting the 
monopsony power of the NHL. In his judgment, this is because the NHL 
is qualitatively superior and because hockey players would rather play in 
the NHL. In Dr. Koch’s opinion, public perception of the NHL is greater 
and players’ salaries are higher. He concluded that, in economic terms, the 
NHL is a distinct market for player services because there is insufficient 
substitutability between the NHL and the World Hockey Association. The 
evidence developed prior to and after Dr. Koch’s testimony supports his 
conclusion that the World Hockey Association has not made a significant 
impact upon the NHL. 
 
Dr. Koch testified that economic analysis applied to bylaw 9A and that it 
had the effect of eliminating the market for free agent services. He 
concluded that the equalization provision unreasonably restrains trade and 
commerce for three reasons. First, the acquiring team must pay both a 
salary and compensation for the free agent. This higher price adversely 
impacts the market for the free agent’s services. Second, because the 
acquiring team does not know what compensation will be required, an 
uncertainty, which has the effect of reducing if not completely eliminating 
competition, is introduced into the market. Finally, the bylaw has the 
effect of depressing salaries in the NHL. On cross-examination, Dr. Koch 
stated that the new reserve clause was one factor explaining higher salaries 
in the NHL because a club knows if a player plays out his option he can 
seek a higher salary with another member club or in the World Hockey 
Association. However, Dr. Koch testified that without the compensation 
requirement salaries would be even higher. 
 
The district court concluded that Section 9A was more restrictive than 
necessary to promote competitive balance and protect the economic solvency of 
NHL member teams because it applies to all players regardless of skill and their 
ability to attract fans and because draft choices could serve as equalization 
payment rather than the assignment of player contracts. The district court also 
noted that the fact that Section 9A was incorporated into the collective bargaining 
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 agreement of May 1976 does not immunize it from the antitrust laws because the 
NHL and the Players Association did not bargain for that bylaw. 
Several economic studies examine the impact of the reserve clause, free 
agency, and equalization payments in the NHL. In contrast to the district court’s 
finding that the World Hockey Association had little competitive impact on the 
NHL, Jones and Walsh (1987) find that player salaries soared when the two 
leagues competed for players and, moreover, during the 1977-78 season, NHL 
player salaries approximated their marginal revenue product. Jones, Nadeau, and 
Walsh (1997, 1999) compare the salaries of players for the 1989-90 season who 
signed a free agent contract at some point in their career with those who had never 
signed a free agent contract. They find no statistically significant difference, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that the required equalization payments 
imposed by the NHL discourage bidding for free agents. However, it is also 
consistent with the hypothesis that the player reservation system is ineffective in 
holding down the salaries of non-free agents. Richardson (2000) compares the 
salaries of players who were free agents in the 1993-94 season with those who 
were not and finds that free agents do not earn significantly more relative to their 
marginal revenue product than do non-free agents. Richardson argues that NHL 
owners have an incentive to bid for players despite the player reservation system 
because the high degree of competitive balance in the league means that an owner 
can easily believe the team is ‘one player away’ from the Stanley Cup. Moreover, 
Richardson finds that the entry draft promotes competitive balance in the NHL. 
 
Van Ryn Rule. Another rule that was challenged on antitrust grounds was 
the so-called ‘Van Ryn Rule’ of the Ontario Hockey League (OHL), a Canadian 
amateur hockey league for players between the ages of 16 and 20 years. The 
OHL’s eligibility rules stated that teams could have no more than three 20-year-
old players. In August 2000, the OHL added another rule – any 20-year-old player 
signed by an OHL team must have been on a Canadian Hockey Association’s or 
USA Hockey Player’s Registration the previous season. The rule had the effect of 
preventing OHL teams from signing 20-year-old collegiate players since the 
NCAA barred players with either of those registrations from playing NCAA 
hockey.  
Despite being drafted by an OHL team at the age of 16, Anthony Aquino 
decided to play NCAA hockey. After his third season, he was drafted by the 
Dallas Stars. Aquino did not want to sign with the Stars because he would be a 
restricted free agent with that team for the next eleven years. Instead, he wanted to 
play one season in the OHL, at which point he would be an unrestricted free 
agent. The problem was that the Van Ryn Rule prevented any OHL team from 
signing him since he played NCAA hockey the previous season. On March 12, 
2001, the NHL Players Association brought an antitrust lawsuit alleging that the 
OHL and its member teams conspired with the NHL in violation of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act. Although the district court found that the Van Ryn Rule 
constituted a group boycott and thus was a per se violation of Section 1, the 
appeals court reversed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, 
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 arguing that sports league rules should be analyzed under the rule of reason.145 
Wilkinson (2004) argues that the anticompetitive effects of the Van Ryn Rule 
outweigh any procompetitive effects and thus it would not survive a rule of reason 
analysis. 
The NHL Players Association responded to the appeals court’s ruling by 
filing an amended complaint which attempted to address issues raised by the 
court. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. The NHLPA appealed, but the appeals court affirmed the 
order of the district court.146 The appeals court acknowledged that the OHL could 
not be treated as a single economic entity and thus the Van Ryn Rule was an 
agreement between multiple actors. The appeals court ruled that “the relevant 
market in this case is the pool of players from which the OHL draws its players, 
i.e., the market for sixteen- to twenty-year-old hockey players in North America”, 
and thus the market includes the NHL, OHL, and other North American leagues. 
This was one of the relevant markets proposed by the NHLPA. The NHLPA’s 
other proposed relevant markets (i.e., the market for player services in the 
Canadian Hockey League, the market comprised of North American organizations 
that compete for the services of 20-year-old hockey players, and the market for 
player services in the NHL) are too narrow. Although the NHLPA identified a 
relevant market, the appeals court found that the NHLPA failed to sufficiently 
identify the anticompetitive effects of the Van Ryn Rule. The Rule has the effect 
of substituting less skilled hockey players for more skilled players, but the 
resulting diminished quality of play is not an anticompetitive effect within the 
meaning of the antitrust laws. Moreover, even if some players are harmed by the 
inability to achieve free agency in the NHL, that harm should be ascribed to the 
NHL’s collective bargaining agreement and not to the Van Ryn Rule. The appeals 
court explained: 
 
The reason Anthony Aquino and Edward Caron (assuming they possessed 
the requisite talent) were unable to achieve free agency in the NHL is not 
that the Van Ryn Rule prohibited them from playing in the OHL; it is that 
the CBA governing eligibility for NHL free agency says that they are not 
eligible for free agency. 
 
 
Salary Cap and Luxury Tax. Before 1992, there had never been a strike in 
the NHL.147 A change in the Players Association’s leadership, however, resulted 
in it adopting tougher tactics. During their 10-day 1992 strike, the union sought to 
reduce the number of rounds in the player draft and increase the opportunities for 
free agency. The strike hurt the NHL team owners by disrupting the latter part of 
the season. The collective bargaining agreement expired in September 1993 and 
the union agreed to play the 1993-94 season without a contract. When NHL 
owners feared the union would call another late-season strike, the league locked-
                                                 
145 NHLPA v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d (6th Cir. 2003). 
146 NHLPA v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2005). 
147 The discussion in this paragraph is based on Staudohar (1998). 
-  - 181
 out the players. The lockout lasted 103 days and cost each team an average of $5 
million. The owners had sought to implement a payroll (or ‘luxury’) tax system 
whereby the teams spending the most on players would have to pay a ‘tax’ to the 
league. The lockout ended without an agreement on a luxury tax, but the league 
did obtain a cap on rookie salaries, an increase in the draft choice compensation 
for the signing of a free agent, and an increase in the age at which a player 
becomes an unrestricted free agent.  
On September 16, 2004, one day after the collective bargaining agreement 
resolving the 1994-95 lockout expired, NHL owners again locked-out the players 
in an attempt to win ‘cost certainty’ by linking player salaries to league revenues. 
The NHL argued that many of its teams were losing money. The Players 
Association disputed the figures and opposed the linking of player salaries to 
league revenues, viewing it as essentially a salary cap. The 2004-05 season was 
eventually cancelled. When the 310-day lockout ended, the NHL and the Players 
Association had agreed on a salary cap. The cap would be $39 million for the first 
year of the collective bargaining agreement.  
 
 
MLS. The case of Fraser v. MLS was discussed in Chapter 2 and thus will be only 
briefly summarized here. Recall that Major League Soccer was (arguably) 
organized as a ‘single entity’ and began play in 1996. The following February, a 
group of players filed an antitrust lawsuit alleging that (1) MLS and its 
operator/investors agreed not to compete for player services in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and (2) MLS monopolized, attempted to 
monopolize, or combined or conspired with the United States Soccer Federation 
to monopolize the market for the services of Division I professional soccer 
players in the United States in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The 
district court granted MLS’s request for summary judgment on the Section 1 
allegation, finding MLS to be a ‘single entity’ and thus unable to conspire with 
itself. A jury found in favor of MLS on the Section 2 count because it rejected the 
players’ proposed relevant market. The jury found that the players failed to prove 
that the relevant geographic market is the United States and the relevant product 
market is limited to Division I professional soccer players. The players appealed. 
The appeals court did not find it necessary to rule on the question of whether 
MLS is a single entity given that the jury rejected the relevant market proposed by 
the players.148  
 
 
LPGA. Barbara Jane Blalock was the Ladies Professional Golf Association 
Rookie of the Year in 1969. By the time she retired from full-time tournament 
competition in 1986, she held the record for the most LPGA victories (27) without 
a major championship win (although she was the runner-up at the LPGA 
Championship twice).  
 During the week of May 15, 1972, Blalock played in the LPGA 
Tournament in Louisville, Kentucky. The LPGA Tournament Director appointed 
four observers to observe Blalock’s play during the second round of the 
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 tournament. The observers reported that Blalock had moved her ball in violation 
of golf rules (i.e., ‘illegally’). The LPGA’s Executive Board, which was 
comprised of professional women golfers who regularly competed in LPGA 
tournaments, convened on May 20 and decided to disqualify Blalock from the 
Louisville tournament, place her on probation for the remainder of the 1972 
season, and impose a $500 fine for cheating. Blalock was informed of the 
Executive Board’s decision on May 26. However, two days later, at an Executive 
Board meeting that included two non-Board members – Marlene Hagge and 
Kathy Farrer, both also player-competitors of Blalock – the Executive Board 
discussed Hagge’s recommendation on behalf of the tournament committee that 
Blalock be suspended. The Executive Board voted to suspend Blalock for one 
year. At a May 30 meeting with the Executive Board, Blalock was informed that 
she was suspended from June 1, 1972 until May 31, 1973 and that all members of 
the Executive Board agreed with the suspension. 
 Blalock filed an antitrust lawsuit against the LPGA and the members of 
the Executive Board, alleging that the suspension constituted a group boycott and 
a per se restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The 
district court issued its opinion on June 21, 1973.149 The district court 
immediately noted that “professional golf is subject to the antitrust laws” – the 
LPGA “conducts its business in such a manner as to constitute interstate 
commerce.” The district court also noted that, although the legality of conduct 
under the Sherman Act is generally judged under the ‘rule of reason’, there are 
exceptions, one of which is group boycotts. Group boycotts are per se illegal – it 
is sufficient to show that such a boycott exists; there is no need to evaluate the 
‘reasonableness’ of the boycott.  
 According to the LPGA Constitution and Bylaws, LPGA members cannot 
compete for prize money in any non-LPGA-sponsored event. Thus, a suspended 
LPGA member is not only excluded from LPGA tournaments, she is excluded 
from winning prize money at any tournament. Moreover, the members of the 
Executive Board that suspended Blalock were Blalock’s competitors on the golf 
course – they were competing with Blalock for the same prize money. 
Consequently, the district court argued that the persons who suspended Blalock 
stood to gain financially from Blalock’s exclusion from the market. As a result, 
the district court determined that the suspension was a per se violation of the 
antitrust laws and thus there was no need to inquire into the ‘reasonableness’ of 
the suspension. However, the district court added that its ruling “does not reach 
the self-policing activities of defendant LPGA which are less than exclusionary in 
their effect.” 
 The district court attempted to distinguish the present case from two others 
in which the leagues’ suspensions were not found to violate the antitrust laws. In 
Molinas v. NBA, a professional basketball player was suspended for gambling by 
the NBA’s president acting pursuant to a clause in Molinas’s contract and an 
NBA rule prohibiting gambling.150 Molinas’s suspension was not imposed by his 
competitors (i.e., other NBA players). In Deesen v. PGA, a professional golfer had 
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 his approved tournament player status terminated by the PGA’s national 
tournament committee, which with one exception was composed on non-
competitors of Deesen.151 Moreover, Deesen was not completely excluded from 
the market (golf tournaments) because he could participate by becoming a golf 
teacher employed by a golf club. Furthermore, Deesen’s termination was the 
result of a virtual mathematical application of pre-determined standards, rather 
than the subjective and discretionary determination of Deesen’s competitors.  
 From a strictly economic perspective, it is not obvious that a golfer’s 
competitors would necessarily stand to gain financially from his or her exclusion 
from a golf tournament. It is true, of course, that reducing the number of 
competitors can only increase the odds of winning for the remaining competitors. 
But in the long run, this may not be true. Consider the case of Tiger Woods, who 
appeared on the Professional Golfers Association (PGA) Tour in 1996. Even early 
in his professional career, it was estimated that ticket and concession revenues 
were an extra $300,000 to $400,000 higher in tournaments in which he played, 
and television ratings for tournaments also depended considerably on whether 
Tiger was ‘in the hunt’; moreover, in 1999, a new television deal doubled annual 
TV revenues for the PGA, Senior PGA, and Nike Tours – a deal negotiated only 
weeks after Woods’ stunning victory at the Masters, which attracted the largest-
ever television audience for a golf tournament.152 
 Woods’ competitors have benefited enormously from the opportunity to 
play against him. In 1997, the bottom-ranked PGA players earned about $160,000 
per year; in 2000, they were earning about $300,000.153 While few players won $2 
million in prize money in 1997, $2 million was the norm a few years later. 
Another television deal – this one for four-years and $850 million – was 
negotiated in 2001 after Woods had won all four major tournaments in succession 
(albeit not all in the same season). One author commented: “What is good for him 
is good for golf – which is why every professional golfer should be breathing a 
big sigh of relief that Tiger is back to kicking their asses again.”154  
 Therefore, even if they could, Woods’ competitors would be worse off in 
the long-run if they managed to exclude him from tournaments, although they 
may benefit in the short-run. The PGA itself would also be harmed – probably in 
both the long- and short-run. However, the PGA would probably suffer even more 
in the long-run if Woods was caught moving his ball in violation of golf rules and 
the PGA failed to take action against him.   
 
 
In summary, sports leagues have developed numerous means of controlling one of 
their major expenses – player costs. Not surprisingly, players have frequently challenged 
these practices on antitrust grounds. There is strong evidence that the reserve clause 
significantly depresses player salaries. Free agency is generally associated with higher 
player salaries, particularly for a league’s superstars. The result has been a corresponding 
                                                 
151 Deesen v. PGA, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966). 
152 Osterland (1997). 
153 Friedman (2000). 
154 Kedrosky (2005). 
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 rise in the inequality of player salaries. Sports leagues argue that the amateur draft, 
revenue-sharing, salary caps, and luxury taxes promote competitive balance because 
teams differ in their ability to generate revenue and thus some means of ‘leveling the 
playing field’ is needed. The economic evidence as to whether such practices have in fact 
enhanced competitive balance is, at best, mixed. The experience of the NBA suggests that 
salary caps may be a means of redistributing rents from superstars back to the league and 
its non-superstar players (who comprise a majority of the players union). 
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 Chapter 7 
 
Sports Leagues vs. Coaches 
 
 
 
 Professional sports leagues have not attempted to impose restraints on coaches 
similar to those placed on players. For example, there has been no ‘reserve clause’ for 
coaches and no cap on their salaries. In the case of the NCAA, however, an attempt has 
been made to limit the number of assistant coaches and the salaries of certain assistant 
coaches. Not surprisingly, the affected assistant coaches filed lawsuits alleging violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The courts ruled that the NCAA’s limit on the number 
of assistant coaches did not violate the antitrust laws, but the NCAA’s limit on the 
salaries of certain assistant coaches did. 
 
NCAA Limits on the Number of Assistant Coaches. The NCAA held a special 
convention in August 1975 at which it adopted Bylaw 12-1 which effective 
August 1, 1976 limited the maximum number of assistant football and basketball 
coaches that Division I members could employ. One school that had to adjust to 
the new Bylaw was the University of Alabama, which reduced to part-time status 
Lawrence Hennessey, who had been an assistant football coach for 16 years, and 
Wendell Hudson, who was in his second year as an assistant basketball coach. 
Although Hennessey suffered a reduction in his annual basic compensation from 
$20,000 to $2,100, Hudson was assigned other non-coaching duties and suffered 
no such reduction in basic compensation. Hennessey and Hudson filed a lawsuit 
alleging that Bylaw 12-1 was a tortious interference with their contract rights, 
denied them equal protection of the law and deprived them of liberty and property 
without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and violated 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. An August 1976 trial ended with a judgment in 
favor of the NCAA. Hennessey and Hudson appealed. 
 The appeals court affirmed the decision on December 16, 1977.155 With 
respect to the antitrust claims, the appeals court began by addressing a number of 
preliminary matters raised by the NCAA. For example, Hennessey and Hudson 
sued only the NCAA even though a single person or entity alone cannot form a 
‘contract, combination, or conspiracy.’ The appeals court did not consider this a 
‘fatal’ objection because Bylaw 12-1 could be viewed as the result of an 
agreement or ‘concert of action’ of various members of the NCAA, as well as of 
the NCAA itself, and plaintiffs have the right to sue some co-conspirators but not 
others. The appeals court also rejected the NCAA’s contention that, as a 
voluntary, non-profit organization whose activities and objectives are educational 
and involve amateur athletics, it is exempt from Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  
The appeals court pointed out that “there is a business aspect in the providing of 
coaching for the athletes or in the providing of athletic events to an interested 
public.” Furthermore, the appeals court rejected the NCAA’s argument that the 
Bylaw did not affect interstate commerce and thus was outside the scope of the 
                                                 
155 Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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 federal antitrust laws. For example, the appeals court observed that the 
employment market for coaches is multi-state (if not national) and the Bylaw has 
the effect of reducing the movement of coaches between institutions located in 
different states. 
 Hennessey and Hudson argued that the Bylaw was a ‘group boycott’ and 
thus per se illegal. The appeals court disagreed, suggesting that the Bylaw was 
more similar to a market share allocation scheme. Group boycotts “typically have 
involved situations where there was some concerted refusal to deal with persons 
or companies because of some characteristic of those persons and companies”, 
whereas the Bylaw does not prevent NCAA members from dealing with members 
of the target group, namely assistant coaches. The Bylaw does limit the freedom 
of NCAA members in changing their assistant coaches given that it sets a 
maximum number. However, the appeals court determined that the Bylaw should 
be analyzed under the rule of reason. 
 The appeals court acknowledged that assistant coaches such as Hennessey 
and Hudson could be injured as their institutions adjusted to Bylaw 12-1 and, 
more generally, the Bylaw could have the effect of depressing the compensation 
of assistant coaches. However, the NCAA attempted to mitigate the impact by 
granting grace periods in circumstances of academic tenure enforceable contracts, 
and formal employment commitments. Moreover, the Bylaw had a pro-
competitive rationale – the promotion of competitive balance. The NCAA felt that 
the expansion of the more successful football and basketball programs was a 
detriment to the whole system of intercollegiate athletics. Some institutions 
reportedly were considering scaling back some sports to focus on the two big 
money-makers – football and basketball. Other institutions reportedly were 
considering abandoning football and basketball due to the difficulty of ‘keeping 
up’ – not to mention ‘catching up’ – with the elite programs. By preventing the 
abandonment of sports programs, the Bylaw arguably could benefit assistant 
coaches overall even if some specific assistant coaches are hurt in the short-run. 
The appeals court observed: 
 
There are, or will be, a not insignificant number of assistant coaches 
displaced or reduced, like Hennessey and Hudson, by the Bylaw. 
However, the effects upon them are not likely to be as severe or 
prolonged, except perhaps with respect to a few older coaches such as 
Hennessey, as suggested by plaintiffs. There are, indeed, many 
opportunities for coaches to pursue their vocations in addition to those 
now partially limited with Division I members of the NCAA: colleges 
which are in other divisions of the NCAA; colleges which are not in the 
NCAA; professional teams; and high schools. While these opportunities 
may not be as rewarding, either financially or emotionally, to many 
coaches, the fact of their existence must be taken into account in 
measuring the “market power” of the NCAA Division I teams and the 
economic effects of the rule. 
  
 The appeals court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the benefits of the 
Bylaw could be achieved via less restrictive means by either extending the grace 
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 period or replacing the limit on the number of assistant coaches with a limit on the 
salaries of assistant coaches. Extending the grace period would only delay the 
benefits of the Bylaw, whereas a limit on the salaries of assistant coaches may not 
be less of a restraint than a limit on the number of assistant coaches.  
 The appeals court concluded that, under a rule of reason analysis, Bylaw 
12-1 is not an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
 
NCAA Limits on the Salaries of Certain Assistant Coaches. The NCAA 
established a Cost Reduction Committee in January 1989 to formulate means and 
strategies to reduce the cost of intercollegiate athletics without disturbing the 
competitive balance among NCAA members. A report commissioned by the 
NCAA, known as the “Raiborn Report”, had found that in 1985 42% of NCAA 
Division I schools had a deficit in their overall athletic program budgets, with the 
average deficit being $824,000.  Between 1978 and 1985, athletic expenses at 
Division I schools had shot up more than 100%. Moreover, 51% of Division I 
respondents reported suffering a net loss in their basketball program, with the net 
loss averaging $145,000 per school. In January 1990, the Committee’s chairman 
told NCAA members that the Committee’s goal was to “cut costs and save 
money.” 
 At the time, Division I basketball programs were permitted to have one 
head coach, two assistant coaches, and two part-time coaches. The latter could be 
part-time assistants, graduate assistants, or volunteer coaches. The NCAA placed 
limits on the compensation received by the part-time coaches. Nevertheless, many 
part-time coaches could earn between $60,000 and $70,000 annually by working 
at summer sports camps or part-time in the physical education department. Many 
part-time coaches had years of experience and thus were hardly the type of 
student assistant envisioned by the rule. The Cost Reduction Committee proposed 
Bylaw 11.6.4 which would limit the staff of Division I basketball programs to one 
head coach, two assistant coaches, and one entry-level coach – a so-called 
“restricted-earnings coach” (REC). The Committee also proposed Bylaw 11.02.3 
(the ‘REC Rule’) which would restrict the earnings of RECs in all Division I 
sports other than football to a total of $12,000 per academic year and $4,000 for 
the summer months. The annual figure of $16,000 was roughly the amount that 
had been paid to part-time graduate assistant coaches. Although the objective of 
the REC Rule was reportedly to save money, the Rule did not prevent the cost-
savings from being spent on other aspects of the athletic program. The NCAA 
adopted the proposed bylaws in January 1991 and they became effective on 
August 1, 1992. 
 A group of restricted-earnings men’s basketball coaches at NCAA 
Division I schools during the 1992-93 academic year filed a lawsuit alleging that 
the REC Rule restricting their compensation violated Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. In May 1995, the district court temporarily enjoined the NCAA from 
enforcing the REC rule. A few months later, in August 1995, the district court 
applied a ‘quick look’ rule of reason analysis and awarded summary judgment to 
the plaintiffs.156 On January 5, 1996, the district court permanently enjoined the 
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 NCAA from enforcing or attempting to enforce any restricted-earnings coach 
salary limitations against the named plaintiffs. The NCAA appealed only the part 
of the injunction finding that the REC Rule violated the antitrust laws. 
 The appeals court noted that the NCAA’s ‘product’ in this case is college 
basketball and that some horizontal restraints, such as those forbidding payments 
to players and requiring players attend classes, are necessary for the ‘product’ to 
exist.157 Thus, even price and output restrictions need to be analyzed under the 
rule of reason. The NCAA argued that the district court erred because it failed to 
define a relevant market and failed to find that the NCAA possessed market 
power in a relevant market. Moreover, the NCAA argued that the relevant market 
includes coaching positions at Division I, Division II, and Division III schools, as 
well as at junior colleges, high schools, and professional teams, and restricted-
earnings coaches comprise, at most, 8% of this relevant market. The appeals court 
countered: “The NCAA misapprehends the purpose in antitrust law of market 
definition, which is not an end unto itself but rather exists to illuminate a 
practice’s effect on competition.” The appeals court explained: 
 
No “proof of market power” is required where the very purpose and effect 
of a horizontal agreement is to fix prices so as to make them unresponsive 
to a competitive marketplace…. Thus, where a practice has obvious 
anticompetitive effects – as does price-fixing – there is no need to prove 
that the defendant possesses market power. Rather, the court is justified in 
proceeding directly to the question of whether the procompetitive 
justifications advanced for the restraint outweigh the anticompetitive 
effects under a “quick look” rule of reason… 
 
We find it appropriate to adopt such a quick look rule of reason in this 
case. Under a quick look rule of reason analysis, anticompetitive effect is 
established, even without a determination of the relevant market, where 
the plaintiff shows that a horizontal agreement to fix prices exists, that the 
agreement is effective, and that the price set by such an agreement is more 
favorable to the defendant than otherwise would have resulted from the 
operation of market forces… Under this standard, the undisputed evidence 
supports a finding of anticompetitive effect. The NCAA adopted the REC 
Rule to reduce the high cost of part-time coaches’ salaries, over $60,000 
annually in some cases, by limiting compensation to entry-level coaches to 
$16,000 per year. The NCAA does not dispute that the cost-reduction has 
effectively reduced restricted-earnings coaches’ salaries. Because the REC 
Rule was successful in artificially lowering the price of coaching services, 
no further evidence or analysis is required to find market power to set 
prices. Thus, in the case at bar, the district court did not need to resolve 
issues of fact pertaining to the definition of the relevant market in order to 
support its decision on summary judgment that the REC Rule is a naked 
price restraint. 
 
                                                 
157 Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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  The NCAA offered three pro-competitive rationales for the REC Rule:  to 
retain entry-level coaching positions, to reduce costs, and to maintain competitive 
balance. The appeals court rejected each of these rationales. The NCAA failed to 
show that the restricted-earnings coaching positions had been filled by entry-level 
applicants or that such applicants would eventually fill those positions. Moreover, 
while opening positions to younger applicants may have social value, any pro-
competitive rationale must be based on the impact on competition, not social 
value. The appeals court rejected the cost-reduction rationale because “cost-
cutting by itself is not a valid procompetitive justification.” If it were, buyers 
could collude in their input market, thereby driving down the price they pay for 
the input. In other words, buyers could collude to exercise monopsony power over 
input suppliers. Although the NCAA argued that cost-reduction is necessary to 
maintain the existence of competitive intercollegiate sports, the appeals court 
noted that the cost savings from the REC Rule could simply be used to increase 
other expenditures in a school’s athletic program, such as equipment or the 
salaries of other coaches. The appeals court concluded: 
 
The undisputed record reveals that the REC Rule is nothing more than a 
cost-cutting measure and shows that the only consideration the NCAA 
gave to competitive balance was simply to structure the rule so as not to 
exacerbate competitive imbalance. Thus, on its face, the REC Rule is not 
directed towards competitive balance nor is the nexus between the rule 
and a compelling need to maintain competitive balance sufficiently clear 
on this record to withstand a motion for summary judgment. 
 
The appeals court thus affirmed the district court’s order granting a 
permanent injunction barring the NCAA from enacting compensation limits such 
as those specified in the REC Rule. 
A damages trial took place in May 1998, resulting in a jury award of $22.3 
million, which was trebled to $67 million. The lawsuit was eventually settled for 
$55.5 million, or approximately $12,000 per coach per year. Just over 1,000 
coaches received compensation.158 
 
 In summary, courts have ruled that the NCAA did not violate the antitrust laws by 
imposing limits on the number of assistant coaches, but did violate the antitrust laws by 
imposing limits on the salaries of ‘restricted earnings’ coaches. Limiting the number of 
assistant coaches arguably promoted competitive balance, whereas limiting the salaries of 
certain assistant coaches may have resulted in cost-savings but lacked a pro-competitive 
rationale. 
                                                 
158 The information in this paragraph comes from Hamilton (2003), which discusses the 
appropriateness of class certification in Law v. NCAA. Hamilton was retained by the 
plaintiffs. 
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 Chapter 8 
 
Sports Leagues vs. Stadium Owners 
 
 
 
 
                                                
As discussed in Chapter 3, sports leagues have attempted to exercise control over 
the relocation of their member teams to different cities. Such relocation rules may prevent 
a stadium owner from securing a team to play in its stadium. Not surprisingly, stadium 
owners have sometimes filed lawsuits alleging that league relocation rules violate 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum was a party 
to the lawsuits concerning the NFL’s Oakland Raiders’ and the NBA’s San Diego 
Clippers’ moves to Los Angeles.159 A discussion of these cases appeared in Chapter 3 
and will not be repeated here.  
 A number of other antitrust lawsuits have been filed by stadium owners against 
sports leagues. One concerned the relocation of the NFL’s Los Angeles Rams to St. Louis 
and the allegedly high cost that St. Louis had to incur due to the NFL’s relocation rules 
and the relocation fee the NFL imposed. The lawsuit was unsuccessful, with all the 
antitrust charges dismissed prior to the case reaching the jury. More recently, NASCAR 
has been sued by a number of speedways (or, in one case, a shareholder of a speedway) 
seeking to obtain a NASCAR-sanctioned race. While the NFL prevailed in its case, 
NASCAR settled one of its cases out-of-court by, among other things, granting Texas 
Motor Speedway a ‘second’ Winston (now Nextel) Cup race. An earlier antitrust lawsuit 
by a racetrack seeking NASCAR Busch series dates was voluntarily dismissed. A 
subsequent lawsuit brought by the Kentucky Speedway against NASCAR continues to 
make its way through the judicial system.  
 
 NFL’s Los Angeles Rams’ Relocation to St. Louis. In 1988, the St. Louis 
Cardinals relocated to Phoenix. The Missouri legislature assigned responsibility 
for procuring another NFL team to the St. Louis Convention and Visitors Center 
(CVC), which had originally been created to promote the city’s convention and 
tourism business. CVC initially sought to procure an NFL expansion franchise to 
be established in 1993. To make the city more attractive to a prospective 
franchise, a new convention center (which included a new football stadium) was 
constructed. The football stadium was named the Trans World Dome and cost 
$258 million, which was paid from state and local government funds. CVC was 
assigned the stadium lease, and in turn subleased the right to present football in 
the stadium to private parties. The NFL decided to award expansion franchises to 
Jacksonville, Florida, and Charlotte, North Carolina – passing over St. Louis 
reportedly because of problems with control over the lease and the ownership 
group. 
 
159 Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 
1986); NBA v. SDC Basketball Club and Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 815 
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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  Having failed to procure an NFL expansion franchise, CVC began to seek 
out an existing NFL team which would be willing to relocate to St. Louis. 
Negotiations began with the Los Angeles Rams, who informed CVC that it would 
discontinue any business dealings if CVC contacted any other team about 
relocating to St. Louis. Accordingly, CVC did not solicit additional bids for the 
Trans World Dome lease. CVC entered into a written agreement with the Rams, 
but the proposed relocation was voted down by NFL owners (relocations had to 
be approved by at least three-fourths of team owners). A revised deal, which 
included a $29 million relocation fee to be paid by the Rams to the NFL, was 
approved by team owners and the Rams began play in St. Louis in 1995. 
Although the deal between CVC and the Rams allowed either party to cancel the 
deal if the NFL demanded a relocation fee of more than $7.5 million (the 
relocation fee paid by the St. Louis Cardinals to relocate to Phoenix), CVC agreed 
to pay $20 million of the relocation fee for the Rams. 
 During the Rams’ very first season in St. Louis, CVC experienced 
financial problems and was unable to make some payments totaling 
approximately $14 million to the Rams. On December 18, 1995, CVC filed an 
antitrust lawsuit against the NFL, alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act. CVC also entered into an agreement with the Rams promising the 
team half of any recovery obtained from the lawsuit in return for the Rams 
forgiving the money owed it by CVC. At trial, CVC argued that the NFL’s 
relocation rules created an atmosphere in which teams were unwilling to relocate, 
and this anti-relocation atmosphere had the effect of discouraging interested teams 
from bidding for the St. Louis lease. The result was that the only bidder for the 
Trans World Dome lease was the Los Angeles Rams, who thus was able to 
negotiate more favorable terms than would have been possible in a competitive 
market. In particular, CVC alleged that the favorable terms obtained by the Rams 
caused CVC to lose between $77 million and $122 million. CVC sought treble 
damages of between $241 million and $366 million and attorneys fees. 
 In a pretrial motion, the NFL attempted to get summary judgment on the 
Section 1 claim on the grounds that the league and its teams are a single economic 
enterprise and therefore are incapable of conspiring among themselves. The 
district court rejected the NFL’s motion, but determined that CVC could not argue 
that the NFL’s relocation rules are per se illegal – CVC was required to prove that 
the anticompetitive effects of the rules outweighed their procompetitive benefits. 
The district court decided that, in order to prove its Section 2 leveraging claim, 
CVC would have to show that the NFL used a monopoly position in the 
professional football market to obtain an advantage in the market for stadiums. 
 After CVC presented its case, the NFL asked the district court for 
judgment on the Section 2 claim. The district court ruled in favor of the NFL, 
finding that CVC failed to show that the NFL had a monopoly in the professional 
football market or that there is a ‘secondary market’ in NFL stadiums. The district 
court also ruled that, in order for the Section 1 claim to go to the jury, CVC would 
have to show more than a theoretical connection between the NFL’s relocation 
rules and the events surrounding the relocation of the Rams to St. Louis. After the 
NFL presented its case, the NFL asked for judgment on the Section 1 claim. The 
district court determined that CVC did not prove that any other team was 
interested in relocating to St. Louis, that the lack of rival bidders for the Trans 
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 World Dome lease was due to the NFL rules, or that CVC suffered an antitrust 
injury. Thus, the district court ruled in favor of the NFL on the Section 1 claim as 
well. 
 CVC appealed the district court’s dismissal of the Section 1 claim and 
sought a new trial, while the NFL appealed the district court’s failure to dismiss 
the Section 1 claim on the grounds that the NFL and its teams are a single 
economic entity. On September 3, 1998, the appeals court affirmed the district 
court’s judgment.160 The appeals court observed that CVC could only prevail on 
its Section 1 claim if it proved: (1) the existence of an agreement between the 
NFL and its teams in restraint of trade, (2) an injury to CVC as a direct and 
proximate result of that agreement, and (3) the damages can be ascertained and 
are not speculative. The appeals court noted that CVC failed to present evidence 
that any other team failed to bid on the Trans World Dome lease due to the NFL’s 
rules. Nor did CVC provide evidence ruling out the possibility that each team 
owner, acting independently, declined to bid on the lease. Moreover, CVC made a 
conscious decision to negotiate with one team at a time. The appeals court also 
pointed out various problems with the testimony of CVC’s expert witness:  
 
CVC contends that the testimony of its expert, Professor John Siegfried, 
establishes a causal link between the NFL’s actions and the lack of 
competitive bidding on the lease. A jury may not rest its verdict on an 
expert’s conclusion “without some underlying facts and reasons, or a 
logical inferential process to support the expert’s conclusion.”… Here, 
there was no evidence on which the jury could have drawn a logical 
inference from Siegfried’s opinion. Siegfried testified that he would have 
expected to see bidding on the lease, but there was no evidence to support 
a finding that there were teams that were actually able and desiring to bid, 
but were prevented from doing it. Moreover, Siegfried rested his 
conclusions on economic theory that states that in a freely competitive 
market NFL teams would want to move to the most advantageous lease 
opportunity, but there was no evidence which tended to show that this was 
actually the case, especially in light of admissions by CVC witnesses that 
several team owners would not move because of loyalty to their 
communities or ownership of their stadia. Siegfried also testified that he 
had not seen any of the lease agreements involved in the case, any 
relocation agreement, or any documentation on the lease negotiations. 
Without evidence tending to show that Siegfried’s economic model 
actually applied to the NFL and the CVC efforts to obtain a team, his 
testimony is insufficient to create a jury question on the issue of causation. 
 
The appeals court concluded: 
 
In sum, CVC did not make out a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, and appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It failed to 
present sufficient evidence to prove that the lack of expressed interest 
                                                 
160 St. Louis Convention & Visitors Commission v. NFL, 154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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 from other teams in the St. Louis opportunity was caused by Article 4.3 
and other acts of a conspiracy consisting of the league and its members, 
and there was no evidence of antitrust injury. 
 
 The appeals court added that since it is affirming the district court’s 
dismissal of the Section 1 claim, it is not necessary to consider the issue of 
whether the NFL and its teams are a single economic entity.   
 Professor Franklin Fisher served as the NFL’s expert witness and co-
authored an article – Fisher, Maxwell, and Schouten (2000) – which discusses 
various aspects of the case. Consistent with the discussion in Chapter 3, Fisher 
argues that sports leagues have a pro-competitive interest in the relocation of their 
member teams: 
 
An important example of free-riding arises in team relocation and was 
illustrated by the St. Louis case. The value of the Rams in St. Louis was 
created by the promotion and development efforts of the League, not by 
the Rams. Indeed, the demand in St. Louis was for NFL football, not for 
the Rams’ franchise specifically. Unless the League and its other member 
teams were appropriately compensated for its efforts to develop that 
demand, which was reflected in the extraordinary deal that the Rams were 
offered to move, the Rams would have enjoyed a free-ride, and an 
inefficient outcome would have resulted. The incentives of the League and 
its teams to improve its product would be reduced if one of the teams 
could simply take advantage of such efforts by moving to a city where fan 
interest was great. (p. 210) 
 
Thus, there is a pro-competitive rationale for imposition of a franchise 
relocation fee. In the St. Louis case, a mutually beneficial outcome was obtained – 
the Rams, the NFL as a whole, the CVC, and consumers all benefited from the 
Rams’ move to St. Louis as evidenced by the Rams’ willingness to pay the 
relocation fee, the NFL team owners’ willingness to vote to approve the 
relocation, CVC’s willingness to pay for the Rams, and consumers’ gain in 
quality-adjusted output. 
Fisher, Maxwell, and Schouten also question the NFL’s alleged 
monopsony power in the “market for stadiums meeting NFL requirements.” They 
argue that such a market is defined too narrowly: 
 
To begin such an analysis in the present case, one must ask what it is that 
the owners of football stadiums are actually selling. It is too narrow an 
answer to this question to look only at the situation after the stadium has 
been built and negotiations with a particular team are underway. In 
thinking about this question, it is useful to distinguish private builders of 
stadiums and public authorities. 
 
Private builders of stadiums are not in a narrowly-defined business of 
providing only stadiums to NFL teams. Rather they are in the business of 
large-scale real estate development. Similarly, public authorities building 
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 or assisting with football stadiums are not in a narrowly-defined business 
of attracting NFL teams. Rather they are in the business of making their 
cities attractive to individuals and businesses, with NFL football only one 
way of accomplishing this. 
 
Hence, the relevant input market here includes both large-scale private 
investments in real estate development and public investments designed to 
make cities attractive. While this includes existing and potential facilities 
suitable for a number of activities of which the exhibition of football is 
one, it also includes other large development projects in which public 
and/or private developers may invest (for example, The Arch, representing 
St. Louis as the Gateway to the West, and other local public goods in 
which cities may invest such as museums, parks, hospitals, or public 
schools). (pp. 214-15) 
  
A team such as the Rams which is considering relocating has greater 
bargaining power in negotiations over the lease of an existing facility than over 
the lease of a facility not yet constructed. The Trans World Dome was constructed 
prior to CVC striking a deal with the Rams. Thus, the CVC was in a weak 
negotiating position and this explains why the Rams succeeded in negotiating 
such a favorable deal. In contrast, the NFL’s relocation rules may place teams at a 
bargaining disadvantage when negotiating a lease with the stadium where the 
team currently plays. In other words, lease terms reflect the parties’ relative 
bargaining power, not necessarily the monopsony power of the team or league: 
 
Since both the private investment funds and city funds have many 
alternative uses, the NFL can have no monopsony power over facilities 
suitable for exhibiting professional football that have not yet been 
constructed. Stadium investors, both communities and private parties, 
have a large number of attractive alternative investment opportunities. 
Stadiums do not offer investors any economic investment return not easily 
obtained elsewhere. 
 
Focusing on the case of the St. Louis CVC, St. Louis did not have to build 
the convention center-stadium complex. It could have built the convention 
facility without the stadium, or it could have devoted its resources to other 
investments. Municipalities provide an array of services to their citizens, 
and face a number of options when investing in public goods. On an 
ongoing basis, they must decide how to allocate their budgets between 
competing projects such as schools, fire and police protection, libraries, 
trash collection, recreation, and stadiums… 
 
… But we are here considering the alleged monopsony power of the NFL 
as a buyer. The fact that it has special requirements does not limit the 
alternatives available to sellers. 
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 This can be described with the following analogy. Suppose that there is a 
maker of address labels who, without prior agreement, were to print 
address labels with a specific name and address on them. Those address 
labels would meet special requirements, but would be essentially useless 
to anyone but the addressee. Having printed the labels, the maker could 
not then reasonably claim that the addressee had monopsony power 
because he or she had insisted on labels with a specific name and address. 
 
So it was with the St. Louis CVC. Any negotiating leverage possessed by 
the Rams was created when the St. Louis parties committed the funds to 
construct and began building the Trans World Dome facility. By deciding 
to build the stadium facility prior to signing long-term leases with 
potential occupants, the CVC placed itself in a far weaker negotiating 
position than would have been the case had the CVC first negotiated long-
term leases. This had nothing to do with the Rams or the NFL, or whether 
or not the League has monopsony power. (pp. 215-16) 
 
Not all economists agree with Fisher. John Siegfried, CVC’s expert 
witness, coauthored an article with Andrew Zimbalist titled “The Economics of 
Sports Facilities and Their Communities.” They argue that the four major sports 
leagues have monopoly power over the placement of league franchises in their 
sport, which in turn enables them “to extract subsidies from communities that 
might otherwise enjoy considerable surplus from hosting a franchise at a 
competitive price.” (p. 98) Each major sports league has between two and four 
potential cities that could host a franchise but do not. This number is sufficiently 
small that it would be difficult for a rival sports league to form by placing 
franchises in these cities, but the number is sufficiently large to create vigorous 
bidding for expansion franchises and franchises considering relocating. Siegfried 
and Zimbalist argue that the major sports leagues have monopsony power, 
although they do not explicitly define the relevant product and geographic market: 
 
The leagues can control the competition among established teams for 
attractive vacant locations by requiring that relocations be approved by a 
supra-majority of the existing teams in the league, and then can use this 
control as a negotiating tool. For example, owners can help a fellow team 
owner to negotiate an attractive subsidy from the current host city by 
threatening both to approve that team’s relocation if a sufficient subsidy is 
not forthcoming, and to rebuff any other team’s attempt to fill the void 
created if the team should depart. The effect of such threats is to create 
monopsony power for teams seeking stadium services. (p. 99) 
 
An obvious question is: why are state and local governments willing to 
provide such subsidies? Siegfried and Zimbalist suggest three reasons: (1) 
consumer surplus may be substantial if the demand for attendance at live sporting 
events is inelastic, (2) hosting a sports franchise may create external benefits for 
local residents even if they do not attend the games, and (3) hosting a sports 
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 franchise generates free advertising for the community and may attract tourists, 
industries, and job hunters. They write: 
 
None of these benefits identified above – consumer surplus to fans who 
attend games, external benefits to non-attenders, and public image 
enhancement – can be captured directly by a team through traditional 
revenue channels. The sum of these benefits in a community may 
approach or exceed the cost of constructing a new playing facility, 
however, making it worthwhile for communities to pay for sports facilities 
when such a facility is necessary to secure or retain a franchise. Thus is 
created a situation in which sports teams have the monopoly power to 
extract some of the consumer surplus, external benefits, and public image 
enhancement from their host communities, and the host communities (or 
at least their political leaders) believe that these benefits are sufficiently 
large to justify paying for a stadium or arena. A deal can be struck. (p. 
100) 
 
Empirical studies (at least ‘independent’ academic studies as opposed to 
‘commissioned’ consulting industry studies) generally find that the economic 
benefits of sports stadiums generally do not exceed their costs. For example, 
Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001) argue that the benefits of attracting a sports 
franchise generally only exceed the costs if one includes in the benefits the 
admittedly hard-to-measure impact on the city’s ‘quality of life.’ The presence of 
a professional sports franchise is one variable influencing a city’s attractiveness as 
a place to live, along with other variables such as the weather, natural scenery, 
and natural recreational opportunities. Coates and Humphreys (2001) examine 
data on cities with NFL or MLB franchises over the period 1969-96 and find no 
impact on the economies of those cities from a work stoppage (i.e., a player strike 
or a player lockout by the team owners). Moreover, they examine data on cities 
with NBA franchises and find no impact on the economies of those cities when 
the team leaves. Coates and Humphreys (1999) examine data on 37 cities with 
professional sports franchises over the period 1969-94 and find that “some 
professional sports franchises reduce the level of per capita personal income in 
metropolitan areas and have no effect on the growth in per capita income, casting 
doubt on the ability of a new sports franchise or facility to spur economic 
growth.” (p. 601) 
 
 
NASCAR’s Winston (now Nextel) Cup and Busch Series Dates. NASCAR 
sanctions stock car races in the United States. The top-tier race series is the Nextel 
Cup, which was formerly known as the Winston Cup. The next-highest tiers of 
NASCAR-sanctioned races are the Busch Series and Craftsman Truck Series. 
NASCAR has been sued on multiple occasions regarding its awarding of 
NASCAR-sanctioned race dates to racetracks. The allegations include violations 
of Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. At least three such lawsuits have been 
filed in the last few years. One lawsuit was dropped, one was settled out-of-court, 
and one continues to work its way through the judicial system. 
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  In December 1986, Michael Liberty purchased the Oxford Plains 
Speedway (OPS) located in Maine from Robert Bahre for approximately $4.3 
million.161 Bahre retained the exclusive rights to sell tires at OPS. According to 
Liberty, Bahre agreed to use his personal and business contacts at NASCAR to 
obtain a steady flow of NASCAR-sanctioned races at OPS and agreed not to take 
any action for 10 years in Maine to compete in the auto-racing business. During 
Bahre’s ownership of OPS in the 1970s and early 1980s, OPS had hosted a 
number of NASCAR-sanctioned races. Bahre also ‘brokered’ NASCAR-
sanctioned events for other racetracks, including Beech Ridge Motor Speedway, 
Wiscasset Motor Speedway, Las Vegas Motor Speedway, and North Wilkesboro 
Motor Speedway. In February 1987, Liberty and NASCAR signed a three-year 
deal for OPS to host a regular schedule of NASCAR-sanctioned races, including 
the inauguration of the Busch Grand National North Tour stock car racing series. 
During the period 1987-89, OPS hosted 20 NASCAR-sanctioned races, including 
more than 10 Busch North series races and at least one Busch Grand National 
Tour race. 
 In 1987, Liberty developed a proposal to build a super-speedway on the 
OPS site. A super-speedway is generally at least one mile in length and designed 
to host premier auto-racing events such as NASCAR Winston Cup races. 
According to Liberty, Bahre agreed to broker a multi-year Winston Cup sanction 
if Liberty paid him a $1 million annual fee for his services as a sanctioning broker 
and track manager. When Liberty discussed his proposal with NASCAR’s 
president and chairman William France in the fall of 1987, France informed 
Liberty that NASCAR did not grant multi-year sanctions and Liberty abandoned 
plans to build the super-speedway. According to Liberty, within a few months, 
Bahre began planning a super-speedway to be built in New Hampshire based on 
the exact same design as Liberty had developed for the OPS site. The New 
Hampshire International Speedway (NHIS) in Louden, New Hampshire opened in 
July 1990 and began hosting a regular schedule of NASCAR-sanctioned races. 
Over the next three years, OPS hosted 14 NASCAR-sanctioned events. 
 According to Liberty, NASCAR promised him that it would take steps to 
minimize any adverse impact of NHIS on OPS, such as bringing the Winston Cup 
drivers to OPS in the 1992 season – which did not occur. Moreover, in 1991, 
NASCAR gave a key race date to NHIS, even though that date coincided with 
OPS’s annual running of the Oxford 250, the track’s premier auto-racing event. 
The two events also coincided in 1992. In both years, the Oxford 250 produced 
losses. OPS attempted in the fall of 1992 to host a race sanctioned by NASCAR’s 
only competitor in the Northeast – the American-Canadian Tour (ACT), a 
sanctioning body formed in 1985 by the former manager of NASCAR’s North 
Tour. Liberty asked NASCAR’s Brian France if hosting an ACT race would 
jeopardize OPS’s relationship with NASCAR and the four Busch North series 
races planned for OPS for the 1993 racing season and was told it would not. The 
planned ACT event for September 1992 was canceled, however, after Bahre filed 
                                                 
161 The discussion of this lawsuit is based primarily on the Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial in Liberty v. Bahre, filed in the U.S. district court (Maine) on April 21, 
2000. 
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 an injunction over his exclusive right to sell tires at OPS. Shortly thereafter, 
Liberty alleges that Brian France told him that it is not in NASCAR’s best interest 
to sanction races at racetracks that host (or attempt to host) races sanctioned by 
NASCAR’s competitors. 
 In order to hold ACT-sanctioned races at OPS, Bahre was paid $100,000 
for his exclusive tire concession. Over the period 1992-95, OPS hosted a regular 
schedule of ACT-sanctioned races, but the ticket prices for those races were 
substantially less than they had been for NASCAR-sanctioned races. NASCAR 
and Bahre allegedly convinced the Beech Ridge Motor Speedway to replace its 
ACT-sanctioned races with NASCAR-sanctioned races and encouraged and 
pressured race car drivers not to participate at OPS races. ACT went out of 
business in late 1995 and the 1995 season was the last stock car racing season 
held at OPS. 
 Liberty made an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to convince NASCAR to 
return to OPS. Liberty claims Bahre told him that he could broker at least three 
NASCAR-sanctioned races for the 1996 season at OPS if the exclusive tire 
concession was returned to him at no cost and if a roughly $11,500 sanctioning 
fee was paid to NASCAR. In January 1996, Liberty agreed to both conditions, but 
on April 23, 1996 Bahre informed Liberty that OPS would not get any races that 
season but things “looked good” for the 1997 season. In the spring of 1996, 
Liberty alleges that Bahre agreed to broker NASCAR-sanctioned races at OPS if 
Liberty guaranteed payment of an unsecured $1 million non-recourse debt 
obligation owed to Bahre by the insolvent Katahdin Corporation, in which Liberty 
had a controlling ownership interest. On July 31, 1996, Liberty signed an 
agreement personally guaranteeing the debt and releasing Bahre from liability for 
any and all past conduct. Liberty made a $400,000 payment to Bahre in October 
1996. By spring 1997, OPS still had not been notified that it would receive any 
NASCAR-sanctioned races in the 1997 season. Liberty alleges that, in spring 
1997, Bahre demanded additional payments on the Katahdin debt before he would 
secure any NASCAR dates. Liberty made a $200,000 payment to Bahre in May 
1997. When Liberty spoke with a NASCAR official in July 1997, he claims that 
he was told that OPS would get race dates once he paid the remaining $400,000 
due on the Katahdin debt. Liberty alleges that in the late spring of 1998, he was 
informed that Bahre would not broker any NASCAR-sanctioned events unless he 
was paid the remaining $400,000. Liberty terminated communications with Bahre 
and NASCAR in June 1998 and, later that year, Liberty sold half his equity 
interest in OPS to a third party and relinquished his entire ownership interest in 
the general partner and management entity. 
 Liberty filed a lawsuit against Bahre, William and Brian France, 
NASCAR, and International Speedway Corporation (which is controlled, albeit 
not wholly-owned, by the France family) on April 21, 2000. The allegations were 
not limited to violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, but also included 
fraud, interference with advantageous relationships, civil criminal conspiracy, 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, promissory estoppel, negligent 
misrepresentation, and RICO counts against some or all defendants. 
 Regarding the Section 1 count, Liberty alleged that “defendants agreed 
and/or conspired to engage in conduct that had the effect of restraining trade or 
commerce in the markets for motor speedway services and stock car racing 
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 sanctioning services in Northern New England.” The defendants allegedly sought 
to harm plaintiffs for doing business with NASCAR’s competitor ACT, drive the 
plaintiffs from the auto-racing business, drive ACT out of business, enhance the 
value of Bahre’s NHIS and pave the way for its eventual purchase by NASCAR,  
drive down the value of OPS and pave the way for its eventual purchase by 
defendants, control and/or limit the number of sanctioned car racing events in 
New England, and gain ownership and control of most, if not all, super-
speedways in the U.S. This conduct produced anti-competitive injury: 
 
Among other anti-competitive effects of defendants’ conduct, stock car 
racing fans in Northern New England who wish to attend competitive 
stock car racing events have no choice but to attend NASCAR-sanctioned 
events and pay the high ticket prices associated with such events; stock car 
racing fans in Northern New England no longer have the option of 
attending competitive stock car racing events at Oxford Plains; and fans of 
premier stock car racing such as the Winston Cup Tour face the dangerous 
probability of a market that is substantially if not entirely vertically 
integrated and the effect that such vertical integration is having and/or 
would have on the quality and/or price of premier stock car racing events. 
 
 
                                                
There were two counts of Section 2 violations. One concerned the alleged 
monopolization of sanctioning services – that Bahre, William and Brian France, 
and NASCAR “have monopolized, attempted to monopolize and/or conspired to 
monopolize the market for stock car racing sanctioning services in Northern New 
England and throughout the Northeast” and that, as a result of such conduct, 
“NASCAR has achieved monopoly power over the market for stock car racing 
sanctioning services in Northern New England and/or throughout the Northeast or 
has a dangerous probability of succeeding in monopolizing that market in either 
or both of those geographic areas.”162 NASCAR’s monopoly was maintained or 
extended by such exclusionary conduct as withholding or conspiring to withhold 
NASCAR’s sanction from Liberty and OPS, engaging or conspiring to engage in 
conduct to drive Liberty and ACT out of business, preventing or conspiring to 
prevent drivers from participating in auto races at OPS, and using NASCAR’s 
sanction to retaliate against Liberty, enrich Bahre, and enhance the value of 
International Speedway and its control over the market for super-speedway 
services. 
 
162 The Complaint’s use of the term ‘sanctioning services’ “is meant to encompass the 
panoply of functions and services performed and provided by NASCAR in 
connection with putting its name behind a stock car racing event or competitive 
touring series, including but not limited to the following: scheduling, booking and 
promoting stock car racing events; organizing, managing and promoting competitive 
touring series; negotiating and entering into contracts with motor speedway owners, 
television stations, sponsors and advertisers; attracting and licensing race car drivers; 
promulgating and enforcing rules and regulations for stock car racing events; and 
hiring and furnishing officials to preside over racing events and enforce NASCAR 
rules and regulations.” 
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  The second Section 2 count concerned the alleged monopolization of 
super-speedway services – that the defendants have “monopolized, attempted to 
monopolize, and/or conspired to monopolize the market for super-speedway 
services in the Northeast and/or throughout the United States” and, as a result of 
such conduct, “International Speedway has achieved monopoly power over the 
market for super-speedway services in the Northeast and/or throughout the United 
States or has a dangerous probability of succeeding in monopolizing that market 
in either or both of those geographic areas.”  Of the approximately 18 super-
speedways in the U.S., nine were owned by International Speedway. Bahre owned 
one (i.e., NHIS) and had a half-interest in another (i.e., the North Wilkesboro 
track). Most of the others were owned by Speedway Motorsports, which is 
substantially owned and controlled by Bruton Smith. Liberty alleges that Bahre 
claimed that he acquired the half-interest in the North Wilkesboro track at the 
urging of William France and NASCAR, who did not want the half-interest to be 
sold to the holder of the other half-interest, Speedway Motorsports, whose 
growing prominence was of great concern to NASCAR, and was rewarded by 
NASCAR for his efforts with a second Winston Cup date for NHIS. 
On August 21, 2000, four months after filing the lawsuit, Liberty had the 
case voluntarily dismissed.163 Shortly thereafter, Liberty filed a lawsuit in state 
court alleging breach of contract and fraud, but did not allege antitrust or 
racketeering violations because those allegations were believed to be drawing 
attention away from the main charges. 
Less than two years later, NASCAR and International Speedway 
Corporation (ISC) were defendants in a breach of contract and antitrust lawsuit 
brought by a minority shareholder of Speedway Motorsports Incorporated (SMI) 
regarding NASCAR’s alleged ‘promise’ to give a Winston Cup date to Texas 
Motor Speedway (TMS), which was built by SMI. SMI’s Bruton Smith claims 
that in 1995 then-NASCAR president William France implored him to “help me 
improve NASCAR” and SMI responded by revamping Charlotte (now Lowe’s) 
Motor Speedway, acquiring and vastly improving Atlanta Motor Speedway, and 
acquiring Sears Point (Infineon) Raceway, Bristol Motor Speedway, and Las 
Vegas Speedway.164 SMI also constructed the 180,000 seat Texas Motor 
Speedway after, according to Bruton Smith, France promised Smith a Winston 
Cup date at TMS. Smith asserts that NASCAR never followed through on its 
promise, while NASCAR denies there ever was such a promise.  
TMS gained a Winston Cup date in 1996 after SMI acquired a half interest 
in North Wilkesboro Speedway, which had two Winston Cup dates, and 
transferring one date to TMS. The other date was transferred to Bahre’s NHIS 
since Bahre had acquired the other half interest in North Wilkesboro. Although 
NASCAR had to approve the transfer of the Winston Cup date to TMS, Smith did 
not consider this approval a fulfillment of NASCAR’s promise of a Winston Cup 
                                                 
163 The information in this paragraph comes from the website ‘Jayski’s Silly Season Site’ 
at www.jayski.com. 
164 Blake (2006). 
-  - 201
 date for TMS. A second Winston Cup race at TMS was estimated to be worth 
more than $40 million.165 
ISC began as Bill France Racing Inc. with the construction of Daytona 
International Speedway in 1959 and later either built or acquired Alabama 
International Raceway (renamed Talladega Speedway), Darlington Speedway, 
Watkins Glen Speedway, and Phoenix International Raceway. In 1999, ISC 
acquired Penske Motorsports Inc., owner of speedways in Michigan, Richmond, 
Rockingham, and Southern California. ISC also had a minority interest in the 
Miami-Homestead Speedway, which was given a Winston Cup date in 1999. In 
2001, Winston Cup dates were given to ISC’s newly constructed Kansas City 
track and the Chicagoland Speedway, in which ISC owned an interest.  
In all, SMI owned six speedways which hosted nine of the 36 Winston 
Cup races, whereas ISC had 12 speedways with 18 Winston Cup races. The 
France family also owned a half-interest in Martinsville Speedway, which had 
two Winston Cup dates. There were ‘independent’ speedways in Dover, 
Indianapolis, New Hampshire, and Pocono with Winston Cup dates. 
The last three speedways to get Winston Cup dates were Homestead, 
Kansas City, and Chicagoland – all ISC tracks. In 1998, SMI’s Las Vegas track 
had been given a Winston Cup date. Thus, since TMS went into operation, one 
Winston Cup date was given to an SMI track and three went to ISC tracks. The 
question arose whether NASCAR was favoring ISC. There had been speculation 
for years that Bruton Smith could set up a rival auto racing sanctioning body to 
NASCAR, although Smith denied he would do so.  
Francis Ferko, an SMI shareholder, tried to persuade SMI to bring a 
lawsuit to get NASCAR to give TMS its promised Winston Cup date. When SMI 
declined, Ferko filed a lawsuit against NASCAR and ISC himself. His complaint, 
filed on February 13, 2000, alleged breach of contract and violations of Sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act. Ferko alleged that NASCAR and ISC conspired to 
award Winston Cup dates to speedways in which ISC had an ownership interest 
and, but for the conspiracy, the Winston Cup dates awarded to ISC’s Homestead 
and Chicago tracks would have instead been awarded to SMI’s Texas and Las 
Vegas tracks. Although SMI was not a plaintiff in the lawsuit, the judge required 
that SMI submit a written statement in support of Ferko’s allegations. 
Given that the Texas and Las Vegas speedways had much larger seating 
capacities than the Homestead and Chicago tracks, track revenue (at last in the 
short-run) arguably would have been higher if the dates had been given to Texas 
and Las Vegas.166 However, NASCAR presumably seeks to maximize its own 
profits, not the revenues of speedways that host Winston Cup races. NASCAR 
had been pursuing a strategy of broadening its geographic appeal by reducing the 
concentration of races located in the southeastern United States. Thus, it could 
have been in NASCAR’s unilateral interest to award Winston Cup dates in ‘new’ 
areas rather than award ‘second’ Winston Cup dates to existing speedways. 
                                                 
165 Cross (2004). 
166 Professor Dennis Carlton of Lexecon served as an expert witness for NASCAR. 
Professor Keith Leffler served as an expert witness for Ferko. 
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 Moreover, NASCAR did not have to ‘conspire’ with ISC to award Winston Cup 
dates to Homestead and Chicago – it could make that decision unilaterally. 
Moreover, NASCAR’s business practices were the opposite of what one 
would expect of someone monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a market. As 
Oxford Plains’ Michael Liberty learned from William France, NASCAR does not 
give multi-year sanctions. A Winston Cup date is awarded for a single season, 
after which NASCAR evaluates the track’s performance before deciding whether 
the track will receive a date the following season. Nor has NASCAR entered into 
multi-year deals with drivers. Thus, NASCAR has not attempted to lock-up the 
inputs which a rival sanctioning body would need to enter the market.  
If NASCAR is a natural monopolist, it may be difficult for a new 
sanctioning body to enter. However, anecdotal evidence suggests entry could 
occur and NASCAR could be dislodged from its dominant position. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, CART, the once-dominant open-wheel racing organization in the 
U.S., was displaced by the Indy Racing League (IRL) formed by Tony George, 
owner of the Indianapolis Motor Speedway. The Indianapolis Motor Speedway 
also hosts a Winston Cup race. Although it may seem implausible that an upstart 
auto race sanctioning organization could displace NASCAR, Tony George has 
shown that it can be done.  
On May 14, 2004, Ferko and NASCAR agreed on an out-of-court 
settlement that had a ripple effect on a number of speedways.167 NASCAR 
awarded TMS a second Winston Cup and a second Busch Series race to be held in 
November 2005, while SMI purchased the North Carolina Speedway in 
Rockingham from ISC for $100.4 million. In effect, SMI purchased 
Rockingham’s Winston Cup date and transferred it to TMS. NASCAR also 
decided on a further realignment, transferring one Winston Cup date from 
Darlington Raceway to ISC’s Phoenix International Raceway and pushing one of 
Atlanta’s dates to later in March due to weather concerns. ISC also acquired 
control of Martinsville Speedway, in which the France family had held a half-
interest. One commentator suggested NASCAR wanted to undertake such a 
geographic realignment of Winston Cup dates all along, moving dates from the 
old Southeastern tracks to the new, more profitable tracks, and that the Ferko 
lawsuit offered NASCAR the chance to do so while painting Bruton Smith as ‘the 
bad guy.’168 
Texas Motor Speedway was constructed, according to Smith, only after 
NASCAR promised it a Winston Cup date. What about a speedway that was 
constructed without such a promise? Would NASCAR have to, under threat of 
violating the antitrust laws, give it a Winston Cup date? Or would such a 
speedway be like the World Football League’s Mid-South Grizzlies or the 
Western Hockey League’s Seattle Totems discussed in Chapter 5. The Grizzlies 
sought to join the NFL; the Totems, the NHL. Both teams’ attempt to join the 
                                                 
167 ‘Jayski’s Silly Season Site – Lawsuits’ at www.jaski.com. As reported by Wilson 
(2005), in retrospect, Ferko regrets filing the lawsuit – he lost his job, moved from 
Plano, Texas to a new job in Atlanta, endured the suicide of his son who had 
remained in Texas, and was now heading for a divorce.  
168 Blake (2006). 
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 league by bringing an antitrust lawsuit failed, at least in part, because the teams 
were attempting to share in the league’s profits, not compete with the league. 
Thus, the failure to accept them into the leagues resulted in no harm to 
competition. 
Kentucky Speedway is a 1.5-mile tri-oval racing facility that opened in 
2000 and was designed and built to host premium stock car racing events such as 
Winston Cup races. The owner of the Kentucky Speedway acknowledges that it 
was built with no promise from NASCAR that it would ever receive a Winston 
Cup date. There were rumors that Kentucky Speedway hoped to buy Bahre’s New 
Hampshire International Speedway and move one or both of NHIS’s Winston 
Cup dates to Kentucky Speedway. Bahre also reportedly refused to ‘lease’ 
Kentucky Speedway one of NHIS’s Winston Cup dates.169 
The Nextel Cup (formerly the Winston Cup) race schedule includes 36 
races. Since the number of weekends in a year is fixed and only one Nextel Cup 
race can be run each weekend, there is an upper bound on the number of races 
that can be added to the Nextel Cup schedule. The Nextel Cup racing season 
already extends from February to November. NASCAR has said that it will only 
consider adding ‘new’ Nextel Cup dates if race locations can be found near New 
York City or Seattle. As a result, NASCAR gave the Kentucky Speedway Busch 
Series and Craftsman Truck Series race dates, but refused to give it a Nextel Cup 
date. Kentucky Speedway’s general manager, Mark Cassis, commented: “We 
thought we could earn our way into the series.”170 
On July 13, 2005, Kentucky Speedway filed an antitrust lawsuit against 
NASCAR and ISC alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.171 
Kentucky Speedway identified the relevant geographic market as the United 
States and two primary relevant product markets: (1) “the market for premium 
stock-car races and related testing and events” and (2) “the market for hosting a 
premium stock car racing event”: 
 
27. There are two primary relevant product markets for Kentucky 
Speedway’s claims. The first product market is the market for 
premium stock-car races and related testing and events. The NEXTEL 
Cup Series Races, which are controlled by NASCAR, are the only 
premium stock-car racing events sanctioned in the United States. 
Premium stock-car racing does not have a reasonably interchangeable 
substitute. Other stock-car racing, such as NASCAR Busch Series 
races, are in different product markets due to differences in consumer 
demand, consumer pricing, television revenue, and corporate 
sponsorship. Racetracks, such as the Kentucky Speedway, would 
                                                 
169 “Jayski’s Silly Season Site – Past New Hampshire International Speedway 
News/Rumors” at www.jayski.com. 
170 Wolf (2006). 
171 The discussion of this lawsuit is based primarily on the Complaint and Jury Demand 
in Kentucky Speedway v. NASCAR and ISC, filed in the U.S. district court (Eastern 
District of Kentucky at Covington) on July 13, 2005. 
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 derive substantially different economic benefits from hosting a 
NEXTEL Cup race, as opposed to a Busch Series race. 
 
28. The second product market is the market for hosting a premium stock 
car racing event. Very few racetracks in the United States are capable 
of hosting a premium stock-car racing event, because of issues relating 
to television broadcasting, fan accommodations, track conditions, and 
track facilities. Racetracks capable of hosting a premium stock car race 
do not have a reasonable interchangeable substitute. 
 
Kentucky Speedway alleged that, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, NASCAR and ISC “have acted, and continue to act, individually and in 
combination and collusion with each other and other companies that control 
tracks hosting the NASCAR NEXTEL Cup Series, to illegally restrict the award 
of NASCAR’s primary product races, the NASCAR NEXTEL Cup Series”. 
NASCAR and ISC allegedly restrict the award of Nextel Cup dates so as to:  
 
(a) assure that ISC racetracks or racetracks in which ISC has an equity 
interest are awarded the majority of these races; 
(b) award to ISC racetracks the majority of NASCAR NEXTEL Cup 
Series and NASCAR Busch Series back-to-back weekend races to 
assure that the greatest financial benefits from NASCAR-sanctioned 
racing events are obtained by ISC racetracks; 
(c) institute policies and procedures that have the purpose and effect of 
restraining the ability of non-ISC racetracks to develop competing 
products; 
(d) schedule, and realign when necessary, NASCAR NEXTEL Cup Series 
races in order to maximize current revenue to ISC racetracks and 
injure competing racetracks, such as Kentucky Speedway; 
(e) award NASCAR NEXTEL Cup Series races to ISC substantially in 
advance of the award of NASCAR NEXTEL Cup Series races to 
competing racetracks; 
(f) reserve NASCAR NEXTEL Cup Series race dates for award to newly 
constructed or purchased ISC racetracks, or racetracks ISC is 
considering purchasing, while withholding the award of these race 
dates to other qualified competing racetracks, such as Kentucky 
Speedway;  
(g) award multiple NASCAR NEXTEL Cup Series races to ISC 
racetracks while awarding no NASCAR NEXTEL Cup Series races to 
qualified competing racetracks such as Kentucky Speedway; and  
(h) award NASCAR NEXTEL Cup Series races to ISC racetracks while 
withholding award of these races to competing racetracks, such as 
Kentucky Speedway, irrespective of seating capacity, ticket sales, 
attendance, facility amenities, track location, track condition and 
safety, television ratings, race sponsorships, and/or consumer 
preference. 
 
-  - 205
 Kentucky Speedway alleged that, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, NASCAR “has illegally maintained a monopoly in the premium stock car 
racing market by, among other things, refusing to sanction a NEXTEL Cup Series 
racing event at the Kentucky Speedway and instituting rules and procedures that 
effectively prevent Kentucky Speedway from staging a competing premium stock 
car race” and “has also illegally leveraged its monopoly in the premium stock car 
racing market in an attempt to monopolize the market for hosting premium stock 
car races through ISC – a company that is owned in part by NASCAR’s 
principals.” Kentucky Speedway identified numerous types of anticompetitive 
conduct by NASCAR: 
 
31. NASCAR is a monopolist in the market for premium stock car races. 
NASCAR’s NEXTEL Cup series are the only premium stock car 
races that are currently sanctioned and hosted in the United States. 
NASCAR has the ability to control prices in connection with premium 
stock car races, including sanction fees, purses, merchandising rights 
and broadcasting revenue. NASCAR also has the ability to control 
output in the premium stock car racing market, and has artificially 
restricted the supply of premium stock car races well below consumer 
demand. In addition, NASCAR, through various anticompetitive rules 
and practices, has excluded competition in the premium stock car 
racing market. 
32. NASCAR has developed and implemented a NASCAR NEXTEL Cup 
Series points system, and other rules and regulations, through which 
NASCAR controls both NASCAR-related and non-NASCAR-related 
activities of drivers, crews, owners, and sponsors. The NASCAR 
point system effectively prevents participation in a non-NASCAR 
race in lieu of a NASCAR race, due to the substantial financial 
penalty involved… 
33. Another anticompetitive action taken by defendants is charging 
Kentucky Speedway disproportionately large purse and sanction fees, 
as compared to ISC tracks. For example, Kentucky Speedway 
purchased Louisville Speedway, and realigned a Craftsman Truck 
Race from Louisville Speedway to Kentucky Speedway. NASCAR 
raised the total awards to drivers from approximately $284,000 to 
$702,000, dramatically increasing the cost to Kentucky Speedway. 
However, when ISC’s tracks have moved races, the purses have either 
not increased or have increased by small amounts, and the purses 
required at ISC’s tracks for Craftsman Truck races are generally much 
lower than NASCAR requires of Kentucky Speedway. Similarly, 
Kentucky Speedway, Kansas Speedway and Chicagoland Speedway 
all received Busch Series races within the same year. Kentucky 
Speedway receives “B” television revenue while the other tracks, 
affiliated with ISC, receive higher “A” television revenue, with no 
rational basis. 
34. By starving competing racetracks of revenue, NASCAR and ISC are 
able to maintain and enhance their monopoly power through either: 1) 
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 purchase of those racetracks at fire-sale prices by ISC; 2) financially 
crippling those racetracks to reduce their potential competitive threat 
in the premium stock car race market; or 3) eliminating those 
racetracks from the market. Once ISC owns a racetrack, NASCAR 
will then increase the revenue to the newly-owned ISC racetrack by 
either scheduling a NEXTEL Cup race or directing other NASCAR-
related revenue to that racetrack. Homestead-Miami is an example of 
this conduct – it was unable to obtain a NEXTEL Cup race until ISC 
assumed ownership. The scheme also benefits ISC, which has gained 
increasing control of the market for racetracks capable of holding a 
premium stock car race. 
35. The actions of defendants not only stifle current competition in the 
markets for premium stock car racing and hosting, it also inhibits 
future competition as well. Any investor interested in spending the 
hundreds of millions of dollars necessary to build a state-of-the-art 
racetrack would be deterred with the knowledge that its ability to host 
a NASCAR NEXTEL Cup race would not be decided by a 
competitive process. Rather, the defendants would make a decision 
based upon whether it would increase NASCAR’s and ISC’s market 
power. Moreover, the defendants’ practices make it impossible to 
enter with a competing product in the premium stock car race market. 
 
Kentucky Speedway argued that it is a victim of NASCAR’s and ISC’s 
illegal behavior, along with NASCAR fans, drivers, sponsors, and radio and 
television broadcasters: 
 
The illegal actions of NASCAR and ISC have harmed every aspect of 
stock car racing. They have hurt race fans by causing higher ticket prices 
and creating fewer options to watch their favorite drivers. They have hurt 
the drivers by limiting the amount of money awarded by the tracks to the 
competitors, by restricting the races in which they can compete, and by 
discouraging the construction of new tracks. They have hurt sponsors by 
giving them fewer options in deciding to align with a particular race. They 
have hurt television and radio broadcasters by limiting the number of races 
featuring the highest-caliber drivers. And they have hurt independent 
racetracks such as Kentucky Speedway by doling out NEXTEL Cup races 
to those tracks that will best protect the market power of NASCAR and 
ISC – to the detriment of Kentucky Speedway and of all those who want 
to see true competition in the stock car racing industry. 
 
Kentucky Speedway sought an injunction requiring NASCAR “to institute 
a competitive bidding process to permit full and fair competition for the right to 
host a NEXTEL Cup Series race.” It also sought $400 million in damages (which 
would then be automatically trebled in accordance with the antitrust laws), a 
Nextel Cup date for the 2006 season, and the right to compete to host a Nextel 
Cup race in each subsequent year. On January 27, 2006, the district court denied 
NASCAR’s and ISC’s motion to dismiss and set a discovery deadline of February 
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 1, 2007. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal published on September 13, 
2007, Brian France offered these comments on the Kentucky Speedway 
lawsuit:172 
 
I think he’s wrong. They’re just very selfish about that. We have about as 
free a market in our situation as you can have. 
 
They built a facility, in our view, in the wrong place. They built the 
facility in a market that’s pretty heavily saturated with Nascar events. 
We’re happy to run there with some of our other things when we have 
space and availability. But they’re taking a position that somebody owes 
them something. 
 
It’s not different than me and you building a car dealership and saying, 
‘Hey Toyota, I think I could do a nice job; I’ve got a really nice 
dealership. Everything looks good. I’ll take a franchise.’ Things don’t 
work that way. In our system, it’s hard to say consumers are harmed in 
any way. All the stakeholders – from stockholders to drivers, teams, 
anybody in between – have done nothing but benefit from our business 
model. 
 
Forcing NASCAR to put its Nextel Cup race dates up for competitive 
bidding could hurt NASCAR’s product, as well as the speedways themselves. 
NASCAR has pursued a long-term strategy of increasing premium stock car 
racing’s appeal outside of its historic base – the southeastern United States. By 
sanctioning Nextel Cup races across the United States, NASCAR has been able to 
generate national interest in its product. As a result of its geographic expansion 
strategy, NASCAR has been able to negotiate multi-billion-dollar television deals 
and attract corporate sponsors. Those benefits may disappear if NASCAR is 
forced to award Nextel Cup dates to the highest bidder. Moreover, if speedways 
have to bid for Nextel Cup dates, their profits will fall. Under NASCAR’s current 
system, most of the rents generated by Nextel Cup races go to the speedways – 
NASCAR has not increased its sanctioning fee so as to extract those rents. Under 
a competitive bidding system, those rents would be transferred from the 
speedways to NASCAR. 
At least some of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct of which Kentucky 
Speedway complains has a procompetitive rationale. For example, fan interest is 
created by standings and championships and therefore it is hardly surprising that 
NASCAR has devised rules to determine a Nextel Cup series champion. To a 
driver hoping to win the championship, those rules may make participation in 
non-NASCAR races unappealing, which in turn may make it difficult for a rival 
sanctioning body to attract drivers for its races. Yet the overall effect of such rules 
may be to enhance the demand for Nextel Cup races.   
 
 
                                                 
172 Thompson (2007). 
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 In summary, stadium owners have brought a number of antitrust lawsuits against 
sports leagues. In the case of the NFL, the league’s relocation rules were successfully 
challenged by the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, enabling the Oakland Raiders to 
relocate to Los Angeles. However, the NFL’s imposition of a relocation fee was not 
successfully challenged. The St. Louis Convention and Visitors Center could not even get 
its antitrust case to the jury before being dismissed.  
Antitrust disputes between speedways and NASCAR involve a somewhat 
different set of issues. It is not a question of league rules regarding franchise relocations, 
but rather the awarding of extremely valuable race dates. None of the three recent cases 
has gone to trial. In one case, the antitrust charges were voluntarily dismissed. In another, 
there was a settlement in which Texas Motor Speedway ultimately received a ‘second’ 
Nextel Cup date. The third case is making its way through the judicial system. 
-  - 209
 Chapter 9 
 
Sports Leagues vs. Equipment Suppliers 
 
 
 
 One function of sports leagues is to set the ‘rules of the game.’ Sports leagues are 
interested in setting rules that enhance the demand for the league’s product. Major 
League Baseball, for example, was rumored to be using ‘juiced’ baseballs to reinvigorate 
interest in the sport after a disastrous strike (although the rumors now are that it was some 
of the players, not the baseballs, that were ‘juiced’). Some sports equipment innovations, 
however, may be so radical as to change the very nature of the sport. There is talk of golf 
courses being made obsolete by improvements in clubs and balls. Sports leagues have to 
decide (or decide not to decide) which innovations to permit and which to ban. 
Obviously, those rules (or the lack of rules) will impact the suppliers of sports 
equipment to league teams. For example, Major League Baseball does not permit players 
to use aluminum bats despite their ‘superior’ performance over wood bats. The NCAA 
currently permits the use of only those aluminum bats whose performance does not 
exceed that of wood bats. Thus, wood bat manufacturers would be impacted by the lack 
of any NCAA rule limiting the performance of aluminum bats, whereas aluminum bat 
manufacturers would be impacted by a rule limiting the performance, or even worse 
banning the use, of aluminum bats. However, simply because an equipment supplier is 
impacted by a sports league’s rules does not imply that the supplier has suffered an 
antitrust injury. League rules regarding equipment generally affect competitors, not 
competition in a relevant market. 
Lazaroff (1999) discusses how to apply the rule of reason to sports equipment 
standards, including delineation of the relevant geographic and product market as well as 
pro-competitive rationales for such standards. He argues that for products such as golf 
clubs and baseball bats, the relevant geographic market is the United States since 
manufacturers of those products sell throughout the country and purchases may be in 
person or by mail. A more difficult question arises as to the relevant product market, 
which “is generally defined as the cluster of products that are reasonably interchangeable 
taking price, use and quality into account.” (p. 156) The question arises over the extent to 
which high-price, high performance equipment and lower-price, lower performance 
equipment are substitutes, which ultimately depends on consumers’ purchasing behavior: 
 
Considering the fact that titanium golf clubs with graphite shafts often retail for 
several hundred dollars and many times the price of other clubs, one could 
reasonably contend that they constitute a relevant submarket separate from all 
other golf clubs. Similarly, the cost and quality of the best aluminum baseball bats 
arguably separate them from the lower cost, less powerful wooden models. This 
would be as economically realistic and sensible as arguing that top of the line 
luxury automobiles do not compete with the low end, economy models because 
luxury car buyers would simply not view the cheaper cars as a reasonable 
substitute. 
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 On the other hand, some differences in price and quality do not necessarily 
remove products from the market. Consumers may factor in the price and quality 
differentials when making a purchase and opt for either the higher quality/higher 
price item or the lower quality/cheaper product. The products may still be 
competing for the consumers’ dollars. At some point the differences in price and 
quality may suggest separate markets, but products need not be identical in 
quality and price to be considered part of the same competitive market. At their 
widest, the relevant markets will include all baseball bats and all golf clubs. More 
narrowly circumscribed markets consisting of only the more expensive, high-tech 
clubs and bats may be asserted, but the buying patterns of consumers should 
ultimately determine the relevant markets. (pp. 158-59) 
 
 The anticompetitive effects of sports leagues’ equipment standards may include a 
reduction in the quality of the available equipment, an increase in the price of that 
equipment, and a reduction in research and development. On the other hand, the pro-
competitive effects of sports leagues’ equipment standards may include increased safety 
of the sport (and thus possibly greater participation), as well as preventing the sport from 
being “fundamentally altered by technological advancements.”  If sports equipment 
became of such superior quality that athletic performance was no longer dependent on the 
athlete’s skills, consumers’ interest in participating in and viewing the sport may 
diminish. Thus, sports leagues may enhance the demand for their product by imposing 
equipment standards. 
Sports equipment suppliers have filed a number of (ultimately unsuccessful) 
lawsuits against sports leagues alleging that their equipment-related rules (or lack of 
rules) violated the antitrust laws. This chapter will focus on those involving NCAA 
baseball, professional tennis, golf, and bowling, and auto racing. 
 
 
NCAA Baseball. Aluminum baseball bats, which have been manufactured since 
the early 1970s, have never been allowed in Major League Baseball games. The 
NCAA, in contrast, has permitted the use of aluminum bats in NCAA baseball 
games since 1974. The early aluminum bats were not clearly superior to wood 
bats – aluminum bats were marketed more for their durability than their bat speed. 
However, as aluminum bats became lighter and more powerful, they enabled 
batters to swing faster and to make more precise contact with the ball. The result 
was that collegiate baseball games became ‘home run derbies’ with football-like 
scores. The NCAA was hit with antitrust lawsuits from both sets of bat 
manufacturers. First, it was sued by a wooden bat manufacturer for not adopting a 
rule limiting the performance of aluminum bats, and then it was sued by an 
aluminum bat manufacturer for adopting a rule limiting the performance of 
aluminum bats.  
 Given the superior performance of aluminum bats, the leading wood bat 
manufacturer – Baum Research and Development – saw its sales to collegiate 
teams plummet. On July 13, 1998, Baum filed an antitrust and tortious 
interference lawsuit against the NCAA and three aluminum bat manufacturers – 
Hillerich & Bradsby Co., Easton Sports, and Worth, Inc. Baum alleged that, in the 
words of the district court, “the bat manufacturers have conspired with the NCAA 
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 to manipulate the standard for baseball bats used in NCAA-sanctioned baseball 
games to perpetuate their dominance and exclude Baum from the market for 
baseball bats used in amateur baseball.” The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that, once again in the words of the district court, “Baum’s alleged injury 
is from competition rather than a lack of competition, and thus Baum’s injury 
does not arise from a violation of the antitrust laws.” On November 19, 1998, the 
district court granted the defendants’ request to dismiss the antitrust claim.173 
 The district court stated that the relevant market is “the market for baseball 
bats used in amateur baseball, which includes, but is not limited to, collegiate 
baseball.” The defendant aluminum bat manufacturers account for 90% of the 
sales in this market because their bats have superior performance relative to wood 
bats, but also cost more. At the time Baum filed the lawsuit, the NCAA did not 
have rules restricting the performance of bats that could be used in NCAA-
sanctioned baseball games. Baum argued that the lack of such rules (1) made such 
games unsafe due to the speed at which the ball travels after being hit with an 
aluminum bat, (2) compromised the ‘integrity’ of the game by favoring the 
offense over the defense and thus resulting in more high-scoring games, and (3) 
led aluminum bat manufacturers to aggressively compete with each other to 
design and produce high-performance aluminum bats. Baum contended that the 
lack of such rules was the result of a conspiracy by the NCAA and the aluminum 
bat manufacturers to drive Baum’s wood bat out of the market by, for example, 
the signing of exclusive agreements between the aluminum bat manufacturers and 
NCAA schools. The district court noted that Baum had suffered no antitrust injury 
– Baum’s harm was the result of it having an inferior product relative to that of 
the aluminum bat manufacturers, not because there had been harm to competition: 
 
Baum has not averred that competition in the amateur baseball bat market 
is at all reduced by virtue of the alleged conspiracy to manipulate the rules 
for baseball bats. Instead, Baum focuses exclusively on the fact that it 
cannot sell its bat in the relevant market without a rule regulating the 
performance of its competitors’ bats. Indeed, Baum acknowledges that 
H&B, Easton, and Worth have “aggressively competed with each other.” 
Thus the fatal flaw in Baum’s case: the NCAA rules, even if the result of a 
conspiracy that violates the antitrust laws, pose no threat to competition in 
the relevant market. In fact, there is a logical inference that the absence of 
a rule regulating bat performance actually fosters competition… 
 
Baum has only alleged an injury to a single competitor: itself. Baum has 
not alleged an injury to the amateur baseball bat market as a whole. In 
fact, it has alleged the opposite: that lax standards have allowed its 
competitors to compete “aggressively” with each other by designing and 
manufacturing superior products. Baum’s alleged injury – its inability to 
sell the Baum Bat – is not the result of any anticompetitive effect on the 
market. Rather, Baum’s injury stems from the competition itself: the 
                                                 
173 Baum Research and Development v. Hillerich & Bradsby, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. 
Mi S.D. 1998). 
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 performance of Baum’s wooden composition bat is inferior to that of the 
bats manufactured by H&B, Easton, and Worth. 
 
 
                                                
On December 4, 1998, Baum filed a motion for reconsideration and to 
amend its complaint. On October 28, 1999, the district court ruled that both 
Baum’s original and proposed amended complaints stated no antitrust claim, but 
the proposed amended complaint did state a claim for tortious interference with 
business relations:174  
 
None of the proposed amendments would alter the flawed theory which is 
the basis for Baum’s antitrust claims. The Michigan court properly 
concluded that even if Baum suffered injury as a result of antitrust 
violations by defendants, Baum’s injury was not the result of any 
anticompetitive effect on the market, but rather stemmed from competition 
itself. Baum’s effort to evade the ruling by alleging that it claims injury to 
a competitor rather than to competition are to no avail. The assertion that 
defendants’ conduct injured Baum and other wood and wood composition 
bat manufacturers and the liberal use of the word “competition,” 
throughout the allegations of antitrust injury, do not alter the nub of 
Baum’s case. The proposed complaint still alleges that non-restrictive bat 
performance standards granted a competitive advantage to aluminum bat 
manufacturers, “which had the effect in the markets of excluding 
competitors such as Baum,” and that Baum was the “specific target” of the 
aluminum bat manufacturers. The gravamen of the proposed complaint 
remains the same as the original, legally insufficient, complaint. 
 
 As the Baum litigation was making its way through the judicial system, 
the NCAA was taking steps to set limits on the performance of aluminum bats. 
On August 12, 1998, only a month after Baum filed its original antitrust lawsuit, 
the NCAA’s Executive Committee approved a rule setting specifications and 
performance standards for baseball bats to be used in NCAA-sanctioned games, 
with the goal of making aluminum bats perform more like wood bats. Five days 
earlier, on August 7, one of the aluminum bat manufacturers, Easton Sports, had 
preemptively filed a $267 million lawsuit against the NCAA alleging that the rule 
constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. The NCAA delayed implementation of the rule, which would have 
limited the speed at which a baseball leaves a bat to 93 miles per hour, limited the 
diameter of bats, and altered bats’ length-to-height differential. On September 28, 
1999, the NCAA Executive Committee accepted a research panel’s 
recommendation to limit the speed at which a baseball leaves a bat to 97 miles per 
hour for at least three years, beginning January 2000. Since its existing bats 
complied with the revised rule, Easton chose to settle its lawsuit against the 
NCAA. 
 
174 In re: Baseball Bat Antitrust Litigation (MDL No. 1249), 75 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Ks 
1999). 
-  - 213
  Cusimano (1999-2000) examines whether the revised NCAA rule 
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. Easton had defined the relevant 
market to be “the purchase of high performance bats for use by college baseball 
players.” Since the majority of schools with baseball teams are NCAA members, 
Easton argued that the NCAA had substantial market power in this market and 
that the rule discriminated against the makers of high performance aluminum bats 
since the rule required them to produce bats which possessed the same 
performance characteristics as Baum’s wood bats. Easton alleged that, as a result 
of the rule, the quality of baseball bats in the relevant market would be reduced, 
which in turn would reduce the quality of the games. The NCAA countered that 
the rule did not limit who could make or sell bats to NCAA teams and thus did 
not harm competition in the relevant market. Moreover, the NCAA identified a 
number of pro-competitive rationales for the rule: (1) to preserve the integrity of 
the game and (2) safety. Easton disputed both alleged rationales. Overall, 
Cusimano concludes: 
 
The NCAA is undoubtedly a unique entity. Although the NCAA is not 
involved in manufacturing and selling athletic equipment, and NCAA 
rules only govern college sports, NCAA activities can have a significant 
impact in the marketplace. The NCAA is a formidable opponent to Easton 
or any other bat manufacturer who chooses to step up to the plate and 
challenges the NCAA’s new baseball bat regulations. 
 
The restriction’ s potential incidental anticompetitive effect on certain 
manufacturers does not, in itself, render the performance standards 
unreasonable under rule of reason analysis. The NCAA has offered 
legitimate non-economic pro-competitive justifications for the stricter 
limits, and there is sufficient evidence showing that the regulations are 
reasonably related to the NCAA’s objectives. (p. 1088) 
 
 
Professional Tennis. The United States Tennis Association (USTA) sanctions 
amateur and professional tournament tennis in the United States. The USTA is a 
member of the International Tennis Federation (ITF), an international 
organization consisting of the 104 national tennis associations worldwide. A 
condition of ITF membership is that the ITF Rules of Tennis will be used in all 
tournaments sanctioned by the national organization. Changes to the ITF Rules of 
Tennis require at least a two-thirds majority vote by members at the annual 
meeting. 
 The ‘double-strung’ racket was developed in the 1970s in West Germany. 
It had two layers of main strings, in contrast to the conventional tennis racket 
which has interlaced and interwoven strings that are all on the same plane. A 
question arose as to whether hitting a tennis ball with a double-strung racket 
resulted in a ‘double hit’, which is not permitted in the game of tennis. On May 2, 
1977, the Swiss Tennis Association contacted the ITF to inquire whether it 
accepted a newly-marketed tennis racket that had double strings. The ITF’s 
Committee of Management (COM) examined information about the racket, 
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 including written reports from various national associations where the racket had 
been used and player reactions. Relative to a conventional racket, a double-strung 
racket generates more spin to a ball hit with a topspin stroke, resulting in fewer 
service returns. Thus, allowing the use of double-strung rackets would favor 
players who develop a very efficient serve and such matches will be characterized 
by relatively fewer service returns than matches with conventional rackets, 
thereby changing the ‘integrity’ and ‘character’ of the game of tennis. The COM 
decided that, effective October 3, 1977, only single-string rackets could be used in 
official tournaments. The purpose of the temporary ban on the use of the double-
strung racket was to give the ITF time to conduct further research on how use of 
the racket affects match play. On October 18, 1977, the USTA announced that it 
would honor the ITF’s temporary ban. At the July 1978 annual ITF meeting, 
members unanimously approved a rule that defined a tennis racket in such a way 
as to exclude double-strung rackets, as well as other non-conventional rackets. 
Gunter Harz Sports manufactured and distributed tennis rackets, as well as 
tennis racket strings and stringing systems, in the United States and 
internationally. Gunter Harz had obtained the exclusive rights to market the 
double-strung racket from its inventor, Werner Fischer. Harz modified Fischer’s 
design and, prior to the July 1978 ITF vote, Harz and Fischer began lobbying the 
tennis community to support double-strung rackets. On December 28, 1979, 
Gunter Harz Sports brought an antitrust lawsuit against the USTA alleging, in the 
district court’s words, “a group boycott of double-strung tennis rackets, having 
the express purpose as well as effect of restraining competition in the manufacture 
and distribution of tennis rackets and tennis racket stringing systems in violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”175 The USTA’s position, once again in the 
district court’s words, was that “the actions of the USTA are exempt from the 
jurisdiction of the Sherman Act under the circumstances of this case because the 
USTA bears no competitive or other business relationship to Harz Sports or to 
any other manufacturer of tennis equipment and, therefore, has no commercial or 
profit motivation for restraining trade by banning plaintiff’s racket.” 
The lawsuit was tried without a jury and on March 4, 1981 the district 
court issued its opinion finding that the USTA did not violate the antitrust laws. 
The district court noted that the case did not involve “an agreement between 
‘business competitors in the traditional sense’” and that the USTA’s actions in 
adopting a rule defining tennis rackets cannot “be labeled as lacking in ‘any 
redeeming virtue.’” Thus, the district court proceeded with a rule of reason 
analysis and set forth a four-part test applicable to “areas where a need for self-
regulation is inherent in an industry” (which includes professional and amateur 
sports organizations): “(1) whether the collective action is intended to accomplish 
an end consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation; (2) whether the action 
is reasonably related to that goal; (3) whether such action is no more extensive 
than necessary; and (4) whether the association provides procedural safeguards 
which assure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnish a basis for 
judicial review.”  
                                                 
175 Gunter Harz Sports v. USTA, 511 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Ne 1981). 
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 The district court rejected the USTA’s argument that, as a member of the 
ITF, it had no choice but to abide by the ITF’s decision to define tennis rackets in 
such a way as to exclude non-conventional rackets such as the double-strung 
racket. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the USTA’s actions 
survived the four-part rule of reason test: 
 
In sum, the Court ultimately finds under the rule of reason analysis, that 
the concerted action engaged in by the defendant, USTA, was intended to 
further the legitimate goals of preserving the essential integrity of the 
game of competitive tennis and conducting that game in an orderly 
fashion; that the temporary freeze of double-strung rackets and the 
subsequent adoption of Rule 4 were rationally related to those goals and 
no more extensive than necessary; and that adequate procedural 
safeguards were provided. Any effect the USTA’s actions had on 
plaintiff’s ability to compete in the market for tennis rackets and tennis 
racket stringing systems was incidental to the USTA’s primary purpose in 
promoting tennis competition. 
 
The Court, therefore, concludes that the defendant’s actions do not 
constitute a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 
Gunter Harz Sports unsuccessfully appealed the district court’s decision. 
On December 2, 1981, the appeals court concluded that the district court’s 
findings “have substantial support in the record and we find no merit in the 
contrary assertions by Harz Sports.”176 
 
 
Professional Golf. The United States Golf Association (USGA) and the Royal and 
Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews (R&A) jointly formulate, copyright, and 
publish the Rules of Golf. The R&A is the ruling body for golf in countries other 
than the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The USGA has more than 6,000 
member golf clubs and courses, which are not required to adhere to the USGA 
rules, although most do. Golf balls, clubs, and shoes are all subject to the Rules of 
Golf. 
 An example of a golf ball innovation opposed by the USGA was the 
Polara ‘asymmetric’ golf ball which was designed to fly straighter than ‘ordinary’ 
(i.e., symmetrical) golf balls due to its smaller, shallower dimples at the ball’s 
poles.177 Polara submitted the ball for the USGA’s approval, but the USGA 
refused to put it on its list of approved balls even though the Polara ball met all 
existing rules and specifications. In 1981, the USGA adopted a new rule requiring 
golf balls to be aerodynamically spherically symmetrical. Polara sued the USGA 
alleging that the USGA conspired with golf equipment manufacturers to keep the 
                                                 
176 Gunter Harz Sports v. USTA, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981). 
177 This paragraph is based primarily on the discussion of Polara Enterprises v. USGA in 
Carton (1991). Gelberg (1996) presents a case study of the Polara golf ball and the 
USGA’s attempt to prevent new technologies from harming the game of golf. 
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 Polara ball out of the market. The case went to trial, with the USGA arguing that 
keeping the Polara ball off its approved list was in the best interest of the game of 
golf because the Polara ball took the skill out of the game. The jury disagreed, 
awarding Polara $1,475,000 in antitrust damages. Notwithstanding the jury 
verdict, the court entered judgment for the USGA, ruling that “the verdict was 
substantially contrary to the weight of the evidence.”178 An out-of-court 
settlement was reached shortly afterwards.  
 The Rules of Golf also have been used to limit the performance of golf 
clubs. In 1942, the USGA and R&A adopted a rule that required the grooves on 
the face of a club to be V-shaped and the space between the grooves had to be at 
least three times the groove’s width. In 1984, the USGA and R&A adopted a new 
rule which permitted U-shaped grooves but did not specify how the width of a 
groove would be measured. Karten Manufacturing Corporation, which designs, 
manufacturers, and sells golf equipment in the United States and throughout the 
world, then introduced PING EYE2 irons with U-shaped grooves, which became 
very popular with golfers and accounted for 99% of Karsten’s production of irons. 
More than 150 professional golfers were sponsored by Karsten and played with 
PING EYE2’s. 
 In 1987, the USGA devised the “30-degree method” for measuring groove 
width. The R&A later adopted the method and ruled that, beginning January 1, 
1990, it would be used for all USGA/R&A championships and, beginning January 
1, 1996, it would be used for all events played under the Rules of Golf. The 
USGA and R&A determined that the PING EYE2 did not conform because the 
distance between its U-shaped grooves was less than three times the width of a 
groove as measured by the 30-degree method. Other golf club manufacturers also 
were found to have nonconforming clubs. Interestingly, the USGA and R&A 
found that some PING EYE2 clubs did conform. 
 On August 10, 1989, Karsten filed an antitrust lawsuit against the USGA 
and R&A seeking $100 million in damages. Five months later, on January 11, 
1990, the district court dismissed the charges against R&A and its individual 
defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction.179 Shortly thereafter, Karsten and the 
USGA reached an out-of-court settlement, which had three key components: (1) 
the USGA agreed to clarify its measurement rules so as to properly describe the 
measurement of grooves with rounded edges, (2) Karsten agreed to re-tool its 
PING clubs to the rules as written, and (3) PING clubs which had already been 
sold would be ‘grandfathered.’180  
 The Professional Golfers’ Association of America (PGA) administers 
professional golf tournaments for the regular Tour and the Senior Tour and is a 
separate organization from, and independent of, the USGA. After the USGA 
changed the rules of golf to permit U-shaped grooves, players on the PGA Tour 
began to complain that the U-shaped grooves were, in the words of the appeals 
court, “detracting from the skill level of the game” because “the U-grooves 
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 imparted more spin on the ball and thus provided greater control for shots from 
grassy lies of the rough” which “offsets the advantage of players with the skill 
necessary to keep the golf shot in the fairways.” In 1987, the USGA and PGA 
both conducted tests confirming that U-shaped grooves impart more spin on the 
ball, although in June of that year the USGA concluded that there was not yet 
sufficient evidence to bar clubs with U-shaped grooves. (However, as discussed 
above, the USGA did adopt a new method of measuring the space between the 
grooves which had the effect of banning PING EYE2 clubs.) The PGA surveyed 
Tour golfers and found that 73% used clubs with U-shaped grooves, 74% 
indicated that U-shaped grooves provide greater control from the wet grass and 
rough, and 60% believed the PGA should ban the use of clubs with U-shaped 
grooves.  
On May 12, 1988, the PGA Commissioner recommended a proposed rule 
change banning clubs with U-shaped grooves. The PGA received comments from 
club manufacturers and made some changes to the proposed rule. In the 
meantime, the USGA finished tests confirming that U-shaped grooves produced a 
different spin rate on balls hit from the rough than clubs with V-shaped grooves, 
although the USGA also determined that the difference was not sufficiently 
significant to justify a ban on clubs with U-shaped grooves. Nevertheless, the 
PGA Commissioner recommended that the PGA adopt a U-groove ban. At its 
February 28, 1989 meeting, with all of the player directors and PGA officer 
directors abstaining due to conflicts of interest, the three independent directors 
unanimously voted in favor of the ban, with the effective date of the rule being 
January 1, 1990. On December 1, 1989, Karsten filed a lawsuit against the PGA 
alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Evidentiary hearings were held on December 15, 19, and 20, 1989. 
Karsten’s vice president testified that U-shaped grooves do not improve player 
performance. Karsten’s expert witness, economist Richard Smith, testified that U-
shaped grooves have not had a negative impact on the PGA. Smith testified that 
the PING EYE2 does not give the players who use it an advantage, as evidenced 
by the fact that the percentage of prize money won by players using that club is 
less than the percentage of players using it. Smith also testified that consumers’ 
choice of golf clubs is correlated with professional golfers’ choice of clubs and 
the PGA ban had caused a drop in Karsten’s market share of golf clubs and other 
products. Moreover, Smith testified that Karsten’s reputation would be harmed if 
it was forced to produce a club conforming to the PGA rule. On the other hand, 
the Tour’s all-time leading money-winner, Tom Kite, testified U-grooves 
diminish the skill factor of the game of golf by offsetting the advantage of being 
able to hit the ball on the fairway. The PGA Commissioner testified that, if a 
preliminary injunction against implementation of the PGA rule were granted, the 
PGA would be unable to propagate any rules for the professional tournaments it 
oversees. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction enjoining the PGA from implementing the rule banning U-shaped 
grooves. The PGA appealed. On June 12, 1991, the appeals court affirmed the 
district court’s decision.181 
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  Six days prior to the trial’s start, Karsten and the PGA reached an out-of-
court settlement. The PGA agreed to respect the USGA’s primacy in rulemaking, 
as did Karsten (although it had already done so three years earlier). Furthermore, 
in exchange for Karsten’s vow to respect the USGA’s primacy in rulemaking, the 
PGA dropped its rule against U-shaped grooves.182 
 More recently, a dispute between the USGA and golf club manufacturers 
has arisen over a proposed rule to limit the spring-like effect off the face of 
drivers.183 On October 18, 2000, Callaway Golf introduced the ERC II, a 
nonconforming club designed to exceed the USGA’s test for spring-like effect. 
However, Calloway did not file a lawsuit against the USGA. Callaway’s position 
is that there are two levels of golf – ‘elite’ and ‘recreational’ – and the ERC II is 
for recreational golfers, who comprise the vast majority of all golfers. As long as 
the USGA did not attempt to ‘stigmatize’ users of the ERC II, Callaway said it 
would not sue.  
 Golf shoes have also been at the center of an antitrust dispute between the 
USGA and an equipment manufacturer. Weight-Rite Golf Corporation 
manufactured and distributed a golf shoe with a patented wedge design that 
incorporated an angled wedge on the outside of the sole which assisted golfers by 
distributing their weight so as to better resist the tendency to push away from the 
ball when swinging. On March 1, 1990, the USGA’s Technical Director 
determined that the Weight-Rite shoe violated Rule 14-3 of the Rules of Golf, 
which states that a player “shall not use any artificial device or unusual equipment 
… which might assist him in gripping the club, in making a stroke or in his play.” 
Six days later, the USGA notified Weight-Rite and other professional golf 
associations of its determination. Some retailers reportedly stopped ordering the 
Weight-Rite shoes and returned their previously-ordered stock. Weight-Rite 
responded by marketing its shoes directly to consumers. It also appealed the 
USGA’s determination to the Equipment Standards Committee and the USGA 
Executive Committee, both of which concluded that the Weight-Rite shoe violates 
Rule 14-3. 
 Weight-Rite sued the USGA alleging violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act. The USGA motioned for summary judgment. On March 12, 1991, 
the district court granted the USGA’s motion, finding that “there is no genuine 
issue of material fact for trial and the USGA is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law.”184 Weight-Rite did not oppose summary judgment in favor of the 
USGA on the Section 2 claim. Regarding the Section 1 conspiracy claim, the 
court noted that Weight-Rite has “identified no direct evidence in the record 
which shows that USGA members must disqualify golfers from play on their 
courses if the golfer uses non-conforming equipment” and “identified no record 
evidence to show that the USGA has taken adverse action against a member for 
allowing a golfer to use non-conforming equipment on the member’s course.” 
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 Regarding the unreasonable restraint of trade claim, the court noted that on 
September 12, 1990 it had held that the challenged conduct did not fit within the 
class of restraints held to be per se unlawful and thus the present question is 
whether a fact finder could reasonably find a violation of the rule of reason. The 
court observed that Weight-Rite had not clearly defined the relevant market but 
for the purposes of the summary judgment motion it would assume that the 
relevant market is “the market for golf shoes in the United States.” The district 
court commented on the affidavit submitted by Samuel J. Kursh on behalf of 
Weight-Rite: 
 
The affidavit contains no specific facts to support the conclusion that the 
USGA’s determination that the Weight-Rite shoe does not conform to the 
Rules of Golf substantially restrained competition in the golf shoe market 
in the United States. There also is no other evidence in the record to 
support this conclusion. At most, Plaintiffs have presented evidence from 
which a fact finder could find that the USGA has the power to 
substantially decrease the marketability of certain types of golf shoes and 
that the marketability of Plaintiffs’ shoe (as currently designed and 
manufactured) has been substantially diminished. Evidence that a single 
competitor has been removed from a relevant product market, in and of 
itself, is insufficient to establish a violation of the rule of reason… 
 
Plaintiffs have not presented evidence from which a fact finder could find 
that the USGA’s determination has significantly restrained the operation 
of the free market with respect to the golf shoe industry. Plaintiffs also 
have not submitted evidence to controvert the USGA’s showing that the 
purpose of Rule 14-3 of the Rules of Golf is to “preserve the traditions of 
the game, and to insure that a player’s score is the product of his skill, 
rather than his equipment.” The USGA is, therefore, entitled to summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 
 
                                                
Weight-Rite appealed the district court’s decision. On January 17, 1992, in 
a one-word opinion, the appeals court affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the USGA.185 
 
 
Professional Bowling. The Professional Bowlers Association of America (PBA) 
organizes and promotes televised bowling tournaments in the United States. There 
are about 34 PBA tournaments annually, for which the PBA receives licensing 
fees from television networks and sponsorship fees from corporations which want 
to associate their name with a particular tournament. The PBA also establishes 
rules and regulations for PBA-sanctioned tournaments, including product 
standards for bowling balls and other bowling equipment. For example, PBA 
rules prohibit bowlers from wearing the logos of more than three commercial 
 
185 Weight-Rite Golf v. USGA, 953 F.2d 651 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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 sponsors on their shirt and pants and the PBA must approve each logo a bowler 
wants to wear. 
 In 1985, Eureka Urethane, a bowling ball manufacturer, introduced the 
‘Bud Ball’ – a ‘Budweiser red’ bowling ball with the Budweiser bow tie logo on 
its side. Eureka had obtained a license from the maker of Budweiser beer, 
Anheuser-Busch. A year earlier, Eureka had introduced the Blue Tank, which had 
a picture of a military tank on its side. The Blue Tank was approved by the PBA; 
the Bud Ball was not. 
 The Bud Ball elicited negative reactions from both the corporate sponsors 
and networks televising PBA tournaments. One of the sponsors of PBA 
tournaments was Miller Brewing Company, Anheuser-Busch’s competitor. 
Miller’s contract with the PBA gave Miller the right to exclude advertising for 
competing products during the tournaments it sponsored. After the introduction of 
the Bud Ball, Miller’s contract with the PBA was changed so that bowling items 
containing commercial logos would be banned from Miller-sponsored 
tournaments. NBC, the television network which was to air the 1986 Fall Tour, 
also objected to the Bud Ball, saying it would not show the Bud Ball if used 
during a televised tournament and threatened not to televise the tournament at all. 
In televising a bowling match in which the Bud Ball was being used, NBC would 
basically be providing free ‘intra-program’ advertising to Anheuser-Busch, which 
would make the commercial spots during the tournament less valuable. 
 Although the Bud Ball was approved for use by the American Bowling 
Congress on December 5, 1985 and by the Ladies Professional Bowlers Tour in 
November 1986, the PBA Executive Board refused to approve the Bud Ball’s use 
in PBA-sanctioned tournaments. It was the first ball ever submitted to the PBA 
which did not receive its approval. The Timber Lane ball – named after a bowling 
alley – had been approved for use, but only in regional tournaments in the 
Northwest, not in national televised tournaments. 
After failing to obtain the PBA’s approval of the Bud Ball, Eureka  
introduced the Black Tank, which was identical to the Bud Ball in construction 
and composition but was black instead of ‘Budweiser red’ and had a logo of a 
military tank on its side instead of the Budweiser logo. The PBA approved the use 
of the Black Tank in PBA-sanctioned tournaments beginning April 18, 1988. 
Eureka filed a lawsuit against the PBA alleging seven counts of violations 
of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as one count of tortious 
interference with business relations. The PBA filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the antitrust counts. On September 6, 1990, the district court granted 
the PBA’s motion and exercised its discretion to dismiss the tortious interference 
claim.186 
The PBA argued that the seven antitrust counts had to fail because it did 
not possess monopoly power in the relevant market. Eureka had defined the 
relevant market to be “items used by professional bowlers during televised 
tournament play.” While the district court believed this definition to be too 
narrow, it stated that the PBA has “failed to present the Court with sufficient 
evidence to expand the relevant product market to include other means of 
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 advertising a bowling ball.” For example, the PBA had not presented evidence 
regarding the cross-elasticity of demand among the various means of advertising 
bowling balls, such as spot commercials, tournament sponsorships, print 
advertisements, and paid endorsements.  
The district court found that, for the purposes of summary judgment, “the 
product market to be defined is that for the advertisement of a bowling ball.” It 
explained that “plaintiff seeks to advertise the Bud Ball in order to sell bowling 
balls, not beer,” and: “The mere fact that the bowling ball contains the logo of a 
beer manufacturer does not change the nature of the product from bowling balls to 
beer.” The court noted that Anheuser-Busch was not a plaintiff and had not 
alleged that it had been injured by the PBA’s refusal to approve the Bud Ball. The 
district court thus assumed that the relevant product market is “the items used by 
professional bowlers during televised tournament play.” 
Regarding the Section 2 claims, the district court found that the PBA does 
possess monopoly power in the relevant market, where ‘monopoly power’ is 
defined as “the power to control prices and to exclude competition with respect to 
a particular product and within a particular geographic market.” However, the 
PBA did not engage in anticompetitive behavior. Its actions “were neither 
unreasonable nor anticompetitive but a valid exercise of business judgment to 
protect that enterprise.” Approval of the Bud Ball would have endangered the 
1986 Fall Tour because NBC was threatening not to televise the tournaments, 
Miller Brewing may have refused to be a sponsor, and (assuming the tournaments 
were televised) the value of spot commercial time may have fallen, thereby 
reducing the prize money and in turn hurting professional bowlers. 
One Section 2 count alleged that the PBA denied Eureka an ‘essential 
facility’, which Eureka defined as “the items which professional bowlers may use 
during televised tournament play.” Eureka argued that this facility is essential for 
the effective promotion of its commercial bowling items and that the PBA has 
monopoly power over this facility. As the district court explained, “The essential 
facilities doctrine requires (1) control of an essential facility by a monopolist, (2) 
the inability to practically or economically duplicate the facility, and (3) the 
unreasonable denial of the use of the facility to a competitor when such use is 
economically and technically feasible.” For the purposes of summary judgment, 
the court assumed (1) and (2), and then explained why condition (3) was not 
satisfied – Eureka and the PBA are not competitors. 
The district court rejected Eureka’s claim that the PBA employs an illegal 
tying arrangement, with the tying product being the right to enter PBA-sanctioned 
tournaments and the tied product being membership in the PBA. The court noted 
that “the laws against tie-in arrangements were designed to protect competition in 
the tied market” and added: “Although plaintiff’s injury may be causally related 
to the alleged illegal tie-in, plaintiff’s injury is only tangential to that which the 
antitrust laws were designed to protect.” 
Regarding the Section 1 claims, the district court found that “Miller was 
not a participant in any concerted action.” Miller’s action to alter its sponsorship 
contract “was taken independently and unilaterally.” As for the other alleged 
conspirators, which included NBC, ABC, and some PBA Executive Board 
members, none are competitors of Eureka and group boycotts “are considered to 
be per se illegal only when they are engaged in by competitors of the plaintiff.” 
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 Similarly, regarding the price fixing count which alleged that the PBA and the 
networks maintained an artificially high level of advertising prices for spot 
commercials by prohibiting advertising on bowling balls, the court could not  
“characterize the price restraint as horizontal because the alleged co-conspirators 
are not competitors of each other or of the plaintiff” and could not “characterize 
the price restraint as classically vertical because defendants do not sell to the 
networks a product or service for which a resale price is fixed.” Therefore, “the 
alleged price restraint is not a per se violation of Section 1 and will instead 
proceed to a rule of reason analysis.” The court argued: 
 
As was explained supra, the intention of defendants was not to harm or 
unreasonably restrain competition. Instead, defendants’ refusal to sanction 
the Bud Ball was a sound exercise of business judgment designed to 
secure its continued efficacy in serving the interests of professional 
bowlers. 
 
The restraint does have an anticompetitive effect in that it forecloses the 
Bud Ball from entry into the submarket defined, supra. The Court, 
however, has weighed the anticompetitive effects of the foreclosure 
against the rights of defendants to administer the sport of professional 
bowling and the networks to earn revenue from the sale of advertising 
spots, and concludes that any competitive effects are not significant. The 
Court has considered the ramifications of plaintiff’s position to the 
television broadcasts of sporting or other events. The heart of this suit is 
not a conflict between plaintiff, a manufacturer of sporting goods, and 
defendant, an organizer and promoter of sporting events. Instead, the 
conflict is between plaintiff and the networks that televise sporting events. 
Plaintiff’s position is that the athlete in a televised sporting event should 
be able to endorse the product of a sporting goods manufacturer by his use 
of the product. The sporting goods manufacturer receives a valuable 
endorsement from the athlete; the athlete is handsomely paid by the 
manufacturer in the form of an incentive payment. Therefore, both the 
sporting goods manufacturer and the athlete benefit by this arrangement. 
The networks, which are in the business of selling advertising, suffer in 
two ways. First, the networks are compelled to permit advertising during 
their telecast for which they are not compensated. Second, the intra-
program advertising decreases the price of spot-commercial programming. 
The antitrust laws do not require, and this Court will not compel, the 
networks to give away the product or service that they are in the business 
of selling. 
 
 The district court thus granted the PBA’s motion to dismiss all antitrust 
counts and the court exercised its discretion to dismiss the tortious interference 
count. Eureka appealed the district court decision. On June 28, 1991, the appeals 
-  - 223
 court ruled that it was “not persuaded that the district court made any error of law 
in its thorough and carefully researched opinion.”187 
 
 
Auto Racing. There are numerous auto racing sanctioning organizations, including 
the National Association of Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR), the United States 
Auto Club (USAC), the International Motor Contest Association (IMCA), and the 
Sports Car Club of America (SCCA). These organizations set performance 
standards for the multitude of pieces of racing equipment in each car. The goal is 
to ensure that the winner of the sanctioned race is determined by the skill of the 
driver, not by the quality of the driver’s equipment. Presumably the demand for 
auto racing is greater when drivers compete with cars using similar equipment and 
the winner is determined by drivers’ skills than when the race winner is largely 
determined by which driver is willing to spend the most for high-performance 
equipment. On a number of occasions, the racing organizations have been sued 
for antitrust violations involving equipment standards, albeit unsuccessfully. 
 On January 18, 1968, STP Corporation filed an antitrust lawsuit against 
the USAC over a change in engine specification for turbine powered cars. In the 
words of the district court, STP alleged that “USAC has used a monopoly power 
in restraint of trade and commerce by adopting rules and regulations which are 
neither reasonable nor reasonably related to the attainment of any of the lawful 
purposes of USAC, and by applying its rules, regulations and technical 
specifications arbitrarily, capriciously, unreasonably, and discriminatorily against 
plaintiffs, all in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act” and that 
“USAC together with certain of its members and other persons who do business 
with said members have engaged in a combination and conspiracy in 
unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce in championship auto 
racing, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.”188 On July 2, 1968, 
the district court ruled in favor of the USAC: 
 
While the evidence tends to establish that championship class racing as 
here involved constitutes a separate relevant market for antitrust purposes, 
the evidence fails to establish that USAC’s sanctioning of such races, so 
far as the plaintiffs here are concerned, could have any more than an 
indirect, insubstantial, fortuitous effect upon plaintiffs’ business in 
interstate trade and commerce. The evidence here is that there are many 
automobile racing sanctioning organizations and cars and drivers who are 
members of USAC who may and have participated in racing events 
sanctioned by other such organizations and drivers who are F.I.A. licensed 
or members of other sanctioning organizations, in good standing with 
USAC, and who are qualified but many of whom are not USAC members 
do race in USAC championship divisions sanctioned events. The 
defendant USAC has not, nor has it attempted to unlawfully monopolize, 
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 nor has it combined or conspired with any persons to monopolize 
automotive racing or any division thereof, and the Court so finds. 
 
 
                                                
The International Motor Contest Association (IMCA) was organized in 
1915 and is the oldest auto racing sanctioning body in the United States. IMCA 
created the ‘modified’ car class in 1979 and adopted a rule governing modified 
car transmissions. In 1993, Gail and Ernie Brookins introduced the ‘Ernie Glide’ 
automatic transmission and the next year a car using that transmission won the 
national championship race. Many drivers and two competing automatic 
transmission makers questioned whether the Ernie Glide’s novel design complied 
with the IMCA rule and, prior to the 1995 season, the IMCA ruled that the Ernie 
Glide transmission violated the rule’s intent, although not its letter. The IMCA’s 
executive committee revised the rule so that all automatic transmissions were 
required to have a functioning pump, a rule change that affected only the Ernie 
Glide. In 1995 and 1996, the Brookins developed modified versions of the Ernie 
Glide that included a functioning pump. They also developed a new ‘Ernie Glide’ 
standard transmission. The IMCA’s executive committee responded with 
additional rule modifications aimed at barring the use of Ernie Glide 
transmissions in IMCA-sanctioned races.  
In mid-1996, the Brookins filed an antitrust and tortious interference 
lawsuit against the IMCA, IMCA president Kathy Root, and Billy Joe Bushore, a 
competing transmission manufacturer, alleging violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Although the district court granted a preliminary injunction 
allowing drivers to continue to use Ernie Glide transmissions for a reasonable 
period, the district court later granted summary judgment dismissing the 
Brookins’ antitrust claim. A jury awarded the Brookins $109,000 on their tortious 
interference claim. The Brookins appealed the dismissal of their antitrust claim. 
The Brookins had claimed that the relevant market was the “oval track 
racing transmission market.” Given that many other auto racing sanctioning 
bodies exist (e.g., NASCAR), the district court concluded that the exclusion of 
Ernie Glide transmissions from modified car races would not have an adverse 
impact in that market. On appeal, the Brookins claimed that IMCA had market 
power in the market for “IMCA-approved transmissions for modified racing.” 
The appeals court rejected this proposed relevant market, noting that it “requires 
proof there is no cross-elasticity of demand between this game and other games 
that modified car racers might choose to play.”189 The appeals court concluded: 
“Given the evidence of many other classes of auto racing, and many other auto 
racing sanctioning bodies, on this record no reasonable jury could find that races 
governed by the IMCA modified car rules are a separate relevant market for 
antitrust purposes.” 
The appeals court explained that “exclusion is an incidental and inevitable 
by-product of defining the game”: 
 
The Brookins’ analysis is flawed because IMCA is not a typical standard-
setting organization. Its rules do not tell transmission manufacturers or 
 
189 Brookins v. IMCA, 219 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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 drivers what types of products or services they may sell or use in an open 
market. Rather, the IMCA modified car rules help define a game or sport 
in which the end product is a form of competition among race car drivers. 
If the game as defined is exciting for participants and spectators, it will 
prosper in relation to other games with which it competes in the broad 
recreational marketplace… 
 
Without question, the way IMCA defines the rules for modified car racing 
will exclude some types of equipment. But the exclusion is an incidental 
and inevitable by-product of defining the game. A rule making body’s 
impact on equipment manufacturers will vary depending on the popularity 
of the game, and the extent to which its rules are followed by the game’s 
players – in other words, the extent to which they are seen as the rules of 
the game itself, rather than the rules of that body’s league of game-players. 
For example, major league baseball’s decision not to approve the use of 
metal bats has probably had only a modest exclusionary impact, because 
metal bats have become extraordinarily popular with millions of amateur 
baseball players who are not bound by major-league rules. On the other 
hand, when the United States Golf Association refuses to sanction a 
“revolutionary” golf ball guaranteed to fly 20% farther, the exclusionary 
impact is probably severe, because most amateur golfers want to play the 
game under uniform nationally-sanctioned rules. 
 
The remaining question is therefore whether IMCA’s decisions were 
‘tainted’ by the coercion of other transmission suppliers. IMCA’s president 
argued that the IMCA’s goal in setting its rules for the modified division was “to 
keep it as close to the 1979 rules as possible and to keep technology out of 
racing.” The appeals court concluded that there was no evidence that either 
Bushore, the defendant transmission supplier, or the non-defendant transmission 
supplier TCI, coerced the IMCA into revising its rule to exclude the Ernie Glide: 
 
The Brookins simply failed to present probative evidence that Bushore or 
TCI coerced the IMCA rulings in question, or that IMCA’s decisions were 
made for reasons other than those explained by Ms. Root. To be sure, 
Bushmore and TCI – as well as many drivers – raised with IMCA the 
question whether the novel Ernie Glide and Ernie Glide transmissions 
were consistent with IMCA’s modified car rules. But it is to be expected 
that contestants and competing suppliers will complain, or at least 
question, whether a new technology complies with “the rules of the 
game.” This type of complaint is not proof that IMCA’s rulings were the 
product of collusive rather than independent action… It is also 
unsurprising that IMCA, when faced with a new transmission technology, 
consulted other transmission manufacturers, as well as the Brookins, in 
investigating the rule compliance issue. There is no evidence that IMCA 
had a financial incentive to accede to the wishes of the Brookins’ 
transmission competitors – sponsors of IMCA-sanctioned events pay only 
modest fees to IMCA and spend most of their money on advertising and 
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 driver prizes. There is no evidence that IMCA’s rulings were made for 
reasons other than its overall purpose to define a set of rules for a popular 
game. Thus, the Brookins failed to present sufficient evidence of 
concerted action in restraint of trade. 
 
The appeals court thus affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 
Brookins’ antitrust claim. 
In all of the sports equipment-related litigation discussed thus far in this 
chapter, the sanctioning organization’s performance standard did not require the 
use of a particular manufacturer’s equipment. However, some tracks have 
required that auto racers in the same division use the same racing tire, although 
several manufacturers may nevertheless supply the track because they supply tires 
for different race divisions. In one case, where a single manufacturer won a 
bidding contest to be the sole tire supplier to a set of tracks for the entire racing 
season, an ‘excluded’ tire manufacturer filed an antitrust lawsuit. Although the 
district court found the ‘same tire’ requirement to be a per se violation of the 
antitrust laws, the appeals court reversed the district court’s decision. 
The Auto Racing Club (ARC) is a nonprofit Massachusetts corporation 
which promotes racing at Seekonk Speedway by segregating division, supplying 
insurance, handicapping racers, paying referees and officials, disbursing prize 
money, and promulgating rules. Most of the racers at Seekonk Speedway, as well 
as at Stafford Motor Speedway, are amateur drivers who race several times each 
week during the racing season. The New England Drivers and Owners Club 
(NEDOC) was formed in 1970 and is an association of race car drivers and 
owners who compete in organized race events in the northeastern United States. 
The NEDOC includes many of the drivers and owners who compete at Stafford 
Motor Speedway, Seekonk Speedway, Thompson Speedway, and Riverside 
Speedway. 
In early 1981, there was an attempt by the NEDOC to adopt a ‘single 
brand’ rule for the 1981 season at these four tracks, but no rule was adopted. The 
NEDOC tried again in the fall of 1981, announcing that a single manufacturer 
would be selected to supply tires for all four tracks for the entire 1982 season. The 
NEDOC told prospective suppliers that the required tire had to be priced in the 
$90-$100 range, about $40-$50 less than the prevailing price of the modified tires 
that had been used in the 1981 season. Four manufacturers submitted tires for 
testing. At a December 17, 1981 meeting, track promoters and NEDOC officials 
unanimously agreed to require that all cars in the modified division use the 
Hoosier 13 inch Budget tire for the 1982 season. 
On March 11, 1982, M&H Tire, one of the manufacturers who had 
submitted a tire that was not selected, filed an antitrust lawsuit against the 
winning bidder (i.e., Hoosier Racing Tire Corporation), the NEDOC, ARC, and 
others. M&H alleged that the ‘single tire rule’ constituted an illegal group 
boycott, a tying arrangement, and a tortious interference with its advantageous 
business relations. On March 29, 1983, the district court ruled in favor of M&H, 
finding that the single tire rule was a per se violation of the antitrust laws and, 
even if it was not a per se violation, the single tire rule would fail a rule of reason 
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 analysis.190 On May 3, 1984, the appeals court reversed the district court’s 
decision.191 
The appeals court noted that “the facts do not present a classic group 
boycott” and this is “a major stumbling block to per se analysis.” The court 
explained: 
 
Because Hoosier did not join with other tire manufacturers against M&H, 
the single tire rule clearly fell outside the classic horizontal group boycott 
paradigm… Here, there is no suggestion of complicity between Hoosier 
and other tire manufacturers: Hoosier did not join with other tire 
manufacturers and put pressure on any group in order to limit competition 
among tire manufacturers or to protect a group of tire manufacturers from 
‘non-group’ tire makers. 
 
M&H would find horizontal activity from the fact that the drivers agreed 
among themselves and the tracks agreed among themselves… The drivers 
are not in economic competition with one another and while they are 
specifying the parameters within which they will compete on the race 
track, what is missing is any effect upon economic competition among the 
drivers… While the tracks may be economic competitors in some sense, 
the rule does not limit economic competition among them either. 
 
The appeals court also disagreed with the district court as to whether the 
single tire rule would fail a rule of reason analysis. The rationale for the single tire 
rule was two-fold: (1) “to control the steadily increasing cost of auto racing, 
which threatened to reduce the field of (mostly amateur) participants” and (2) “to 
promote greater parity among the competing cars.” M&H itself conceded that 
“specifying a single brand was the only feasible method to insure that a single 
rubber compound was being raced on.”  
The appeals court agreed that the relevant product market was racing tires 
(or, possibly, short oval modified racing tires), but rejected the geographic market 
as being limited to the four above-mentioned northeastern U.S. tracks. At least 15 
other northeastern tracks feature modified short oval racing. Some of these tracks 
also have a single tire rule and have designated M&H as their supplier. In fact, 
M&H’s sales of short oval modified racing tires soared from $52,000 in 1981 to 
$250,000 in 1982 – the year during which M&H alleges that it was the victim of a 
‘group boycott.’ 
The appeals court argued that ‘less restrictive’ schemes to achieve the 
same goals were not available. For example, selecting a single supplier for each 
track or for each race would raise the cost of participating in the races and thereby 
possibly reduce the number of participants. Moreover, M&H and the other two 
losing bidders would have the opportunity to become the designated supplier for 
the 1983 season.  
Overall, the appeals court concluded: 
                                                 
190 M&H Tire Company v. Hoosier Racing Tire, 560 F. Supp. 591 (D. Ma 1983). 
191 M&H Tire Company v. Hoosier Racing Tire, 733 F.2d 973 (1st Cir. 1984). 
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We are satisfied that the conduct defendants engaged in was justified as a 
reasonable way to regulate and improve modified class auto racing, and 
that it did not in all circumstances have anti-competitive ramifications so 
severe as to warrant a finding that it was illegal. 
 
 
 In summary, a sports equipment supplier faces a difficult task in establishing that 
a sports league’s equipment-related rules violate the antitrust laws unless it can be shown 
that the league adopted those rules under the coercion of the equipment supplier’s 
competitors. As the appeals court for the 8th Circuit noted in Brookins v. IMCA, 
“exclusion is an incidental and inevitable by-product of defining the game.” 
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 Chapter 10 
 
Sports Leagues vs. Promoters/Sponsors, For-Profit Sports Camp Operators, 
Merchandisers, and the Media 
 
 
 
Sports leagues produce a valuable product on which others seek to profit. 
Promoters/sponsors want to use a league’s players to stage their own competitions. 
Operators of for-profit sports camps want to host forums where aspiring athletes can 
showcase their skills before league coaches. Merchandisers want to sell replica team 
jerseys, game balls, apparel, and other goods with the league’s (or a league member’s) 
logo. The media (e.g., television stations, newspapers, internet websites) want to 
broadcast games or provide information about the league or a league team so as to profit 
by attracting viewers.192 Each of these groups has come into conflict with sports leagues 
and resorted to filing antitrust lawsuits to achieve their objectives. 
 
 
Promoters/Sponsors. In some sports, like tennis, sponsors organize competitions 
using players who compete in the events sanctioned by the sport’s governing 
body.  In other sports, such as boxing, promoters stage bouts ‘certified’ or 
‘sanctioned’ by one of the sport’s sanctioning organizations. Organizing such 
events requires promoters/sponsors to attract ‘independent contractors’ to their 
competitions. Other promoters sometimes attempt to stage their own competitions 
using players/employees (or even entire teams) from an independent sports 
league, such as the NIT preseason and postseason college basketball tournaments 
involving NCAA member teams.  
In some respects, the objectives of the sponsors/promoters bear some 
resemblance to establishment of a rival league. Not surprisingly, professional 
sports leagues like the NBA have generally refused to permit their players to 
participate in non-NBA basketball competitions. Other sports governing bodies 
for events whose participants are ‘independent contractors’ create incentives for 
those players to participate in their events (and thus not to participate in non-
sanctioned events) during the season.  
Promoters/sponsors have brought a number of antitrust lawsuits against 
sports leagues, including the NCAA, the NBA, the Men’s International 
Professional Tennis Council, and the World Boxing Council.  
 
                                                 
192 Fantasy sports leagues enable fans to create and manage their own ‘teams’ and may 
enhance fan interest in games, especially that of fans of teams unlikely to win the 
championship. Using player statistics from actual games, fantasy sports leagues create 
a product that may be a complement to, or substitute for, the actual games. Thus, 
fantasy leagues also free-ride on the product of major professional sports leagues, 
which may lead to a future antitrust showdown. It has already led MLB to go to court 
alleging that a fantasy league’s use of players’ names and identities is a violation of 
players’ “right of publicity.” See Mehra & Zuercher (2006). 
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 NCAA. The NCAA places numerous rules on games played by Division 1 
men’s basketball teams. For example, NCAA rules limit the number of 
allowed games a team can play per season, determine whether the games 
played as part of a single tournament will count as a single allowed game, 
restrict the participation of each team to one ‘certified’ basketball event in 
one academic year (and not more than two certified basketball events 
every four years), prohibit teams from participating in more than one post-
season tournament, prohibit teams which have qualified for the NCAA 
post-season tournament from participating in any other post-season 
tournament, and prohibit teams from playing games after the conclusion of 
the NCAA post-season tournament. Not surprisingly, organizers of 
collegiate basketball tournaments have filed lawsuits challenging these 
rules on antitrust grounds. Interestingly, the NCAA purchased the rights to 
the only other post-season tournament as part of the settlement of one of 
those lawsuits – and the antitrust authorities (i.e., the Antitrust Division of 
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission) did not 
object. 
 
 Postseason Rules. The Postseason National Invitation Tournament 
(‘Postseason NIT’) began as a six-team collegiate basketball tournament 
in 1938 and was conducted by the Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball 
Association (MIBA), an unincorporated association of five New York-
area colleges and universities: Fordham University, Manhattan University, 
New York University, St. John’s University, and Wagner College. The 
Postseason NIT was held at Madison Square Garden. The following year, 
in 1939, the NCAA began an 8-team post-season basketball tournament.  
Until 1953 when the NCAA adopted a rule prohibiting teams from 
participating in more than one post-season tournament, a team invited to 
both tournaments was allowed to participate in both and, in fact, City 
College of New York won both tournaments in 1950. In 1961, the NCAA 
adopted a rule stating that teams invited to the NCAA post-season 
tournament were “expected” to participate. Nevertheless, after adoption of 
the ‘One Postseason Tournament’ and ‘Expected Participation’ Rules, a 
number of teams invited to both tournaments chose the NIT tournament. 
The last team to do so was Marquette University in 1970, whose coach 
was upset over his team’s seed in the NCAA tournament.  
The NCAA also took steps to expand the number and quality of 
teams in its post-season tournament. In 1975, the NCAA changed a rule so 
that a team finishing second in its conference would be eligible for an ‘at 
large’ invitation to the field of 32 teams. The number of invited teams was 
increased to 40 in 1979 and 48 in 1980, the same year as the NCAA 
dropped its limit on the number of teams that could come from any one 
conference. The NCAA considered expanding the field to 64 teams in 
1981, leading the MIBA to complain that doing so would likely destroy 
the Postseason NIT. The NCAA decided to expand the field to 52 teams in 
1982, 53 in 1984, and 64 in 1985. The NCAA asserts that this expansion 
was in response to the increased consumer demand for Division I men’s 
basketball beginning in the 1970s and to the increase in the number of 
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 schools with Division I men’s basketball programs (26 teams were added 
between 1975 and 1980). 
In 1981, the NCAA revised the Expected Participation Rule so that 
any team invited to a NCAA post-season championship in any sport was 
required to participate in that championship or in no post-season 
competition at all. This ‘Commitment to Participate’ Rule has been in 
effect (with minor revisions) since the 1982-83 season, except for the 1991 
Tournament due to timing problems in publishing a revision of the Rule. 
In 2000, an ‘antitrust subcommittee’ appointed by the NCAA’s Division I 
Management Council recommended eliminating the Rule, but the 
Management Council did not vote on the recommendation. 
In 1985, the MIBA began conducting a Preseason NIT 
Tournament.193 Doing so first required that the NCAA adopt special 
legislation exempting all Preseason NIT games from the maximum 
number of games a team was allowed to play. Although the Preseason NIT 
became quite popular, the NCAA considered eliminating the exemption. 
As of 2001, when a new rule was proposed, a team was charged only one 
game for competing in a preseason tournament regardless of how many 
games it actually played in the tournament. The proposed new rule would 
require teams to count all preseason tournament games to be counted 
against the maximum.  
In March 2001, the MIBA filed an antitrust lawsuit against the 
NCAA over its rules regarding pre-season and post-season tournaments. 
The MIBA alleged, in the words of the district court, that (1) “several of 
the NCAA rules, which affect Division I men’s college basketball, reduce 
competition from preseason and postseason non-NCAA sponsored 
tournaments and are unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act” and (2) “the NCAA uses the rules affecting 
postseason competition to achieve or attempt to gain monopoly power in 
the market for Division I men’s college basketball tournaments, in 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.”194 The MIBA challenged the 
NCAA’s ‘Commitment to Participate’ Rule, ‘One Postseason 
Tournament’ Rule, and ‘End of Playing Season’ Rule, as well as the 
NCAA’s automatic qualifier procedure and bracket expansions. The 
MIBA also challenged proposed NCAA rules which would eliminate 
certain exemptions benefiting the Preseason NIT – the exemption 
permitting the Preseason NIT to take place prior to the start of the regular 
season and the exemption of games played at the Preseason NIT from 
being counted towards the maximum number of games a team is allowed 
to play. 
Both the MIBA and NCAA motioned for summary judgment. The 
MIBA sought summary judgment only on the Commitment to Participate 
                                                 
193 The information in this paragraph comes primarily from Matthew Roberts (2001) and 
Matisik (2005). 
194 Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball Association v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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 Rule, whose effect when combined with the effect of the other rules 
allegedly prevents the Postseason NIT from competing for teams to 
participate and from moving the tournament until after the conclusion of 
the NCAA’s post-season tournament. On September 29, 2004, the district 
court denied MIBA’s motion. 195 
The district rejected the NCAA’s argument that it should be 
exempt from Section 1 scrutiny because it is a single entity, ruling that the 
Commitment to Participate Rule “constitutes an agreement among the 
member institutions and subjects the NCAA to § 1 scrutiny.” On the other 
hand, the district court rejected MIBA’s argument that the Commitment to 
Participate Rule should be condemned as per se illegal and, if not, the 
Rule should be examined under a ‘quick look’ analysis:  
 
Even assuming for the moment that the MIBA is correct to 
characterize the Commitment to Participate Rule as a facially 
unreasonable restraint of trade such as a group boycott, the 
Supreme Court made clear in Board of Regents that a per se 
analysis would not be appropriate. Because sports activities can 
only be carried out jointly and the NCAA must create certain 
horizontal restraints in order to function, the rule is not invalid in 
and of itself. At a minimum, the rule’s possible procompetitive 
effects must be examined… 
 
Because a per se rule should not be applied, the summary judgment 
evidence must be examined in accordance with “rule of reason” 
analysis… Under the rule of reason, whether the Commitment to 
Participate Rule is reasonable depends on its actual effects on the 
market and its procompetitive justifications… 
 
Under a “quick look” analysis, a plaintiff is relieved of its initial 
burden of showing that the challenged restraints have an adverse 
effect on competition because the anticompetitive effects of the 
restraint are obvious… The Supreme Court has clarified that the 
use of the “quick look” approach is only appropriate when, “an 
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics 
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”… 
 
The MIBA argues that the Commitment to Participate Rule should 
be examined using the “quick look” approach used in Board of 
Regents and Law. In its view, the Commitment to Participate Rule 
obviously suppresses competition by prohibiting NCAA members 
who are invited to the NCAA Tournament from participating in 
competing postseason tournaments like the Postseason NIT. The 
                                                 
195 Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball Association v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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 NCAA objects and argues that only a full rule of reason analysis in 
which the MIBA must prove the anticompetitive effects of the rule 
is appropriate… 
 
Similarly, under the Commitment to Participate Rule, the MIBA 
may choose from any of the 260 teams which are not invited to the 
NCAA Tournament and invite those teams to the Postseason NIT. 
The Postseason NIT has expanded from a six-team tournament to a 
40-team tournament and the MIBA has not presented any evidence 
that it has been unable to fill its Postseason NIT bracket each year. 
It cannot be said that “an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics” would find the Commitment to 
Participate Rule’s adverse effect on competition so obvious. 
Therefore, a “quick look” analysis is not appropriate and the 
MIBA is required to meet its burden under the full rule of reason 
analysis to show the anticompetitive effects of the rule. The MIBA 
does not argue that it is entitled to summary judgment under the 
rule of reason. 
 
Regarding the MIBA’s claim that the NCAA engaged in a 
conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
the district court noted that the MIBA has to give proof of (1) concerted 
action, (2) overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) specific 
intent to monopolize. The district court wrote: 
 
Even assuming that the MIBA has provided sufficient proof of the 
first two elements, there remains a material question of fact as to 
whether the Commitment to Participate Rule was enacted with the 
specific intent of suppressing competition from the NCAA 
Tournament’s competitor. The MIBA has come forward with 
evidence of statements made during the 1940’s, 50’s, and 60’s by 
NCAA committee persons and argues that these prove the illegal 
motivation behind the adoption of the Rule. However, the NCAA 
responds that these statements are unrelated and show nothing 
about the reason for the implementation of the Commitment to 
Participate Rule. Considering this evidence in a light most 
favorable to the NCAA, the MIBA has not established specific 
intent to monopolize as a matter of law on its § 2 Sherman Act 
claim, 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 
A few weeks later, on October 13, 2004, the district court denied 
the NCAA’s motion for summary judgment on all five “Postseason 
Rules.”196 The district court rejected the NCAA’s argument that the Rules 
are ‘noncommercial’ and thus Section 1 scrutiny is inappropriate: 
                                                 
196 Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball Association v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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The only “noncommercial” justification NCAA proffers for the 
Commitment to Participate Rule and the bracket expansions is that 
they were enacted in response to the “membership’s changing 
characteristics and the growth in the number of Division I 
basketball teams.”… That explanation has little to do with whether 
the rule is noncommercial. Moreover, one of NCAA’s 
procompetitive justifications for the rule is that it ensures the best 
teams will participate in the NCAA Tournament which makes it 
more attractive to broadcasters, advertisers, and fans. Thus, the 
rule cannot be said to be noncommercial. 
 
The district court also rejected the NCAA’s argument that the 
Postseason Rules are sanctioned by the Supreme Court’s NCAA v. Board 
of Regents decision: 
 
NCAA points out that all sports leagues structure their postseason 
championships, and require their member teams to participate in 
the final championship games, if selected. NCAA argues that it is 
reasonable as a matter of law for a league to require its member 
institutions to share the responsibility of enhancing their joint 
product by requiring that all selected teams participate in the 
league’s final championship game, especially since the member 
institutions benefit from consumer interest in the championship. 
Even assuming that NCAA is a sports league and that the above 
statements have merit, MIBA is not challenging only the 
Commitment to Participate Rule. MIBA argues that the 
combination of the Commitment to Participate Rule and the One 
Postseason Tournament Rule make it impossible for them to host a 
postseason tournament in which invitees of the NCAA Tournament 
participate. In combination, the rules do not simply require teams 
to participate in the NCAA Tournament if invited. They also 
prevent teams from competing in both tournaments. Therefore, the 
challenged rules and expansions are not so obviously reasonable as 
to fall into the group of restrictions sanctioned by the Board of 
Regents. 
 
Thus, the district court ruled that the five Postseason Rules need to 
be examined under the rule of reason. The court found that the NCAA and 
MIBA have a “genuine dispute” as to the relevant market. MIBA’s expert, 
Professor Noll, argued that the relevant market is Division I men’s college 
basketball postseason tournaments, while the NCAA’s expert, Professor 
Willig, argued that the relevant market for the NCAA postseason 
tournament is “marquee sports programming” – which in addition to the 
NCAA postseason tournament includes the NHL’s Stanley Cup, MLB’s 
World Series, NFL’s Super Bowl, the NBA finals, the Masters 
Tournament in golf, and the Olympic Games. The district court ruled: 
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MIBA and NCAA are marketing reasonably interchangeable 
products in that each of their tournaments features competition 
between Division I men’s college basketball teams after the 
conclusion of the regular season and these games are played 
around the country and are nationally televised. Although NCAA 
tries to place itself in the market of “marquee sporting events,” 
MIBA has produced sufficient evidence to show that college 
basketball is a very different product from professional basketball 
or other professional championships and that it appeals to fans in a 
different way. As the Supreme Court noted in Board of Regents, 
college athletics is a unique product, whose amateur rules 
distinguish it from professional sports and widen consumer 
choice… In that case, the Supreme Court went on to affirm the 
district court’s determination at trial that the relevant market was 
“live college football” rather than the broad “entertainment 
market” advocated by NCAA… Despite NCAA’s urging to the 
contrary, MIBA has made a sufficient showing that it will be able 
to prove at trial that the relevant market is Division I men’s college 
basketball postseason tournaments. 
 
MIBA has also made a sufficient showing that NCAA has power 
in the market for Division I men’s college basketball postseason 
tournaments… Professor Noll has calculated that in 2002, NCAA 
had over 70 percent of attendance, over 90 percent of game 
revenues, over 98 percent of total revenues and over 99 percent of 
television revenues in the market of Division I men’s college 
basketball postseason tournaments. This evidence suggests that 
NCAA earns monopoly profits and has the power to exclude 
competing tournaments, such as the Postseason NIT, from the 
market through its control over the athletic participation of its 
member universities and conferences. 
 
The district court discussed a number of additional issues that 
preclude summary judgment. On the issue of antitrust injury, the court 
observed: 
 
The rules limit to one the number of postseason contests a team 
may enter. Professor Noll has concluded that this injures 
competition because even a low-seeded team, which has little 
chance of advancing in the NCAA Tournament, must participate 
even though it might have a good chance of doing quite well in the 
Postseason NIT. If these lower-seeded teams had a choice about 
which tournament to attend, they might well choose to attend the 
Postseason NIT, where the chance to advance deep into the 
Tournament is greater. These facts tend to show that the 
Postseason Rules adversely affect competition by depriving 
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 colleges and fans of a potentially attractive postseason tournament 
choice and possible participation in an additional tournament. The 
quality of the competition the Postseason NIT produces would then 
be better, without any real detriment to the NCAA Tournament, 
because low-seeded teams do not advance much past the first 
round. Although NCAA relies on the fact that a few of the teams in 
the NCAA Tournament actually are ranked lower than some teams 
in the NIT by virtue of conference championship upsets, there is no 
dispute that the vast majority of NCAA teams rank above the best 
NIT teams. MIBA has submitted the declarations of two coaches 
and the athletic administrators of MIBA’s member schools who 
state that if the Postseason Rules were different and the NIT 
became a more competitive tournament, their schools would 
seriously consider an invitation from both tournaments. While it 
remains to be seen whether MIBA will be able to meet its burden 
to prove anticompetitive effects at trial, the combination of the 
anticompetitive nature of requiring invitees to participate in the 
NCAA Tournament to the exclusion of any other postseason 
tournament and a sufficient showing of market power raises a 
genuine issue of disputed fact as to the challenged rule’s effect on 
competition.  
 
Regarding the NCAA’s alleged procompetitive rationales for the 
Commitment to Participate Rule, the district court noted the NCAA argues 
that the Rule is necessary because: (1) if schools chose not to attend the 
NCAA Tournament, the legitimacy of the National Champion would be 
jeopardized, (2) the Rule contributes to efficient scheduling since the 
NCAA can count on all invited teams to attend, and (3) the Rule prevents 
a rival tournament from ‘free-riding’ on the NCAA’s product by offering 
last minute incentives for the top teams to compete in its tournament rather 
than the NCAA Tournament. However, the district court also pointed out 
that the NCAA argues that the Rule is unnecessary because the goal of 
every Division I men’s basketball team is to compete in the NCAA 
Tournament and become the National Champion: 
 
If all of the teams selected for the NCAA Tournament would 
participate in that Tournament regardless of this rule, then it is 
difficult to see its procompetitive justifications. Therefore, it seems 
that there is at least a question of fact as to whether the 
Commitment to Participate Rule has real procompetitive 
justifications. 
 
The district court ended its opinion by noting that there are also 
questions of fact regarding whether the Postseason Rules are the least 
restrictive means of accomplishing the NCAA’s goals: “For instance, if 
the Tournaments were scheduled so as not to conflict and the One 
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 Postseason Tournament Rule were abolished, participation in both 
Tournaments might be a reasonable possibility.” 
The trial began on August 1, 2005. Two weeks into the trial, the 
MIBA and NCAA reached an out-of-court settlement in which the NCAA 
agreed to purchase the NIT preseason and postseason tournaments for 
$40.5 million and to pay the MIBA $16 million in damages, with the 
combined amount to be paid over ten years.197 
The NCAA’s acquisition of the NIT tournaments was 
controversial, with the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) sending a letter 
dated September 12, 2005 to the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and New York’s Attorney General 
calling on them to carefully scrutinize the proposed settlement. The AAI 
believed that “there is a significant probability that the effect of the 
proposed merger may be to significantly lessen (or eliminate entirely) 
competition between organizers in acquiring men’s Division I basketball 
teams for participation in post-season tournaments.” The AAI wrote: 
 
Concentration in this market is already high enough such that any 
merger-related increase would trigger intense antitrust scrutiny 
under the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
 
Even a cursory look into the proposed settlement raises serious 
questions about the health of competition in post-merger markets. 
For example, the NCAA would be in a position, post-merger, to 
impose its “mandatory participation” rule for both the NIT and its 
own tournaments. This would erect an insurmountable barrier to 
entry into post-season play. In enhancing their market power in 
acquiring tournament teams, the NCAA would in turn enjoy 
significantly more market power in sales of broadcast rights, 
sponsorships, concessions, and event tickets. The proposed deal 
thus packs a double punch for consumers. Schools would have 
fewer options and face potentially non-competitive terms for post-
season tournament play. And sponsors and consumers of the 
tournament games would potentially face higher prices. 
  
The AAI therefore proposed: 
 
In light of the foregoing, the AAI urges one or more of you to 
initiate an inquiry into the proposed merger. The merger would 
spell an end to the NIT which, once upon a time, was an equally-
matched and vigorous competitor to the NCAA. But a series of 
actions by the NCAA has diminished that competition, to the 
detriment of consumers. The proposed consolidation would further 
hurt consumers and preclude the emergence of a stronger rivalry 
                                                 
197 Van Riper (2006); NCAA press release titled “NCAA, MIBA End Litigation; NIT 
Tournaments Purchased” (August 17, 2005). 
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 between the NCAA and NIT (and with respect to new upstarts). An 
antitrust investigation of the merger could focus on such key issues 
as market definition (which was controversial in the MIBA v. 
NCAA litigation); the significant potential for unilateral exercise 
of market power; and entry barriers created by the merger. 
Moreover, the inquiry should extend to the likely effects of the 
merger on pre-season tournaments by giving the NCAA the “green 
light” to enact a pending rule that would replace independent 
tournaments with events the NCAA can control. 
 
It is not clear how closely, if at all, the proposed settlement was 
scrutinized by the DOJ, FTC, and New York Attorney General. It is clear, 
however, that none decided to publicly oppose the settlement. 
Would the MIBA have prevailed over the NCAA if the case had 
not settled? In an article written prior to the settlement, Fellin (2006) 
argues that it would have. He argues that the NCAA’s actions would fail a 
rule of reason analysis and thus be found to violate Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Regarding the antitrust injury caused by the NCAA’s 
actions, Fellin writes: 
 
Under a traditional rule of reason analysis, the MIBA must show 
adverse effects on competition because of NCAA actions. The 
MIBA must show more than mere harm to itself, because 
competition as a whole must be adversely affected. The most 
harmful effect on competition is the lack of choice that colleges 
have for postseason play. Though this may not greatly affect the 
‘power schools’ of college basketball, it can have a large effect on 
smaller schools. The prime example is the young, inexperienced 
team who barely makes it into the NCAA Tournament, and will 
probably play only one game before having its season end 
abruptly. By not having an option to play in the NIT, a team such 
as this is unable to make a long run in the tournament, generating 
more fan interest and gaining important experience for the athletes. 
Also, because the NIT allows schools to host some of the early 
games on their home campuses, the NCAA restrictions prevent 
these schools from earning added revenues from ticket sales of 
NIT games. (pp. 521-22) 
 
According to Fellin, the NCAA’s two alleged pro-competitive 
rationales for its actions are: (1) to limit the amount of time that student-
athletes devote to basketball so as to limit interference with the academic 
demands of college and (2) to maintain the legitimacy of the NCAA 
championship. With respect to the latter, Fellin observes that the NCAA 
“helps to make MIBA’s argument that there is no need for the rule simply 
because the evidence shows that the NCAA should have no worries that a 
school will choose the NIT over the NCAA Tournament.” (p. 523) 
Regarding the former procompetitive rationale, Fellin argues that, even 
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 accepting it as a legitimate justification, the NCAA’s goal can be achieved 
via less restrictive means. Specifically, by eliminating the ‘Commitment to 
Participate’ Rule and only enforcing the ‘One Postseason Tournament’ 
Rule, the NCAA would accomplish its goal of promoting academics while 
allowing schools to choose the post-season tournament in which they 
wished to participate.  
Fellin also argues that the MIBA would prevail on its Section 2 
claims. He agrees with the MIBA that the relevant market is Division I 
men’s college basketball postseason tournaments and points to Professor 
Noll’s market share statistics when he comments: “These large 
percentages give rise to the presumption that the NCAA possesses 
monopoly power.” (p. 525) Moreover, Fellin argues that the NCAA’s 
dominant position resulted from unlawful practices: “History shows that 
the NCAA has consciously enacted rules over the past 50 years to turn the 
NIT from a worthy competitor to the afterthought that it is today.” (p. 526) 
In a postscript, Fellin offers his assessment of the MIBA-NCAA 
out-of-court settlement: 
 
In the long run, this shortsighted decision by the MIBA will harm 
not only college basketball, but college athletics as a whole. What 
was shaping up to be an excellent case for the MIBA was quickly 
swept under the rug by the NCAA and its large pool of resources. 
That this suit was settled so easily only speaks to the unfair 
bargaining power that the NCAA has when going up against any 
competitors. The only positive thing that can come out of this 
settlement is that the NCAA can no longer argue that it does not 
hold a monopoly in the arena of college basketball. Now, they are 
truly the only game in town, despite the continuing existence of the 
NIT. The NCAA owns both tournaments, and, at any point in time, 
it can pull the plug on the NIT, or change eligibility rules to the 
point that the NIT becomes even less of a factor than it already is 
today. With a private suit now impossible, one can only hope that 
the Department of Justice can step up to the plate and see the big 
picture. If the NCAA is able to muscle out a plaintiff who had a 
very strong case just by the use of money, what other potential 
anticompetitive threats will it pose in the future? (pp. 529-30) 
 
Two-in-Four Rule. Another NCAA rule which was challenged on 
antitrust grounds is the so-called ‘2-in-4’ Rule, which was part of Rule 98-
92 adopted in 1999. The ‘2-in-4’ Rule limits NCAA Division I men’s 
basketball teams to playing in (at most) one ‘exempted’ event per season 
and not more than two exempted events every four years. For decades, the 
NCAA had exempted (or ‘certified’) certain multiple-game early-season 
tournaments from the maximum number a team was permitted to play so 
as to make it easier for schools in Hawaii and Alaska, given their 
inconvenient locations, to schedule games with schools from the 
mainland. In 1985, the NCAA began certifying some mainland events as 
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 well, such as the Preseason NIT. Rule 98-92 also stated that an exempt 
tournament would count as a single ‘game’ towards the season limit and 
the maximum number of ‘games’ per season was increased from 27 to 28. 
A group of sports promoters filed a lawsuit against the NCAA 
alleging that the ‘2-in-4’ Rule violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act and sought a permanent injunction enjoining the NCAA from 
enforcing the rule. In July 2002, the district court declined to issue the 
requested injunction. The district court wanted to see the Rule’s impact in 
its third and fourth years. In February 2003, with evidence of the Rule’s 
effect in its third year now available, the plaintiffs once again requested a 
permanent injunction.  
On July 28, 2003, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ request 
for a permanent injunction against the ‘2-in-4’ Rule.198 The plaintiffs 
offered the testimony of four sports promoters who testified to the 
difficulties encountered in organizing exempt tournaments since 
introduction of the Rule, resulting in the cancellation of some events. 
Plaintiffs also offered the testimony of Professor Tollison, while the 
NCAA offered the expert testimony of Louis Guth. Both experts agreed 
that, compared to the 2001-02 season, the 2002-03 season had (1) 72 
fewer ‘exempt’ games – a 3.3% reduction in ‘school-scheduled’ games, 
(2) 107 fewer games played in ‘certified’ events – a 43% reduction in total 
certified games, and (3) 8 fewer ‘certified’ tournaments – a 32% 
reduction. Guth countered that these declines are not evidence of the 
Rule’s anticompetitive effect because there are close substitutes for the 
events (i.e., other ‘school-scheduled’ games) and the decline may simply 
represent the market’s reasonable adjustment after promoters scurried to 
stage events after the Rule’s introduction. The district court found “no 
reason to reject Tollison’s opinion that this decline constitutes an 
anticompetitive effect.” 
Tollison argued that the Rule does not have any pro-competitive 
benefits because, in the district court’s words, “the rule does not advance 
the concern of athletes missing class time, since no specific provisions of 
the rule relate to scheduling around classes, vacations, travel, or other 
factors as to potential missed classes” and (2) “the rule has not advanced 
the ability of lesser known schools to participate in certified events.”  Guth 
countered that the Rule promotes competitive equity by standardizing the 
number of games played in a season. Moreover, Guth argued that when 
the three provisions of Rule 98-92 are considered jointly (as he argues 
they must), the overall effect is to increase output and create a framework 
for handling certified events.   
The district court observed that the number of games played in 
exempt events by lesser-known, ‘non-power’ conference teams (i.e., the 
Rule’s alleged beneficiaries) declined sharply in 2002-03. Moreover, the 
court noted that the Rule does not limit such things as the number of 
                                                 
198 Worldwide Basketball and Sports Tours v. NCAA, 273 F. Supp. 2d 933 (S.D. Oh E.D. 
2003). 
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 games that can be played while school is in session and thus does little, if 
anything, to improve the welfare of student-athletes. Moreover, the court 
found that the Rule did virtually nothing to standardize the playing season 
since it does not equalize the number of games ultimately played by each 
team. Thus, the district court concluded that the NCAA failed its burden 
under a rule of reason analysis of showing that the Rule’s anticompetitive 
effects are overcome by its pro-competitive benefits. Therefore, the 
district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction 
enjoining the NCAA from enforcing the ‘2-in-4’ Rule. The NCAA 
appealed. 
On November 15, 2004, the appeals court reversed the district 
court’s judgment.199 The appeals court noted that the district court 
correctly determined that this case is not suitable for a ‘quick-look’ 
analysis but nevertheless proceeded to apply such an analysis: 
 
Far from being a case in which “an observer with even a 
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the 
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on 
customers and markets,” … here the relevant market is not readily 
apparent and the Plaintiffs have failed to adequately define a 
relevant market, thereby making it impossible to assess the effects 
of 98-92 on customers rather than merely on competitors. While it 
is true that “the rule of reason can sometimes be applied in the 
twinkling of an eye,” … this abbreviated or “quick-look” analysis 
may only be done where the contours of the market and, where 
relevant, submarket, are sufficiently well-known or defined to 
permit the court to ascertain without the aid of extensive market 
analysis whether the challenged practice impairs competition. 
Under the “quick-look” approach, extensive market and cross-
elasticity analysis is not necessarily required, but where, as here, 
the precise product market is neither obvious nor undisputed, the 
failure to account for market alternatives and to analyze the 
dynamics of consumer choice simply will not suffice. The district 
court therefore erred in applying a quick-look analysis. 
 
Regarding the district court’s determination of the relevant market, 
the appeals court wrote: 
 
The district court found the relevant market in this case to be 
Division I men’s college basketball, and noted that both the 
Promoters and the NCAA agreed with this definition of the 
relevant market… Although the NCAA does not appear to have 
disputed the Promoters’ view that the relevant market is Division I 
Men’s Basketball as a whole, the basis for that view is not 
established… Dr. Tollison, the Promoters’ expert witness, admitted 
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 that he did not look at those in competition with the Promoters 
(their competitors), the competitors’ output, or their output relative 
to the Promoters. And he did no test to determine which events are 
in competition with others. Finally, Dr. Tollison, when pressed, 
admitted that his testimony regarding the Big Six market was 
instead derived from “common sense.” 
 
Furthermore, the district court concedes that Dr. Tollison “did not 
perform a study on the effect of the Two in Four Rule on 
consumers of Division I men’s games. According to Tollison, the 
loss of games necessarily constitutes a loss to consumers in the 
relevant market because college basketball events are not fungible. 
However products need not be fungible to be market competitors 
for the purposes of antitrust analysis. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that “it is improper ‘to require that products be 
fungible to be considered in the relevant market.’”… Rather than 
fungibility, the proper analysis “is an appraisal of the ‘cross-
elasticity’ of demand in the trade.”... Indeed, Dr. Tollison admitted 
that a cross-elasticity study is necessary to determine the relevant 
market, yet he concedes that he failed to perform such an analysis. 
 
The appeals court also criticized the district court’s determination 
of the relevant submarket: 
 
The district court, however, did not base its decision that the Two 
in Four Rule is anticompetitive simply on the Division I Men’s 
College Basketball market taken as a whole. Instead, the court held 
that “it is undisputed that the relevant market in this case is 
Division I men’s college basketball together with the appropriate 
submarket consisting of school-scheduled games,” where school-
scheduled games are defined as games that a team is not required 
to play but rather are selected by a school’s scheduling coach… 
Contrary to the district court’s findings, however, the record 
suggests that the submarket is not undisputed. 
 
Dr. Tollison did not testify that school-scheduled games are the 
relevant submarket, nor did he provide any basis for arriving at that 
conclusion. Rather, he opined that the relevant submarket is pre- 
and post-season tournaments, but because Tollison failed to 
provide any basis for that opinion, the district court correctly found 
it unreliable. Because the Promoters failed to define the relevant 
market, and with it the submarket, the district court had ample 
basis to dismiss the claim… Instead, however, the district court 
relied on what it found to be the opinion of the defendant’s expert, 
Mr. Guth – that the relevant submarket is school-scheduled games 
– an opinion with which the court said Dr. Tollison agreed. 
However, it is less than clear that Mr. Guth defines school-
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 scheduled games as the relevant submarket… Given this record, it 
would be difficult to conclude that Mr. Guth named school-
scheduled games as the relevant submarket. Accordingly, we 
decline to relieve the Promoters of their burden based on such a 
dubious stipulation by the defendants’ expert. 
  
Overall, the appeals court concluded: “Because the Promoters 
failed to meet their duty to define the relevant market and submarket, this 
court has insufficient information to reach the question of whether the 
Promoters suffered an antitrust injury – that is, an injury resulting from 
interference with ‘the economic freedom of participants in the relevant 
market.’” Thus, the appeals court reversed the district court’s judgment. 
In a concurring opinion, appeals court justice Julia Smith Gibbons 
explained that she agreed with the court’s decision, but “would decide this 
case based on the plaintiffs’ failure to establish that they have suffered an 
antitrust injury.” Gibbons argues that the NCAA is basically providing a 
subsidy to sports promoters and it is not an antitrust injury for the NCAA 
to limit that subsidy. The 2-in-4 Rule limits the subsidy enjoyed by sports 
promoters, and promoters understandably dislike the Rule for that very 
reason, but the Rule does not interfere “with the promoters’ freedom to 
compete in the market for Division I men’s college basketball games.” 
Gibbons explains: 
 
Nothing about the Two in Four Rule prohibits these promoters 
from continuing to compete in that market. It does not deny the 
plaintiffs access to the necessary resources to compete in the 
market for college basketball games. Those resources are still 
available. If the promoters want Kentucky, they can get Kentucky 
every year (provided Kentucky wants to come), by promoting non-
certified tournaments or a series of single-game events similar to 
the ACC-Big Ten Challenge. To do that, they would have to give 
up the advantage the subsidized format provides them and thus it 
may be more difficult for the promoters to schedule high profile 
teams, but forcing the promoters to make this choice has not 
caused them to suffer antitrust injury. If anything, the Two in Four 
Rule increases competition in the relevant market because it limits 
an advantage the promoters of certified events have had over the 
promoters of non-certified events and member institutions, and 
injury resulting from an increase in competition is certainly not the 
type of injury the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. 
  
 
NBA. The 1988 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the NBA 
and its players’ association, as well as the amendments to that agreement, 
contain a number of provisions relating to the exclusive employment 
obligations of all NBA players. For example, Article XX, Section 6 
prohibits all NBA players from participating in “off-season” basketball 
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 games unless approved by the NBA and the players’ association. To be 
eligible for approval, such games must meet a number of requirements, 
such as (1) all proceeds must be used for charitable purposes and the 
games must generate at least $100,000 for charity, (2) the games must not 
be televised, and (3) the players must not be compensated for playing. The 
Uniform Player Contract (UPC) also contains provisions prohibiting 
players from participating in non-NBA basketball games.   
In 1989, Independent Entertainment Group (IEG), which promotes, 
organizes, and produces entertainment events, and ProServ, a sports 
marketing and management company, decided to stage a one-on-one 
basketball competition involving NBA players to be televised on a pay-
per-view basis. The event was to be called “King of the Court” and would 
be held at the conclusion of the NBA season. The Chicago Bulls’ Michael 
Jordan and the Los Angeles Lakers’ Earvin ‘Magic’ Johnson agreed to 
participate if the NBA gave its approval. The NBA did not, and IEG and 
ProServ filed a lawsuit against the NBA and its member teams alleging 
violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the NBA and its member 
teams unreasonably restrained trade and monopolized, or attempted to 
monopolize, “the market for ‘major league’ basketball events, including 
the sale of all forms of television rights that showcase ‘major league’ 
professional basketball players, and the market for major league basketball 
players.” The defendants motioned for summary judgment, which the 
district court granted on May 20, 1994.200 
For the purposes of summary judgment only, the defendants 
conceded many points, including that the relevant markets are those 
alleged by the plaintiffs, that they possess a monopoly and monopoly 
power in the relevant markets, and that the alleged anticompetitive 
agreements between the NBA and the players’ association foreclosed 
plaintiffs from the relevant markets. Nevertheless, with respect to the 
Section 1 claims, the district court reached the following Conclusions of 
Law: 
 
2. This Court finds that it is reasonable as a matter of law for the 
member teams of a professional sports league to require their 
player-employees to remain loyal to the team and the league 
and not work for any competing entity while they remain 
employed… 
 
3. Professional athletes employed by a sports league, therefore, 
may lawfully be restricted during the term of employment from 
playing for any competitive entity… 
 
5. For the purposes of defendants’ motion, the Court finds that the 
exclusive employment obligations of NBA players are 
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 contained in the UPC, the 1988 CBA, Article XX, Section 6, 
the 1986 GLA [Group Licensing Agreement] and the 1989 
Events Agreement. Since all of these agreements require 
exclusivity only while an NBA player is under contract, they 
are reasonable as a matter of law under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. 
 
6. … This Court finds that the term of an employment contract is 
a matter of contract interpretation for the Court, and that in this 
case NBA players sign player contracts that run for the entire 
calendar year… 
 
7. Moreover, the Court rejects plaintiffs’ argument that they seek 
to use NBA players under contract only in the “off-season.” 
Plaintiffs’ revised market definition is for basketball events 
involving NBA players at any time during the calendar year… 
Thus, the Court finds there is no meaningful distinction 
between the “off-season” and any other time during which an 
NBA player is not actually engaged in a game or practice for 
his team. 
 
8. This Court also rejects plaintiffs’ attempt to cast this case as an 
unlawful “restriction of output” of basketball events involving 
NBA players. NBA member teams may contract for the 
exclusive services of player-employees during the term of 
employment as a matter of law. While the natural effect of this 
lawful contractual relationship is to prevent third parties such 
as plaintiffs from using NBA players under contract to produce 
more basketball events, any resulting effect is reasonable as a 
matter of law. 
 
9. Because the exclusive employment by NBA member teams of 
NBA players is reasonable as a matter of law, summary 
judgment for defendants on plaintiffs’ Section 1 claim is 
warranted. 
 
 
Similarly, regarding the Section 2 claims, the district court reached 
a number of Conclusions of Law: 
 
14. Conduct that is reasonable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
should not be considered anticompetitive under Section 2… 
Accordingly, because of the exclusive employment obligations 
embodied in the challenged agreements are reasonable as a 
matter of law under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, these 
restrictions cannot form the basis of a Section 2 claim. 
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 15. Alternatively, this Court finds that exclusive personal services 
contracts with employees cannot be “predatory” as a matter of 
law under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. By analogy, a 
monopolist cannot be sued for “predatory” hiring of employees 
unless they are hired solely to keep them from a rival… Here, 
it is indisputable that the NBA did not hire Jordan or Johnson 
solely to prevent them from playing for plaintiffs. 
 
 
16. Further, a monopolist does not have to share its employees 
with a competitor even if it had done so in the past and even if 
its refusal to share harms plaintiffs’ business… 
 
17. Indeed, even if defendants intended to exclude plaintiffs from 
the alleged market by entering into exclusive employment 
obligations with their player-employees, Section 2 is not 
violated because the intent to exclude competitors through 
lawful means cannot be predatory as a matter of law… 
 
18. It appears to this Court that this case, at bottom, is about 
plaintiffs’ attempt to free-ride on the NBA’s investment in its 
star players and in rebuilding the League during the 1980’s. 
Exclusive employment agreements lawfully prevent such free-
riding as a matter of law… 
 
19. Finally, because plaintiffs have not alleged any conduct which 
could support a monopolization claim under Section 2, 
plaintiffs’ attempted monopolization and conspiracy to 
monopolize claims must also fail. 
 
 
Overall, the district court concluded that “Article XX, Section 6 of 
the 1988 CBA, the 1986 GLA and the 1989 Events Agreement are 
exclusive employment arrangements with NBA players that cannot be 
unreasonable or predatory under the Sherman Act as a matter of law.” 
 
 
Professional Tennis. Since 1974, the Men’s International Professional 
Tennis Council (MIPTC) has organized and overseen the Grand Prix 
Circuit, a series of men’s professional tennis tournaments which includes 
Wimbledon, the U.S. Open, the French Open, the Australian Open, the 
Masters Tournament, and the Davis Cup. Between 1974 and 1981, the 
number of Grand Prix events increased from 50 to 90. The MIPTC also 
began requiring, as a condition for participation, that men’s professional 
tennis players sign ‘Commitment Agreements’ requiring a player to 
participate in a minimum number of Grand Prix events and limiting 
participation in non-MIPTC-sanctioned events. 
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 Although Volvo is primarily a producer of automobiles and trucks, 
it also produces and sponsors men’s professional tennis events. Volvo 
purchased the rights to be the overall sponsor of the Grand Prix during the 
period 1980-84. On February 1, 1984, MIPTC selected Nabisco Brands, 
not Volvo, to be the 1985 Grand Prix sponsor, despite the fact that Volvo 
had already acquired contractual rights to use Madison Square Garden for 
the January 1985 Masters Tournament and have it televised on NBC. 
Volvo then assigned its contracts with the Garden and NBC to MIPTC 
and, in return, MIPTC agreed to sanction several individual Grand Prix 
events where Volvo would be a “subsidiary” sponsor. However, relations 
between Volvo and the MIPTC soured, with Volvo complaining that the 
MIPTC was attempting to “dissuade and intimidate” tournament owners 
and producers from associating with Volvo and the MIPTC complaining 
that Volvo was attempting to create the public impression that it was still 
the overall sponsor of the Grand Prix. 
 In April 1985, Volvo filed an antitrust lawsuit against the MIPTC, 
its administrator, M. Marshall Happer III, and its chairman, Philippe 
Chatrier. Five months later, in September, two other companies in the 
business of producing men’s professional tennis events – IMC and 
ProServ – joined Volvo as plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants’ actions constituted (1) a combination and conspiracy to 
restrain trade and a group boycott in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act and (2) a combination, conspiracy, and attempt to monopolize trade in 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The relevant markets were 
alleged to be: (1) the submarket for the production of men’s professional 
tennis events; (2) the submarket for the tennis-playing services of men’s 
professional players; and (3) the submarket for the rights to broadcast 
men’s professional tennis events on television in the United States.  
The plaintiffs alleged that the MIPTC violated the antitrust laws by 
(1) denying the plaintiffs the opportunity to produce tennis events in the 
manner they would so choose (e.g., the MIPTC allegedly refused to 
sanction a tournament unless the owner agreed to a ceiling on player 
compensation), (2) inhibiting the development of competing events by 
entering into an agreement with World Championship Tennis (WCT) – a 
rival sanctioning organization formed in the late 1960s but which later 
agreed to obtain MIPTC sanctions for its entire circuit of events – whereby 
WCT events would be integrated into the Grand Prix, (3) decreasing the 
number of non-sanctioned tournaments in which players can compete due 
to the MIPTC’s requirement that the players sign Commitment 
Agreements, (4) requiring owners and producers of sanctioned events to 
contribute to a ‘bonus pool’ which provides additional compensation to 
players who perform well at sanctioned events, and (5) proposing 
additional restrictions such as a ‘Special Events’ Rule requiring owners of 
sanctioned events not to ‘promote’ any Special Event during the week of 
any Grand Prix tournament, a ‘Best Interest’ Rule giving the MIPTC the 
right to refuse to sanction any event it determines would not serve ‘the 
best interest of the sport’, a ‘Conflicts of Interest’ Rule enabling the 
MIPTC to prohibit owners and producers from inviting certain players to 
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 participate in their tournaments as ‘wild cards’, and a rule that would 
allow the MIPTC to serve as the exclusive representative and agent for the 
pooled sale of television broadcasting rights to sanctioned events.  
 Although a motion for summary judgment was submitted in 
January 1986, the district court’s decision did not appear until August 10, 
1987.201 It began: 
 
The decision on this motion for summary judgment submitted in 
January of 1986 has been a long time in coming. The reason for 
this is that I had difficulty (as often happens) in articulating the 
obvious. Sometimes it is necessary to explain the obvious, 
something that district court judges are competent to do… It is 
necessary in this case. 
 
When hiring an employee, an employer may make that 
employment dependent on certain conditions. Such conditions may 
include length and hours of employment, rate of pay, vacation 
time, sick leave policies, and restrictions on whether the employee 
may work at other jobs, so long as they are not imposed for longer 
than a reasonable period of time. The employment contracts at 
issue bind the employee tennis players to such conditions for a 
period of approximately thirty-six weeks per year. The basic 
charge here is that these employment contracts for tennis players 
preclude the plaintiffs from hiring those players during the period, 
so that plaintiffs cannot successfully compete in exhibiting those 
players. Sophist arguments advanced by plaintiffs would turn this 
into an illegal monopoly and a violation of the antitrust laws. The 
real relief sought by plaintiffs is a declaration by this court that 
exclusive employment contracts even for a reasonable period of 
time monopolize the employees’ time and are thus illegal. 
 
Regarding the conspiracy claim, the district court observed that the 
only co-conspirator named by plaintiffs is the International Tennis 
Federation (ITF), with which the MIPTC cannot be said to have conspired: 
 
The ITF formed MIPTC originally, participates in MIPTC’s 
operation, and ITF members make up one-third of MIPTC. 
Because ITF makes up part of MIPTC, and because it is legally 
impossible to conspire with oneself, … plaintiffs can make out no 
claim of conspiracy to restrain trade or to monopolize against ITF 
and MIPTC. Plaintiffs also allege that other co-conspirators exist, 
“some of whom may not be known to the plaintiffs at this time.” 
… However, no conspiracy claim can stand against unidentified 
and unknown parties. 
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 The district court also found the plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim to be 
unconvincing: 
 
Furthermore, MIPTC does not possess an illegal monopoly power 
in the men’s professional tennis market. Nothing other than 
perhaps economics bars any of the plaintiffs from entering the 
market for men’s professional tennis events. However, plaintiffs 
are unwilling to compete in that market. Because they are 
unwilling to expend the funds necessary to enter the market, 
plaintiffs claim that MIPTC has a monopoly power, which 
assertion is not borne out by the facts alleged in the Complaint. 
 
As a result, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ antitrust 
claims. Plaintiffs appealed. On August 30, 1988, the appeals court issued 
its opinion vacating much of the district court’s order – apparently what 
the district court found to be “obvious”, the appeals court did not.202 
The appeals court began by rejecting MIPTC’s argument that the 
plaintiffs lacked ‘antitrust standing’ because, to the extent a conspiracy 
occurred, the plaintiffs were participants in that conspiracy. In other 
words, the appeals court declined to “adopt a per se rule prohibiting 
putative cartel members from asserting antitrust claims against other 
members of the cartel.” The reason is that the interest of a cartel member 
does not necessarily coincide with the interest of the cartel. The court 
explained: 
 
Thus, a restraint that merely prevents a cartel member from 
acquiring a greater share of the fruits of the cartel would not cause 
the member to suffer antitrust injury… But to the extent a cartel 
member credibly asserts that it would be better off if it were free to 
compete – such that the member’s interest coincides with the 
public interest in vigorous competition – we believe that the 
individual cartel member satisfies the antitrust injury requirement. 
 
With respect to the plaintiffs, the appeals court found that their 
“individual interests may coincide with the public interest in promoting 
competition” and thus the plaintiffs “have satisfied the first element of the 
standing analysis.”  
As for the district court’s opinion that the Section 1 claim fails 
because the MIPTC cannot conspire with itself, the appeals court 
disagreed: 
 
Although we agree with the principle that it is impossible to 
conspire with oneself, we do not believe that the district court was 
correct to apply this principle in the present case. As we have 
noted, MIPTC is an association consisting of representatives of 
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 national tennis associations, tournament owners and directors, and 
professional tennis players. Courts have consistently held that, 
since joint ventures – including sports leagues and other such 
associations – consist of multiple entities, they can violate Sec. 1 
of the Sherman Act… We therefore hold that appellants have 
adequately alleged the element of contract, combination, or 
conspiracy. 
 
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged a 
number of restraints of trade, including price-fixing, horizontal market 
division, and group boycott (or a concerted refusal to deal).  
As for the Section 2 claim, the appeals court found that the 
plaintiffs had clearly alleged that MIPTC engaged in monopolization (i.e., 
MIPTC possesses monopoly power and willfully maintained that 
monopoly power), attempted to monopolize by engaging in exclusionary 
conduct with the specific intent to monopolize, and conspired to 
monopolize.   
Overall, the appeals court concluded: 
 
In our view, appellants have standing to attack MIPTC’s 
administration of the Grand Prix circuit, the MIPTC-WCT 
Agreement, the Commitment Agreements, the bonus pool system, 
and the Special Event Rule. The complaint adequately alleges that 
appellees have engaged in price fixing, horizontal market division, 
and that they have threatened a concerted refusal to deal. The 
complaint further alleges, properly, that appellees have engaged in 
monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize. Finally, we believe 
that Volvo has adequately stated a claim for relief for interference 
with prospective business relations. Accordingly, we remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 Note that the appeals court was not ruling that MIPTC’s alleged 
behavior violated the antitrust laws – it was only ruling that those antitrust 
claims should not have been dismissed on summary judgment. The Volvo-
MIPTC litigation apparently ended prior to a verdict on those claims. 
 
 
Boxing. The two primary boxing regulatory organizations are the World 
Boxing Council (WBC) and the World Boxing Association (WBA). Both 
promote championship boxing matches throughout the world, recognize 
world champion boxers in various weight classes, prescribe a system of 
ranking boxers, designate minimum defense requirements for champions, 
and establish rules governing bouts.  
 On January 28, 1978, Alexis Arguello defeated Alfredo Escalera 
for the WBC super featherweight championship and, the next day, 
Arguello’s manager signed a contract with promoter Don King for a 
rematch. Six months later, on July 26, Arguello and his manager signed a 
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 deal with New York’s Madison Square Garden giving the Garden the right 
of first refusal for all of Arguello’s bouts for one year. The deal contained 
the stipulation that it would remain in effect only as long as Theodore 
Brenner remained the Garden’s president of boxing. A little over a month 
later, on September 1, Brenner left his position with the Garden to become 
an independent boxing promoter and, one month after that, Brenner signed 
a deal with Arguello and his manager giving Brenner the right to promote 
Arguello’s bouts for three years. Brenner then reached a deal with CBS 
Sports for the telecast of the Arguello-Escalera rematch. The Arguello-
Escalera rematch was to take place on February 3, 1979. 
 Despite signing a three-year exclusive deal with Brenner, 
Arguello’s manager later signed contracts with King for a Arguello-Arturo 
Leon bout and a Arguello-Bobby Chacon bout. Moreover, in December 
1978, King informed CBS and the WBC that he had the rights to the 
Arguello-Escalera rematch, not Brenner. Needless to say, at the WBC 
annual convention from December 4-7, 1978, there was great confusion 
over who would be promoting which Arguello bouts.   
 The WBC executive committee refused to ‘certify’ these proposed 
fights, deciding that, in accordance with its rules, Arguello would first 
have to defend his title against the WBC’s number one ranked contender, 
Rafael Limon. The WBC had a ‘mandatory defense’ rule which required 
the champion to defend his title at least once a year against the highest 
ranked contender who was willing and able to fight. Brenner informed the 
WBC that he already had a television deal for the Arguello-Escalera 
rematch and the WBC’s president said he would ask the WBC executive 
committee to reconsider. The next day, the committee voted to certify the 
rematch if three conditions were met: (1) Limon agreed to step aside; (2) 
the rematch was not postponed; and (3) Brenner and King resolved their 
dispute over the rematch either by agreement or in court. The Arguello-
Escalera bout occurred on February 4, 1979, but was televised on ABC 
because on December 20, 1978 CBS had cancelled its contract with 
Brenner after its legal department determined that Brenner did “not own 
all of the necessary ancillary rights to grant CBS Sports exclusive 
television broadcast rights to (the fight).” 
 In late February 1979, the WBC executive committee voted 
unanimously to suspend Brenner because he failed to pay the WBC’s 
annual registration fee for promoters, failed to submit to the WBC his 
contracts for the Arguello-Escalera rematch, failed to submit proof to the 
WBC that he was registered as a promoter in any state, and violated his 
commitment to the WBC that he would pay $25,000 to King, which had 
been a condition for the WBC certifying the Arguello-Escalera rematch. 
Brenner was informed of his suspension in a letter dated May 2, 1979. 
 On February 14, 1980, Brenner filed a lawsuit against the WBC 
and its president, Jose Sulaiman Chagnon, alleging that, in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, they engaged in an unlawful conspiracy 
with boxing promoters, including Don King, to eliminate Brenner as a 
competitor and in a group boycott by suspending Brenner from promoting 
WBC championship bouts. A jury trial was held and the district court 
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 judge entered a directed verdict for the defendants on the conspiracy 
count, finding that “there (were) no facts in this record from which a jury 
may draw a reasonable inference that a conspiracy existed between King 
and Sulaiman to have the World Boxing Council suspend Brenner and 
restrain competition in the field of boxing promotion.”  
On the group boycott claim, the district court judge instructed the 
jury that it could reach a verdict in favor of Brenner only if a fair 
preponderance of the evidence indicated that (1) the WBC suspended 
Brenner for the purpose of preventing him from engaging in his trade as a 
boxing promoter and (2) the defendants’ conduct did not fall within the 
recognized exception to per se group boycotts. According to the test 
spelled out in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, conduct falls 
within the exception to per se invalidation of group boycotts if three 
conditions are met: (1) a legislative mandate for self-regulation “or 
otherwise” exists; (2) the conduct is (a) intended to accomplish an end 
consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation, (b) reasonably related 
to that goal, and (c) no more extensive than necessary; and (3) the 
association has procedural safeguards so that the restraint is not arbitrary 
and there is a basis for judicial review. The jury returned a verdict for the 
defendants on the group boycott count. Brenner sought a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial on the 
group boycott claim. The district court judge denied Brenner’s motion. 
Brenner appealed. 
 On March 18, 1982, the appeals court issued its opinion affirming 
the judgment and orders of the district court.203 Regarding the conspiracy 
claim, the appeal court wrote: 
 
This record does not support a reasonable inference of a conspiracy 
among appellees and King to advance the interests of King over 
those of Brenner. Rather, the only conclusion that can be drawn is 
that the WBC and Sulaiman aided Brenner: they permitted his 
Arguello-Escalera fight to take precedence despite having denied a 
similar request by King; Sulaiman acted as intermediary, upon 
Brenner’s request, in settling the dispute with King; and Sulaiman 
refused to halt the fight when King so requested. Furthermore, the 
record is devoid of evidence that the WBC and Sulaiman actually 
knew at any time that King’s contracts were defective, if in fact 
they were… We find no conspiracy in Sulaiman’s adherence to the 
terms laid down by the WBC convention. The WBC convention 
had decided to take a position of neutrality. In light of the refusal 
of the court and of CBS to find King’s contracts invalid, we can 
hardly say that Sulaiman’s adherence to the convention’s mandate 
was suspect. Neither can we conclude that a determination to allow 
the parties to settle this matter in court or by agreement should be 
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 interpreted as conspiratorial or as favoring of one promoter over 
another… 
 
Brenner next points to the repeated attempts of Don King to 
undermine the fight as evidence of the conspiracy. The district 
court provided the answer when it said that this evidence “shows 
that King isn’t a nice guy, the people he deals with don’t think he’s 
a nice guy but that doesn’t prove that he entered into a conspiracy 
with Sulaiman to have Brenner suspended.” 
 
 As for the group boycott claim, the appeals court rejected 
Brenner’s contention “that discipline imposed by a sports organization for 
the violation of rules and regulations aimed at achieving reasonable 
objectives other than participant parity, safety and league integrity serve 
no purpose beyond the stifling of competition.” The appeals court also 
rejected Brenner’s contention that he presented sufficient evidence that the 
Denver Rockets requirements are not met in this case. Although Brenner 
claimed to have presented evidence “establishing that the WBC is corrupt 
and that its rules are administered in an arbitrary and ad hoc fashion”, the 
appeals court found “no merit in these claims.”  Furthermore, the appeals 
court explained: 
 
Similarly, we cannot conclude that Brenner’s failure to honor his 
agreements with the WBC or with its rules were improper bases 
under Section 1 of the antitrust laws for suspending him from 
promoting WBC world title fights. Brenner has not presented, nor 
can we discern, a patently anticompetitive purpose behind the 
adoption of the WBC’s rules or its agreement with Brenner. 
Neither can we conclude that the executive committee which 
suspended Brenner was composed of competitors who stood to 
gain from his suspension. 
  
In summary, promoters/sponsors have brought a number of antitrust 
lawsuits against sports leagues. The lawsuits that have concluded with a judicial 
decision have tended to be unsuccessful. However, some lawsuits were settled 
prior to a verdict.  
 
 
For-Profit Sports Camp Operators. Although the NCAA does not own, sponsor, 
or operate any youth basketball camps, some NCAA members do. These camps 
are known as “institutional camps.” Camps operated by non-NCAA members, in 
contrast, are known as “non-institutional camps.” Institutional camps are subject 
to NCAA rules, including the NCAA’s amateurism- and recruiting-related 
bylaws. Thus, for example, institutional camps must be open to any and all 
entrants and cannot pay a prospective student-athlete’s expenses to attend the 
camp. Non-institutional camps, while not under the NCAA’s direct control, are 
nevertheless indirectly affected by the NCAA’s recruiting rules. While a non-
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 institutional camp can be ‘selective’ in accepting participants (unlike institutional 
camps), a non-institutional camp (1) must be ‘certified’ by the NCAA before 
Division I coaches can attend the camp to evaluate prospects, (2) must be held 
during a narrow window of a few weeks because Division I coaches can only 
attend such camps during that window, and (3) cannot employ Division I coaches, 
among other restrictions. 
 The NCAA’s certification requirement has been in effect since 1993. To 
be certified, a non-institutional camp must meet certain requirements. For 
example, camp participants and attending coaches (and their relatives) cannot 
receive gifts, inducements, or air/ground transportation. Prospective student-
athletes cannot retain athletic equipment or apparel (other than an event T-shirt) 
unless they pay the item’s normal retail value. The camp cannot be operated or 
managed by any sports agents. Nor can the camp receive financial support from a 
sports agent.  
 The time window during which Division I coaches can attend non-
institutional camps has fluctuated over time. In 1981, the NCAA developed a 
recruiting calendar which divided a year into four types of periods: contact, 
evaluation, quiet, and dead. Permitted coaching activities differ each period. For 
example, during an ‘evaluation period’, authorized athletic department staff can 
attend off-campus events to evaluate prospective student-athletes. In 1981, the 
summer evaluation period was set at 45 days. It was shortened to one month in 
1983, reset to 45 days during the period 1984-86, cut to 21 days in 1987, set at 27 
days during the period 1989-94, after which it was reduced to 24 days. At the time 
the lawsuit was filed, the evaluation period was 24 days but was to be shortened 
to 14 days in the summer of 2001. In 2002, the evaluation period was 20 days. 
Since Division I coaches can only attend non-institutional camps during an 
evaluation period and attendance of those coaches is allegedly essential to the 
camps’ success, those camps have to consider the NCAA’s recruiting calendar 
when scheduling their events. 
 The NCAA prohibited Division I basketball coaches from being employed 
by (or lecturing at) non-institutional camps in 1990, although the coaches could 
be employed by and lecture at institutional camps. The restriction was in effect 
through 2001, but was lifted for the summer of 2002.  
On November 9, 2000, five operators of for-profit summer basketball 
camps for children and teenagers filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA 
alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs alleged that 
the NCAA enacted the certification requirement, reduced the evaluation period, 
and prohibited Division I coaches from working at non-institutional camps “in 
order to protect institutional basketball camps and to harm non-institutional 
basketball camps.” The NCAA countered, in the words of the district court, that 
“its regulation of the recruiting of student-athletes is intended to protect the young 
prospects from being exploited, and that this regulation has been in place for 
decades.”  
The NCAA requested summary judgment on all counts and, on April 30, 
2004, the district court granted the NCAA’s motion.204 The district court noted 
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 that none of the plaintiffs offered evidence as to the harm caused by the 
certification requirements, which they all satisfied. Moreover, the district court 
noted that the plaintiffs “offer no evidence suggesting that a Division I coach who 
is not employed by an institutional camp can observe and evaluate prospects at 
that camp outside of the official evaluation period, nor any evidence that Division 
I coaches employed by institutional camps are permitted to formally evaluate 
players while coaching them.” On the other hand, the district court found the 
NCAA’s rationale for the regulations convincing: 
 
The NCAA has provided substantial evidence in support of its position 
that the rules were enacted to protect young players from being 
exploited… Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that rebuts the evidence 
disclosed by studies demonstrating abuse under the prior system. 
 
The evidence shows that the NCAA enacted the certification requirement 
in response to basketball recruiting becoming a “showplace” that seemed 
“inconsistent and inappropriate for college athletic recruiters.” … In this 
regard, many of the certification requirements, such as the requirement 
that camp staff not have a history of illegal involvement in sports, the 
prohibition of gifts and inducements, and the requirement that camp 
events not be financed by marketers, are grounded in the paternalistic goal 
of separating high school athletics from the realm of professional sports. 
 
The evidence also shows that the NCAA reduced the summer evaluation 
period so that prospects would have more recruiting time when parents 
and coaches were available to supervise the process… This finding 
supports the NCAA’s position that the rules were enacted in the spirit of 
promoting amateurism, and with the prospects’ best interests in mind. 
  
The district court thus concluded that one reason why the plaintiffs’ 
Section 1 claim fails is that the challenged restrictions are not “commercial” 
restraints, even though they may impose costs on camp operators.  A second 
reason why the Section 1 claim fails is that the plaintiffs failed to present 
sufficient evidence in support of their proposed relevant market – summer 
basketball camps in the United States: 
 
Plaintiffs have not alleged specific facts or brought forth evidence 
establishing that the market for summer basketball camps is distinct from 
the market for other kinds of summer camps, or from camps run during the 
academic year. There are no allegations in the complaint, nor any evidence 
relating to the price of or demand for summer basketball camps. Thus, 
plaintiffs have not alleged or proven whether there are reasonably 
interchangeable alternatives for their product. Defendant has suggested 
that many prospective basketball summer camp attendees would consider 
other kinds of athletic camps reasonable substitutes for basketball summer 
camp, and would also consider basketball camps run during the school 
year as reasonable alternatives. 
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Without plaintiffs properly setting forth a relevant product market, a court 
cannot conclude that the proposed market of summer basketball camps is a 
separate and distinct market, and therefore a relevant market for antitrust 
purposes… Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to adequately set forth the 
relevant market, which is another reason that the § 1 claim fails. 
 
Plaintiffs’ failure to plead a relevant market also caused the Section 2 
claim to fail. In addition, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ tortious 
interference claim. As a result, the district court granted the NCAA’s motion for 
summary judgment on all counts. 
 
 
Merchandisers. As discussed in Chapter 3, the major North American sports 
leagues typically enter into league-wide licensing and merchandising 
arrangements and some teams have challenged these arrangements on antitrust 
grounds. For example, Adidas America and the New York Yankees entered into a 
merchandising deal and filed an antitrust lawsuit against Major League Baseball 
and its other member teams, accusing them of operating “a cartel for the licensing 
of club trademarks and for retail and wholesale baseball merchandise sales.” 
Whether the collective sale of merchandising and television rights is 
anticompetitive is a controversial subject. Roberts (2001) objects even to the term 
“collective sale” since he argues that the league is the owner of these rights, not 
the individual teams. He contends that consumers only want to purchase a 
particular team’s merchandise and view its games because the team is part of the 
league. Thus, there is no “pooling” or “collectivizing” of rights – it is the league 
which owns the rights in the first place. Grusd (1999), on the other hand, 
disagrees: “While the value of a team’s logo depends in part on the league, the 
independent efforts of the owner to differentiate his team and the team logo play a 
more significant role in determining price.” (p. 25) 
 Since the Yankees’ and Adidas’s antitrust lawsuit against MLB was 
discussed in Chapter 3, which focused on antitrust disputes between leagues and 
their member teams, it will not be addressed in this chapter. Rather, the focus will 
be on two other antitrust disputes – Adidas America’s lawsuit challenging a 
NCAA Bylaw regarding manufacturer logos on collegiate team uniforms and 
American Needle’s lawsuit against the NFL over the league’s exclusive licensing 
contract with Reebok. 
 
NCAA Restrictions on Manufacturer Logos on Team Uniforms. In 1983, 
Patrick Ewing, a star basketball player at Georgetown University, wore, 
under his uniform, a Nike t-shirt which bore the Nike logo on each 
shoulder. At the time, the NCAA did not have a specific rule addressing 
the wearing of apparel exhibiting a manufacturer’s logo or trademark, but 
did have a rule against a student-athlete promoting commercial 
enterprises. In 1978, the NCAA had considered whether the wearing of 
apparel bearing the manufacturer’s logo or trademark would violate its 
rule against promoting commercial enterprises and decided that as long as 
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 the logo or trademark is generally available on the product sold to the 
public, the wearing of such apparel would not be considered promotion of 
a commercial enterprise. However, the NCAA revisited the issue 
following the Ewing incident and, in its 1984-85 manual, changed the logo 
rule so that a student-athlete could wear apparel that bore the 
manufacturer’s normal logo, but the number and size of those logos was 
restricted. In particular, the apparel could bear only one manufacturer’s 
logo, which could not exceed 1 ½ inches in height or width. The new rule 
was eventually codified as NCAA Bylaw 12.5.4. 
 Apparel manufacturers attempted to circumvent Bylaw 12.5.4 by 
adding design elements to uniforms that resembled the manufacturer’s 
logo. In April 1994, the NCAA adopted an interpretation of the Bylaw 
which stated that a team’s official uniform cannot bear a design element 
similar to the manufacturer’s logo. For example, Adidas apparel is 
distinguished by three descending stripes along the apparel’s sleeve or 
pants leg and thus an Adidas soccer shirt would not be permitted to bear 
three descending stripes on the shirt’s shoulders. Bylaw 12.5.4 eventually 
became Bylaw 12.5.5 and was revised so that the manufacturer’s logo 
could be any four-sided figure with an area not exceeding 2 ¼ square 
inches. The Bylaw did not prohibit a team from wearing a three-striped 
uniform designed by a manufacturer whose logo was not three stripes. 
 Once in 1993 and twice in 1998, the NCAA determined that 
certain Adidas soccer uniforms violated the Bylaw. In 1993, the NCAA 
decided that the three stripes constituted a ‘second’ logo (since the 
uniform also contained a small Adidas logo) and, moreover, the three 
stripes exceeded the logo size limit. In 1998, the NCAA decided that two 
Adidas soccer uniforms violated the Bylaw because the stripes resembled 
Adidas’s logo. In September 1998, the NCAA offered to review Adidas’s 
proposed uniforms to provide a definitive answer whether a particular 
uniform violated the Bylaw, but Adidas did not accept the NCAA’s offer. 
 Adidas filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA alleging that 
the NCAA unreasonably restrained trade and engaged in a group boycott 
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and attempted to monopolize 
in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Adidas submitted a motion 
for a preliminary injunction enjoining the NCAA from enforcing Bylaw 
12.5.5. On March 26, 1999, the district court denied Adidas’s motion.205  
 The district court ruled that Adidas had failed to demonstrate that it 
faces irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction. 
Moreover, Adidas failed to demonstrate that there was a likelihood that it 
would eventually prevail on the merits of its claims. Regarding the latter, 
the district court argued that Bylaw 12.5.5 has three purposes and 
objectives, all of which are “noncommercial” – the Bylaw (1) “is designed 
to accomplish the NCAA’s principle of maintaining amateurism by 
protecting student-athletes from commercial exploitation”, (2) “attempts to 
preserve the integrity and uniqueness of intercollegiate sports by 
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 preventing member schools from turning their student-athletes into 
billboards in the pursuit of advertising revenue”, and (3) “is designed to 
avoid excessive advertising that could potentially interfere with the basic 
function of the student-athletes’ uniforms, which is to provide immediate 
identification of the athlete’s number and team to his or her teammates and 
to the referee or umpire officiating the contest.” The district court 
observed that there “is no evidence before the court to suggest that the 
purpose of Bylaw 12.5.5 is to provide the NCAA or its member 
institutions with any commercial or economic advantage” and thus the 
court concluded that “Bylaw 12.5.5 has noncommercial purposes and 
objectives.”  
In a footnote, the court pointed out that “Adidas’ briefing focuses 
almost solely on the issue of whether 12.5.5 is necessary and whether its 
application is reasonable.” The court commented: “Adidas fails to 
recognize that Bylaw 12.5.5 does not violate antitrust laws merely because 
it is potentially unnecessary, over-restrictive, or unfairly applied to 
Adidas.” 
The district court then observed that it “is not difficult to conceive 
of a facially noncommercial activity that confers an intentional and direct 
economic or competitive benefit to an antitrust defendant” and, therefore, 
“the court must next determine if the contested activity, despite its 
noncommercial nature and purposes, is objectively noncompetitive”, 
which requires the court to “determine whether the NCAA or its member 
institutions receive a direct economic or competitive benefit from the 
enforcement.” The district court concluded that “the NCAA and its 
member institutions are not competitors of Adidas and do not realize any 
financial or competitive advantages by limiting the amount of advertising 
allowed on the backs of student-athletes” and, furthermore, “if Bylaw 
12.5.5 places any restraint on the advertising market, it is an incidental by-
product of the NCAA’s legitimate attempt to maintain the amateurism and 
integrity of college sports, and it does not economically benefit the NCAA 
or its member institutions.” 
 The NCAA motioned for judgment on the pleading, which the 
district court granted on August 26, 1999.206 The court summarized 
Adidas’s allegations as follows: 
 
According to Adidas, the NCAA and its member institutions, 
acting as a cartel, are using Bylaw 12.5.5 to illegally restrict the 
sale of NCAA promotional rights. This intentional restriction of 
promotional rights artificially limits the price and quality options 
available to apparel manufacturers as consumers of promotional 
space, forces manufacturers to pay additional amounts for 
billboard space or other advertising, decreases the selection of 
apparel offered to the end consumer, increases the price of the 
apparel for end consumers, and financially benefits the NCAA and 
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 its member institutions. The complaint further alleges that the 
NCAA benefits from its enforcement of Bylaw 12.5.5 as follows. 
The NCAA competes directly with Adidas and other 
manufacturers for promotional space on NCAA member 
institutions’ uniforms. This competition is the result of the 
NCAA’s commercialization of its own “NCAA” logo. The NCAA, 
in partnership with the Collegiate Licensing Company, is actively 
licensing use of the NCAA logo to apparel manufacturers at 
exorbitant royalty rates. Furthermore, the NCAA asked that all 
member institutions place the NCAA logo on their student-
athlete’s uniforms and equipment for the purpose of enhancing the 
commercial value of the logo. Once member institutions place the 
NCAA logo on its uniforms, manufacturers such as Adidas will be 
forced to pay royalties to the NCAA in order to include the NCAA 
logo on replica uniforms sold to end consumers. 
 
 The district court observed that the NCAA countered that Adidas’s 
antitrust claims should be dismissed on seven different grounds: “(1) the 
enforcement of Bylaw 12.5.5 is not a commercial activity; (2) Adidas has 
not alleged that it suffered an ‘antitrust injury;’ (3) Adidas has not alleged 
a plausible or legally cognizable relevant market; (4) Adidas has not 
alleged concerted action; (5) Bylaw 12.5.5 is reasonable as a matter of 
law; (6) Adidas has failed to show that the NCAA has monopoly power; 
and (7) Adidas has failed to allege facts showing that the NCAA acted 
with the requisite intent to monopolize.” The district court agreed with the 
NCAA that Adidas “has failed to allege a plausible or legally cognizable 
relevant market” and thus there was no need for the court to consider the 
other six alternative grounds for dismissal. 
 Adidas alleged that one of the relevant markets for its Section 1 
and 2 claims was “the market for the sale of Promotional Rights by an 
individual Member Institution or by Member Institutions on the athletic 
apparel and footwear of a Member Institution or Member Institutions used 
in connection with NCAA-controlled intercollegiate athletics in which the 
Member Institutions participate.” Adidas argued that its sponsorship 
agreements with NCAA member institutions are a critical component of 
its marketing strategy, as well as that of competitors. Adidas also argued 
that the sponsorship agreements drive the demand for the company’s 
apparel and footwear. The district court countered: 
 
Adidas’ allegations establish, for purposes of this motion, that 
NCAA promotional rights are excellent advertising vehicles for 
increasing demand for athletic apparel and footwear. They do not, 
however, establish that such promotional rights are, in and of 
themselves, a relevant market for purposes of Adidas’ instant 
antitrust claims. The allegations in Adidas’ complaint fail to define 
the relevant market in terms of interchangeability and cross-
elasticity of demand. As a result, Adidas has failed to explain or 
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 even address why other similar forms of advertising, namely 
sponsorship agreements with teams or individuals competing in the 
National Football League, the National Basketball Association, the 
Women’s National Basketball Association, Major League 
Baseball, Major League Soccer, or the Olympics, are not 
reasonably interchangeable with NCAA promotion rights or 
sponsorship agreements. Similarly, Adidas has not explained why 
sponsorship agreements with teams or individuals in any of the 
above organizations would fail to satisfy Adidas’ goals of 
enhancing the “visibility of adidas’ trademarks on the playing 
field” and authenticating Adidas as a “high quality athletic brand, 
with products that serve the high performance needs of these 
athletes.” Accordingly, the market for the sales of NCAA 
promotional rights cannot be considered a relevant market for 
purposes of Adidas’ instant claims under § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman 
Act. 
 
 Adidas also alleged that the NCAA’s unreasonable restriction of 
output in the NCAA promotional rights market caused injury to 
competition in the market for the sale of sports merchandise, which 
Adidas defined as “markets for the sale of certain athletic uniforms, 
related athletic apparel and athletic footwear to consumers in which adidas 
competes.” The district court countered that Adidas’s complaint “does not 
contain factual allegations sufficient to support the conclusory allegation 
that the NCAA’s enforcement of Bylaw 12.5.5 restricts the ‘markets for 
the sale of certain athletic uniforms, related athletic apparel and athletic 
footwear to consumers in which adidas competes.’” 
 
 
NFL’s Exclusive Licensing Arrangement with Reebok. Prior to 2001, 
clothing manufacturers competed with one another to license NFL team 
trademarks for use on their headwear and apparel – and the NFL (via 
National Football League Properties, Inc.) granted multiple licenses. In 
December 2000, the NFL decided to instead offer an exclusive license to a 
single company, which turned out to be Reebok. American Needle, a 
maker of headwear, had a licensing agreement with the NFL that expired 
in March 2001 and was not renewed. 
 On December 1, 2004, American Needle filed an antitrust lawsuit 
against the NFL, NFL Properties (NFLP), the individual NFL teams, and 
Reebok alleging that the exclusive license constituted an unreasonable 
restraint of trade under both the per se rule and the rule of reason, in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and constituted a 
monopolization of, a conspiracy to monopolize, and an attempt to 
monopolize various markets. The defendants moved to have the complaint 
dismissed, but, on May 5, 2005, the district court dismissed only the count 
alleging a per se Section 1 violation, agreeing with the defendants that the 
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 exclusive licensing agreement must be analyzed under the rule of 
reason.207 
 The defendants argued that the other counts should be dismissed 
because American Needle failed to identify a relevant market. The district 
court observed that American Needle identified six relevant markets 
impacted by the defendants’ conduct: “(1) the market for licenses to use 
NFL and NFL teams’ trademarks in the design, manufacture and sale of 
apparel, (2) the market for licenses to use these trademarks in the design, 
manufacture and sale of headwear, (3) the wholesale market for the sale 
and distribution of apparel with these trademarks, (4) the wholesale 
market for the sale and distribution of headwear with these trademarks, (5) 
the market for the manufacture of apparel with the NFL and NFL teams’ 
trademarks, and finally, (6) the market for the manufacture of headwear 
with these trademarks.” The defendants argued that all six proposed 
relevant markets are defined by the use of trademarks and thus are 
inadequate as a matter of law. 
 The district court observed that a relevant market “is composed of 
products whose use is interchangeable and for which there is a ‘cross-
elasticity of demand’” and noted that “courts have repeatedly rejected 
markets that are defined by a company’s trademark.” For example, Amoco 
gasoline, Mobil gasoline, and Shell gasoline are not three separate product 
markets. Nor is the market for Mercedes-Benz automobiles a separate 
product market, despite the prestige of the company’s trademark. 
However, the court added: 
 
Yet, the analysis from these trademark cases cannot be readily 
applied to the facts of the instant case… The NFL team names and 
logos that appear on apparel and headwear are not a “symbol” of 
the T-shirt or cap on which they appear. In fact, the NFL teams’ 
trademarks carried on a T-shirt or cap may be more properly 
viewed as the product itself, rather than the T-shirt or cap. 
 
In Generac, the Seventh Circuit recognized the absurdity in 
claiming that one brand of gasoline was not interchangeable with 
another, and therefore constituted its own separate market. The 
same would be true in claiming that one brand of t-shirt or cap 
could not substitute for another brand. However, we must 
acknowledge that some portion of the market for headwear and 
apparel carrying NFL teams’ trademarks has little to do with the 
items carrying the logos. Certainly some people purchase a shirt or 
hat with an NFL team’s logo simply because they need a shirt or a 
hat. As defendants argue, apparel with a different logo or with no 
logo would serve as a reasonable substitute for these consumers. 
But, just as certainly, a significant segment of the market for NFL-
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 branded headwear and apparel is purchasing the team logo. If a 
store sold out of hats carrying the Chicago Bears logo, these 
individuals would not necessarily find caps carrying logos for 
SpongeBob, the University of Michigan, or even the Chicago Bulls 
to be reasonable substitutes. More likely, they would purchase a 
different item of apparel, such as a T-shirt or sweatshirt, or even a 
non-apparel item like a mug or key chain that carries the Bears 
logo. The product for these consumers is the trademarked logo. 
This is not the case with the trademarks Pine-Sol, Olympian, 
Rolex, or Shell. Though customers may prefer those brand names 
for any number of reasons, what they are buying is a disinfectant 
household cleaner, … an electric generator, … a high-end watch, 
… or gasoline…, all of which have reasonable substitutes under 
other brand names. But for many people purchasing headwear or 
apparel with an NFL team’s logo, they are purchasing the ability to 
be identified with a particular team – the right to be recognized as 
a fan. Defendants state that “Relevant markets include not just 
brands that consumers could ‘practicably turn’ if ‘prices become 
anticompetitive.’” For consumers seeking to wear something in 
support of an NFL team, what is the alternative to which they can 
practically turn if the NFLP’s exclusive contract with Reebok 
allows this headwear and apparel to become anticompetitive? 
 
… If a unique, separate market exists for the television rights of 
NCAA football games and NBA basketball games, we do not see 
how, as a matter of law, a unique market cannot exist for the 
manufacture and distribution of merchandise carrying NFL 
trademarks. 
 
 The district court stressed that it had “not determined whether the 
markets plaintiff alleges do in fact exist, thereby supporting its claims”, 
but rather had “found only that the law does not preclude an antitrust 
claim based on such markets.” In fact, the court acknowledged that 
American Needle’s market definitions may be improper and that many 
questions remained concerning the viability of its claims: 
 
As indicated in our analysis, if the true product in this case is NFL 
teams’ logos, not the items that carry them, then there may be no 
justification for limiting the relevant market to headwear and 
apparel that carry these logos. Perhaps, the market would more 
properly include all merchandise carrying NFL logos. Of course, 
this broader market definition would then alter the impact of the 
exclusive contract with Reebok, which is allegedly limited to the 
manufacture and distribution of headwear and apparel. 
 
Many questions concerning the viability of plaintiff’s claims 
remain. For example, it is far from clear, for a different reason, that 
-  - 263
 NFLP’s control over the trademarks and logos is subject to the 
antitrust laws. The same reasoning that has led courts to reject the 
per se concept, when somewhat extended, can lead to the 
conclusion that the NFL should be viewed as a single source for 
the purpose of protecting the clubs’ trademarks and logos. The 
league may be viewed much like a franchisor. The NFL may 
license others to use its trademarks and logos to affix to 
merchandise and apparel they make, just as McDonald’s licenses 
its trademarks for use by others, who make hamburgers. The NFL 
may have as great an interest as McDonald’s in protecting the good 
will inherent in their marks by selectively choosing who may use 
them… It is a rather dramatic assertion that the antitrust laws 
prohibit the NFL from determining who may use its trademarks 
and logos and, therefore, its good will. But we leave that 
consideration to another day, as the present contention is confined 
to whether or not there can be relevant markets. 
 
In a footnote, the district court also observed that, although “it is 
not relevant to the inquiry before us and carries no weight at this stage in 
the litigation”, Reebok’s 2004 annual report states that its agreement with 
the NFL is exclusive for some distribution channels, but that it is “a non-
exclusive distributor of NFL-branded apparel through catalogs, in retail 
stores that primarily carry NFL-branded products and in other retail 
channels.”  This appears to contradict American Needle’s assertion in its 
complaint that Reebok is “the exclusive provider of apparel and headwear 
bearing the Trademarks of the individual NFL Teams and the NFL.” 
Given the district court’s ruling, it is not clear whether American 
Needle is continuing to pursue its lawsuit. 
 
 
The Media. Broadcast media (i.e., television and radio), print media (i.e., 
newspapers, magazines), and internet websites have all attempted to profit from 
the sports leagues’ product – games. Of course, sports leagues want these media 
to publicize the games and, for a fee, broadcast them. As a result, sports leagues 
enter into exclusive contracts with television and radio networks to broadcast 
certain games (thereby giving the network an incentive to extensively promote the 
game), may withhold authorization of the broadcast of a non-soldout game into 
the home team’s territory (thereby giving the home team’s fans an incentive to 
attend the game), may limit the number of games a league member can televise on 
a superstation (which draws a national audience and thus may draw viewers away 
from the games of other league members), may prevent internet sites from 
reporting real-time scores as quickly as the league’s own website (thereby 
allowing the league to earn a return on its investment in reporting real-time 
scores), and may protect the league members’ trademarks by seeking to prevent 
non-league members from operating websites with domain names resembling that 
of league members. Media companies have challenged these league actions on 
antitrust grounds. 
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Television stations. In general, sports leagues want their games televised – 
the broadcast fees they can negotiate are often enormous.208 But to obtain 
an agreement, a league may have to promise a broadcaster exclusivity – at 
least during a particular time-slot – and possibly the ability to choose 
which of the league’s games will be broadcast in that time slot. Thus, 
broadcasters compete to become the ‘exclusive’ broadcaster during a 
particular time slot and, not surprisingly, the ‘losing’ broadcasters may not 
be content with broadcasting ‘inferior’ games in ‘inferior’ time slots and 
therefore may decide to challenge the exclusivity agreement on antitrust 
grounds. In addition, sports leagues may seek to help teams that have 
difficulty selling-out their home games by allowing the home team to 
withhold authorization for the televising of its non-soldout home games. 
Not surprisingly, a broadcaster prevented from televising the home game 
may challenge the ‘blackout’ on antitrust grounds. Sports leagues also 
generally want their members to obtain as large an audience for their 
games as possible, but if doing so results in the league member’s games 
draining audiences away from the games of other league members, the 
league may seek to limit the number of such games the team can play. 
Such games are likely to appear on ‘superstations’, which have a national 
broadcast audience, and these superstations may challenge the league’s 
limit on antitrust grounds. 
 
College Football Association television exclusivity agreements. 
The College Football Association (CFA) was formed in 1977 by 
62 of the largest NCAA Division I football programs, who were 
frustrated in their attempts to divert more college football 
broadcast revenues to the major programs. The CFA included all 
of the major football conferences except the Big Ten and the Pac 
Ten. As discussed in Chapter 3, in 1981, the CFA was offered a 4-
year $180 million contract by NBC to pull its games from the 
NCAA television package with ABC, but the CFA backed down 
after the NCAA threatened to expel any institution accepting the 
NBC offer. Such an expulsion would have hurt those institutions 
with strong Division I men’s basketball programs, which would 
have been prohibited from participation in the NCAA’s post-
season tournament. Since the CFA institutions did not believe they 
could host a successful basketball tournament outside the NCAA, 
the CFA did not attempt to form a rival organization to the NCAA. 
However, the CFA did cover the legal expenses of the Universities 
of Oklahoma and Georgia when they sued the NCAA over the 
collective sale of football broadcast rights, arguing that the 
                                                 
208 For discussions of the sale of sports broadcast rights in Europe and how it differs from 
that in the U.S., see Cameron (1997), New & Le Grand (1999), Cave & Crandall 
(2001), Hoehn & Lancefield (2003), Tonazzi (2003), Falconieri, Palomino & 
Sákovics (2004), and Forrest, Simmons & Szymanski (2004). 
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 collective sale constituted an illegal cartel. After the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1984 decision against the NCAA, the CFA negotiated a 
one-year deal with ABC for $12 million, while the Big Ten and 
Pac Ten signed a one-year deal with CBS for $9.6 million. The 
games on ABC and CBS were in the same time slot so, as 
Siegfried and Burba (2004) observed, “in 1984 a duopoly emerged 
to replace the monopoly that previously had sold college football 
television broadcast rights.” (p. 806)  
 The 1984 CFA-ABC contract was exclusive during the 
afternoon time slot in the sense that other teams in the CFA could 
not broadcast their games during that slot. However, teams not 
selected by ABC to play the afternoon game could sell their games 
to other syndicators or cable networks for broadcast in an earlier 
time slot. ABC had to give at least 12 days advance notice when 
selecting which game it would broadcast in the exclusive Saturday 
afternoon time slot, except for September games which had to be 
selected prior to the start of the season.  
The CFA also entered into a contract with ESPN in 1984 
for a Saturday evening game. The slot was not perfectly exclusive 
because, for example, it did not prevent the ‘pay-per-view’ 
broadcast of other CFA games. ESPN had to provide advance 
notice of which game it would air. Both the ABC and ESPN 
contracts contained limits on the number of times a particular 
team’s game could be chosen for the exclusive slot. 
The CFA’s contracts with ABC and ESPN were challenged 
on antitrust grounds by the Association of Independent Television 
Stations (INTV) and Sports View Company (SVC), which brought 
suit against the CFA, the Big Eight conference, ABC, and ESPN. 
The plaintiffs alleged, in the words of the district court, that (1) “by 
these agreements the defendants fixed prices, limited output, 
divided markets, excluded competition, and restricted viewers’ 
choices among games, and thus unreasonably restrained trade” in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and (2) “the defendants 
have conspired and attempted to monopolize the college football 
television market” in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
INTV and SVC asked for summary judgment establishing the 
defendants’ antitrust liability and enjoining many of their 
collaborative activities. 
On March 20, 1986, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgment.209 The court noted that there were 
genuine issues of material fact and thus the plaintiffs were not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For example, with respect 
to the Section 1 claim, the court found that “INTV and SVC have 
not established beyond factual dispute that the challenged 
                                                 
209 Association of Independent Television Stations v. CFA, 637 F. Supp. 1289 (W.D. Ok 
1986). 
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 arrangements constitute per se illegal price fixing, output 
restrictions, or division of markets” and “INTV’s and SVC’s rule 
of reason claims are burdened with material factual disputes 
concerning market definition and power, the anticompetitive 
effects of the agreements, and the business reasons offered to 
justify them.”  
In arguing that the challenged actions are not obviously per 
se illegal, the district court referred to the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents and explained: 
 
In the marketing of television rights, just as in the 
management of the live contest itself, some cooperation is 
necessary if the product, live college football television, is 
to be available at all… 
 
Even if it were already established beyond factual dispute 
that the challenged television rights agreements worked 
price distortions or restricted output, it would be premature 
to condemn them per se. It is clear that we find the 
restraints in an industry in which agreements among 
competitors are necessary if the product is to be available at 
all. The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court is as 
applicable to restraints by the CFA as it is to restraints 
imposed by the NCAA. It is not the nature, purpose, or 
membership of the organization engaged in the conduct that 
determines whether a restraint may be condemned per se or 
whether it may pass under the rule of reason; it is the nature 
of the industry in which the restraint appears. If the 
industry is such that cooperation among competitors is a 
commercial necessity, the agreements which permit such 
cooperation should ordinarily warrant the discriminating 
review afforded by the rule of reason. Only if the 
cooperative arrangements are revealed to be naked 
restraints should they be condemned per se. 
 
The plaintiffs and defendants did not agree on the relevant 
product market. The plaintiffs asserted that the relevant product 
market is live college football television. The CFA and the Big 
Eight asserted that the market includes professional football 
(including not only NFL games, but USFL games as well since the 
USFL planned to move to a fall schedule in 1986). ABC argued 
that the relevant market includes all fall sports programming. 
With respect to the Section 2 claim, the district court 
observed: 
 
In order to establish monopolization, INTV and SVC thus 
must prove that the defendants have monopoly power in a 
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 relevant market; that is, the power to control price and 
prevent entry to the market… 
 
Having argued that the relevant product market is live 
college football television, INTV and SVC curiously then 
assert that CFA’s monopoly power should be judged by 
reference to a product market that includes only CFA, Big 
10 and PAC 10 games. Since CFA has 63 members, these 
63 institutions constitute approximately 75 percent of the 
relevant market of 83 competing institutions. 
 
INTV’s summary elimination of all other college football 
from the relevant product market is unexplained. INTV and 
SVC also take no account of the market share commanded 
by CFA’s own members marketing telecast rights outside 
the CFA and Big Eight plans. Because each of the member 
institutions is free to sell television rights to its games, CFA 
argues that the market power of CFA cannot be inferred 
from mere reference to the number and quality of its 
members. Unlike NCAA members under the NCAA plan, 
CFA members individually may enter the marketplace 
along with CFA. 
 
Finally, the court notes that INTV accuses the Big 10-PAC 
10 collaboration with monopolization of the same 
geographical and product markets as INTV alleges in these 
actions. Certainly, two or more entities may combine to 
establish monopoly power – a shared monopoly – in the 
same market; but there is no allegation of concerted action 
by CFA and the Big 10-PAC 10 collaboration. Moreover, 
control of less than half of a market may prove absence of 
monopoly power. INTV and SVC have not shown the 
defendants’ monopoly power beyond genuine factual 
dispute. 
 
The district court pointed out numerous other ‘genuine 
issues of material fact’ with respect to the Section 1 and 2 counts 
and thus concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
In 1986, at the time of the district court’s denial of 
summary judgment, the CFA was in the second year of a 2-year 
contract with ABC and ESPN. It then reached a 4-year contract for 
the years 1987-90 with CBS and ESPN, followed by a 5-year 
contract for the years 1991-95 with ABC (which had acquired 
ESPN). Interestingly, ABC also won the 1991 Big 10-Pac 10 
contract. Given it was able to broadcast a single game in the 
Saturday afternoon slot and believing that few college teams had a 
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 truly national following, in order to air all the games it had 
promised, ABC developed regional telecasts of games. However, 
one CFA member which did have a huge national following was 
Notre Dame, which resigned from the CFA and signed a 4-year, 
$38 million deal with NBC. After the Fox network outbid CBS for 
NFL games in 1995, CBS approached the Southeastern Conference 
(SEC) and offered a 5-year, $85 million deal. The SEC decided to 
conclude a deal outside the CFA. With the loss of its most 
prominent member, Notre Dame, and the loss of the SEC, the CFA 
lacked a sufficient number of attractive games to strike another 
television deal, thereby ending its role in televising college football 
in 1996. In June 1997, the CFA was dissolved and its net worth 
distributed to its member institutions. 
Siegfried and Burba (2004) argue that the CFA behaved 
like a “classic cartel” because it “restricted output – broadcasts of 
live college football contests held on Saturday afternoon – below 
competitive levels and then auctioned the artificially scarce supply 
to the highest bidder.” (p. 810) As evidence that the CFA restricted 
output, they point out that, since the CFA’s dissolution, there are 
now simultaneous broadcasts of games from numerous 
conferences on Saturday afternoon. Moreover, they argue that CFA 
broadcast rights fees substantially exceeded marginal costs in each 
of its contracts – in other words, over time, broadcast rights fees 
for CFA games were not competed down to marginal cost. 
Siegfried and Burba attribute the lack of competition to the 
lack of overlap between the geographic territories of the CFA and 
the Big 10-Pac 10 coalition, as well as the inelastic demand for 
advertising on Saturday afternoon. They argue that one college 
football game may not be a good substitute for another: 
 
To the extent that television viewers in Atlanta or Dallas do 
not view a football game between Michigan and Wisconsin 
to be a good substitute for a Tennessee-Florida or Texas-
Oklahoma game, respectively, the CFA may have enjoyed 
a substantial amount of market power in spite of a rival 
game broadcast on Saturday afternoon… 
 
The effect of regional parochialism among college football 
fans is to minimize the amount of actual competition 
among games televised into any particular area. While the 
duopoly that began broadcasting games simultaneously on 
Saturday afternoons in September 1984 constituted twice as 
many competitors as did the NCAA monopoly that 
preceded it, the games were not perfect substitutes in the 
eyes of potential viewers, leaving both the network 
broadcasting CFA games and the network broadcasting Big 
Ten/Pac Ten games facing a less than perfectly elastic 
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 demand for advertising. That circumstance translated into 
downsloping demand for the broadcast rights to the games 
that are particularly popular in specific geographic regions. 
While the post-1984 market for Saturday afternoon college 
football broadcasts was more competitive than the market it 
supplanted, it remained far from perfectly competitive. (pp. 
813-14) 
 
In addition to a lack of competition among games, 
Siegfried and Burba explain how the lack of good advertising 
substitutes drives up the price of advertising, which in turn drives 
up the price of the broadcast rights for the programs on which the 
advertising is to appear: 
 
The demand for broadcast rights is a derived demand, 
arising from the demand by advertisers for time to tout their 
products during game telecasts. Television networks are 
thus intermediaries. They buy broadcast rights from 
universities that try to get the highest possible price, sell 
advertising time to firms that desire to communicate with a 
target audience – primarily young males – and are largely 
indifferent as to how they reach that audience. The fewer 
alternatives available to reach the target audience, the more 
inelastic is demand, and the higher will be the price of 
advertising time. 
 
The demand for advertising on Saturday afternoon college 
football games is inelastic because the alternatives are 
abysmal. The prime-time hits, “Seinfeld” and “Friends,” 
were not shown on Saturday afternoons. Reruns of “Lassie” 
and “Leave It to Beaver,” or World War II documentaries 
are the best alternatives to Saturday afternoon football, and 
young men do not flock to these classics. At an advertising 
price reflecting marginal cost for a college football 
broadcast, advertisers can reach so many target consumers 
per dollar that their demand is quite inelastic. But in the 
absence of good substitute programming, the networks 
push prices above the competitive level, at least to the point 
that advertisers begin to consider alternatives, thereby 
providing the networks with rents that, in turn, boost their 
demand for broadcast rights. (pp. 814-15)  
 
According to Siegfried and Burba, the “key impediment to 
entry into the market for college football games that are attractive 
to television networks is established brand capital.” (p. 815) They 
explain: 
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 A tradition of success on the field, membership in a 
respected conference, and a large number of alumni (or 
residents in the case of state universities) all help to propel 
the same institutions onto the screen year after year. The 
accumulated brand capital of Penn State, Nebraska, USC, 
or Notre Dame can attract more viewers with a mediocre 
season than Tulane, Northwestern, Brigham Young, or 
Kansas State can when they are undefeated. Because much 
of this brand capital was accumulated by pioneers in the 
early post-World-War-II broadcasting era, it may be more 
expensive for new entrants to match these respected 
programs than it was for the established teams to achieve 
their dominance in the first place. (p. 815) 
 
 A second impediment to entry is the challenge of 
constructing a “credible” schedule: 
 
Unlike entry into most other industries, successful entry of 
individual teams into sports requires the cooperation of 
incumbents. To gain recognition, a new entrant needs to 
compete (and win) against high-caliber opponents. But 
strong incumbents have little incentive to schedule 
upgraded teams. If Michigan or Alabama were to schedule 
a new entrant, it would forfeit the chance at television 
broadcast rights revenues for that game. Mismatches do not 
draw large viewing audiences. In addition, scheduling 
weaker opponents, as upgraded programs inevitably are, 
reduces the strength of an established team’s playing 
schedule, thus diminishing its chances at the financial 
payday associated with a premier bowl game. (pp. 815-16) 
 
 In summary, although the CFA was never found to be a 
cartel by a court, at least some economists believe it was a cartel 
and that its dissolution was followed by an expansion in output.  
 
 
NFL’s blackout policy. Until 1961, NFL teams individually 
negotiated the sale of television rights to their games, subject to 
certain NFL bylaw provisions preventing teams from broadcasting 
their games into the “home territory” of another team while that 
team was also playing, either at home or away. The “home 
territory” was defined as the area within 75 miles of the city where 
the team played its home games. As will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 11, the U.S. Department of Justice filed an 
antitrust lawsuit against the NFL over its television restrictions, 
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 many of which were found to be illegal in 1953.210 However, the 
district court did not find illegal the NFL’s blackout policy related 
to the broadcast of “outside games” within the home territory of a 
team playing at home.  
Around 1961, after the newly-created American Football 
League had negotiated a joint television pooling arrangement, the 
NFL attempted to do the same but the district court ruled that such 
an arrangement would violate the court’s 1953 decree and voided 
the NFL’s contract.211 Seventy-two days later, the U.S. Congress 
enacted an antitrust exemption permitting NFL teams to pool their 
rights to televise their games and to sell them as a package to 
television networks. However, the antitrust exemption contained 
an exception with an exception – it was illegal to restrict the 
televising of games except within the home territory of a team 
playing at home. 
 Television station WTVX began broadcasting from a new, 
more powerful transmitter located 96 miles north of Miami and its 
television signal penetrated 40 miles into the NFL’s Miami 
Dolphins’ home territory. The Dolphins refused to allow WTVX to 
broadcast their home games that were not sold-out. WTWV, the 
owner and operator of WTVX, filed an antitrust lawsuit against the 
Dolphins and the NFL, arguing that the Dolphins can legally 
restrict the “televising” of their games only within their home 
territory and since the transmitter is located outside the Dolphins’ 
home territory, the Dolphins cannot prevent WTVX from 
televising the games. The Dolphins and NFL countered that 
whether WTVX is televising in the Dolphins’ home territory 
depends on where its television signal penetrates, not where its 
transmitter is located. The district court ruled in favor of the 
Dolphins and the NFL. WTWV appealed. 
 On June 11, 1982, the appeals court affirmed the district 
court’s judgment, concluding that Congress’s intent on passing the 
antitrust exemption was “to permit football teams to engage in 
limited antitrust activity to protect home game ticket sales.”212 
Interpreting “televising” in the way proposed by the plaintiff 
“would go a long way toward defeating that purpose.” The appeals 
court commented: “If at all possible, courts should interpret 
statutory language in a way that accomplishes the obvious purpose 
of Congress in enacting the statute.”   
 
 
NBA’s limit on the number of games broadcast on superstations. 
The NBA imposed limits on the number of games the Chicago 
                                                 
210 U.S. v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa 1953). 
211 U.S. v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa 1961). 
212 WTWV v. NFL, 678 F.2d 142 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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 Bulls could televise on superstation WGN. The Bulls and WGN 
sued the NBA twice, winning an injunction enjoining the NBA 
from enforcing its 20-game limit in 1992, but failing to persuade 
the court to require the NBA to raise the limit to 41 games and to 
find the NBA’s “tax” on games broadcast to national audiences to 
be excessive in 1996.213 Since these two cases were discussed in 
Chapter 3, which addressed conflicts between sports leagues and 
their members, they will not be discussed in this chapter. 
 
 
Other Media. Television stations are not the only media companies to 
challenge sports leagues on antitrust grounds. Newspapers, both print and 
electronic, want to publicize the results of sporting contests, even those 
still in progress, as soon as possible. Sometimes a media company’s desire 
to publicize results as soon as possible (and to sell those results to others) 
clashes with the sports league’s desire to earn a return on its investment in 
reporting results – and the result is an antitrust lawsuit, as in the case of 
Morris Communications’ lawsuit against the PGA Tour. An antitrust 
dispute has also arisen between the owner of websites with domain names 
similar to that of NFL teams. In the former case, the court observed that 
the sports league was simply seeking to prevent free-riding on its 
investment for reporting results; in the latter, the court ruled that the sports 
league was simply protecting its trademarks. 
 
PGA’s Real-Time Scoring System. Since the early 1980s, the PGA 
Tour has invested tens of millions of dollars in developing its Real-
Time Scoring System (RTSS), an electronic relay system which 
relies on both state-of-the-art computer technology and dozens of 
trained workers and volunteers stationed throughout a golf course 
to enable the PGA to monitor play around the entire course. The 
information is sent to a remote processing truck, where the player 
scores are processed and transmitted to the PGA’s website, various 
electronic leaderboards stationed around the golf course, and an 
online media center where members of the media can access the 
scores. 
 Prior to 1999, a credentialed member of the media could 
view the scores in the media center and then immediately re-key 
the scores directly into its own computers. As a result, credentialed 
media members could publish real-time scores on their websites as 
fast as, if not faster than, the PGA did on its website. One such 
media member was Morris Communications, a publisher of both 
                                                 
213 Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership and WGN Continental Broadcasting 
Company v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992); Chicago Professional Sports 
Limited Partnership and WGN Continental Broadcasting Company v. NBA, 95 
F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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 print and electronic newspapers, which began selling the scores to 
third parties. However, in January 1999, the PGA Tour and USA 
Today entered into an exclusive syndication deal and instituted 
Online Service Regulations which applied to all credentialed 
media.  
 The Online Service Regulations stated that credentialed 
media members could publish a score on any website no sooner 
than 30 minutes after the shots occurred, thereby giving the PGA 
Tour the first opportunity to post the real-time scores. In April 
1999, the Regulations were amended so that the scores could not 
appear on an unaffiliated website until 30 minutes after the shots 
occurred or when the information became publicly available. 
Shortly afterwards, the PGA Tour permitted Morris 
Communications to immediately publish scores it obtained from 
the online media center on its own website, but not the websites of 
non-credentialed third-parties. The Regulations were amended 
again in January 2000 so that “no scoring information may be used 
by, sold, given, distributed or otherwise transferred to, any party 
other than the Credentialed Site in any manner whatsoever, without 
the prior written consent of the PGA Tour.”  
 Despite the Online Service Regulations, Morris planned to 
sell scoring information obtained from the online media center to 
the Denver Post. The PGA Tour agreed to permit Morris to do so, 
but only for one tournament. In August 2000, the PGA Tour 
agreed to permit Morris to sell real-time golf scores so long as 
Morris collected the scores from the PGA Tour’s website, not from 
the online media center. Morris found such a method unworkable 
given the delay in re-keying information from the PGA Tour 
website. On September 13, 2000, Morris asked the PGA Tour to 
permit it to sell real-time scores obtained directly from the online 
media center. The PGA Tour refused and, on October 11, 2000, 
Morris filed an antitrust complaint against the PGA Tour alleging 
monopolization of the Internet markets, unlawful refusal to deal, 
monopoly leveraging, and attempted monopolization of the 
Internet markets in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
 The PGA Tour asked for summary judgment, which the 
district court granted on December 13, 2002.214 Morris appealed. 
On March 31, 2004, the appeals court affirmed the judgment of the 
district court.215 The appeals court explained: 
 
Ordinarily, when determining whether a defendant has 
violated § 2 of the Sherman Act, we first determine the 
relevant market and then decide whether the defendant 
possessed monopoly power in that market. In this case, 
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 however, we do not pursue such an inquiry because we 
agree with the district court that even if PGA possessed 
monopoly power in the relevant market, Morris’s § 2 
claims cannot prevail because PGA has a valid business 
justification for its actions. Therefore, even if PGA is 
monopolistic, and even if PGA refused to deal with Morris, 
it has not violated § 2 of the Sherman Act… 
 
In this case, PGA met its business justification burden by 
showing that it seeks to prevent Morris from “free-riding” 
on PGA’s RTSS technology… To achieve its business 
purpose, PGA has refused to grant Morris access to PGA 
tournaments unless Morris agrees not to sell the product of 
PGA’s proprietary RTSS – compiled real-time golf scores – 
to non-credentialed third-party internet publishers. Morris 
responds that it has a right to sell such product 
notwithstanding that RTSS was developed and paid for, 
and is operated by, PGA. We disagree with Morris. The 
compiled real-time golf scores acquired through RTSS are 
not a product that Morris has a right to sell because they are 
a derivative product of RTSS, which PGA owns 
exclusively. We agree with the district court that PGA “has 
a right to sell or license its product, championship golf, and 
its derivative product, [compiled] golf scores, on the 
Internet in the same way the [PGA] currently sells its rights 
to television broadcasting stations.”… 
 
If Morris wishes to sell PGA’s product, it must first 
purchase it from PGA… PGA is willing to sell its product 
to its competitors, including Morris, thereby allowing 
credentialed media organizations like Morris to syndicate 
compiled real-time golf scores after paying a licensing fee 
to PGA. Accordingly, we conclude from the record that 
PGA has satisfied its burden to show a valid business 
justification. 
 
The appeals court concluded: 
 
The district court correctly found that a company – even a 
monopolist company – that expends time and money to 
create a valuable product does not violate the antitrust laws 
when it declines to provide that product to its competitors 
for free. PGA has accommodated Morris at every step 
along the way, has agreed to sell its product to Morris, and 
has acted appropriately to protect its economic interests and 
investments. Yet Morris demands that it be given access to 
the product of PGA’s proprietary RTSS, without 
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 compensating PGA, so that Morris can then sell that 
product to others for a fee. That is the classic example of 
“free-riding,” the prevention of which, under antitrust law, 
constitutes a legitimate pro-competitive reason for 
imposing a restriction. 
 
 
Websites with Domain Names Similar to that of NFL Teams. In 
May 1997, Steven Weber registered and paid for the rights to the 
domain names “jets.com” and “dolphins.com” and shortly 
thereafter listed the domain names for sale on his website. Weber 
received a letter from counsel for the NFL, NFL Properties, the 
NFL’s New York Jets, and the NFL’s Miami Dolphins claiming 
that he had violated their trademark rights. The company through 
which the domain names were registered and purchased, pursuant 
to its policy, responded by putting the domain names on hold and 
barred their sale or use pending an outcome of the dispute.  
 Weber filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL, NFL 
Properties, the Jets, and the Dolphins alleging that the defendants 
“agreed, colluded, and/or conspired to restrain trade” in violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and “used the ordinary lawful act 
of infringement enforcement as the vehicle for an unlawful scheme 
to attempt to extend their legal monopoly in the [jets dolphins] 
word market into an illegal monopoly” in violation of Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act. 
 The defendants motioned for the district court to dismiss 
the case, which it did on July 31, 2000.216 As evidence of collusion 
and conspiracy, Weber pointed to the letter from counsel alleging 
that he was violating the defendants’ trademark rights. However, 
the district court observed: 
 
Courts have found that efforts to protect trademark rights, 
even those that go as far as bringing suit against a party 
who has allegedly infringed upon or diluted the trademark 
owner’s rights, represent fair competition, further general 
trademark policies, and do not constitute violations of 
antitrust laws… 
 
The weight of the authority dictates that legal efforts to 
protect trademark rights simply do not constitute a restraint 
of trade in violation of antitrust laws. That does not mean 
that there has been no violation of law on the part of the 
trademark holder, it simply means that it cannot be 
characterized as violating antitrust legislation where there 
is no showing by the plaintiff that the action itself was 
                                                 
216 Weber v. NFL, 112 F. Supp. 2d 667 (N.D. Oh W.D. 2000). 
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 illegal. Here, plaintiff merely has alleged the bald elements 
of a private antitrust claim in vague and conclusory 
terms… More significantly, plaintiff must do more than 
allege that a defendant has sought to enforce his trademark 
rights to state an antitrust claim. He has not done so. 
 
 Regarding the Section 2 claim, the district court argued that 
Weber mischaracterized the relevant market: 
 
Plaintiff argues that the relevant market should be defined 
by the demand for the domain names “jets.com” and 
“dolphins.com.” I disagree. 
 
… The football defendants argue that the market should not 
be defined in terms of their specific marks, but rather in 
terms of domain names in general, and since the number of 
domain names is essentially limitless, their actions could 
not possibly be seen as an attempt to control or monopolize 
that market. 
 
The logic of the football defendants’ argument is sound, 
and there is support for their contention in a recent Seventh 
Circuit decision… 
 
… In this case, the market is defined in terms of domain 
names in general, not “jets.com” and “dolphins.com.” 
Therefore, I find that plaintiff has not demonstrated that the 
football defendants have attempted to control the market, 
and there is no possibility for monopolization thereof. 
 
 
In summary, numerous entities seek to profit from the product produced by sports 
leagues, including promoters/sponsors, operators of for-profit sports camps, 
merchandisers, and the media. Some want to use a league’s players and coaches for their 
own profit and have challenged the league’s rules in this regard on antitrust grounds, 
generally unsuccessfully due to the pro-competitive effect of such rules. Merchandisers 
have had difficulty challenging league rules because the league is typically not a 
competitor of the merchandiser. The media has successfully challenged some league 
rules, but not others.  
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 Chapter 11 
 
Sports Leagues vs. Fans, Taxpayers, and the Federal Government 
 
 
 
 An individual can be a rabid sports fan and yet be upset by the actions of the team 
(and/or the sports league) which he or she supports. Even rabid fans may complain about 
‘excessive’ prices for game tickets, television game packages, and licensed merchandise. 
They may be upset about the tying of the purchase of preseason tickets with the purchase 
of regular season tickets or the television blackout of non-soldout home games. They may 
be outraged by unfair labor practices that lead to cancellation of some or all of a season 
due to a player strike or owner lockout. They may feel unfairly treated by the league’s 
suspension of ‘their’ team for violating league rules. Similarly, taxpayers, regardless of 
whether they are fans, may be upset at having to pay for a sports stadium to be used by a 
professional sports team whose owners and players are multimillionaires. The federal 
government, the representative of ‘the people’, acts to enforce the antitrust laws against 
sports leagues – and to grant sports leagues antitrust exemptions. 
 
U.S. Government Antitrust Lawsuits Against Sports Leagues. In the 1950s, the 
U.S. government launched two significant antitrust attacks involving sports leagues: (1) 
the government attacked an alleged antitrust conspiracy among organizations in the 
business of promoting professional championship boxing contests, which ultimately led 
to the court ordering the organizations’ dissolution (as well as other remedies) and (2) the 
government challenged the NFL’s television ‘blackout’ policy which prevented the 
broadcast of ‘outside’ games into a team’s home territory on days when it played – 
whether at home or away. The former led the U.S. Supreme Court to stress that its 
previous decisions support an antitrust exemption for the business of baseball only, not 
for all sports leagues generally. The latter eventually resulted in the U.S. Congress 
passing the Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA) of 1961, which permitted the collective sale 
of television rights by sports leagues on behalf of their members and allowed the blackout 
of the broadcast of home games in the home team’s territory. In 1973, Congress passed 
an ‘anti-blackout law’ which prohibited the blackout of the broadcast of a home game in 
the home team’s territory as long as the game was sold-out within 72 hours of gametime. 
The anti-blackout law expired at the end of the 1975 season, but the NFL continued to 
comply with the spirit of the law. A number of fans and local businesses attempted to 
challenge the NFL’s blackout policy on antitrust grounds, without success. 
 
Professional Boxing. In January 1949, the heavyweight champion of the 
world, Joe Louis, who wished to retire, entered into an agreement with 
James D. Norris and Arthur M. Wirtz, who owned and controlled the 
Chicago Stadium, the Detroit Olympia Arena, and the St. Louis Arena. 
Louis agreed to obtain exclusive promotion rights (including radio, 
television, and movie revenues) from each of the four leading contenders, 
who would fight a series of elimination matches to determine the new 
champion. Louis then assigned the exclusive rights to the International 
Boxing Club, Illinois (IBC-I), which was organized by Norris and Wirtz, 
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 and, in return, Louis received $150,000 in cash, an employment contract, 
and a 20% stock interest in IBC-I. 
 Norris and Wirtz also held stock in Madison Square Garden 
(MSG), which had an exclusive lease with Mike Jacobs. In March 1949, 
Norris and Wirtz lobbied MSG to buy out Jacobs’ interest, which included 
exclusive leases not only with MSG but also with Yankee Stadium and the 
St. Nicholas Arena, as well as a contract with then-welterweight champion 
Sugar Ray Robinson. MSG did so and assigned the contracts to 
International Boxing Club, New York (IBC-NY). 
 The only remaining significant competitor in the promotion of 
championship boxing matches was Tournament of Champions, Inc. (TC), 
which was part-owned by the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and 
had an exclusive lease with the Polo Grounds as well as an exclusive 
promotion contract for the next two fights by the then-middleweight 
champion. In May 1949, MSG acquired TC for $100,000 plus 25% of the 
profits on the two middleweight matches and assigned the assets to IBC-
NY. In a simultaneous but separate five-year deal, CBS promised not to 
invest in or promote any professional boxing matches and, in return, CBS 
obtained the first refusal right to broadcast certain boxing matches held at 
MSG.  
 Thus, Norris, Wirtz, IBC-I, IBC-NY, and MSG had exclusive 
control of three championship divisions (i.e., heavyweight, middleweight, 
welterweight) and perpetuated their hold by requiring each contender in a 
championship fight to grant them an exclusive promotion contract 
(including film and broadcast rights) to his championship fights for a 
period from three to five years. The arenas which they controlled had 
staged 50% of all championship boxing contests fought during the period 
1937-48. Norris and Wirtz increased their stock ownership in MSG to the 
point where they were able to control it and dictate its boxing activities.  
 In March 1952, the U.S. government filed an antitrust lawsuit 
against Norris, Wirtz, IBC-I, IBC-NY, and MSG. The complaint alleged, 
in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, that “the defendants have 
restrained and monopolized this trade and commerce – ‘the promotion, 
exhibition, broadcasting, telecasting, and motion picture production and 
distribution of professional championship boxing contests in the United 
States’ – through a conspiracy to exclude competition in their line of 
business”, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.217 During 
the period from June 1949 (when the defendants staged their first 
championship bout) until March 1952 (the date of the complaint), the 
defendants promoted (or participated in the promotion of) 19 (90%) of the 
21 championship boxing matches held in the U.S. From June 1949 until 
May 15, 1953 (the date of the amended complaint), the defendants staged 
36 (82%) of the 44 championship boxing matches held in the U.S. In fact, 
the defendants staged every heavyweight and middleweight championship 
bout held in the United States during this period. 
                                                 
217 U.S. v. International Boxing Club of New York, 348 U.S. 236 (1955). 
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  The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that the defendants were engaged in the live presentation of local 
exhibitions (and thus not in interstate commerce) and, in accordance with 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Federal Baseball and Toolson, the 
defendants’ business was outside the reach of the federal antitrust laws. 
The appeals court reversed the district court’s judgment, ruling that 
businesses were not exempt from the antitrust laws simply because they 
were based on the performance of local exhibitions.  
The matter went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which issued its 
decision on January 31, 1955.218 The Supreme Court explained: 
 
The question thus presented is whether the defendants’ business as 
described in the complaint – the promotion of professional 
championship boxing contests on a multistate basis, coupled with 
the sale of rights to televise, broadcast, and film the contests for 
interstate transmission – constitutes “trade or commerce among the 
several States” within the meaning of the Sherman Act. 
 
The question is perhaps a novel one in that this Court has never 
before considered the antitrust status of the boxing business. Yet, if 
it were not for Federal Baseball and Toolson, we think that it 
would be too clear for dispute that the Government’s allegations 
bring the defendants within the scope of the Act. A boxing match – 
like the showing of a motion picture … or the performance of a 
vaudeville act … or the performance of a legitimate stage 
attraction … -- “is of course a local affair.” But that fact alone does 
not bar application of the Sherman Act to a business based on the 
promotion of such matches, if the business is itself engaged in 
interstate commerce or if the business imposes illegal restraints on 
interstate commerce. Apart from Federal Baseball and Toolson, it 
would be sufficient, we believe, to rest on the allegation that over 
25% of the revenue from championship boxing is derived from 
interstate operations through the sale of radio, television, and 
motion picture rights. 
 
The Supreme Court also noted that four recent bills before 
Congress would have granted an antitrust exemption to all professional 
sports enterprises and all four were unanimously opposed by the House’s 
Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the 
Judiciary. Thus, “the defendants in the instant case are now asking this 
Court for precisely the same exemption which enactment of those bills 
would have afforded.” The Court stated that if the defendants are to be 
exempted from the antitrust laws, the exemption will have to come from 
Congress. 
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 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter pointed out the lack of 
logic in upholding the antitrust exemption for the business of baseball, but 
denying the antitrust exemption to the business of other sports: 
 
It would baffle the subtlest ingenuity to find a single differentiating 
factor between other sporting exhibitions, whether boxing or 
football or tennis, and baseball insofar as the conduct of the sport 
is relevant to the criteria or considerations by which the Sherman 
Law becomes applicable to a “trade or commerce.” … Indeed, the 
interstate aspects of baseball and the extent of the exploitation of 
baseball through mass media are far more extensive than is true of 
boxing. If the intrinsic applicability of the Sherman Law were the 
issue, no attempt would be made to differentiate the two sports. 
 
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Minton argued that boxing is 
not trade or commerce: 
 
Of course, there was at that time only one champion, Joe Louis. He 
had a monopoly on that, and while he got it by competition, he did 
not get it in trade or commerce. I do not suppose that Joe Louis had 
to go back into the ring and be walloped to a knockout or a 
decision before he could surrender his championship. And if he 
arranged with four other fellows to fight it out in elimination 
contests for the championship and no one else was restrained from 
doing the same, it is difficult for me to see how there was any 
conspiracy. If other promoters wanted to start an elimination 
contest, they were free to do so. Whether they received public 
acceptance depended upon something other than trade or 
commerce. What does a boxer or athlete have for sale but 
“personal effort, not related to production,” which, as Justice 
Holmes said, is not commerce? Such services they may contract 
about free from any control of the Sherman Act. Suppose the 
appellee did, as the Court states, control what the parties called all 
but two of twenty-one championship contests, what trade or 
commerce have they restrained? 
 
As I see it, boxing is not trade or commerce. There can be no 
monopoly or restraint of nonexistent commerce or trade. Whether 
Congress can control baseball and boxing I need not speculate. 
What I am saying is that Congress has not attempted to do so. If 
there is a conspiracy, it is not one to control commerce between the 
States. 
 
The case went to trial and the government prevailed. The district 
court ordered the dissolution of IBC-I and IBC-NY, the divestiture of 
certain stock owned by Norris and Wirtz, and injunctive relief, in the 
words of the U.S. Supreme Court, “designed to open up the market in the 
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 business of promoting professional world championship boxing 
matches.”219 The defendants appealed, arguing that the district court had 
carved out too narrow a relevant market – the market for championship 
boxing contests. Once again, the case ended up in the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which issued its opinion on January 12, 1959, upholding the district 
court’s judgment.220  
In support of the district court’s definition of the relevant market, 
the Supreme Court stated: 
 
With this in mind, the lower court in the instant case found that 
there exists a ‘separate, identifiable market’ for championship 
boxing contests. This general finding is supported by detailed 
findings to the effect that the average revenue from all sources for 
appellants’ championship bouts was $154,000, compared to 
$40,000 for their nonchampionship programs; that television rights 
to one championship fight brought $100,000, in contrast to 
$45,000 for a nontitle fight seven months later between the same 
two fighters; that the average ‘Nielsen’ ratings over a two-and-one-
half-year period were 74.9% for appellants’ championship 
contests, and 57.7% for their nonchampionship programs 
(reflecting a difference of several million viewers between the two 
types of fights); that although the revenues from movie rights for 
six of appellants’ championship bouts totaled over $600,000, no 
full-length motion picture rights were sold for a nonchampionship 
contest; and that spectators pay ‘substantially more’ for tickets to 
championship fights than for nontitle fights. In addition, numerous 
representatives of the broadcasting, motion picture and advertising 
industries testified to the general effect that a ‘particular and 
special demand exists among radio broadcasting and telecasting 
(and motion picture) companies for the rights to broadcast and 
telecast (and make and distribute films of) championship contests 
in contradistinction to similar rights to nonchampionship contests.’ 
 
In view of these findings, we cannot say that the lower court was 
‘clearly erroneous’ in concluding that nonchampionship fights are 
not ‘reasonably interchangeable for the same purpose’ as 
championship contests. 
 
As for the relief granted by the district court, the Supreme Court 
explained: “The decree should (1) put ‘an end to the combination or 
conspiracy when that is itself the violation’; (2) deprive ‘the antitrust 
defendants of the benefits of their conspiracy’; and (3) ‘break up or render 
impotent the monopoly power which violates the Act.’” The Court 
concluded that “the relief granted was not beyond the allowable discretion 
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 of the district court.” The Court noted, for example, that since May 15, 
1953, there have been 37 championship boxing matches held in the U.S., 
excluding one bantamweight match. The defendants had “promotional 
control” of 24 (65%) of the 37 bouts, and “were not financial strangers to 
the other 13 championship contests which were held in cities other than 
New York and Chicago.” Three justices – Frankfurter, Harlan, and 
Whittaker – dissented on the issue of relief. 
 
 
NFL Blackout Policy. On October 9, 1951, the U.S. government filed an 
antitrust complaint against the NFL seeking an injunction against the 
enforcement of the provisions of Article X of the NFL’s Bylaws, which 
the NFL had adopted earlier that same year. Article X, in the words of the 
district court, “provides that no club shall cause or permit a game in which 
it is engaged to be telecast or broadcast by a station within 75 miles of 
another League City on the day that the home club of the other city is 
either playing a game in its home city or is playing away from home and 
broadcasting or televising its game by use of a station within 75 miles of 
its home city, unless permission for such broadcast or telecast is obtained 
from the home club.”221 The NFL played most of its regular season games 
on Sunday and thus the effect of Article X was to prevent audiences 
within 75 miles of the home city of any participating team that Sunday 
from watching any NFL games not involving that team, unless that team 
granted such permission – a seldom occurrence. Article X included special 
provisions for cases where the home territories of two teams overlapped.  
 Article X contained four basic provisions: it (1) “prevents the 
telecasting of outside games into the home territories of other teams on 
days when the other teams are playing at home”; (2) “prevents the 
telecasting of outside games into the home territories of other teams on 
days when the other teams are playing away from home and permitting the 
telecast of their games into their home territories”; (3) “prevents the 
broadcasting by radio of outside games into the home territories of other 
teams both on days when the other teams are playing at home and on days 
when the other teams are playing away from home and are permitting the 
games to be broadcast or televised into their home territories”; and (4) 
“gives the Football Commissioner an unlimited power to prevent any and 
all clubs from televising or broadcasting any or all of its or their 
games.”222 
 The district court issued its opinion on November 12, 1953.223 
Each of the four basic provisions was analyzed separately. Regarding the 
provision preventing outside telecasts into the home territory of a team 
playing at home, the district court observed: “There can be little doubt that 
this provision constitutes a contract in restraint of trade.” The question was 
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 whether it was an unreasonable restraint of trade. The district court also 
noted that the provision “is a clear case of allocating marketing territories 
among competitors, which is a practice generally held illegal under the 
anti-trust laws.” However, it is not always illegal – and thus a rule of 
reason analysis is needed. The court acknowledged that professional 
football “is a unique type of business” and teams in a professional sports 
league “must not compete too well with each other in a business way” or 
else “the stronger teams would be likely to drive the weaker ones into 
financial failure”, and thus “eventually the whole league, both the weaker 
and the stronger teams, would fail, because without a league no team can 
operate profitably.” The court noted that “in the National Football League 
less than half the clubs over a period of years are likely to be financially 
successful” and, therefore, “it is both wise and essential that rules be 
passed to help the weaker clubs in their competition with the stronger ones 
and to keep the League in fairly even balance.” One such rule would be to 
“reasonably restrict the projection of games by radio or television into the 
home territories of other teams.” The district court explained: 
 
The evidence indicates that television audiences and sponsors have 
so little interest in games between weak teams that it is very 
difficult to obtain sponsors for outside telecasts of such games. 
Consequently, the weaker teams lose practically nothing by this 
television restriction. But they benefit greatly from it in that the 
restriction adds to their home game attendance by preventing 
potential spectators from staying home to watch on television 
exciting outside head-on games between strong teams. The 
competitive position of the weaker teams is improved by this 
increase in home attendance, while the competitive position of the 
stronger teams is weakened somewhat by their inability to sell to 
sponsors the right to televise their desirable head-on games into the 
home territories of the weaker teams when the weaker teams are 
playing at home. 
 
The court pointed to several pieces of evidence to support its 
position that the telecast of an outside game would adversely affect 
attendance at home games. One concerned attendance at Los Angeles 
Rams games during the 1950 season when all of its home games were 
televised into its home territory. The evidence “shows quite clearly that 
the telecasting of a home game into a home territory while the home game 
is being played has an adverse effect on attendance at the game” and this 
“clearly indicates by implication that the telecast of an outside game, 
particularly a head-on game, also adversely affects attendance at a home 
game.” Other evidence comes from studies of college football attendance, 
since “the conclusions in these reports concerning the adverse effect of 
telecasts of college outside games on attendance at college home games do 
indicate that the telecasting of outside professional football games would 
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 have a similar effect upon attendance at home games of the professional 
teams.” The district court concluded: 
 
The greatest part of the defendant clubs’ income is derived from 
the sale of tickets to games. Reasonable protection of home game 
attendance is essential to the very existence of the individual clubs, 
without which there can be no League and no professional football 
as we know it today. 
 
… This particular restriction promotes competition more than it 
restrains it in that its immediate effect is to protect the weak teams 
and its ultimate effect is to preserve the League itself. By thus 
preserving professional football this restriction makes possible 
competition in the sale and purchase of television rights in 
situations in which the restriction does not apply. 
 
The purposes of the Sherman Act certainly will not be served by 
prohibiting the defendant clubs, particularly the weaker clubs, from 
protecting their home gate receipts from the disastrous financial 
effects of invading telecasts of outside games. The member clubs 
of the National Football League, like those of any professional 
athletic league, can exist only as long as the league exists. The 
League is truly a unique business enterprise, which is entitled to 
protect its very existence by agreeing to reasonable restrictions on 
its member clubs. The first type of restriction imposed by Article X 
is a reasonable one and a legal restraint of trade. 
 
The district court then addressed the restriction on the telecasting 
of outside games into the home territory of a team playing an away game 
and telecasting its own game into its home territory. In this case, the 
restriction cannot serve to protect the game’s gate attendance since few 
fans in the home territory would be expected to attend the away game 
even if the game was not televised in the home territory. The district court 
rejected the argument that the restriction protected the home team’s gate 
attendance at future home games by protecting the team’s ‘good will’, 
stating that “there is not one shred of evidence, not one specific example 
based on actual experience, to support this opinion which, more accurately 
stated, is nothing more than conjecture.” Rather, “the primary reason for 
the restrictions in this situation actually is to enable the clubs in the home 
territories to sell monopoly rights to purchasers of television rights to 
away games.” The district court concluded: 
 
The record in this case contains no factual justification for Article 
X’s suppression of competing telecasts of League games when, for 
example, the Philadelphia Eagles’ away game is being televised in 
its home territory. Defendants’ speculation or conjecture that 
without such restriction gate attendance would decline a week or 
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 two later at the Eagles’ home game has little probative value. 
Article X’s restriction on this type of competition is an 
unreasonable and illegal restraint of trade. 
 
Next, the district court addressed radio broadcasts of outside games 
into home territories of teams either playing a home game or playing an 
away game and televising or broadcasting the game back to the home 
territory: 
 
There is no evidence whatsoever indicating any adverse effect of 
radio broadcasts of outside games in the home territory of another 
club. Since each of the defendant clubs permits the broadcasting in 
its home area of all of its own games (both away games and home 
games), it is apparent that none of them feels that such broadcasts 
have any significant adverse effect on gate attendance at their own 
games. Indeed, the evidence indicates that broadcasts of outside 
games when there is no home game have a stimulating effect on 
attendance at home games because of the interest thereby created 
in professional football generally. Granting monopoly rights to 
broadcasts of away games (that is, the right to broadcast away 
games in the home territory coupled with the suppression of 
competition from “outside” broadcasts or telecasts) enhances the 
value of such rights to purchasers, but has no significant effect on 
attendance at football games. There is no factual justification for 
Article X’s territorial restrictions on the sale of radio broadcasting 
rights. Therefore, they are illegal under the Sherman Act. 
 
The district court then addressed Article X’s requirement that the 
NFL Commissioner approve in writing the telecast or broadcast of all 
games. The court noted that the Commissioner’s decision of whether or 
not to give his approval “is final, binding, conclusive, and unappealable” 
and thus the Commissioner has “unlimited and arbitrary power to prevent 
the broadcasting and televising of any and every game”, which in turn 
gives him “the power to set up and enforce the very same restrictions 
hereinbefore held to be illegal.” The district court concluded:  
 
Therefore, it is apparent that the Commissioner must be prohibited 
from exercising his veto power over contracts for the purpose of 
maintaining and enforcing these illegal territorial restrictions. 
Unless his power is limited in this manner, it would be a futile act 
for the Court to enjoin these illegal restraints. Accordingly, the 
enforcement of Section 1(a) of Article X will be enjoined in such a 
way that the Commissioner will be prohibited from exercising his 
power to disapprove contracts for the purpose of effecting and 
maintaining the territorial restrictions hereinbefore held to be 
illegal. 
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 Finally, the district court rejected the NFL’s argument that 
professional football is not interstate commerce and thus is not subject to 
the federal antitrust laws. The court explained: 
 
Defendants contend that the action against them must be dismissed 
because professional football is not commerce or interstate 
commerce. This contention must be rejected. Radio and television 
clearly are in interstate commerce… The restrictions by 
professional football on the sale of radio and television rights 
impose substantial restraints on the television and radio industry. 
Since the League by-laws restrict substantially something which is 
in interstate commerce it is immaterial whether professional 
football by itself is commerce or interstate commerce… 
 
I am not unmindful of the decisions of the Supreme Court in 
Federal Base Ball Club v. National League … and in the very 
recent cases, decided November 9, 1953, of Toolson v. New York 
Yankees, Inc…. In those baseball “reserve clause” cases the Court 
dismissed anti-trust suits against the major professional baseball 
leagues on the theory that big-league baseball is a sport, local in its 
nature, and not interstate commerce. The only restriction alleged in 
the baseball cases was in the internal operation of professional 
baseball itself. The only question involved in those cases was 
whether professional baseball itself is interstate commerce. No 
question of restrictions on the sale of radio and television rights 
was involved in those cases. The present case, on the other hand, 
primarily concerns restrictions imposed by the National Football 
League on the sale of radio and television rights. Therefore, the 
present case basically concerns the League’s restraint of interstate 
commerce in the radio and television industries. It is obvious that 
whether professional football itself is or is not engaged in interstate 
commerce is immaterial in the present case and that the decisions 
in the baseball cases referred to do not control the present case. 
 
The district court ordered the U.S. government and the NFL to 
each submit a proposed decree within 30 days. Final judgment in the case 
was entered on December 28, 1953. 
On April 24, 1961, the NFL and the Columbia Broadcasting 
System (CBS) entered into a contract granting CBS the sole and exclusive 
right to televise NFL games for two years, with certain limited exceptions. 
Prior to that date, each NFL team negotiated its own broadcast deals. 
Under the 1961 contract, the NFL would receive $4,650,000 from CBS 
annually, which (after certain deductions) would then be distributed 
equally to the NFL’s 14 teams. The NFL changed its policy after the 
upstart American Football League signed a single broadcast contract with 
NBC in 1960 (the NBA and NHL had entered into similar broadcast 
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 contracts).224 The NFL petitioned the district court to find that the NFL-
CBS contract does not violate the 1953 Final Judgment. The government 
opposed the NFL’s petition. The district court decided the case on July 20, 
1961, finding that the NFL-CBS contract does violate the 1953 Final 
Judgment.225 
The district court observed that Section V of the Final Judgment 
prohibits agreements “having the purpose or effect of restricting the areas 
within which broadcasts or telecasts of games … may be made.” The 
NFL-CBS contract, however, gives CBS the right to determine which 
games will be telecast and where such games will be televised and 
therefore the contract “restricts the individual clubs from determining ‘the 
areas within which *** telecasts of games *** may be made ***,’ since 
defendants have by their contract given to CBS the power to determine 
which games shall be telecast and where the games shall be televised.” 
Therefore, the district court was “obliged to construe the Final Judgment 
as prohibiting the execution and performance of the contract dated April 
24, 1961, between the National Football League and the Columbia 
Broadcasting System.” 
 Seventy-two days after the district court’s decision, Congress 
passed the Sports Broadcasting Act, which President Kennedy signed into 
law on September 30, 1961. The Sports Broadcasting Act stated: 
 
The antitrust laws … shall not apply to any joint agreement by or 
among persons engaging in or conducting the organized 
professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, or 
hockey, by which any league of clubs participating in professional 
football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells or otherwise 
transfers all or any part of the rights of such league’s member clubs 
in the sponsored telecasting of the games of football, baseball, 
basketball, or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or conducted 
by such clubs. 
 
 
                                                
The Sports Broadcasting Act contained certain exceptions aimed at 
protecting NCAA football from NFL football. Specifically, the antitrust 
exemption would not apply to professional football broadcast contracts 
that permitted the televising of games on Fridays and Saturdays (the days 
on which most NCAA football games were played) within 75 miles of 
where an NCAA football game was scheduled to be played. When the 
Sports Broadcasting Act was expanded in 1966 to give an antitrust 
exemption to the NFL-AFL merger, the broadcast exception was expanded 
to protect both NCAA and high school football games. 
 Note that the Sports Broadcasting Act provides an antitrust 
exemption only for professional sports leagues – therefore the Act does 
not, for example, give the NCAA an antitrust exemption to collectively 
 
224 Voluntary Trade Council (2005). 
225 U.S. v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa 1961). 
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 negotiate a broadcast deal on behalf of all of its members. Also note that 
the Act provides an antitrust exemption only to professional football, 
baseball, basketball, and hockey – therefore the Act does not give an 
antitrust exemption to, for example, professional soccer. Moreover, note 
that the antitrust exemption is restricted to “sponsored telecasting” and 
thus arguably does not apply to games televised on satellite TV (e.g., 
DirecTV) or cable TV (e.g., ESPN) because such telecasts are not 
‘sponsored.’ Nor would the antitrust exemption apply to radio broadcasts 
of games because they are not ‘telecasted.’ 
According to Noll (2007), the immediate effect of the Sports 
Broadcasting Act was a reduction in the number of televised games in 
baseball and football and a more than tripling of rights fees. Similarly, 
Cave and Crandall (2001) argue that the result of the passage of the Sports 
Broadcasting Act was “a dramatic increase in the value of national 
network television sports rights throughout the 1960s as a network 
triopoly bid aggressively for the right to broadcast NFL games, and – 
more modestly – for the rights to other professional league broadcasts.” (p. 
F9) One interpretation of the increase in the value of national network 
television sports rights is that, by collectively negotiating on behalf of all 
of its members, the NFL was able to exercise monopoly power over 
broadcasters, thereby resulting in a reduction in social welfare. 
Several recent economic studies suggest that this interpretation 
may be overly-simplistic. Heubeck (2004) compares the collective and 
individual sale of games and analyzes two models: (1) the league acts as a 
monopolist in selling the games of its members and (2) a broadcaster has 
to obtain broadcast rights from each of the two teams involved in a 
specific game. She finds that price is higher (and quantity lower) when the 
games are sold individually by the participants. The reason is that the 
value of a broadcast right from one participant is worthless unless the 
broadcaster can also obtain a broadcast right from the other participant. 
Heubeck shows that a broadcaster would have to pay more in total to the 
two participants for each individual game than it would have to pay the 
monopolist sports league for the package of all games. An alternative to 
the individual sale of games by both participants would be to have a rule 
whereby the home team owns the broadcast right to the game, which it is 
free to sell to the highest bidder. Heubeck concludes that “in order to 
internalize externalities in demand and, hence, get an outcome that is 
optimal in the social welfare sense, the rights to all games have either [to] 
be bundled and sold collectively by one single economic entity, e.g. the 
league or association, or they have to be sold individually, i.e. each game 
by one party.” (p. 18)  
Falconieri, Palomino, and Sákovics (2004) compare social welfare 
under the individual and collective sale of broadcast rights. They argue 
that social welfare depends on three effects: a bargaining power effect, a 
prize effect, and a free-riding effect. The bargaining power effect may be 
positive or negative depending on the relative bargaining powers of the 
parties The prize effect may also be positive or negative (i.e., collective 
sale is welfare improving if the exogenous performance-related prize is 
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 small so that the league could boost teams’ incentives to invest by 
implementing a performance-based revenue-sharing system). The free-
riding effect is negative under a collective sale and more negative the 
greater the number of teams in the league (i.e., under collective sale with 
revenue-sharing, the greater the number of teams in the league, the less 
incentive a team has to invest in its performance). They conclude that 
“collective sale is socially preferable when (a) leagues are small and 
relatively homogeneous in terms of clout and (b) teams get little 
performance-related revenues.” (p. 833) 
Several pro-competitive rationales for the collective negotiation of 
broadcast deals have been suggested. As just discussed, some studies 
contend that, at least under certain circumstances, social welfare is higher 
under collective sale of sports broadcast rights than under the individual 
sale of each game’s broadcast rights. Moreover, Roberts (2001) contends 
that (1) collective selling creates substantial cost-saving efficiencies by 
reducing the number of people employed by each team to negotiate, draft, 
and manage the broadcast deals and by simplifying the negotiations of 
broadcasters who would be able to negotiate with a single entity instead of 
with 30 or more individual teams and (2) collective selling enhances the 
quality of the league’s product by preventing huge revenue disparities 
across teams.  
However, whether the reduction in revenue disparities translates 
into greater competitive balance is a matter of dispute. As Cave and 
Crandall (2001) explain, a team’s incentive to invest in talent depends on 
the marginal value of talent. Even if broadcast revenue is shared equally, 
large market teams may receive more revenue from a given amount of 
talent (due, for example, to higher gate revenue). As a result, large market 
teams will still have an incentive to acquire more talent than small market 
teams and thus the sharing of broadcast revenue will not promote 
competitive balance: “This pooling of broadcast revenues does not 
eliminate the advantages of large-market teams in securing talent, and 
therefore it does not necessarily contribute to competitive balance.” (p. 
F14) Similarly, Noll (2007) concludes that “centralization of rights sales 
does not improve competitive balance or benefit financially weak teams.” 
(p. 400) 
Gürtler (2005) argues that whether a league prefers collective (i.e., 
“central”) or individual (i.e., “decentral”) sale of games depends on the 
nature of the demand for the league’s product: 
 
It was found that a sports association that is only interested in 
competitive balance will always market centrally. In contrast, a 
sports association that is interested in one extremely high-
performing team or that wishes to maximise the aggregate 
performance in the league for some parameter constellations 
chooses central marketing, while for others it chooses decentral 
marketing. 
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 Usually, a sports association cares for both, intense competition 
between the clubs and high absolute performance. Central 
marketing is then always preferred when TV revenue allocation 
under decentral marketing is extremely unjust. Under central 
marketing, revenue could be redistributed such that the aggregate 
number of high-ability players in the league increases. In this case, 
competition becomes more intense and absolute performance gets 
higher. On the other hand, decentral marketing might be optimal, if 
the creation of a very strong team is desired that cannot be reached 
under central marketing. 
 
Moreover, it was shown that we have extreme conflicts of interest 
between the more and less famous clubs and the more and less able 
players. The “weak” parties, i.e., the small clubs and less able 
players, always prefer central marketing, while the big clubs and 
more able players wish to exploit their superior position by means 
of decentral marketing. (p. 18) 
 
 In 1973, Congress passed Public Law 93-107, which, in the words 
of Siegfried and Hinshaw (1979), “provided that if any game of a 
professional sports club was to be televised on a network pursuant to a 
league contract and all tickets offered for sale had been sold 72 hours 
before game time, blackout agreements prohibiting the simultaneous 
telecast of the game in the home territory were invalid” – with the 
definition of “home territory” left somewhat ambiguous. (p. 1) This so-
called ‘anti-blackout law’ expired at the end of the 1975 season, but the 
NFL continued to comply with the spirit of the law. The alleged rationale 
for the NFL blackout rule was that the televising of a non-soldout home 
game increased the number of no-shows at the game, which in turn 
reduced food, parking, and other concession revenues. 
 Several economic studies investigate the NFL’s blackout policy 
and test whether blacking-out the local telecast of a home game raises live 
attendance at the game. The early evidence is that it did not, but more 
recent studies indicate that blacking-out home games that are not sold-out 
within 72 hours of gametime raises live attendance by reducing the 
number of no-shows. Table 11.1 summarizes the economic literature. 
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Table 11.1 
The Impact of NFL Local Area Television Blackouts on Live Attendance 
 
Study Data 
Attendance 
Measure 
Blackout 
Measure Estimate 
Individual game 
ticket sales. 
Estimated 
probability of 
blackout. 
11,310 more 
fans at blacked-
out games. 
Putsis & 
Sen 
(2000) 
NFL games played by the 8 
teams in the 1996-97 season 
that did not sell out all of their 
games (Baltimore, Buffalo, 
Cincinnati, Detroit, 
Indianapolis, Los Angeles, 
Minnesota, Seattle). 
Game-day no-
shows. 
Estimated 
probability of 
blackout. 
4,959 fewer no-
shows at 
blacked-out 
games. 
 
Welki & 
Zlatoper 
(1994) 
NFL games in the 1991 
season. 
Game attendance. Dummy variable 
denotes blacked-
out games. 
5,300 fewer 
fans at blacked-
out games. 
NFL games in the 1983 and 
1984 seasons in which the 
blackout was always or 
partially lifted. 
 
Game-day no-
shows as a 
percentage of 
stadium capacity. 
Dummy variable 
denotes not 
blacked-out games. 
Not statistically 
significant. 
Zuber & 
Gandar 
(1988) 
NFL games in the 1983 and 
1984 seasons in which the 
blackout was never or partially 
lifted. 
Game-day no-
shows as a 
percentage of 
stadium capacity. 
Dummy variable 
denotes not 
blacked-out games. 
2,201 and 3,305 
fewer no-shows 
at blacked-out 
games in 1983 
and 1984 
seasons, 
respectively. 
 
Siegfried & 
Hinshaw 
(1979) 
NFL games in the 1973-1977 
seasons, excluding the home 
games of two expansion clubs 
(Seattle, Tampa Bay). 
Game-day no-
shows as a 
percentage of 
tickets distributed. 
Dummy variable 
denotes not 
blacked-out games. 
Not statistically 
significant. 
 
 
Siegfried and Hinshaw (1979) did not find a statistically significant 
impact on game-day no-shows using data for the 1973-77 seasons, 
excluding the games of two expansion teams (i.e., Seattle, Tampa Bay). 
Welki and Zlatoper (1994) estimate that there were 5,300 fewer fans at 
blacked-out games during the 1991 season, which is hardly surprising 
since it is the non-soldout games that get blacked-out. 
On the other hand, although Zuber and Gandar (1988) did not find 
a statistically significant impact on game-day no-shows for those NFL 
games in the 1983 and 1984 seasons in which the blackout was always or 
partially lifted, they found that, for games in which the blackout was never 
or partially lifted, blacking-out a game was associated with 2,201 and 
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 3,305 fewer no-shows during the 1983 and 1984 seasons, respectively. In 
other words, it appears that if fans knew there was little or no chance the 
game was going to be televised, they were more likely to attend. Similarly, 
Putsis and Sen (2000) analyze data on the NFL games played by the eight 
teams that did not sell out all of their home games in the 1996-97 season 
and estimate that there were 4,959 fewer no-shows and 11,310 more fans 
at blacked-out games. 
Putsis and Sen emphasize, however, that the gain in on-site 
stadium revenue due to the blackout is more than offset by the societal 
losses from not broadcasting the game in the home territory. As a result, 
they suggest a number of possible policy interventions, including the 
passage of legislation outlawing blackouts: 
 
It is possible to argue that the antitrust exemption given to 
professional sports organizations (allowing them to bargain as a 
cartel) is the reason why the blackout rule exists in the first place, 
and hence is the cause of any market failure. More specifically, 
one could argue that it is this antitrust exemption that allowed the 
NFL to generate sufficient bargaining power to negotiate the 72-
hour blackout contracts into all broadcast agreements. Clearly, the 
television networks would prefer local broadcasts since each game 
generates the most interest (and ratings) in the local market, even 
for blacked out games. However, legislating against local blackout 
(if constitutional) does not produce a Pareto superior market 
outcome (since the policy intervention results in a reduction in 
team revenue, the NFL is made worse off and the redistribution 
cannot be Pareto superior). (p. 1506) 
 
 
Sports Fans’ Antitrust Lawsuits Against Sports Leagues. Sports fans have often 
attempted to use the antitrust laws to overturn sports leagues’ rules, policies, or 
actions with which they disagree. For example, sports fans have challenged the 
NFL’s blackout policy which prevents the televising of home games within a 75-
mile radius of the game site, the NFL’s and NBA’s pricing of television game 
packages, the tying of regular season and preseason game tickets, the pricing of 
licensed merchandise, league suspensions of teams, a league’s alleged unfair labor 
practices, and scheduling of contests. In general, such antitrust challenges by 
sports fans have been largely unsuccessful. 
 
NFL’s Blackout Policy. Sports fans have made numerous attempts to 
challenge the NFL’s blackout policy, without success. For example, 
several plaintiffs filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL, the New York 
Giants, and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) seeking a 
preliminary injunction which would have required NBC to either televise 
nationally the NFL’s championship game to be held on December 30, 
1962 in Yankee Stadium or not to televise it at all. Under the NFL’s 
blackout policy, the game was to be televised nationally except within the 
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 75-mile radius surrounding Yankee Stadium. The plaintiffs contended that 
the blackout policy was an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce 
and trade. The district court issued its decision on December 28, 1962, 
denying the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.226 
 The district court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ assertion that the 
blackout policy authorized by the Sports Broadcasting Act applied only to 
regular-season games, not to post-season games (and thus not to the 
championship game). The district court reasoned that if Congress had 
wanted to exclude the championship game from the blackout 
authorization, it would have explicitly done so. The district court also 
rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that championship games are automatic 
sellouts. Although the upcoming championship game was a sellout, 10 of 
the 13 championship and playoff games during the period 1950-61 were 
not sellouts. Moreover, the court noted: “The rights of the defendants are 
neither diminished nor enhanced by the fact that Sunday’s game is sold 
out.” The court added: 
 
The defendants, on the other hand, contend that were the injunction 
to be granted it would be to their extreme detriment as it would 
bring about the very adverse economic effects which the restrictive 
broadcasts were intended to eliminate. They point out that to 
compel them to lift the area blackout would seriously diminish the 
sale of box office tickets for future championship games – and the 
circumstance that the current game is a sellout does not eliminate 
the need for protection. Their contention is that suspicion in the 
public mind that a championship game might be televised in the 
local area of a home team would, in succeeding years, bring into 
play the same factors which resulted in nonsellouts in earlier years 
– that sales would be hampered; that many fans would prefer, 
particularly at times of inclement and cold weather, to view the 
game at their homes instead of at stadia. 
 
The defendants make the further contention that many fans who 
bought tickets for the current championship game acquired them as 
a result of the purchase of season tickets for seven regular home 
games, which carried an option to buy tickets for the championship 
game; that if it is known or suspected that the championship game 
might be televised locally on the day of the home game, then the 
purchase of regular season tickets, a substantial source of revenue, 
will be greatly curtailed. Of course, whether or not the dire 
consequences which defendants envisage will materialize cannot 
now be determined with certainty, but the concern expressed by 
the defendants that ticket sales will be impaired in the future bears 
a degree of plausibility based upon prior experience. 
  
                                                 
226 Blaich v. NFL, 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y.  1962). 
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 In denying the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, the 
district court commented: “Undoubtedly, plaintiffs and millions of other 
football fans within the seventy-five mile area eagerly desire to see 
Sunday’s championship game in the comfort and warmth of their homes, 
but their preferences cannot overcome the right of these defendants, as 
authorized by Congress, to impose the local area restriction, believing as 
they do that it serves their economic interest, however ill advised the 
public may view their policy.” 
Another antitrust challenge to the NFL’s blackout policy 
concerned the 1972 Super Bowl to be played in New Orleans. The owner 
of two Ramada Inns in New Orleans brought an antitrust lawsuit against 
the NFL because the game was to be telecast locally on a delayed basis. 
For the past 20 years, the NFL had followed its practice of not televising 
locally a World Championship or Super Bowl game. The district court 
issued its opinion on December 17, 1971, denying the plaintiffs’ motion 
for summary judgment and granting the NFL’s motion for summary 
judgment.227  
The district court observed that the plaintiffs’ Ramada Inns would 
likely be completely filled during Super Bowl weekend and thus the 
plaintiff “has produced no evidence of possible irreparable damage and no 
concrete evidence of actual or probable damage.” The court added:  
 
There is no evidence that the arrangements made by the 
Commissioner for the telecasting of the 1972 Super Bowl Game 
have any effect on hotels and motels like the Ramada Inn by 
reason of the local blackout of the Super Bowl Game. Carriage 
Inn, Inc., as the owner of a motel, is not within the area of the 
economy which may be endangered by a break-down of any 
competitive conditions. Nor has it been shown that any damages to 
the plaintiff under the antitrust laws will result directly from the 
NFL practices of which plaintiff has made complaint. No 
competition in which the plaintiff participates has been foreclosed. 
 
The provision of the Sports Broadcasting Act protecting high 
school football games from competition with televised NFL games also 
was the subject of an antitrust lawsuit. The Colorado High School 
Activities Association (CHSAA) brought an antitrust lawsuit against the 
NFL for televising games within the 75-mile radius of a high school game. 
The blackout provision of the Sports Broadcasting Act required that notice 
of the high school game date and “game site” be published in a newspaper 
with general circulation. On or before August 1, 1977, the CHSAA 
published an announcement that the Colorado state 4A football 
championship game would be held “in Denver” on December 10, 1977 at 
1 p.m. The CHSAA could not identify the exact game site since its 
practice was to designate one of the two finalists as the ‘home team.’  
                                                 
227 Campo v. NFL, 334 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D. La 1971). 
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 The district court issued its opinion on September 28, 1981, 
denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granting the 
NFL’s motion for summary judgment.228 The court ruled that the term 
“game site” means “the football field or stadium where the game is to be 
played” and thus the CHSAA failed to give notice of the 1977, 1978, and 
1979 championship ‘game sites’, “and therefore these games did not 
qualify for § 1293’s exception to the antitrust exemption conferred upon 
professional football television broadcast agreements by § 1291.” 
 
 
Television Game Packages. The NFL and NBA have deals with DirecTV, 
a satellite television provider, which allow sports fans to watch most 
regular season games. However, fans cannot purchase only those games 
they wish to watch – they have to buy the entire season package. As a 
result, sports fans have filed antitrust lawsuits against the NFL, the NBA, 
and their member teams alleging a price-fixing conspiracy. The NFL 
attempted to settle its lawsuit out of court, but the district court rejected 
the settlement agreement, finding it to be “not fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.”229 On the other hand, the district court granted the NBA’s and 
DirecTV’s motions to dismiss.230  
 
NFL Sunday Ticket. During a given week of the NFL regular 
season, only a few games are available on ‘free’ television. For 
example, NFL fans in Chicago would be able to watch the week’s 
Bears game and a few others, but would not be able to regularly 
watch the week’s Packers game. Beginning in 1994, however, NFL 
fans with satellite television service from DirecTV could subscribe 
to the NFL Sunday Ticket program, which would enable them to 
watch non-network broadcasts of NFL games for an entire season 
– for an additional fee.  
On August 13, 1997, three sports fans filed an antitrust 
lawsuit against the NFL and five of its member teams alleging that 
they, together with the other 25 NFL teams, conspired to 
artificially raise the price of satellite broadcasts of NFL games by 
restricting fans’ viewing options. The defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under which 
relief could be granted and that the Sports Broadcasting Act 
specifically exempted their conduct from the antitrust laws. In June 
1998, the district court denied the defendants’ motion.231 
The district court rejected the NFL’s argument that there 
was no concerted action because it alone sold the NFL Sunday 
Ticket. The court noted that plaintiffs “complain that all the 
                                                 
228 Colorado High School Activities Association v. NFL, 524 F. Supp. 60 (D. Co 1981). 
229 Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 157 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Pa 2001). 
230 Kingray v. NBA, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (S.D. Ca 2002). 
231 Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 1998 WL 419765 (E.D. Pa 1998). 
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 member clubs, through and with the NFL, have conspired to 
restrain the trade in televised football” and therefore the plaintiffs 
“have adequately pled plural participation.”  
Regarding the Sports Broadcasting Act, the court observed 
that the question was basically: what is the definition of 
“sponsored telecasting”? The court defined a “sponsor” as “[o]ne 
that finances a project or an event carried out by another person or 
group, especially a business enterprise that pays for radio or 
television programming in return for advertising time.” The 
defendants argued that “the Sunday Ticket package is simply a sale 
of their residual rights in the games which were broadcast on 
‘sponsored telecasts,’ and, so, the package is a sale of ‘part of the 
rights’ to the ‘sponsored telecasts.’” The district court argued that 
the defendants’ interpretation cannot possibly be correct given the 
SBA’s legislative history. First, the SBA was drafted so that it 
focused specifically on the sale of games to sponsored television 
networks.  Second, the legislative report on the SBA states: “The 
bill does not apply to closed circuit or subscription television.” 
Third, in his testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, 
NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle was asked “You understand, do 
you not, Mr. Rozelle, that this Bill covers only the free telecasting 
of professional sports contests, and does not cover pay T.V.?” and 
he answered “Absolutely.” Thus, the district court concluded: 
 
In the SBA, the NFL got what it lobbied for at the time. It 
cannot now stretch that law to cover other means of 
broadcast. Accordingly, I find that the defendants’ conduct 
is not exempt from antitrust liability under the SBA. 
 
The NFL appealed the district court’s denial of its motion 
to dismiss. On April 9, 1999, the appeals court agreed with the 
district court, ruling that because “we find that the subscription 
satellite broadcast of NFL games is not a part of the NFL’s rights 
to the sponsored telecasting of those games and therefore not 
within the Sports Broadcasting Act’s exemption to the antitrust 
laws, we will affirm the district court’s decision.”232 
The NFL and the other defendants reached an out-of-court 
class action settlement with the plaintiffs on February 5, 2001. The 
class included all persons in the United States who purchased one 
or more residential subscriptions to NFL Sunday Ticket at any time 
from January 1, 1994 through May 25, 2001. The terms included a 
$7.5 million settlement fund to be established by the defendants, a 
separate $2.3 million to be paid by the defendants to notify class 
members and administer the settlement, an additional $3.7 million 
to be paid by the defendants to cover attorneys’ fees and expenses, 
                                                 
232 Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 172 F.3d 299 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
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 a 10% discount to all class members on all merchandise purchased 
at the NFL Shop website for up to $75 (except for class members 
who purchased NFL Sunday Ticket for three or more seasons, who 
were entitled to a 15% discount for up to $150), and an “incentive 
award” of up to $1,000 for each class representative. Also, for the 
2001 season, the NFL would offer a “Single Sunday Package” 
which would enable fans to purchase all out-of-market NFL 
broadcasts on a single Sunday for $29.99. The NFL was permitted, 
at its sole discretion, to cancel the “Single Sunday Package” 
offering after the 2002 football season (or even after the 2001 
season if the NFL’s net subscription revenue was sufficiently low). 
In return, the plaintiffs agreed to release the defendants of all 
liability regarding the NFL Sunday Ticket – under the condition 
that the defendants continued to offer the Single Sunday Package 
(if the NFL discontinued the Single Sunday Package but continued 
to sell the NFL Sunday Ticket, the release would become null and 
void).  
The district court gave its preliminary approval to the 
settlement on May 9, 2001, concluding that the settlement 
agreement “appears, upon preliminary review, to be fair, adequate, 
and reasonable.”233 Plaintiffs submitted an unopposed motion for 
final approval of the settlement agreement on July 5, 2001. 
However, on August 13, 2001, the district court ruled that it “finds 
that the Settlement Agreement is not fair, reasonable, and adequate 
and, therefore, will deny the motion for final approval.”234 
Specifically, the court concluded that the settlement “is not fair, 
reasonable, or adequate” for six reasons: “1) it fails to provide 
sufficient and non-final prospective relief; 2) the amount of the 
settlement fund is too low; 3) the merchandise discounts do not 
ameliorate the antitrust violation alleged and are not convertible to 
cash; 4) the release bars later claims for future conduct which was 
not the subject of the litigation and provides defendants broad 
protection for inadequate compensation; 5) the attorneys’ fees are 
too large and are not commensurate with the limited success 
achieved in the litigation; 6) by failing to properly balance the 
interests of the class with those of counsel and the defendants, it 
offends sound notions of public policy.” The district court added: 
 
The court rejects the notion that, given the weaknesses of 
the plaintiffs’ claims, “a bad settlement is better than no 
settlement at all.” Instead, the court finds that rejection of 
the Settlement Agreement will serve the following public 
purposes: 1) it will act as an incentive to class action 
counsel in the future to exercise a high degree of care and 
                                                 
233 Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Civil Action No. 97-5184 (E.D. Pa 5/9/2001). 
234 Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 157 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Pa 2001).  
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 diligence before initiating class action litigation; 2) it will 
afford defendants protection from payment of 
unmeritorious claims simply because the claims are joined 
and aggregated with other equally unmeritorious claims; 3) 
it will reassure the public that the significant judicial 
resources expended in superintending class action litigation 
do not generate payment of claims of doubtful validity 
and/or to recompense counsel who has failed to obtain 
significant results for the class. 
 
 
NBA League Pass. Beginning with the 1994-95 season, residential 
and commercial satellite dish owners could purchase the “NBA 
League Pass”, a bundled package of more than 1,000 out-of-
market NBA games that sold for a fixed price. Fans were not 
permitted to purchase individual games at a reduced price. The 
package did not include all out-of-market games because some 
games were subject to blackout (e.g., a game was scheduled to be 
telecast nationally on a cable channel). 
 Initially, only satellite service customers of DirecTV could 
purchase NBA League Pass. However, on April 22, 1998, the NBA 
and DirecTV entered into a deal whereby DirecTV would not have 
exclusive rights to the package – a second license was to be given 
to PrimeStar, another satellite television provider. Within a week, 
DirecTV had acquired PrimeStar and exercised its contractual 
option to be the exclusive distributor of NBA League Pass. As a 
result, another satellite television provider, Echostar, was barred 
from distributing NBA League Pass. In 2000, the NBA League 
Pass was made available to cable television customers on a pay-
per-view basis via iN Demand. 
 Several DirecTV residential and commercial customers, as 
well as a customer of a cable television service provider, all of 
whom had purchased NBA League Pass, filed an antitrust lawsuit 
against the NBA, some of its member teams, and DirecTV. In the 
words of the district court, plaintiffs alleged that “the NBA 
Defendants conspired with DirecTV for the broadcast of a bundled 
package of NBA out-of-market basketball games, agreeing to 
restrict output of those games according to geographical market, 
price, and quantity.”235 The district court summarized the 
plaintiffs’ arguments: 
 
Plaintiffs allege the agreement to restrain the sale of rights 
to any NBA game outside of the team’s assigned 
geographic territory except through the “NBA League 
Pass” is not reasonably necessary to achieve any legitimate 
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 business objective… According to Plaintiffs, the system of 
exclusive geographic territories is not necessary to preserve 
the viability of any individual NBA Team in attracting fans 
to live games, but only serves to artificially increase prices 
and reduce output… Plaintiffs further contend that the 
system of exclusive territories is not necessary to preserve 
the quality and attractiveness of NBA games by promoting 
competitive balance among NBA teams as this concern 
could be addressed, as it is in Major League Baseball, by a 
system of revenue-sharing… According to Plaintiffs, the 
continuing agreement and conspiracy among the 
Defendants was to fix, raise, stabilize, and maintain prices 
for the rights to, and to restrict the output of, video 
broadcasts of out-of-market NBA games. 
 
The defendants asked the district court to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ complaint. On February 1, 2002, the district court 
granted the defendants’ motion.236 The court observed that 
plaintiffs’ Section 1 claims rest on four theories: “first, that the 
NBA Defendants and DirecTV engaged in vertical price-fixing; 
second, that DirecTV and the NBA Defendants engaged in a 
vertical conspiracy to limit output; third, that the exclusive 
distribution agreement between the NBA Defendants and DirecTV 
unreasonably restrains trade; and finally, that the NBA Defendants 
engaged in a horizontal conspiracy to divide the market and fix 
prices.” The court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to adequately 
support any of these theories. 
For example, the district court noted that the contract 
between the NBA and DirecTV requires DirecTV to pay a 
wholesale price to the NBA for the NBA League Pass, but does not 
set the retail price at which DirecTV can sell the package to its 
customers. Thus, plaintiffs failed to state a claim for vertical price-
fixing. Furthermore, the only games blacked-out on NBA League 
Pass are those that are broadcast on other channels and thus “the 
NBA League Pass’s black-out provision does not restrict output; it 
only affects what channel the game is available on.”  The court 
explained: 
 
Accordingly, output of out-of-market NBA games 
increased by virtue of the NBA League Pass, rather than 
decreased. 
 
Insofar as Plaintiffs contend that output of out-of-market 
games could be increased if satellite users were not 
required to purchase the entire NBA League Pass on an all-
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 or-nothing basis, Plaintiffs have already waived this 
argument in their opposition to DirecTV’s motion to 
dismiss the original complaint where they stated they were 
not alleging the bundled nature of the NBA League Pass is 
an illegal tying arrangement… Further, Plaintiffs have not 
cited, nor is this Court aware of, any authority indicating 
that when a defendant offers a new product in a competitive 
manner (e.g., all out-of-market games via the NBA League 
Pass), a party can allege a Section 1 violation on the basis 
the product is not being offered in the manner the plaintiffs 
would prefer (out-of-market games in a non-bundled 
format). Antitrust laws are to ensure competition is not 
unlawfully harmed; economic market forces will dictate 
whether the product will be successful. 
 
Regarding the plaintiffs’ exclusive distributorship theory, 
the court observed that “the fact that other satellite providers such 
as Echostar are not authorized to broadcast the NBA League Pass 
does not, standing alone, properly allege a violation of antitrust 
laws” and “[t]o so hold would mean that exclusive distributorships 
would be a per se violation of Section 1” – which they are not. 
Finally, with respect to the NBA Defendants’ horizontal 
conspiracy alleged by the plaintiffs, the district court explained: 
 
Further, DirecTV and iN Demand could not engage in 
horizontal conspiracy with the NBA Defendants. 
Horizontal price fixing occurs when competitors agree to 
set prices and thereby interfere with free market forces… 
As alleged in the FAC [first amended complaint], DirecTV 
is “a provider of high power direct broadcast satellite 
service,” … and iN Demand “provides ‘pay-per-view’ 
programming to cable companies and their subscribers 
nationwide.” … The NBA Defendants, in contrast, govern 
and participate in a professional basketball league… 
Accordingly, the NBA Defendants are not competitors with 
DirecTV and iN Demand and therefore cannot engage in a 
horizontal conspiracy. 
 
 
Tying of Regular Season and Preseason Game Tickets. In the early 1970s, 
a number of NFL fans filed lawsuits against their local NFL team, the 
NFL itself, and NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle alleging that the tying of 
the purchase of season tickets to the purchase of tickets for preseason 
games violated the antitrust laws. The district courts granted the 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and the appeals courts 
affirmed the district courts’ rulings. 
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  Angelo Coniglio was a fan of the AFL’s Buffalo Bills and began 
regularly attending their games in 1960. He became a season ticket holder 
in 1964 and thereby acquired additional benefits over purchasers of single-
game tickets, including preferential seat selection, preferential access to 
post-season playoff tickets, and preferential seat selection for the 
following season. Coniglio purchased a season ticket again in 1965. In 
1966, the year of the tentative merger of the NFL and AFL, the team 
altered its season ticket policy by requiring season ticket purchasers to buy 
a ticket to one preseason game. In 1968, the team required season ticket 
purchasers to buy tickets to two preseason games and, in 1970, the 
requirement was raised to three preseason games. Coniglio decided not to 
continue as a season ticket holder, although he continued to purchase 
individual game tickets to some games.  
On September 9, 1970, Coniglio filed an antitrust lawsuit against 
Highwood Services (the owner and operator of the Buffalo Bills), the 
NFL, and NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle alleging that the conditioning 
of season ticket purchases on the purchase of preseason tickets constituted 
an unlawful tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act and constituted an abuse of the Bills’ monopoly power over 
professional football in the Buffalo area in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. Furthermore, Coniglio alleged that the unlawful tying 
arrangement was the result of a conspiracy between Highwood Services, 
the NFL, and Pete Rozelle in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court 
granted on August 1, 1973. Coniglio appealed. 
On April 17, 1974, the appeals court issued its decision affirming 
the district court’s ruling.237 The appeals court identified “four factors 
essential in determining whether a particular sales practice constitutes an 
illicit tying arrangement: (1) two separate and distinct products, a tying 
product and a tied product; (2) sufficient economic power in the tying 
market to coerce purchase of the tied product; (3) anti-competitive effects 
in the tied market; (4) involvement of a ‘not insubstantial’ amount of 
interstate commerce in the tied market.”  
The appeals court noted that the fourth factor is easily satisfied 
since the total value of tied preseason tickets in 1970 was $483,000. 
Moreover, the court argued that the first factor may be satisfied since 
preseason games are arguably of sufficiently inferior quality that 
preseason and regular season games are separate products (whether they 
are in fact separate products is a question requiring factual determinations 
and thus is an issue more appropriately determined at trial than by 
summary judgment). Furthermore, the court argued that the second factor 
may be satisfied even though more than half of the 46,206 seats at War 
Memorial Stadium could be purchased on an individual game basis 
because a buyer is not free to purchase a season ticket by itself. In other 
words, the fact that roughly 23,000 fans were willing to purchase season 
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 tickets “is certainly some evidence of the ‘desirability’ of these tickets, 
sufficient at least to persuade us that the existence of the requisite 
economic power is a triable issue of fact.” 
The appeals court explained, however, that the third factor was not 
satisfied – Coniglio had failed to demonstrate that there was an 
anticompetitive effect in the tied market: 
 
Quite simply, just as the Bills has a monopoly over the 
presentation of regular season professional football games in the 
relevant geographic market, which is Buffalo, so too does it have a 
monopoly over the presentation of exhibition professional football 
games – the tied product. Thus, Highwood is not using its 
economic power in the tying (season ticket) market to ‘restrain free 
competition in the market for the tied product,’ … for it is 
undisputed that, at the time this complaint was filed, there were 
neither actual nor potential competitors to the Bills in the 
professional football market. Accordingly, the tying arrangement 
attacked by Coniglio does not fall within the realm of contracts ‘in 
restraint of trade or commerce’ proscribed by Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act… 
 
Coniglio tries strenuously but unsuccessfully to skirt this obstacle. 
He argues that the tying arrangement foreclosed competition in 
what could only be characterized at oral argument as the ‘general 
entertainment market in Buffalo.’… 
 
… Viewed in this light, Coniglio’s claim that plays, movies, and 
musicals are all within the boundaries of the same product market 
as exhibition football amounts to nothing more than the boundless 
contention that, by extracting extra dollars from season ticket 
holders, the Bills leave less in their pockets to spend on any other 
form of diversion, from a trip to the zoo to a night at the opera. 
Suffice to say that the extraordinary breadth of the market 
encompassing such diverse yet assertedly competitive products is 
far beyond that ever contemplated for a relevant product market. 
 
The appeals court emphasized that “the proprietary of summary 
judgment in this case rests upon Coniglio’s total failure to demonstrate 
any adverse effect on competition, actual or potential, an issue perfectly 
well suited to objective, statistical analysis.” Regarding Coniglio’s Section 
2 claim, the court noted that, “since we have made plain that Highwood 
has not used the tying arrangement either to prevent competition or 
destroy it, its ticket sale practice does not represent an unlawful abuse of 
its monopoly power.” As for the conspiracy claim regarding the NFL and 
Commissioner Rozelle, the appeals court argued that “it is readily 
apparent that if Highwood’s tying arrangement is not unlawful, an 
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 agreement among the defendants to establish that practice, even if it could 
be proven, would not be unlawful either.” 
Similarly, Richard Driskill was a fan of the NFL’s Dallas Cowboys 
who filed an antitrust lawsuit against the Cowboys, the NFL, and 
Commissioner Rozelle over the Cowboys’ tying of season tickets to the 
purchase of less desirable items – specifically, preseason tickets and low-
interest stadium bonds. The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants. Driskill appealed and, on August 9, 1974, the 
appeals court affirmed the district court’s ruling:238 
 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
defendants, holding as follows: (1) since single game tickets have 
been available for every home game in the past, Driskill has not 
been coerced to buy preseason tickets in order to gain admission to 
the regular season games; (2) the granting of preferred parking to 
season ticket holders is a reasonable business practice with no 
anticompetitive effect; (3) since individual home game tickets have 
always been available, Driskill has not been coerced to buy a 
stadium bond in order to gain admission to regular season games; 
and (4) forcing the purchase of a stadium bond or bonds as a 
prerequisite to the purchase of a season ticket package has no 
anticompetitive effect. We affirm on the ground that Driskill has 
not pleaded that the tying of season tickets to preseason tickets and 
stadium bonds has an anticompetitive effect, nor has he alleged 
with particularity any material facts in issue that would support a 
finding of anticompetitive effects or coercion to purchase the 
bonds so as to avoid an adverse summary judgment. 
 
The appeals court noted its agreement with the appeals court 
decision in Coniglio v. Highwood Services: 
 
There has been a spate of cases alleging Sherman Act violations in 
the tying of preseason tickets to season tickets by various National 
Football League teams. These cases have all resulted in summary 
judgment for the defendant teams… Summary judgments have 
been granted or upheld on appeal on three different theories: (1) 
that fans are not in fact coerced into buying tickets to preseason 
games (as part of a season ticket package) in order to gain 
admission to regular season games; (2) that no tying of one product 
to another is possible, since there do not exist two different 
products – preseason and regular season games – but rather only 
one indivisible product – professional football games; and (3) that 
the tying of preseason to regular season tickets has no 
anticompetitive effect in the tied market. We agree with the 
conclusion reached by the Second Circuit after a very careful 
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 analysis in Coniglio, that, although neither of the first two theories 
is sufficient to sustain the summary judgment here, the last 
provides a basis for affirmation… 
 
… As in Coniglio, however, the Cowboys have a complete 
monopoly in the tied market – preseason professional football 
games in Dallas – and there can thus be no adverse effect on any 
competitors, even if a tying scheme exists. There being no 
anticompetitive effect in the tied market, the fourth requirement for 
a Sherman Act tying scheme is not met, and the portion of 
Driskill’s suit dealing with preseason game tickets was properly 
dismissed on summary judgment for the defendants. 
 
As for the tying of season tickets to the purchase of stadium bonds, 
the appeals court observed that the tickets and the bonds are clearly two 
different products and that the Cowboys have a monopoly over the former. 
However, the court noted that “Driskill failed to forestall summary 
judgment on this part of his claim by failing to assert specific facts tending 
to show either exploitation of their monopoly by the Cowboys to coerce 
the purchase of the bonds or any anticompetitive effect in the tied market 
for long-term bonds.” 
 
 
Price-fixing of Licensed Merchandise. NASCAR was named as a 
defendant, along with independent vendors of NASCAR souvenirs and 
merchandise, in a lawsuit brought by a class of purchasers of such 
souvenirs and merchandise. The purchasers alleged that the defendants 
engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy by agreeing on minimum prices for 
souvenirs and merchandise sold at NASCAR races, monitoring the prices 
at which souvenirs and merchandise were sold at those races, and 
disciplining vendors who violated the price-fixing agreement. The price-
fixing conspiracy allegedly began as early as January 1991. 
In general, the licensor (e.g., NASCAR, the speedway, the 
sponsor) is paid a percentage of gross receipts from sales of the licensed 
merchandise by the licensee. Vendors wishing to sell at a NASCAR race 
must be licensed by the speedway, which receives a fee and a percentage 
of gross sales from each vendor. The speedway, in turn, pays a percentage 
of gross receipts to NASCAR. 
On May 12, 1998, the district court dismissed NASCAR as a 
defendant. The remaining defendants reached an out-of-court settlement 
with the plaintiffs.239 
 
 
                                                 
239 In re: Motorsports Merchandise Antitrust Litigation, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (N.D. Ga 
2000); In re: Motorsports Merchandise Antitrust Litigation, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392 
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 League Suspensions of Teams. Southern Methodist University’s football 
program was suspended for the 1987 season by the NCAA for violating 
NCAA rules regarding compensation for student-athletes. An antitrust 
lawsuit challenging the NCAA’s compensation rules was brought by 
David McCormack, an SMU alumnus, on behalf of SMU ‘as an 
institution’, its graduates and current students, some members of the 
football team, and some cheerleaders. As discussed in Chapter 6, the court 
found that the football players lacked standing to sue. The district court 
also found, and the appeals court affirmed, that the SMU alumni and 
cheerleaders lacked standing to sue.240 The appeals court explained: 
 
Not every person who complains of injury as a result of violation 
of antitrust laws has standing to assert claims under the statutes. 
Only a person injured “in his business or property” may seek 
damages for violation of the antitrust laws, and only a person who 
can show a significant threat of such injury from impending 
violations can obtain injunctive relief. Even a plaintiff injured in 
his business or property must, in order to sue for damages, show 
“antitrust injury,” that is, “injury of the type the antitrust laws were 
designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes 
defendants’ acts unlawful.” Finally, even if the plaintiff meets 
these requirements, the court must consider whether he is a “proper 
plaintiff” to sue for damages, examining such factors as (1) 
whether the plaintiff’s injuries or their casual link to the defendant 
are speculative, (2) whether other parties have been more directly 
harmed, and (3) whether allowing this plaintiff to sue would risk 
multiple lawsuits, duplicative recoveries, or complex damage 
apportionment. 
 
Neither McCormack nor any of the cheerleaders satisfies these 
requirements. The cheerleaders assert only the loss of the 
opportunity to lead cheers, which clearly does not qualify as an 
injury to business or property. The only injuries McCormack 
alleges are the devaluation of his degree, the loss of the 
opportunity to see football games, and the damage to his contact 
and association with current and prospective student athletes 
derived from his membership in the Mustang Club, “an athletic 
fund-raising organization.” Of these three, only the first is even 
arguably an injury to business or property. Although the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that “property” in this context “has a 
naturally broad and inclusive meaning,” we cannot conclude that 
the devaluation of McCormack’s degree is an injury for which the 
antitrust laws were designed to afford a remedy. The alleged 
connection, moreover, between the NCAA’s actions and the 
devaluation of his degree presents the sort of “speculative” and 
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 “abstract” causal chain that the Supreme Court has held 
insufficient to support antitrust standing.  
 
 
Unfair Labor Practices. The collective bargaining agreement between 
Major League Baseball and the MLB Players Association expired on 
December 31, 1993 and, after months of failed negotiation, the players 
went on strike, ultimately resulting in the cancellation of the remainder of 
the 1994 regular season, the 1994 playoffs, the 1994 World Series, and 
part of the 1995 regular season. The MLB team owners and MLB Players 
Association accused each other of unfair labor practices and filed charges 
with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB granted a 
temporary injunction after finding reasonable cause to conclude that the 
MLB team owners had engaged in unfair labor practices. 
 A class action lawsuit was brought against MLB and the 28 MLB 
teams on behalf of baseball fans and businesses that operate in the vicinity 
of baseball stadiums, alleging violation of the antitrust laws. The 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) plaintiffs’ 
claims are barred by MLB’s antitrust exemption and the nonstatutory labor 
exemption and (2) plaintiffs lack antitrust standing to bring the claims. 
 The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on 
November 2, 1995.241 The court agreed with the defendants that MLB’s 
antitrust exemption, as established in the Federal Baseball, Toolson, and 
Flood decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, barred plaintiffs’ claims. 
However, even ignoring MLB’s antitrust exemption, the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to bring their claims: 
 
Even if the Court had accepted plaintiffs’ invitation to narrowly 
construe the antitrust exemption, dismissal pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) would have been appropriate because neither class of 
plaintiffs have standing to bring this action. Antitrust standing is 
given to “any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws…” 
… The “any person” language of the statute is not to be read 
literally; rather, the Court must determine whether Congress 
intended to protect the interest asserted by the plaintiff… In 
making this determination, the Court “must ‘evaluate the plaintiff’s 
harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants and the 
relationship between them.’”… 
 
As defendants assert, the fans lack standing. There is no evidence 
that the Owners intended to harm the fans. In addition, the injury 
suffered by the fans is not direct, that is, the injury can be fairly 
characterized as an indirect “ripple effect.”… Finally, the fans’ 
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 damages do not arise out of the allegedly illegal conduct that the 
antitrust laws are intended to remedy… 
 
Similarly, the businesses lack standing. The antitrust laws were not 
intended to apply to “ripple effect” injury sustained by third 
parties… That the businesses have a symbiotic relationship with 
the business of baseball is insufficient to allow them to have 
antitrust standing.    
 
 
Scheduling. As discussed in Chapter 8, Francis Ferko, a NASCAR fan and 
shareholder of Speedway Motorsports (the owner of Texas Motor 
Speedway) filed an antitrust lawsuit against NASCAR over the scheduling 
of Winston Cup races. In order to proceed with the lawsuit, the court 
required Speedway Motorsports (which was not a plaintiff in the lawsuit) 
to confirm that it agreed with Ferko’s allegations. The Ferko litigation was 
ultimately settled out-of-court, with Texas Motor Speedway receiving a 
‘second’ Winston Cup date. 
 
 
Taxpayer Antitrust Lawsuits Against Sports Leagues. As discussed in Chapter 8, 
professional sports teams are often able to convince their local governments to 
supply at least some of the financing for a new stadium and to offer the team a 
favorable lease. Not surprisingly, taxpayers – even those who are fans of the team 
– are sometimes less than thrilled with the prospect of paying higher taxes to pay 
for a new stadium, where the multi-millionaire players and owners will generate 
annual earnings many times that of the average taxpayer. Sometimes taxpayers 
have resorted to filing antitrust lawsuits against the team (and sometimes against 
the government officials who approved the financial deal) in attempt to change 
the financing and lease terms. 
 For example, the citizens of Allegheny County contributed to the 
construction of a new stadium for the NFL’s Pittsburgh Steelers – Heinz Field. 
Under the terms of the lease, the Steelers do not pay annual base rent, receive 
almost all of the new revenue from the stadium, and the Sports & Exhibition 
Authority of the City of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County are responsible for 
capital repairs and future expenditures. Robert Warnock, an Allegheny County 
taxpayer, filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL and its member teams alleging 
that “by limiting the number and barring public ownership of NFL franchises, 
defendants forced Allegheny County to pay … far more to build Heinz Field and 
to agree to more onerous lease terms to keep the Steelers in Pittsburgh than a 
marketplace free of these restraints would have demanded.” Warnock asked the 
court to declare the Heinz Field lease voidable at Allegheny County’s discretion 
and to award compensatory and punitive damages of more than $200 million to 
Allegheny County. 
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 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Warnock did 
not have standing to sue. On February 9, 2005, the district court granted the 
defendants’ motion.242 The court summarized the plaintiff’s case as follows: 
 
Under these factual circumstances, plaintiff is essentially bringing 
derivative claims on behalf of Allegheny County and the Sports & 
Exhibition Authority. Plaintiff does not allege he was injured in any way 
by Allegheny County or the Sports & Exhibition Authority. In fact, 
plaintiff alleges that he and the other taxpayers of Allegheny County were 
“willing to build a new football stadium” for the Steelers and “to agree to 
lease terms that allowed the franchise to field a competitive team while 
remaining profitable.”… Plaintiff contends, however, that defendants’ 
actions “forced” Allegheny County to pay far more tax revenue than what 
the taxpayers, himself included, expected to contribute toward the Steelers 
becoming “a competitive team while remaining profitable.”… Thus, under 
the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, Allegheny County and the Sports 
& Exhibition Authority are characterized as victims beholden to 
defendants in order to keep the Steelers in Pittsburgh. 
 
 
                                                
The district court observed that Allegheny County and the Sports & 
Exhibition Authority have not joined the lawsuit as plaintiffs and explained why 
the taxpayer plaintiff lacked standing to sue: 
 
Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true for purposes of defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, do not rise to standing in this case. The court will assume for 
purposes of defendants’ motion that plaintiff alleged a sufficient “injury,” 
i.e., that plaintiff’s tax dollars were improperly expended on the disputed 
practice… The court also accepts for purposes of the motion to dismiss 
that plaintiff’s injury could be redressed by a favorable decision finding 
that the stadium lease was voidable at Allegheny County’s discretion… 
Plaintiff does not have to demonstrate that his taxes will be reduced as a 
result of a favorable judgment… 
 
The court, however, cannot find that plaintiff’s injury is “fairly traceable 
to the conduct” of defendants… Plaintiff’s injury, as demonstrated above, 
is that his tax dollars are allegedly being improperly spent on a disputed 
practice. Plaintiff in effect alleges that defendants committed an antitrust 
violation that caused Allegheny County to spend tax dollars in order to 
keep the Steelers in Pittsburgh. In this respect, however, plaintiff’s theory 
is missing a critical link in the chain of causation. Defendants are not the 
entity that allegedly improperly distributed plaintiff’s tax dollars. 
Defendants are not a municipal or state body, they do not have any 
characteristics of such an entity, and they certainly do not have the ability 
to levy and collect taxes from the citizens of Allegheny County. While the 
 
242 Warnock v. NFL, 356 F. Supp. 2d 535 (W.D. Pa 2005). 
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 standing doctrine may be an elastic concept, extending the doctrine to fit 
plaintiff’s theory would stretch standing beyond the breaking point. 
 
 
In summary, the U.S. government in the 1950s actively enforced the federal 
antitrust laws against sports leagues, with significant success. However, the major 
professional sports leagues were able to do an ‘end run’ around the antitrust laws, at least 
to some extent, by successfully lobbying Congress to pass the Sports Broadcasting Act in 
1961 and then to amend the Act in 1966 to provide an antitrust exemption for the NFL-
AFL merger. Sports fans and taxpayers have been generally unsuccessful in bringing 
antitrust lawsuits against sports leagues. Often, the fan or taxpayer is found to lack 
standing to sue. 
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 Chapter 12 
 
Proposals to Curb Leagues’ Monopoly Power 
 
 
 
 The preceding chapters have identified numerous concerns about the market 
power of sports leagues. For example, their ability to artificially restrict the number of 
teams in the league provides teams with bargaining power over their host cities, enabling 
them to extract lucrative subsidies for the construction of new stadiums and to demand 
(and receive) extremely generous stadium lease terms. Prior to the introduction of free 
agency, teams generally did not have to pay players their ‘full’ value (i.e., their marginal 
revenue product) because the players had few good alternatives – only for brief periods 
have the major North American sports leagues of today been challenged by rival leagues. 
The competitive threats of the most successful of those rival leagues – the American 
Football League, the American Basketball Association, the World Hockey Association – 
were negated by the dominant sports leagues by merging with their rivals, either in whole 
or in part – sometimes with an antitrust exemption to the merger thanks to the U.S. 
Congress. 
 In the 1950s, the U.S. government attempted to enforce the antitrust laws against 
sports leagues, with some success. However, the leagues’ ability to lobby Congress to 
pass legislation exempting certain of their activities from the antitrust laws negated much 
of the antitrust enforcement authorities’ achievement. Today, there is a call for the 
antitrust authorities to once again vigorously challenge the actions of sports leagues. 
There is also a call for Congressional action to ‘do something’ about franchise 
relocations. One proposal calls for legislation banning public subsidies for sports leagues 
and teams. Another proposal is to grant leagues an antitrust exemption so that they can 
prevent franchise relocations. Still another proposal is for courts to reject the competitive 
balance defense in antitrust cases. 
 
Proposed Structural Remedies. Some commentators have called for the U.S. 
government to aggressively enforce the antitrust laws against sports leagues and to seek a 
structural remedy (or have Congress impose such a remedy). The structural remedy 
proposals include (1) breaking up each league into three or more independent leagues that 
are permitted to coordinate their activities only with respect to arranging a national 
championship, (2) regulating sports leagues as natural monopolies,  (3) reorganizing 
sports leagues into a vertical structure similar to that of NASCAR, with a central 
upstream organization supplying competition-organizing services for independent 
downstream teams, and (4) implementing a system of promotion and relegation similar to 
that of European sports leagues (i.e., change from a ‘closed’ to an ‘open’ league 
structure). 
  
Breaking Up Sports Leagues. The most radical proposal is for the U.S. 
government to seek the breakup of the major North American sports leagues, 
similar to the government’s attempt to address AT&T’s monopoly power by 
breaking the company up into a number of smaller companies. For example, at a 
congressional subcommittee hearing on November 29, 1995, Stephen Ross of the 
University of Illinois called on Congress to correct its “mistake” in permitting the 
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 NFL-AFL merger. He argues that legislation repealing the NFL-AFL merger 
would (1) benefit fans in cities without teams by increasing the likelihood that 
each league will expand into new cities, (2) benefit taxpayers in cities without 
teams by forcing the rival leagues to bid for a chance to play in new stadiums, (3) 
benefit fans in cities with teams by reducing the probability that the team will 
leave since the most lucrative markets will already have teams, (4) benefit 
taxpayers in cities with teams by reducing popular support for tax subsidies since 
the local team will be unable to credibly threaten to relocate to a desirable market, 
(5) benefit elected representatives who do not depend on the political support of 
the NFL, (6) benefit television networks by potentially reducing broadcast fees, 
and (7) benefit young and average players by increasing the number of 
professional football teams and thus the demand for players. Legislation repealing 
the NFL-AFL merger would harm NFL owners by removing their ability to 
exploit taxpayers by threatening to relocate their teams. Currently “over-paid” 
stars could either benefit or be harmed from such legislation because, on the one 
hand, the NFL’s monopoly income would be reduced, but, on the other, the 
newly-created leagues would have to compete for players. Ross argues that there 
would be no antitrust obstacles to the newly-formed leagues agreeing on inter-
league play, including a Super Bowl. 
 Instead of federal legislation, a break-up of sports leagues could also be 
pursued through the courts. Ross (2001) observes that “plaintiffs would probably 
need to prove willful monopolization or conspiracy to monopolize in violation of 
the Sherman Act to secure a court-ordered divestiture.” (pp. 158-59) The problem 
with pursuing the break-up through the courts is that Major League Baseball has a 
judicially-created antitrust exemption and the National Football League has a 
special merger-authorizing statute. 
 Critics of breaking up sports leagues, such as Roberts (1995), counter that 
sports leagues are natural monopolies – if a league is broken up into a number of 
rival leagues, eventually one of those newly-created leagues will emerge as the 
‘premier’ league. The natural monopoly argument was discussed in Chapter 1. If 
the proponents of the natural monopoly view of sports leagues are correct, 
breaking up sports leagues may temporarily reduce their market power, but, in 
time, there will re-emerge one dominant league in each of the major sports. 
Roberts (1995) argues: 
 
Some (like Professor Steve Ross) argue that Congress or the Courts should 
require each league to split into three or more competing leagues that 
operate completely independently of each other, and that the resulting 
competition will greatly diminish any one league’s market power. The 
underlying theory of this approach is reasonable and if it worked as 
planned the legal mechanism created would be principled and legitimate. 
The problems with this approach are that it is politically unfeasible and 
that as a factual matter I doubt it would work over the long term. I believe 
that within a few years, inevitably one league in each sport would become 
perceived by the public as having the highest-quality product, which in 
turn would result in the dominant league expanding to fill the national 
market and reestablishing the major league monopoly in the sport. 
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The more technical explanation for this phenomenon is that sports leagues 
face average fixed costs that greatly exceed marginal costs. In highly 
competitive product markets, each league would thus price their output at 
levels somewhat above marginal cost but well below average fixed costs, 
which means that the leagues would inevitably lose money and one-by-
one go out of business until only one remained that had the market power 
to charge prices high enough to allow it to recoup its fixed costs. Thus, I 
strongly suspect that each major sports league is a natural monopoly 
whose market power in many markets cannot (and probably should not) be 
diminished for very long by forced market competition. 
 
 Ross (1989), not surprisingly, does not believe that sports leagues are 
natural monopolies: 
 
Baseball and football are not natural monopolies; two or more rival 
leagues can compete in each sport. There is no apparent economic reason 
why stable competition cannot exist. That single leagues historically have 
monopolized these sports does not suggest they are natural monopolies. 
Rather, termination of inter-league rivalry through mergers and predatory 
practices and the expansion of Major League Baseball and the National 
Football League to a size that now virtually precludes new entrants 
explain their persistent monopoly status. 
 
Were baseball and football characterized by competing leagues, the 
antitrust laws could effectively regulate competition in the industry. (p. 
755) 
  
 Ross is not alone in calling for the break-up of sports leagues. For 
example, Quirk and Fort (1999) advocate that MLB’s antitrust exemption be 
ended and that the U.S. Department of Justice file antitrust lawsuits against the 
major sports leagues with the goal of obtaining court-ordered divestitures. Quirk 
(1997) concludes: 
 
A real breath of fresh air in pro team sports would result from using the 
antitrust laws to split up the existing leagues into competing leagues, each 
free to locate franchises where it wished. This would obviate any need for 
a salary cap or other kinds of restrictions on the player market, and, as a 
side benefit, would eliminate most of the subsidies from cities that teams 
currently obtain by exploiting their monopoly position. Expedients such as 
salary caps or luxury taxes are poor substitutes for old fashioned 
marketplace competition. (p. 108) 
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 Regulating Sports Leagues as Natural Monopolies. Traditionally, governments 
have addressed the economic problems posed by natural monopolies (or at least 
what were believed to be natural monopolies) by regulating them. Examples 
include the electricity generation and transmission, natural gas utility, telephone, 
railroad, and airline industries.  
Roberts (1995), who believes that sports leagues are natural monopolies, 
proposes that “Congress should create and empower a regulatory body to identify 
the markets in which sports leagues possess extraordinary unchecked market 
power and then to regulate what leagues may do in those markets so as to prevent 
exploitation beyond that necessary to guarantee a fair rate of return.” Roberts 
argues that “regulating natural monopoly power is far more principled, 
predictable, and rational than subjecting an enterprise to the vagaries of 
unprincipled, arbitrary, and unpredictable section 1 antitrust enforcement by 
courts, each of which has its own agenda – and I say this even after fully taking 
into account the dangers of incompetence, conflict of interest, and corruption that 
can plague government regulatory schemes.” 
Heintel (1996) calls for the regulation of the National Football League as a 
natural monopoly. He observes that courts have difficulty even defining the 
‘output’ produced by a sports leagues – it is not simply individual games – and 
thus courts “have invented many different definitions of the NFL’s product and 
output market to try to warp the NFL into a structure with which antitrust laws 
can deal.” (p. 1049) Heintel argues against applying the antitrust laws to sports 
leagues: 
 
Antitrust law rests on the assumption that consumer interests are best 
served through competition in the market. Such an assumption may not be 
valid in the case of the NFL; a fan’s interest may not be served by 
competition between leagues in a market. Competition between leagues 
will divide the best players between leagues, preventing fans from seeing 
all the best players compete against each other. Competition between 
leagues has resulted in player bidding wars. Increasing player salaries 
would probably lead to the need for leagues to charge higher prices, either 
in the form of higher ticket and peripheral prices or perhaps in shifting 
games from free to pay television. Antitrust laws designed to promote 
competition could produce results diametrically opposed to results that 
would be in the interests of fans. Since the NFL’s product and output 
market are not definable to the extent necessary for an antitrust analysis 
and since application of antitrust law to the NFL does not serve the 
purpose for which it was created, courts cannot properly apply antitrust 
law to the NFL. (pp. 1049-50) 
 
Heintel advocates that the NFL be given a statutory exemption to the 
antitrust laws and, instead, an arbitration board should be formed to regulate the 
league’s activities. One-fourth of the board’s members would be chosen by the 
NFL, with the other members selected by some ‘reasonable’ method, such as 
congressional appointment. Board decisions would be determined by majority 
vote. The board would operate under the basic guideline that “the league cannot 
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 take actions that are contrary to fan interest.” (p. 1065) Thus, league actions that 
may be to fans’ detriment (e.g., the movement of players and/or franchises, game 
broadcasts, the number of games) would be subject to the board’s regulation, 
whereas other league actions (e.g., playing rules, allocation of league profits) 
would not. Board decisions would be subject to limited judicial review, similar to 
that permitted in labor arbitration contract situations. 
Ross (1989) argues that regulation is not a workable means of preventing 
the harm caused by monopoly sports leagues. One reason is that the regulator will 
likely be ‘captured’ by the league since the league will have a much greater stake 
in the regulator’s decisions than will the general public. Consequently, the league 
is likely to be the most vigorous and effective lobbyist of the regulator. Moreover, 
even in the absence of ‘regulatory capture’, the regular would have to make 
“enormously difficult, if not impossible,” determinations as to “the location of 
football franchises, the proper number of baseball franchises, the proper allocation 
of games between free television and cable, the best method of allocating players 
among teams, and what constitutes ineffective management.” (p. 703) 
 
Mandating a Vertical Structure Where a Central Upstream Organization 
Provides Competition-organizing Services for Independent Downstream Teams. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, NASCAR is organized and functions as a sanctioning 
body which sets and enforces race rules and guarantees prize money, among other 
things. In other words, NASCAR provides ‘competition-organizing services’ for 
independent racing teams. An entrepreneur who assembles a sufficiently high 
quality race team will be able to enter NASCAR-sanctioned races and compete 
against the sport’s top racers. This situation is quite unlike that of the NFL, NBA, 
NHL, and MLB, which are closed leagues, and thus, for example, an entrepreneur 
cannot simply assemble an elite football team and then schedule games against 
NFL teams.  
 Couldn’t the NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB be reorganized into sanctioning 
bodies on the model of NASCAR? In a series of papers, Ross and Szymanski 
(2004, 2005a, 2005b) make the case that such a reorganization can, and should, 
occur. This is a second-best alternative which assumes that the sports leagues 
cannot be split into competing leagues. 
 Ross and Szymanski (2004) propose the creation of “The League” as “an 
entity organizing a sporting competition that is separate from the owners.” (p. 72) 
They “suggest that sports leagues would be more profitable and fans’ welfare 
improved if sports leagues looked more like McDonald’s and less like the United 
Nations, by restructuring the leagues to create a separate company (NFL, Inc.) 
that would make key decisions and limit the club owners to participating in the 
competition.” (p. abstract)  
As Ross and Szymanski (2005a) explain, “McDonald’s Corporation is 
vertically separate from its franchised restaurant outlets, who do business 
pursuant to a detailed franchise agreement.” (p. 6) They argue that “club-run 
leagues forego attractive business opportunities because they are unable to 
overcome the significant transactions costs involved in agreeing on how to 
distribute the proceeds from the opportunity.” (p. 7) They explain: 
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 Club owners need not insist on collectively controlling the sporting 
competition in which they participate. If, like NASCAR, relevant rules 
were decided by an independent Board of Directors of “NFL, Inc.,” 
“MLB, LLC,” or the like, we suggest that (a) franchises will be more 
likely to be located in a manner responsive to consumer demand; (b) 
broadcast rights will be sold in a manner to maximize overall revenues 
(which often means increased viewership); (c) incompetent ownership 
would be more likely to be replaced; (d) marketing and sponsorship 
opportunities would be divided between the league and local clubs based 
on which entity can most efficiently sell rights and products; (e) collective 
bargaining agreements will be easier to reach (no approval of a 
supermajority of owners) and more likely to be designed in a manner to 
enhance the consumer appeal of the sport. (pp. 7-8) 
 
If such a vertical structure has so many advantages, why haven’t owners 
adopted that organizational structure for the league? Ross and Szymanski suggest 
three reasons: (1) the team owners are unable to agree on how to divide the gains 
from such a reorganization, (2) the owners’ egos (e.g., the owners would have to 
forfeit the power to make the rules and would have to accept the directives of 
others), and (3) there is little competitive pressure on sports leagues. 
Ross and Szymanski (2005b) observe: “Government intervention is 
welfare-enhancing if it can reliably require an industry restructuring to eliminate 
collective action problems that cause inefficient and exploitative output 
reductions not likely to be subject to market correction.” (pp. 67-68) They suggest 
two avenues by which such government intervention may occur. One is to apply 
conventional antitrust principles to the relevant anticompetitive agreement – “the 
agreement among competing clubs to arrogate to themselves the control of the 
organization of the dominant competition in their sport.”(p. 69) The vertically-
integrated league structure “raises prices, lowers output, and renders output 
unresponsive to consumer demand.” (p. 69) Structural antitrust relief would 
involve the divestiture of the competition-organizing function of the league by the 
member teams. An alternative form of government intervention would be 
Congressional legislation: “… Congress may properly legislate to require 
divestiture under a clarifying amendment to the Sherman Act or via direct 
regulatory legislation, or to secure divestiture through the use of Congress’ 
eminent domain power by acquiring from the clubs the property rights necessary 
to create a business entity, The League, separate from clubs that participate in its 
competition.” (p. 68)   
 
Mandating a System of Promotion and Relegation. Although divestiture is the 
preferred option of some experts, they concede that the political will to implement 
such a system may be lacking and, as a result, second-best alternatives should be 
considered. One of those alternatives is to require that North American sports 
leagues adopt a system of promotion and delegation such as exists in Europe. In 
other words, the North American sports leagues should be required to convert 
from their current structure as ‘closed’ leagues into ‘open’ leagues. 
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  For example, Ross (2001) argues that the best legal argument to secure a 
court-ordered open-league structure “is to establish that the current agreement 
among club owners to operate their leagues with a closed structure is in itself an 
agreement that unreasonably restrains trade in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.” (p. 167) Competition is foreclosed by the agreement to operate a 
closed league. One reason is that “existing clubs have agreed to exclude potential 
rivals for stadium subsidies and other benefits now obtained through relocation.” 
(p. 167) Another reason is that, “because in an open-league structure all teams 
would compete each year against each other to remain in the major league, the 
decision to operate as a closed league constitutes an agreement to foreclose 
competition among existing clubs.” (p. 167) 
 There would be a number of legal obstacles to obtaining a court-imposed 
open league structure. One is baseball’s antitrust exemption. Another, possibly the 
league’s best argument against a court-imposed open league structure, is that 
“requiring an open-league structure is tantamount to compulsory access to their 
joint venture, and such access is often disfavored because of concerns that new 
entrants will free ride on the prior investment of the existing members of the 
venture, with consequent adverse effects on the incentive of firms to invest in the 
venture.” (p. 170) Ross finds this argument unpersuasive since (1) “the institution 
of open competition will lead to efficient output increases through increased 
investment” and thus the free rider defense would not be valid and (2) “to the 
extent that a portion of the prior investment by clubs in the major leagues can be 
considered as capital specific to membership in the league, a reasonable fee might 
be imposed upon clubs being promoted to the major league, to be paid out to 
those clubs being demoted (similar to capital fees paid by attorneys or accountants 
upon admission to and exit from partnership at their firms).” (p. 170) 
 Ross argues that sports leagues would likely choose to adopt an open 
league structure by “maintaining the existing league as the top-tier league and 
adding one or two junior leagues, the lowest tier featuring easy entry.” (p. 166) 
He would require that “a new entrant who makes skillful business and sport-
related decisions to be in a position to viably compete in the top-tier league within 
two years.” (p. 166) 
 Ross and Szymanski (2002) describe the system of promotion and 
relegation as “an ideal structure for surgical intervention to promote entry, since it 
involves replacing the least efficient incumbent (in terms of wins) with the most 
efficient entrant” and, yet, “entry is only conditional on continuing success, so 
that a relegated incumbent has an opportunity to recapture its position the 
following season.” (p. 629) They conclude that, “in the current controversy over 
baseball’s contraction, government-ordered promotion and relegation seems 
clearly preferable to either the continued monopolistic exploitation by owners or 
to some court-supervised freeze on franchises, mandatory relocations, or other 
highly regulatory approach.” (p. 629) 
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 Other Proposed Congressional Actions. A number of other proposals have been 
suggested, including enactment of legislation granting an antitrust exemption for sports 
league rules concerning franchise relocation and curbing the use of tax subsidies to lure 
or retain sports teams. 
 
Legislation Granting an Antitrust Exemption for Sports League Rules Regarding 
Franchise Relocation. A number of Congressional bills have been introduced to 
protect sports fans from the threat of their local team relocating. The bills sought 
to provide such protection by granting leagues an antitrust exemption for 
restrictions on franchise relocation. For example, on May 4, 1999, Senator Arlen 
Spector proposed the Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999 
(SFFRA), whose terms are explained by Oram (2000): 
 
The SFFRA would amend the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 to require 
MLB and the NFL to place 10% of their national broadcasting revenues 
into a trust fund to be used solely to finance stadium renovation and 
construction costs. Money from the trust fund would be available to pay 
for up to 50% of facility construction or renovation so long as local 
governments agree to provide at least one dollar of financing for every two 
dollars from the trust fund. If MLB or the NFL did not comply with these 
trust fund provisions, the leagues would lose their antitrust broadcasting 
exemption originally granted in the SBA. However, the bill would provide 
all four major professional sports leagues an antitrust exemption with 
regard to franchise relocation, allowing MLB, the NFL, the NBA and the 
NHL to deny a member team’s request to move to another city. (pp. 187-
88) 
 
 Oram adds: “Due to MLB’s broad antitrust exemption under the common 
law, MLB arguably already enjoys this statutory exemption.” (p. 188) Scibilia 
(1996) also argues that MLB’s antitrust exemption applies to franchise relocation 
decisions.  
Ross (1995) explains that legislative attempts to give the NFL an antitrust 
exemption with respect to franchise relocation decisions are misguided because 
they “will not solve the real problems of the exercise of the NFL’s monopoly 
power.” He gives five reasons why he opposes an antitrust exemption for league 
restrictions on franchise relocation: (1) “such an immunity does nothing to 
prevent cities, fans, and taxpayers from exploitation when the league works in 
concert with a team owner to threaten or actually relocate”; (2) “depending on the 
language of the legislation, such immunity could block what I believe is a 
potentially viable antitrust challenge to the current problems in the NFL”; (3) 
“such immunity would also improperly immunize the inefficient and 
anticompetitive vote by a minority of NFL owners to block a desirable relocation 
solely to protect an existing owner from competition”; (4) “such an immunity is 
not really necessary to enable the NFL to effectively prevent franchise free 
agency if it chose to do so”; and (5) “although on balance carefully drafted and 
narrow legislation might represent a slight improvement over the status quo, 
Senators representing states without NFL franchises (obviously including 
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 Senators Thompson and Heflin of this Committee) are likely to come under 
tremendous constituent pressure to strongly oppose such legislation.” 
Roberts (1995) agrees that an antitrust exemption for league restrictions on 
franchise relocation would not solve the problem caused by sports leagues’ 
monopoly power. However, Roberts endorses such an antitrust exemption as a 
second-best solution given the apparent political infeasibility of regulating sports 
leagues as natural monopolies or forcing them to divest. He explains: 
 
The ability of major league franchise owners to extract huge subsidies of 
various kinds from communities by auctioning their teams to the highest 
bidder demonstrates enormous market power in the sports franchise 
market. By restricting the supply of franchises well below the demand for 
them, team owners can reap classical monopoly profits – driving up the 
value of a commodity by restricting output and forcing consumers to bid 
up the price for the scarce item. But the only way to mitigate significantly 
the monopoly wealth transfers from community taxpayers to franchise 
owners (and in turn to the players who share in the owners’ largesse) 
would be to create structures that would increase the number of franchises 
available so almost every viable community could have one, and this 
could only be accomplished through radical measures like direct 
government regulation or forced breaking up of each league, ideas which 
are apparently not politically viable. 
 
Thus, if we must accept a fixed number of unregulated franchises in each 
sport, two things are inevitable. First, many communities that could 
support a franchise in a sport won’t have one (a “misallocation of society’s 
resources” effect). Second, in order to have a franchise, a community will 
be required to pay huge subsidies (a “monopoly wealth transfer” effect). 
So assuming a set number of teams, Congress’ ability to mitigate the 
effects of the leagues’ market power is quite limited. The question we are 
focusing on today is simply whether it is in the public’s interest for 
decisions affecting franchise location to be made by individual franchise 
owners or by the full league/joint venture partnership. I believe that in 
virtually every case, the answer is that such decisions are better made by 
the league, and thus an antitrust exemption from section 1 suits should be 
granted in these types of cases. 
 
Legislation Curbing the Use of Tax Subsidies to Lure or Retain Sports Teams. 
There have been a number of Congressional attempts to curb the use of tax 
subsidies to lure or retain sports teams. For example, Senator Moynihan 
introduced a bill that would have ended the federal tax exemption for bonds used 
to finance sports stadium construction or improvements. Bernstein (1998) notes: 
“Given the desperate desire of cities to keep and attract teams, the Moynihan bill 
could have the perverse incentive of making matters worse if cities simply issued 
taxable bonds instead.” (p. 53) Other proposals include (1) declaring bonds issued 
for sports stadium construction/improvements to be “private activity bonds” and 
thus force states into a tradeoff given that there is a limit on the amount of private 
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 activity bonds a state can have outstanding at a point in time and (2) requiring 
league revenue-sharing agreements to apply to public subsidies. Bernstein 
comments: “If Art Modell had stood to collect only one-thirtieth of the generous 
payment Maryland offered him to move the Browns, it is unlikely he would have 
left Cleveland.” (p. 54) 
Ross (1995) supports the curbing of tax subsidies to lure or retain 
franchises as a second-best solution: “Although restoring competition to 
professional football and allowing the marketplace to allocate franchises would be 
most consistent with general public policy, one legitimate congressional response 
to the immediate problem of franchise free agency would be to directly target the 
social harm caused by this process – the exploitation of taxpayers – by prohibiting 
special tax subsidies to lure or retain franchises from leaving a state.” He points 
out that the European Community has historically had such a prohibition. Given 
that Congress passed the legislation enabling the NFL and AFL to merge, it would 
be “entirely appropriate” for Congress “to insist that such a league not play one 
community against another through tax subsidies.” Ross adds: “If federalism 
concerns are perceived to prevent Congress from limiting the ability of states to 
use their spending or taxing authority in a way that Congress believes is inimical 
to interstate commerce, legislation could be drafted that would provide that, 
notwithstanding the 1966 merger legislation, the NFL would be subject to a 
monopolization challenge under §2 of the Sherman Act if it or its member teams 
accepted tax subsidies as a lure to remain or relocate a franchise.” 
Ross also supports a requirement that the NFL’s revenue-sharing system 
include public subsidies and stadium-related income (e.g., skybox revenues). He 
argues that, “by requiring teams to share all revenues from live gate, television, 
and souvenirs, but permit teams to keep for themselves all revenues from local tax 
subsidies, the NFL owners have illegally channelled their entrepreneurial 
competition away from making their games exciting and entertaining to fans and 
toward exploiting taxpayers.” 
 
 
Rejection of the Competitive Balance Defense in Rule-of-Reason Analyses. Sports 
leagues often defend their practices by arguing that the practices promote ‘competitive 
balance.’ As discussed throughout the preceding chapters, economic studies generally 
find, at best, mixed support for the leagues’ arguments. One possible reason is that it is 
difficult to capture quantitatively just what is meant by ‘competitive balance.’ An 
alternative explanation, however, is that the leagues are using ‘competitive balance’ 
arguments as a smokescreen to justify their anticompetitive practices. 
 Mehra and Zuercher (2006) argue that the competitive balance argument is based 
on three “imperfect” assumptions: (1) “there is and must be only one championship 
competition per sports league”, (2) “leagues can and will successfully engineer balance in 
that competition”, and (3) “fan interest is directly related to a championship.” (p. 1501) 
They contend that each of these assumptions is doubtful. They introduce the concept of 
“competing competitions.” 
Consider the Premier League for English football, which is wildly popular even 
though a handful of teams are dominant year after year. Despite the lack of competitive 
balance, fan interest is maintained by holding ‘within league’ competitions throughout 
the season. Lower quality teams must compete to avoid relegation to a lower league. 
-  - 320
 Moreover, there are two single-elimination tournaments involving Premier League and 
‘minor league’ teams held during the course of the season, so even if a team has a lousy 
record, it nevertheless might play a few great games in a row and win a tournament. 
Thus, in addition to an overall league champion, there are ‘champions’ of each 
tournament. There are also tournaments in which Premier League teams play against 
teams from other European countries. Mehra and Zuercher point to the Premier League as 
a counterexample to the three imperfect assumptions on which the competitive balance 
argument relies. 
Fantasy sports leagues are another prominent counterexample. Fans can create 
and ‘manage’ their own teams. Even if a fan’s ‘real’ team is terrible and has no chance of 
winning the league championship, his or her ‘fantasy’ team may win the fantasy league 
championship. Mehra and Zuercher point out that fantasy leagues are another form of 
‘within league’ competition. 
Given these counterexamples, Mehra and Zuercher contend that “a sports league 
can itself incorporate several different competing competitions among its constituent 
teams and thus maintain fan interest even in the absence of competitive balance in that 
league.” (p. 1501) They assert that “continued acceptance of the competitive balance 
argument may represent an aesthetic judgment about what an attractive sports league 
looks like, but does so unsupported by empirical study.” (p. 1501) Mehra and Zuercher 
conclude that, “in light of new experience and economic research, competitive balance 
should be thrown out of the ballgame.” (p. 1500) 
 
 
 Possible League Responses. Sports leagues have limited options in responding to 
government challenges to their monopoly power. They could lobby Congress to expand 
antitrust exemptions, as they have in the past. Although there may be some Congressional 
sentiment in favor of expanding leagues’ antitrust exemptions in some areas (i.e., 
franchise relocation), Congress is unlikely to grant a sweeping antitrust exemption to 
protect leagues from adverse court decisions in antitrust cases brought by the DOJ’s 
Antitrust Division or the FTC. Sports leagues could attempt to protect themselves from 
Section 1 cases by reorganizing into ‘single-entity’ leagues.  
  
Reorganization of the Major Sports Leagues Into Single-entity Structures. As 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, Major League Soccer, the Women’s National 
Basketball Association, and a number of other recently-formed sports leagues 
have been structured as single entities so as to receive an antitrust exemption – a 
single entity cannot engage in an antitrust conspiracy only with itself. Thus, the 
leagues would be protected from lawsuits alleging violations of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Leagues would still be vulnerable to lawsuits alleging Section 2 
violations. 
Mathias (1999) proposes that each of the major North American sports 
leagues convert to a single entity structure by forming a limited liability 
corporation that purchases all of the league’s franchises from their owners. The 
bought-out owners would become ‘investor-owners’ much as in Major League 
Soccer. The franchises would either be directly owned by the league or be wholly-
owned subsidiaries of the league. Of course, such a reorganization would require 
the consent of the owners, who may find the disadvantages of such a plan to 
outweigh the antitrust benefits. For example, owners may fear that such a 
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 reorganization would interfere with their ability to run their teams without 
interference from the league. Moreover, the reorganization may protect the league 
from Section 1 charges (this question would probably not be settled until decided 
by the U.S. Supreme Court), but would still leave the league open to Section 2 
charges. The players’ union also would likely oppose the reorganization, although 
it may not have the legal ability to prevent the league and its owners from 
deciding how the league will be organized.  
 
 
In closing, there is little dispute that sports leagues possess monopoly power. 
Obviously, sports are a form of entertainment and thus compete with other forms of 
leisure, but these are rather poor substitutes. Numerous proposals have been suggested to 
address sports leagues’ monopoly power, with the most radical being divestiture into 
three or more leagues, divestiture of the league’s competition-organizing services, and 
government regulation. It will be interesting to see if the federal antitrust authorities (i.e., 
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission) and/or the U.S. Congress decide that sports leagues’ monopoly power 
require their attention. 
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